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Abstract
Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism is mostly composed of fragments— sometimes 
in the form of lectures, sometimes as notes, and sometimes scribbled on the blank leaves 
of pamphlets. In his lectures from 1808 to 1819 on literature, Coleridge seldom adhered 
to the prospectus. In many cases they ended up as fragments. Critics are divided 
between those who insist that Coleridge’s criticism is distinguished by the consistency 
of its principles and methodology and those who insist on its fragmentariness.
The purpose of the thesis is to reveal the wholeness of a Shakespearean criticism 
that consists of fragments. Some critics such as Thomas MacFarland claim that 
fragmentation is the distinguishing condition of the Romantic era. According to him, a 
diasperactive form; that is, an actual incompleteness striving toward a hypothetical unity 
is common in the art of an era in which the fragment functions as the symbol for the 
whole. Lee Lust Brown argues that Coleridge hypothesised a textual whole which was 
both more than and prior to its parts and yet his own writing manifests a degree of literal 
fragmentation. He takes the fragment as a synecdoche of wholeness and claims that 
textual wholeness is not so much lost as deferred or displaced in the question of its 
possibility. Agreeing with these critics, I argue for the wholeness of Coleridge’s 
Shakespearean criticism. In so doing, first of all, I deal with the representative schools 
of Shakespearean criticism before or contemporary with Coleridge, those of his 
predecessors and of the German Idealists,' because these constitute the two main sources 
informing Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism. Considering that Coleridge’s
Shakespearean criticism is closely linked to his poetic principles, I try to define his 
poetic principles—the concept of nature, organicism, and imagination. I deal with 
Coleridge’s criticism of Shakespeare under three heads; Shakespeare as an artist, 
Shakespeare’s poetic works, and their appreciation.
In chapter one, in order to trace the background of Coleridge’s Shakespearean 
criticism, I discuss the two distinctive schools of Shakespearean criticism contemporary 
with Coleridge; i.e., the British school and the German school. After describing the 
general characteristics of the two schools, I focus on several leading exponents of each 
of the two kinds of criticism; for the British school, Samuel Jolmson, David Garrick, 
and the character critics such as Richardson and, for the German school, I focus on the 
Schlegel brothers.
In chapter two, I deal with the poetical principles that form the ground of Coleridge’s 
Shakespearean criticism; that is, the concept of nature, organicism and imagination. 
These unifying principles are themselves expounded by Coleridge in a series of 
fragments. The concept of nature forms the basis of his explanation not only of 
Shakespeare himself but of Shakespeare’s work. His notion of nature is closely related 
with his notion of art, organic unity, copy and imitation. I discuss these concepts by 
comparing them with similar concepts in his predecessors and in the Schlegel s. Another 
concept in Coleridge’s criticism is imagination. His concept of imagination is shown to 
differ not only from the empirical concept but also from the concept found in the 
German idealists.
In chapter three, I show how a unified ideal of Shakespeare can be drawn from the 
fragments. Just as Coleridge believed that it was possible to formulate a portrait of
Shakespeare as an artist from his writings, my focus is on the role of Shakespeare in 
giving substance to Coleridge’s concept of poetic genius, a concept that Coleridge 
arrives at by reconciling the notion of genius as it was formulated within the British 
empiricist tradition and by the German idealists.
In chapter four, I begin by tracing Coleridge’s insistence that Shakespeare’s drama is 
an instance, indeed the highest instance, of all art. Hence Coleridge insists on the 
relationship between the different instances of the aesthetic. I, then, turn to Coleridge’s 
representation of the plays as themselves constituting the supreme instance of organic 
form. In his discussion of Shakespeare’s plots Coleridge characteristically focuses on the 
begiiming scenes only. Hence, his discussion of the plays is fragmentary. But for 
Coleridge the beginning scenes are the seeds in which the principle determining the 
development of the whole play is fully contained. A similar organic principle underlies 
Coleridge’s treatment of the different element of drama; form, character, language, pun, 
and wit. Coleridge insists that none of these can be studied separately and that they have 
their being only in their interrelationship. I focus on the relationship between theoretical 
and practical criticism, indicating Coleridge’s distinctiveness by comparing his notion of 
form, characterisation, and language with those of other 18^ '’ centuiy critics.
In chapter five, I deal with Coleridge’s appreciation of Shakespeare’s work. This 
chapter focuses both on ways of seeing and reading Shakespeare. The starting point of 
my argument is the question of whether or not Coleridge is appropriately regarded as a 
closet critic. Most commentators have insisted on Coleridge’s preference for reading 
rather than seeing plays but his writing shows that he was interested in seeing plays and 
in theatrical illusion. His focus moved to reading plays partly because of his dislike of
performance but more importantly because of his dislike of current theatrical practices. 
Thus his theory of illusion applies equally to theatrical illusion and the reading 
experience. Coleridge establishes illusion as the product of the imaginations of both 
poet and audience working in co-operation. Finally, I discuss Coleridge’s idea of the 
perfect audience for Shakespeare’s plays, the audience that the plays imply.
In conclusion I offer a general view of Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism and 
indicate its crucial place in critical history.
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Introduction
Studies of Coleridge as critic have almost invariably remai'ked on his Shakespearean 
criticism. ^  But, considering its overall importance, exclusive studies of the Shakespeare 
criticism are not very substantial. After Hemy Nelson Coleridge edited Coleridge’s 
notes on Shakespeare in The Literary Remains(4 vols 1836-9), Sara Coleridge published 
Notes and Lectures on Shakespeare in 1849. Then, T.M. Raysor first assembled and 
organised scattered notes, lecture reports, and letters on Shakespeare into two volumes 
of Shakespearean Criticism{l9'N)\ revised 1960). In the introduction to this book.
' J.R.de J. Jackson, in his Method and Imagination in Coleridge’s Criticism. London; Routledge & K.Paul, 
1969, uses Coleridge’s analysis o f Hamlet in his explanation of Coleridge’s notion o f human faculties. 
Jackson also remarks Coleridge’s notion o f Shakespeare as his example of a poet who practises a Method 
to explain Coleridge’s concept o f Method. Appleyard, in Coleridge's Philosophy o f  Literature, 
Cambridge, Mas.: Harvard University Press, 1965, points out that Coleridge is among the first who saw 
aesthetic form in its historical context and demonstrates Coleridge’s explanation o f the difference between 
the plays o f Shakespeare and Sophocles. In explanation o f Coleridge’s organic unity, quite a few critics 
discuss Coleridge’s notion o f Shakespeare’s dramatic form. James Volant Baker in The Sacred River 
Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 1957, argues that Shakespeare is an example o f  
Coleridge’s theory o f the reconciliation o f opposite powers. Clarence D. Thorpe in “Coleridge As 
Aesthetician and Critic.” Journal o f  the Histoiy and Ideas 5(1944): 387-414, remarks that Shakespeare is 
Coleridge’s example o f the reconciliation between multitude and unity. Richard Harter Fogle in The idea  
o f  C oleridge’s Criticism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: California University Press; Cambridge University 
Press, 1962, also writes that Coleridge, in his treatment o f Shakespeare, pursues his method o f reconciling 
unity with multitude. Stephen Prickett in Coleridge and Wordsworth: The Poetry o f  Growth. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970, notes that Coleridge offers Shakespeare as a genius who realised 
organic theoiy Ronald C. Wendling in Coleridge’s Progress to Christianity. London: Bucknell University 
Press, 1995, explains that Coleridge’s notion o f “symbols and myths created by the imagination are the 
media where the universal and particular, the eternal and the temporal meet” and offers Shakespeare’s 
dramas as symbols and myths of secular literature. Paul Hamilton in Coleridge's Poetics. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983, exemplifies Coleridge’s idea o f Shakespeare in explaining his poetics. Critics such as 
Tim Fulford, Robert N. Essick, and James C. McKusick propose the language o f  Shakespeare’s dramas as 
the prime example o f Coleridge’s theory o f language. Fulford, for example, in Coleridge's Figurative 
Language. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991, insists that Coleridge’s greatness as a critic is demonstrated in 
his Lectures about Shakespeare’s language. McKusick, in Coleridge’s Philosophy o f  Language. New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, offers Shakespeare’s language as what Coleridge calls the ‘language 
o f nature’. Essick in “Coleridge and the Language o f Adam,” Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria: Test and 
Meaning. Ed. Frederic Burwick. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989. 62-74, argues that 
Coleridge finds the possibility o f recovering Adamic language in Shakespeare’s language.
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Raysor remarks that though Coleridge borrowed very largely from Schlegel and other 
critics, he had his own arguments and some are the products of his own superb genius. 
Raysor especially emphasizes Coleridge’s introspective psychology and his insight into 
human motives. Terence Hawkes edited Coleridge’s Writings on Shakespeare in 1959. 
In 1987 R.A.Foakes edited Lectures 1808-1819: On Literature in two volumes of which 
a large portion is devoted on Shakespeare. There he tried to arrange Coleridge’s lectures 
clii'onologically and tried to comiect his Shakespearean criticism with his other general 
criticism. In his Editor’s Introduction, Foakes describes the procedure of the lectures, 
the characteristics of the Shakespearean criticism, its similarities with and differences 
from his British predecessors, as well as Coleridge’s historical views, his method of 
criticism, and its value for the future. Two years later he also edited Coleridge’s 
Criticism o f  Shakespeare.
Other studies have been carried out in the form of books or periodical articles. 
Jonathan Bate, in Shakespeare and the English Romantic Imagination^ points out 
Coleridge’s achievement, originality, and contribution to Shakespearean criticism in 
terms of his synthesis of English and German sources. In The Romantics on 
Shakespeare^ he shows the political, and historical background to the Romantics’ 
studies of Shakespeare. For the Romantics, Bate argues, Shakespeare was ‘a vital 
resource with which the Romantics could register their own development from pro- 
French radicals to apologists for the English and the Middle classes.’ For Coleridge, 
Hamlet is a philosophical aristocrat, reflecting Coleridge’s view of himself. Similai'ly in
 ^ Bate, Jonathan. Shakespeare and the English Romantic Imagination. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. 
-^------. The Romantics on Shakespeare. London; Penguin, 1992.
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“The Politics of Romantic Shakespearean Criticism,”'^  Bate also searches for the 
political meaning of Shakespeare for the Romantics including Coleridge. According to 
him, behind the notion of organic and mechanical form is a hidden political agenda, 
equating organic form with Britain and Germany, and mechanical form with France.
Some critics claim Coleridge’s unique status among Shakespearean critics. Earl 
R.Wasserman, in “Shakespeare and the English Romantic Movement,”  ^ distinguishes 
between Shakespeare for the eighteenth-century critics, and for the Romantics including 
Coleridge. Jolm Beer in “Coleridge’s Originality As a Critic of Shakespeare,”  ^ tries to 
define the difference between Coleridge and Schlegel in terms of their concept of 
organic form. T.S.Eliot in “Shakespearean Criticism: From Dryden to Coleridge,”  ^
acknowledges Coleridge’s importance for modern Shakespearean Criticism. In 
“Coleridge on Shakespeare: Method Amid the Rhetoric,”  ^ Peter Hoheisel generally 
characterises Coleridge’s notion of Shakespeare’s drama as an embodiment of the ideal 
or a symbol of the ideal.
Some articles mainly deal with Coleridge’s character criticism. Roberta Morgan in 
“The Philosophic Basis of Coleridge’s Flamlet Criticism,”  ^ argues that Coleridge’s
'-------■ “The Politics o f Romantic Shakespeare: Germany, England, France.” European Romantic Review
1(1990): pp. 1-26.
 ^ Wasserman, Earl, R. “Shakespeare and the English Romantic Movement.” Ed. Herbert M. Schueller, The 
Persistence o f  Shakespeare Idolatry: Essays in Honour o f  Robert W. Babcock. Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1964.
 ^ Beer, John. “Coleridge’s Originality as a Critic o f Shakespeare.” Studies in the Literary Imagination 
19(1986):51-69.
’ Eliot, T.S. “Shakespearean Criticism: From Dryden to Coleridge.” Eds. Harley Granville-Barker and 
G.B.Harrison. A Companion to Shakespeare Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949.287- 
299.
 ^Hoheisel, Peter. “Coleridge on Shakespeare: Method Amid the Rhetoric.” SIR 13(1974): 15-23.
Morgan, Roberta. “The Philosophic Basis o f  Coleridge’s Hamlet Criticism.” £Z //(1939):256-270.
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criticism of Hamlet is based on association psychology. In “A Note on Coleridge,” *^  
Alice D Snyder also discusses Coleridge’s debt to psychology in his character analysis. 
David Ellis and Howard Mills disagree with the largely accepted argument that 
Coleridge ‘Romanticised Hamlet’. In “Coleridge’s Hamlet; The Notes versus the 
Lectures,”* ' they assume Coleridge as character critic, but argue that Coleridge’s interest 
is in Hamlet’s whole character related to the play. In their opinion, Coleridge was not 
concerned with ‘Hamlet’s thinking too much’ but with the more fundamental problem 
of perception. A balance between the real and the imaginary is a moral necessity for 
Coleridge.
Another approach concerns Coleridge’s theoiy of illusion. R.A.Foakes, in “Forms to 
His Conceit’; Shakespeare and the Uses of Stage Illusion,”*^  explains Coleridge’s notion 
of illusion, linking to it his theory of imitation. J.R.de J.Jackson similarly attacks the 
argument that Coleridge was a closet critic, and relates Coleridge’s theory of imitation 
and stage illusion in his “Coleridge on Dramatic Illusion and Spectacle in the 
Performance of Shakespeare’s Plays’’*^ . In Illusion and the Drama^‘^, Frederick Burwick 
distinguishes between Coleridge’s and Schlegel’s notions of illusion. Whereas Schlegel 
is mainly concerned with illusion thematically, Coleridge is interested in the mechanism 
of illusion itself, and related it to his theoiy of imitation.
Snyder, Alice D. “A Note on Coleridge’s Shakespeare Criticism.” MLY(1923): 23-31.
‘ ' Ellis, David; Mills, Howard. “Coleridge’s Hamlet; The Notes versus the Lectures.” Essays in Criticism  
29(1979): 244-53.
'“Foakes, R.A. “’Forms to His Conceit’: Shakespeare and the Uses o f Stage Illusion.” Proceedings o f  the 
British Academy 66(1980): 103-119.
Jackson, J.R.de J., “Coleridge on Dramatic illusion and Spectacle in the Performance o f Shakespeare’s 
Plays.” Modern Philology 62(1964): 13-21.
Burwick, Frederick. Illusion and the Drama: Critical Theoiy o f  the Enlightenment and Romantic Era. 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1991.
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In his Coleridge: Critic o f Shakespeare^^, M.M.Badawi attempts to study the critical 
methods and assumptions of Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism and to reveal his 
contribution to Shakespearean criticism in England. First, Badawi highlights problems 
in English Shakespearean criticism before Coleridge such as the concept of nature as a 
sense of wildness and irregularity, the concept of imagination defined by sensationalist 
psychology, attention to the psychological element in aesthetic experience, seeking 
motives in charaeters, character studies on the assumption that characters are human 
beings, and the attempt to find morality in Shakespeare’s works, the location of beauties 
and faults in Shakespeare’s works, etc. Then he discusses the relation between 
Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism and his poetic theory; i.e., the pleasure principle, 
the theory of imagination, the end of poetic drama, and poetic faith and dramatic 
illusion. In Section III, “Form and meaning”, in Section IV, “Character and psychology”, 
and in Section V, “Character and morality”, Badawi tries to show Coleridge’s difference 
from the eighteenth-century critics. In Section VI, “Shakespeare’s poetiy,” he deals with 
language, words and meaning, imageiy metaphor, puns, and versification. To some 
extent, Badawi’s study is successful especially in unfolding the subtleties and 
elaboration of Coleridge’s character analysis as distinguished from that of the 
eighteenth-centuiy critics. But there is no clear explanation of the basis of Coleridge’s 
method and the assumptions of his Shakespearean criticism. And Badawi does not link 
Coleridge’s poetic theoiy to his practical criticism.
My main concern in this thesis is, like other critics, to reveal Coleridge’s unique 
position as a critic of Shakespeare. In doing so, I begin from the problem of the
Badawi, Muhammad M. Coleridge: Critic o f  Shakespeare. New York and London: Cambridge
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fragmentariness of his criticism. As Thomas McFarland points out, “Coleridge’s most 
pregnant, vital, and idiosyncratic work is to be found in his pure fragments: in the 
haphazard entries of his notebooks, and in the immediacies of marginal notations in 
books he was reading.”**’
As R.A.Foakes points out in his edition of the Lectures on Literature, they were not 
very well organised. As Henry Crabb Robinson complained, there were often 
irrelevancies and digressions.*^ “The records of the lectures”, Foakes puts it.
are never better than incomplete, and are frequently sketchy. Coleridge’s annotations 
in the editions of Shakespeare he used may include a few pages written out at the 
beginning of a play to provide an introduction, but for the rest consist usually of 
jottings and brief comments intended for development in the lecture-room.*^
Here, we can discuss whether the fragmentai'iness of his lectures and notes on 
Shakespeare was the result of his lack of will, illness, procrastination or simply of the 
literary Zeitgeist.
Such critics as Anne Janowitz question whether Coleridge’s fragmentaiy poems 
belong to a genre that should be recognized as the dominant mode of romanticism or 
whether the fragmentariness is simply a kind of excuse. According to Janowitz, 
Coleridge “finds in the notion of the fragment a useRil vehicle by means of which to 
defend his poems from censure and give them status as part of an identifiable, not
University Press. 1973.
McFarland, Thomas. Romanticism and the Forms o f  Ruin: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Modalities o f  
Fragmentation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, p.22.
See Lect I, p.283.
Foakes, R.A. Coleridge’s Criticism o f  Shakespeare. London: The Athlone Press, 1989, p .l4 . Also see, 
Lect I, p.xl
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universal, poetic geni'e.”'^
Unlike Janowitz, Elizabeth Wanning Harries in The Unfinished Manner categorises 
Coleridge’s poems published in Sibylline Leaves{\?>\6) as fragmentary poems following 
the tradition of the Vergilian Sibylline leaves, which is a metaphor for a collection of 
various and fragmented pieces. Harries researches the ruin form as deliberate partial 
creation in the later eighteenth century which ranged in its expression from poetry to 
novels, essays, sermons, and artificial ruins. Though Harris distinguishes the romantic 
fragmentary form from the ruin form in the late eighteenth century, she strongly insists 
on the connection between the two forms; that is, the romantic fragmentary form 
depends on the ‘fragmentary procedures and justification’ which developed in the later 
eighteenth century. In this context, Coleridge’s fragmentaiy form, according to her, was 
influenced by Sterne. Harris notes, “The extent of Coleridge’s debt to Sterne seems to 
me astonishing, particularly though not only in chapter 13” *^^ of Biographia Literaria.
Such critics as Thomas McFarland, Philip Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Lee Rust Brown, John Beer, and Stephen Prickett offer the fragment as a prevalent 
mode of romanticism. McFarland in Romanticism and the Forms o f Ruin discusses the 
problem of the gap between Romantics’ organic ideals and the fragmentary nature of 
what they actually experienced, and he tries to interpret the fragment as the part which 
symbolically implies the whole. According to him, the conception of reconciled 
opposites is an attempt to overcome this ruptured awareness of existence and 
“Coleridge’s own polar schematisms are, typically for him, but also generically for a
Janowitz, Anne. “Coleridge’s 1816 Volume: Fragment as Rubric.” SIR 24(1985): 21-39, p.22.
Harris, Elizabeth Wanning. The Unfinished Manner: Essays on the Fragment in the Later Eighteenth 
Century. Charlottesville and London: University Press o f Virginia, 1994, p. 155.
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wider definition of Romantic activity, almost invariably inconclusive or fragmentary.” *^ 
Stephen Prickett proposes romanticism, especially German Romanticism as self­
consciously revolutionary both in form and in content and claims that its manifesto was 
presented in the form of fragments, at once isolated and all-embracing.^^ John Beer in 
“Fragmentations and Ironies” relates the circumstances of the romantic era to the form 
of the fragment, i.e., a fractured society, the gap between the Romantics’ religious and 
political thought and reality.
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy define the fragment as the romantic g e n i e . T h e y  
propose that the fragment as a genie should not be confused with ‘the detached piece 
pure and simple’, with ‘the residue of a broken ensemble’, or with an ‘erratic block’. For 
them, the fragment is not only philosophical. The philosophical fragment, according to 
them, takes on the value of a ruin which functions as a monument and an evocation of 
something beyond itself. However, “what is thereby both remembered as lost and 
presented in a sort of sketch (or blue print) is always the living unity of a great 
individuality, author, or work.” The literary fragment, unlike a pure piece, or any of the 
genre terms employed by the moralists such as sentence, maxim, opinion, and anecdote, 
implies incompletion. They explain the relation of fragment to the whole thus:
Fragmentary totality, in keeping with what should be called the logic of the 
hedgehog, cannot be situated in any single point: it is simultaneously in the whole 
and in each part. Each fragment stands for itself and for that from which it is 
detached. Totality is the fragment itself in its completed individuality. It is thus
McFarland. Romanticism and the Forms o f  Ruin., p.339.
Prickett, Stephen. “Coleridge, Schlegel and Schleiermacher: England, Germany (and Australia) in 
1798.” 1798: The Year o f  the Lyrical Ballads. Ed. Richard Cronin. London: Macmillan Press, 1998. 170- 
184, p. 174.
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe and Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Literary Absolute: The Theoiy o f  Literature in 
German Romanticism. Tr. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester. Albany: State University o f New York Press, 
1988, p.40.
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identically the plural totality of fragments, which does not make up a whole (in, say, 
a mathematical mode) but replicates the whole, the fragmentary itself, in each 
fragment/'*
According to Lee Rust Brown, “Coleridge, following German theories, hypothesized 
a textual whole which was both “more than” and “prior to” its parts; and yet Coleridge’s 
own writing, both poetry and prose, manifests a degree of literal brokenness 
proportionate to the severely difficult status of his ideal of wholeness.”^^  Brown argues 
that, for Coleridge, a unified text was a promise which could never be fulfilled and that 
“the prose fragments ask to be read in light of their fractured relationship to an absent 
unified text: their own brokenness substitutes, apologetically, for the wholeness they 
s i g n i f y . B r o w n  proposes the problem of the reader’s reading of fragments. 
“Coleridge’s prose fragments,” according to him.
engage readers to view the text at hand with an eye on the prospect of a wholeness 
which is also a text, but which is not present for reading. Part of what we, as 
readers, have inherited from romanticism is a willingness to trade our demand to 
“comprehend” a text for a certain latitude in the register of “speculation”: we look 
for something more and other than what we find on the page, something more and 
other than we have found, so far, on any page.^^
Coleridge in chapter 13 of Biographia Literaria remarks on the character of his 
own writing. The letter which Coleridge insists came from a friend is in fact known to 
be written by himself^^:
Ibid., p.44.
Brown, Lee Rust. “Coleridge and the Prospect o f the Whole.” SIR 30(1991): 235-253, p.237. 
Ibid., p.243.
Ibid., p.245.
See BLI,n3.
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. ..I  see clearly you have done so much, and yet not enough. You have been obliged 
to omit so many links, from the necessity o f  compression, that M>hat remains, looks 
( i f !  may recur to my former illustration) like the fragments o f the winding steps o f  
an old ruined tower.{BL I, 302-3)
In studying Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism, my concern lies in finding the 
wholeness in the fragments as Brown suggests. Following the notion of taking the 
fragment as the defining romantic gem*e, I would like to display wholeness in the 
fragmentary pieces of Coleridge’s criticism. As Harris suggests, fragmentary writing in 
the Romantic era is a genre which succeeds the tradition of the ruin form. But whether it 
is deliberately planned or unplanned is obscure. As McFarland and other critics argue, 
the fragment is a unique romantic mode of writing which inevitably results from the 
disparity between vision and articulation. Coleridge, for instance, in analysing 
Shakespeare’s form as the example of an organic unity, might have felt a disparity 
between his idea and its articulation.
In Chapter one, the notion of wholeness in fragments may be understood as John 
Livingston Lowes does in The Road to Xanadu. Here, Lowes makes the point that the 
“essential virtue of poetry is resident, not in its matter, but in the power that moulds 
brute m a t t e r . L o w e s  in this book tries to display how fragments are picked up and 
metamorphosed into immortal shape in Coleridge’s poems. In Coleridge’s 
Shakespearean Criticism, as in his poems, various materials are picked up and are 
metamorphosed into a shape that is Coleridge’s own. Therefore, if we define Coleridge’s 
Shakespearean criticism as fragmentary, the fragments themselves are shaped by 
bringing together numerous fragments.
Lowes, John Livingston. The Road to Xanadu: A Study in the Ways o f  the Imagination. Boston:
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Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy emphasise individuality and dynamics in each 
fragment. “Just as the fragment of Antiquity manifests the essential originality, of the 
ancient work,” they write,
The modern fragment “characterizes” this originality, and thereby sketches out the 
“project” of the future work whose individuality will dialectically reunite and 
sublate (art aside, we are very close to Hegel) the thinking, living, and 
vjoûdr\g[oeuvrant\ dialogue of ancient and modern fragments.^**
In chapter one, I attempt to survey the sources of Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism, 
largely British and German ones, to see how Coleridge ‘dialectically reunites and 
sublates’ the sources for his own criticism. Unlike Badawi’s section one, “Shakespeare 
before Coleridge,” I focus on the particularités of several representative individuals or 
groups both in Britain and Germany such as Samuel Jolmson, David Garrick, the 
character critics, and the Schlegel brothers.
In adumbrating the wholeness of Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism, I make 
Coleridge’s concept of nature the central idea of his Shakespearean criticism. In chapter 
two, my main concern lies in relating the Coleridgean notion of nature to his poetic 
principles. In The Friend, Coleridge distinguishes natura naturans from natura 
naturata, taking the former as his ideal. His reinterpretation of natura naturans is, 
however, quite different from the notion of nature in the eighteenth-eentuiy 
Shakespearean critics, which may render him unique in Shakespearean criticism. His 
concept of nature is directly related to his poetic principles; that it, his concept of art, the 
reconciliation of opposites, organic unity, and imagination. In describing his poetic
Houghten Mifflin Company, 1927, p. 101.
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy. The Literary Absolute, p.47.
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principles, I also attempt to display his originality.
Ill chapter three, I attempt to portray Shakespeare as an artist. In this chapter, I 
relate Coleridge’s concept of nature to his idea of Shakespeare. Though Coleridge 
conventionally describes Shakespeare as ‘a poet of nature’, the meaning is quite 
different from what was generally accepted in the eighteenth century. I would aim to 
describe in what way it is different and how his concept of nature could be related to his 
idea of Shakespeare as a poet of genius, Spinozistic deity or Proteus, a poet of method, a 
poet and prophet, and a poet of his age and of no age.
In chapter four, I deal with Coleridge’s idea of Shakespeare’s artistic works. 
Starting with Coleridge’s general view of Shakespeare’s works I will examine his 
comparison of them with painting and certain kinds of music. Then, applying 
Coleridge’s principle that artistic work is analogous to nature in Shakespeare’s works, I 
try to demonstrate Coleridge’s method of analysing Shakespeare’s work as an organic 
unity.
Finally, in chapter five, my concern lies in Coleridge’s interest in the reception of 
Shakespeare. My argument begins with whether the description of Coleridge as a ‘closet 
critic’ is appropriate or not. My intention is to reveal that he is not anti-theatrical. His 
concern with illusion is important evidence in support of this argument. Coleridge’s 
theory of illusion is one of the most remarkable aspects of his Shakespearean criticism. 
To demonstrate its uniqueness, I examine his comparison of illusion with dreams and 
with his theoiy of imitation and copy. Finally, I focus on his interest in the audience and 
the relationship between author, work, and audience, which is also based on his concept 
of nature.
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Chapter 1. The Reconciliation of British and German Sources
Coleridge’s status as a critic seems even more assured than his reputation as a poet. 
Clarence D. Thorpe’s evaluation of Coleridge as an aesthetician and critic is typical:
He was first of all a master of synthesis, whose eager, searching mind reached out in 
every direction for every manner of knowledge and idea, examining, trying out, 
accepting, rejecting, and finally assimilating that which he found both true to logic 
and to his own experience and adaptable to the system he eventually evolved. The 
key words to his achievement are Catholicism, reconciliation, and integration. *
Herbert Read claims that Coleridge was responsible for a revolution in critical method:
The distinction of Coleridge, which puts him head and shoulders above every other 
English critic, is due to his introduction of a philosophical method of criticism. 
English criticism before his time, in the hands of a Dryden, a Warton, or a Johnson, 
had been a criticism of technique, of craftsmanship—  sometimes presupposing 
some general rules, such as that of dramatic unity, but oftener a merely mechanical, 
but at best an individualistic and arbitrary activity, resulting in such perversities, or 
rather inadequacies, as Johnson’s remarks on Shakespeare. Coleridge changed all 
that.^
This opinion might be disputed and, in fact, such critics as Norman Fruman and Joseph 
Warren Beach have dismissed Coleridge’s criticism as a kind of accumulation of 
plagiarism. Beach insists that “ we are in a position today to outline the pictui'e of a 
rather minor prophet furtively stuffing his shirt with other men’s wisdom and giving 
himself the airs of an Aquinas or an Aristotle.”  ^ Norman Fruman also argues that 
Coleridge is overvalued. In his Coleridge, The Damaged Archangel, he tries to reveal
‘ Thorpe, Clarence D. “Coleridge As Aesthetician and Critic.” Journal o f  the History and Ideas 5(1944): 
387-414, p.389.
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the ‘true’ face of Coleridge. He says of, for instance, Biographia Literaria that “ Many 
historically significant studies of the subject have quoted only sparingly from German 
sources, sometimes without stooping to provide translations; others have consistently 
directed English readers to obscure German texts where, presumably, relevant 
comparisons with Coleridge might be made.”'^  He attacks Coleridge for the “deliberate 
plagiarism and obscurantism” in his Shakespearean criticism.^ McFarland has said of 
Fruman’s study that the work
was a dedicated attack on Coleridge’s reputation from almost every possible 
vantage point, and it received much attention in the press. For a while one would 
hear from lawyers and stockbrokers at cocktail parties that it was a shame that 
Coleridge studies had been destroyed by Fruman’s attack. What actually happened, 
however, was entirely predictable to one who understood the dynamics of 
canonicity; after the initial fluny, Fruman’s book was simply incorporated into the 
body of Coleridge interpretation, where it now generates occasions for still further 
publication by way of confirmation or rebuttal, and the Coleridge snowball, actually 
augmented by the addition, rolls downward ever more massively.*’
Emerson R. Marks similarly notes that Fruman
would both deflate the author himself and precipitate a revision of a major literary 
epoch. But these confident expectations have foundered on the solid worth of 
Coleridge’s achievement, indefeasible even after due subtraction of whatever is not 
his own. Almost two decades later his fame, resistant alike to well-founded 
reservation and sensationalist detraction, continues undiminished.^
 ^Read, Herbert. “Coleridge as Critic.” Sewanee Review 56(1948): 597-624, p.606.
 ^Beach, J.W. “Coleridge’s Borrowing horn the German.” 9(1942): 36-58, p.37.
* Fruman, Norman. Coleridge, the Damaged Archangel. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971, 
p.xviii.
 ^ See Ibid., p. 142. He insists that without the aid o f Schlegei’s Vorlesungen, the corpus o f Coleridge’s 
Shakespearean criticism would be markedly different.
*’ McFarland, Thomas. “ A Coleridgean Criticism of the Work o f M.H. Abrams.” High Romantic 
Argument: Essays fo r M.H.Abrams. Ed. Lawrence Lipking, Ithaca and London, 1981. 106-127, p .120.
 ^Marks, Emerson R. “Perverse and Inspired Genius.” The American Scholar 57(1988):291-305, p.300.
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Coleridge, as a critic, especially as a critic of Shakespeare has maintained his 
reputation. R.A. Foakes argues that “ In spite of its limitations and fragmentary nature, 
Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism again and again reveals the style of a great critic, 
the power of summing up a particular insight in a memorable way, so that his 
formulation remains a challenge to later critics.”  ^Kathleen Coburn celebrates Coleridge 
similarly:
Controversy has sometimes raged over his criticism of Shakespeare, but 
somehow it survives all his commentators, not only undimmed by time but growing 
in its twentieth-centuiy development as we begin to catch up with his meaning. 
Shakespeare, Coleridge held, could not be adequately judged and understood by a 
priori canons of criticism. His plays have the single unity of the operation of an 
idea, of forces in conflict, of character or of some other inexorable process of 
human situations. Their unity is not mechanical, and does not depend on the 
externals, say of a physical place or one short span of time appropriate to the 
Greeks or the French theatre. The unity of a Shakespeare play lies elsewhere. 
Enriched by and not sacrificed to its diversity, its unity lies in the imaginative vision 
behind it and in the mind of the perceptive spectator, a concept so obvious to us that 
we forget that it was Coleridge who made it so.^
How could Coleridge achieve such a unique position in Shakespearean criticim? 
Among his other achievements, what is most frequently pointed out is his contribution 
to the reconciliation of English Empiricism and German Idealism. “Coleridge’s 
achievement,” according to Jonathan Bate,
was to combine English empiricism with German systematic rigour, to follow the 
tradition both of an eighteenth-century critic such as Morgarm who began to pay 
detailed attention to Shakespeare’s charcters and of the Germans, A.W.Schlegel 
especially, who placed Shakespeare at the centre of a theory of art.‘®
Foakes, R.A. Coleridge’s Criticism o f  Shakespeare, p. 15.
 ^Coburn, Kathleen. “Coleridge : A Bridge between Science and Poetry.” Coleridge’s Variety. Ed. John 
Beer. 81-100, p.97.
Bate, Jonathan. Shakespeare and the English Romantic Imagination, p. 12.
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Raysor also says that Coleridge “drew from the thought of predecessors in the 
eighteenth century; and from a foreign source,— from the writers of Germany in the 
great age of German literature—he gathered ideas which gave philosophical scope and 
dignity to his criticism”" The merit of Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism, according 
to James Baker, is in “the original amalgam that Coleridge made, the very excellent job 
of smelting and welding the best elements of older theories into one.” '  ^ Certainly, 
Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism was not produced in a vacuum, or merely as a 
personal preference, unrelated to contemporary ciucumstances. Rather, it reflects 
various kinds of arguments about Shakespeare during the period from the later 
eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century.
In Shakespearean criticism, Samuel Johnson tried to free himself from the fetters of 
rigid ‘neo-classical’ rules. Character critics such as Richardson and Morgann reflect the 
aesthetically changing atmosphere of this period. In Shakespearean performance, David 
Ganick was a key figure. We might not be able to say that Coleridge was directly 
influenced by all of them. But it would not be too much to say that they provided a 
momentum for Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism.
Another crucial factor which contributed to his achievement is German criticism. 
Coleridge’s indebtedness to A.W.Schlegel has especially been the subject of a heated 
controversy: some blame Coleridge for his plagiarism and some plead in his favour.
In this chapter, I will deal with the various elements Coleridge adapted to establish 
his own Shakespearean criticism.
“ Raysor, T.M. C oleridge’s Shakespearean Criticism. London: Constable, 1930; rev. edn, London: Dent, 
I960, p.xvii.
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1. The British Comiectioii
1 • i The change of Aesthetic Orientation in the Latter Part of the Eighteenth Century
Some critics try to see Coleridge as the middle point in which two distinguished 
streams are united. One is the stream of the British tradition, which Coleridge is often 
seen as continuing rather than breaking. Wasserman, for example, tries to emphasise his 
continuity with earlier British criticism. In his opinion,
The whole current of eighteenth-centuiy criticism had been in the direction of 
exposing and acclaiming the supreme greatness of Shakespeare’s plays-as art, as 
drama, as psychology, as morality, as truth; and this was to be continued, usually 
with greater sophistication, by Coleridge, Hazlitt, Lamb, and others.
According to David Nichol Smith, the third quarter of the eighteenth century is the true 
period of transition in Shakespeare criticism .G eorge Winchester Stone, Jr. also argues 
that in this period a change in critical focus took place:
...Shakespearean criticism underwent a change from 1700 to 1800 from the early 
judicial standpoint, which measured the dramatist by standards of “rules,” which, 
though finding him a genius, found him deficient in learning, correctness, decorum, 
and especially in the unity of action or plot, to a later appreciative attitude which 
abandoned such standai'ds by erecting a new dramatic focus centered upon character 
delineation rather than upon plot structure—  a focus which, in treating 
Shakespeare’s characters as living things acting on varied motives, emphasized that 
he not only chronicled the stage of all life, but was also the profoundest of moral
Baker, James Volant. The Sacred River, p.281.
Wasserman, Earl R. “Shakespeare and the English Romantic Movement.” p.80.
Smith, D.N. Eighteenth Century Essays on Shakespeare. Glasgow: James MacLehose, 1903, p.xxxii.
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philosophers. The critical years for this shift were the middle tliree decades of the 
century."
Several facts contributed to produce this “shift”. British Empiricism was one of the very 
important factors which changed the aesthetic orientation of this era. “The general 
movement of eighteenth-century aesthetics,” according to Thorpe
was in the direction of empirical considerations having to do with the relations of art 
to the mind in creative and responsive processes. Coleridge was, however, more 
decisive in this approach than any one before him. His system of critical thought 
was built upon it, and he would grant validity to aesthetic principles only so far as 
they could be demonstrated as true tlirough reference to the laws of the human 
m ind."
In Britain, a new aesthetics based on human psychology paved the way for a new 
criticism. Philosophers such as Hobbes, Hume, and Hartley were the main contributors 
to the new aesthetics. For Hobbes, the origin of thought is sense. “The cause of sense,” 
according to him,
is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either 
immediately, as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and 
smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and 
membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a 
resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, which 
endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, 
or fancy, is that which men call sense-, and consisteth, as to the eye. In a light, or 
colour figured-, to the ear, in a sound-, to the nostril, in an odour, to the tongue and 
palate, in a savour, and to the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and 
such other qualities as we discern by feeling}^
" Stone, G.W.jr. “David Garrick’s Significance in the History o f Shakespeare Criticism.” PMLA 
65(1950); 183-197, p. 189.
Thorpe, “Coleridge As Aesthetician and Critic.”, p.392.
Hobbes, Thomas. The English Works o f  Thomas Hobbes.Vo\.3. Ed. William Mo les worth , London: 
John Bohn, 1839, pp. 1-2.
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For Hobbes, after an object(s) is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the 
thing seen, and it is this that we call imagination. Therefore, imagination is, in his 
words, nothing but ‘decaying sense’. Hobbes explains all human mental faculties in 
terms of his theory of sense. In explaining passion, he argues that passions are the 
mainspring of human activity." The beginnings of motion, within the body of man, 
before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, according to 
Flobbes, are commonly called endeavour." From the word ‘endeavour,’ he explains 
various kinds of human passion such as love, hate, contempt, good, evil, delightful, 
profitable, unpleasant, offence, displeasure, joy, pain, etc. Thorpe evaluates Hobbes’s 
contributions to aesthetics as follows;
Hobbes did much to make the emotions respectable; he also helped to make them 
understood....
Hobbes’s approbation of novelty is rooted in his developed conception of the 
natural craving of human spirit for an extension of experience. “Knowing much” is 
the basis for novelty, because the wiiter whose wide observation and ranging 
curiosity has earned him beyond the ordinary reaches can open to the minds of his 
readers previously undiscerned vistas. He has discovered relationships before 
unperceived, has seen more, has seen more clearly and deeply than others; he is 
therefore able to express similitudes which are fresh and new and which strike with 
pleasant suiprise, with a sense of strangeness, and with a delightful satisfaction in a 
perception of added knowledge. This is essentially a romantic principle_.Hobbes 
was not the first to recognize the principle, but he was the first of the moderns to 
give it a full and rational exposition. It is not strange, therefore, that his statement 
made strong appeal to succeeding critics who had an eye to fundamentals.^^
18 See Thorpe, Clarence Dewitt, The Aesthetic theory o f  Thomas Hobbes. Ann Arbor: The University o f
Michigan Press, 1940, p.289.
Hobbes, The English Works o f  Thomas Hobbes. Vol. 3.,p.39.
Thorpe. The Aesthetic Theory o f  Thomas Hobbes., pp.289-290. Also see Baker, James Volant. The 
Sacred River, p.46. According to Baker, “Hobbes, in spite o f his mechanical theory, makes the mind 
creative and uses association o f ideas as an aid to creativity. Association provides the cohesion in the 
storehouse o f memory.”
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David Hume divides the perceptions of the human mind into two distinct kinds, i.e., 
impressions and ideas. In his thought, “ all our simple ideas in their first appearance 
are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and \\>hich they 
exactly representC^^ He divides impressions into two kinds, those of sensations and 
those of reflexion. He explains the relations between the two kinds of impressions and 
ideas in this way:
An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, 
thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a 
copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression eeases; and this we call 
an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the 
new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be 
called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These again are copied by 
the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give 
rise to other impressions and ideas.
For him, memory and imagination are not always easy to distinguish from each other. 
Both memory and imagination boiTOW their simple ideas from the impressions, and 
never go beyond these original perceptions. However, whereas memory keeps the 
original order and position of its ideas, imagination transposes and changes them as it 
likes.^^ Imagination is also the means by which simple ideas are changed into complex 
ones. Hume explains forming complex idea from simple ones thus:
As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united 
again in what form it pleases, nothing wou’d be more unaccountable than the 
operations of that faculty, were it not guided by some universal principles, which 
render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places. Were ideas 
entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou’d join them; and Tis impossible 
the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly
21 Hume, David. A Treatise o f  Human Nature, in The Philosophical Works o f  D avid Hume. Vol. 1. Eds.
T.H.Green, and T.H.Grose. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1874, p.314. 
Ibid., p.317.
Ibid., pp.386-387.
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do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which 
one idea naturally introduces another.
For him the associating qualities are ‘resemblance’, ‘contiguity’, and ‘cause and effect’ 
and the faculty which notices these qualities is imagination. In Hume, another important 
point in forming ideas is that
’tis certain that we form the idea of individuals, whenever we use any general term; 
that we seldom or never can exhaust these individuals; and that those, which 
remain, are only represented by means of that habit, by which we recal them, 
whenever any present occasion requires it. This then is the nature of our abstract 
ideas and general terms; and ’tis after this manner we account for the foregoing 
paradox, that some ideas are particular in their nature, but general in their 
representation?^
In explaining the individuality of each idea, Hume emphasises the subjectivity of the 
perceiver.
David Hartley also holds to the view that ideas come from sense and that complex 
ideas are formed out of simple ideas by means of association. First, external objects 
impress vibratory motions upon the white medullary substance of the nerves and brain. 
By impressions gained from this first procedure, we get sensations. Sensations, 
according to him, are internal feelings of the mind, which arise from the impressions 
made by external objects upon the several parts of our bodies. He calls other internal 
feelings ideas, and ideas which resemble sensations, ideas of sensation. He terms ideas 
of sensation simple, and intellectual ideas complex. The simple ideas of sensation run
Ibid., p.319.
Ibid., p.330.
See Hartley,
Printed by R.Cruttwell, 1810, p. 12.
 David. Observations on Man: Itis frame, his duty and his expectations. V ol.l. Bath:
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into clusters and combinations by association, and these coalesce into one complex idea, 
by the approach and commixture of the several compounding parts.^^
Hartley also suggests the difference of ideas between people according to their 
particular circumstances. “As persons who speak the same language have,” he says,
a different use and extent of words, so though mankind, in all ages and nations, 
agree, in general, in their complex and decomplex ideas, yet there are many 
particular differences in them; and these differences are greater or less, according to 
the difference, or resemblance, in age, constitution, education, profession, country, 
age of the world, &c. i.e. in their impressions and associations.^^
This kind of view is reflected in the aesthetics of the time in terms of the concept of 
human nature, the importance of feeling, and of subjectivity.^^ As to the focus on the 
subjectivity of mind, as W.J.Bate points out.
by encouraging aesthetics to take the subjective activity of the mind as the starting 
point of any investigation, British associationism opened the door even more widely 
for an inevitable individualistic relativism. In doing so, it substantiated a tendency 
which was to be even more characteristic of the romantic thought of the following 
century: a tendency to emphasize the fundamental importance of individual feeling 
or sentiment.^*^
Ibid., p.77.
Ibid., p.80.
See Appieyard, J.A. Coleridge's Philosophy o f  Literature, p.62. There he suggests, “...the stronger and 
more frequently repeated impressions gradually overcame the weaker ones and came to control the 
associative process; likewise, in the ambiguous voluntaristic-necessitarian theory o f  will which the 
associationists proposed, it was possible for a person to direct this associative process by concentrating on 
better thoughts and feelings so as to have them prevail. The unity o f mind thus became one o f viewpoint, 
originating in and controlled by a subjective process. In aesthetics this meant that the unity o f  the work o f  
art, which had heretofore been based on its correspondence to the requirements o f the genres which 
expressed the “kinds” o f literature which the general principles o f human nature allowed, now found itself 
defined by the “dominant idea” which animated the work. Unity was therefore a matter o f  tone, o f the 
attitude o f writer to audience or to subject matter.”
Bate, W.J. From Classic to Romantic: Premises o f  taste in eighteenth-centwy England. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946, p. 128.
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The main elements of British romanticism, i.e., spontaneity of emotion, subjectivism, 
the importance of feeling and sympathy, are, in large parts, the heritage of late 
eighteenth-century aesthetics based on British empirical psychology.
With the rise of British empiricism several aesthetic changes followed. “Neo- 
classicism”, Thomas Woodman says,
was itself a much more flexible system than might at first appear, but the emphasis 
within it had already begun to shift, as we have seen. The criticism of Addison early 
ill the century is significantly more psychological and subjective than before, and 
this was to be the way forward. Ideas such as originality and the need for 
imagination began to receive much more attention from the mid-century on. The 
Renaissance revival of learning had encouraged a new historical study of the 
classics, but, paradoxically, this would eventually undermine classicism by showing 
how different the classical world was from our own. Interest in earlier British 
literature also grew enormously. The new historical and textual scholarship led 
ultimately to relativism and historicism, the idea that each culture has its own 
radically different values and standards.
As to the decay of rigid neo-classical rules, James Engell points out the erosion of a 
sense of stable g e n r e s . H e  also suggests that what he calls ‘the New Rhetoricians’ 
altered the course of British letters. According to Engell, they renovated the study of 
rhetoric and applied it to contemporaiy English literature, which eventually provided “a 
basis for the romantic veneration of the expressive and emotional power of figurative 
and “natural” l anguage .They ,  Engell says,
are among the most perceptive psychologists of their time. If close reading was one 
leg of the stiff twin compass they used to measure literature, then the other leg was 
nothing less than knowledge of human nature—  not as some steady and unchanging 
construct, but tlirough personal observation, reflection, and study.^ "^
Woodman, Thomas. A Preface to Samuel Johnson. London: Longman, 1993, p. 111.
See Engell, James, Forming the Critical Mind: Diyden to Coleridge. Cambridge, Mas., London: 
Harvard University Press, pp. 156-157.
”  Ibid., p. 195.
Ibid., p.200.
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The conception of sympathy is another key factor which pervaded literature during this 
time. Walter Jackson Bate argues that sympathy has similarities to the German concept 
of Einfuhlung and has an important role in forming British romanticism.^^ With it, the 
sentimentalist view gained ground and changed the critical treatment of Shakespeare’s 
characters.^*’
But the development of Shakespearean criticism did not only passively reflect 
development in philosophy. The role of several individuals was also important, 
individuals such as Jolmson, Garrick, Richardson, Whately and Morgami.
1 • ii Samuel Jolmson
If we divide neo-classicist, and Romantic critics of Shakespeare into separate groups, 
it would be natural to place Johnson with neo-classicists, as Abrams indicates;
Whether art is to represent a composite of scattered beauties, generic humanity, 
average forms, and familiar appearances, or whether unique characteristics, 
undiscovered particularities, and ultra-violet discriminations—  all these forms and 
qualities are conceived to be inherent in the constitution of the external world, and 
the work of art continues to be regarded as a kind of reflector, though a selective 
one. The artist himself is often envisioned as the agent holding the mirror up to 
nature, and even the originality of a genius is explained in large part by his 
possessing the zeal and acuity to invent (in the root sense of ‘discover’) aspects of 
the universe and of human nature hitherto overlooked, and the imaginative 
ingenuity to combine and express familiar elements in new and surprising ways. 
Nature’s world, as Sidney had said, ‘is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden’; but 
the dynamics of the transformation, so far as they are discussed, consist not of
See Bate, W.J. From Classic to Romantic: Premises o f  Taste in Eighteenth-Centwy England, p. 132. 
Stock, R.D. Samuel Johnson and Neoclassical Dramatic Theory. Lincoln, Neb.: University o f Nebraska
Press, 1973, p.43.
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emotional stresses peculiar to the poet, but of the legitimate human demands, 
common to poet and audience, for illumination and delight
However, Johnson cannot be securely labelled a neo-classicist/^ R.G.Peterson, for 
example, says that “his literary criticism is no longer said to embody all the neoclassical 
or Augustan v a l u e s . I n  James Engell’s opinion.
Jolmson’s positions do not stem from a constrained or rigid system, nor from a code 
of maxims built on fear of the practices of others simply because those practices are 
different. There is rarely anything narrow or self-righteous about his positions and 
their structures. His actions and words are the product of thinking always alert to the 
opposite implication of whatever is being forcefully presented at the moment.'^*’
W.R.Keist points out the imrovatory aspects in Johnson’s criticism:
Whichever of these tlnee bases Jolmson uses to ground his case against the earlier 
critics—  whether the activity of poets, the real state of nature, or the general 
conditions of pleasure he is endeavoring to replace what he considers narrow 
principles with principles more commodious. And this endeavour regularly leads 
him to forsake the view of art as manifesting itself in distinct species, a view 
presented in greater detail in the treatises of his predecessors, for the ampler domain 
of nature, in which, as he conceives of it, distinctions and definitions hitherto 
thought inviolable and “natural” can be shown to be rigidities, arbitrary 
constrictions, or, at best, ideal manifestoes. One of the chief distinctions of Johnson 
from his predecessors in criticism is in this careful reduction of the realm of art, and 
this habit of regarding literature as a natural process, set in the context of other 
natural processes such as social behavior, and thus amenable to treatment in relation 
to its psychological causes and effects, its natural materials, and its circumstantial 
determinants."^^
Abrams, M.H. The Mirror and the Lamp. London, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953, pp.41-42.
See Woodman, Thomas. A preface to Samuel Johnson, p. 111. Elsewhere in the book, he says that “In 
some accounts he was the last bastion o f an alien neo-classicism and in others the sturdy defender o f  
British liberty against the rules.”
Peterson, R.G. “Samuel Jolmson at War with the Classics.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 9(1975): 69-86, 
p.74.
Engell. Forming the Critical Mind: Dryden to Coleridge, p. 175.
Keist, W.R. “The Theoretical Foundations o f Johnson’s Criticism.” Critics and Criticism. Ed.Crane and 
et al. Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1952. 389-407, p.395.
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Jolmson’s flexibility is shown in his Shakespearean criticism, which turns away from 
previous Shakespearean criticism. His sturdy empiricism allows him to recognise that 
neo-classical principles may be unsuitable for dealing with dramas such as 
Shakespeare’s. In dealing with Shakespeare’s dramas, he accepts a broader concept of 
nature based on human experience. To uncover what is distinctive in his criticism, we 
must start with his concept of nature.
Nothing can please many, and please long, but just representations of 
nature....Shakespeare is above all modern writers, the poet of nature; the poet that 
holds up to his readers a faithful mirror of manners and of life. His characters are 
not modified by the customs of particular places unpractised by the rest of the 
world; by the peculiarities of studies or professions, which can operate but upon 
small numbers; or by accidents of transient fashions or temporary opinions; they are 
the genuine progeny of common humanity, such as the world will always supply, 
and observation will always find. His persons act and speak by the influence of 
those general passions and principles by which all minds are agitated, and the whole 
system of life is continued in motion. In the writings of other poets a character is too 
often individual; in those of Shakespeare it is commonly a species(fre/hce, 4-5).
Here, we can see Johnson’s idea of the ideal poetic work and of the ideal poet. He takes 
the representation of nature as the ideal poetic work and the poet of nature, the poet 
holding up to his readers a faithful mirror, as the ideal poet. Though these arguments 
seem to follow faithfully the norms of neo-classicism, more careful investigation of his 
concept of nature, however, reveals that the substance of his argument is not the same.
For a neo-classicist, “the laws of nature are the laws of reason; they are always and 
everywhere the same, and like the axioms of mathematics they have only to be presented 
in order to be acknowledged as just and right by all men.”"^  ^The neo-classicists held that 
the universe is a giant machine designed by God, and that it runs by God’s will without
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even a slight error. Thus people can understand divinity through the nature of the world. 
Locke’s statement well demonstrates the neo-classical concept of nature;
But since we are searching now for the principle and origin of the knowledge of this 
law in which it becomes Imown to mankind, I declare that the foundation of all 
knowledge of it is derived from those things which we perceive through our senses. 
From these things, then, reason and the power of arguing, which are both distinctive 
marks of man, advance to the notion of the maker of these things... and at last they 
conclude and establish for themselves as certain that some Deity is the author of all 
these things. As soon as this is laid down, the notion of a universal law of nature 
binding on all men necessarily emerges; and this will become clear later on. From 
what has been said, however, it is quite certain that there is a law of nature that can 
be known by the light of nature. For whatever among men obtains the force of a 
law, necessarily looks to God, or nature, or man as its maker; yet whatever man has 
commanded or God has ordered by divine declaration, all this is positive law. But 
since the law of nature cannot be known by tradition, all that remains is that it 
becomes known to men by the light of nature alone.
Likewise, for neo-classicists, divinity reveals itself not merely in nature but in man’s 
inner self. Nature, however, can only be perceived tlirough the refinement and maturity 
of men’s inner selves. Therefore, for them, nature “has come to mean what is congenial 
to those in whom human nature is most fully developed, that is, to the educated in the 
most polite nations of the civilized world.”"^"^
In solving the problem of how to apply the concept of nature to the criticism of 
literature, critics such as Pope identify nature with the ancients, suggesting that to follow 
nature is to follow the ancients.
But as the eighteenth century unfolded, the concept of nature changed. Whereas for 
the neo-classicist nature meant reason, for later generations, it meant instinct, emotion.
Willey, Basil. The Eighteenth Century Background. London: Chatto and Windus, 1940, p.2.
Locke, John. Essays on the Law o f  Nature. Ed. W. von Leyden. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958, 
p.133.
Willy, Basil. The Eighteenth-Centiuy Background, p.20.
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and sensibility. Some even regarded reason as an aberration from nature. Such changes 
can be detected in Johnson’s concept of nature.
For Johnson, according to Frederic V. Bogel, general nature is not
a metaphysical entity, a kind of Adamic essence imparted by each generation to its 
progeny or a Platonic Form of which individual men and women are more or less 
accurate copies. Nor, for Jolmson, does this lack of metaphysical status mean that 
there is no such thing as general nature, merely numerous particular individuals. 
Rather, it is an “empirical” concept, of sorts, derived from the testimony of human 
history, the evidence of literature and other cultural witnesses,..
Here, we can see that the Jolmsonian concept of nature is different both from the neo­
classical concept of nature and from the romantic one. Likewise, Shakespearean truth to 
nature in Johnson’s opinion, G.F.Parker says,
is something clearly distinct from the realism characteristic of the novelist, and this 
difference makes finally umiecessary the directive moral purpose upon which 
Johnson had insisted in the case of the novel. Shakespeare’s representations of 
general nature, it would seem, penetrating as they do beneath qualities ‘superficial, 
accidental, and acquired’, reach to a depth at which fidelity to the truth of the world 
and fidelity to moral truth become one.'^ *’
In The Preface to Shakespeare, Johnson shows his opinion of Shakespeare’s work, 
comparing it with that of others:
The work of a correct and regular writer is a garden aceurately formed and diligently 
planted, varied with shades, and scented with flowers; the composition of 
Shakespeare is a forest, in which oaks extend their branches, and pines tower in the 
air, interspersed sometimes with weeds and brambles, and sometimes giving shelter 
to myrtles and to roses; filling the eye with awftil pomp, and gratifying the mind 
with endless diversity. Other poets display cabinets of precious rarities, minutely 
finished, wrought into shape, and polished into brightness. Shakespeare opens a 
mine which contains gold and diamonds in inexhaustible plenty, though clouded by
45 Bogel, Frederic V. “The Rlietorlc o f Substantiality: Johnson and the Later Eighteenth Century.’
Eighteenth-Century Studies 12(1979): 457-80, p.472.
Parker, G.F. Johnson 's Shakespeare. Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1989, p.21.
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encrustations, debased by impurities, and mingled with a mass of meaner 
mineral.(Pre/nce, 31)
In these comparisons, we can catch the uniqueness of Johnson. For example, the 
comparison to a forest or a mine appeals to an empirical or commonsensical meaning of 
the word nature, not to a Coleridgean understanding of the word. But the comparison 
because it is designed to defend Shakespeare’s ‘irregularities’ or ‘impurities’ 
demonstrates Johnson’s deviation from neo-classicists. In Jolmson’s opinion, 
Shakespeare’s adherence to general human nature
has exposed him to the censure of criticks, who form their judgments upon narrower 
principles. Deimis and Rliymer thinlc his Romans not sufficiently Roman; and 
Voltaire censures his kings as not completely royal. Deimis is offended, that 
Meneniiis, a senator of Rome, should play the buffoon; and Voltaire perhaps thinks 
decency violated when the Danish usurper is represented as a drunkard. But 
Shakespeare always makes nature predominate over accident; and if he preserves 
the essential character, is not very careful of distinctions superinduced and 
adventitious. His stoiy requires Romans or kings, but he thinks only on men. He 
knew that Rome, like eveiy other city, had men of all dispositions; and wanting a 
buffoon, he went into the senate-house for that which the senate-house would 
certainly have afforded him. He was inclined to shew an usurper and a murderer not 
only odious, but despicable, he therefore added drunkeimess to his other qualities, 
knowing that kings love wine like other men, and that wine exerts its natural power 
upon kings (Pre/due, 8).
Here, based on his concept of human nature, Jolmson again defends what neo-classicists 
identified as Shakespeare’s faults. According to the neo-classical concept of propriety, 
“the manners must be suitable, or agreeing to the persons; that is, to the age, sex, 
dignity, and the other general heads of manners: thus, when a poet has given the dignity 
of a king to one of his persons, in all his actions and speeches, that person must discover 
majesty, magnanimity, and jealousy of power, because these ai'e suitable to the general
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manners of a king.”"^  ^ From the neo-classical viewpoint, Shakespeare’s aristocratic 
Romans or English Kings represent a violation of nature. But Johnson defends such 
things precisely by claiming that they are consonant with nature. Nevertheless, the 
expression ,“if he preserves the essential character, is not very eareful of distinctions 
superinduced and adventitious”, shows a lingering neo-classical aesthetic.
Johnson and Coleridge derive their concepts of human nature from different 
sources, but they attach a similar content to the term."^  ^The following two passages will 
show us similarities while also indicating basic differences:
His characters are not modified by the customs of particular places, unpractised by 
the rest of the world; by the peculiarities of studies or professions, which can 
operate but upon small numbers; or by the accidents of transient fashions or 
temporary opinions: they are the genuine progeny of common humanity, such as the 
world will always supply, and observation will always find {Preface, 4).
...he(Shakespeai'e)"^^ drew characters which would always be natural, and therefore 
permanent, inasmuch as they were not dependent upon accidental 
circumstances(5'c/z //, 110).
Like Johnson, truth to human nature is Coleridge’s major literary concern. In his 
principle of truth to human nature, according to Thorpe, “he began where Samuel 
Jolmson and the Scotch rhetoricians had ended, and from it derived all his indispensable 
subsidiaiy principles.” *^^
Bligh, John. “Shakespearean Character Study to 1800.” Shakespeare Stirvey: An Annual Survey o f  
Shakespeare Studies and Production 37 (1981): 141-153, p .144.
See Robinson, Herbert Spencer. English Shakespearean Criticism in the Eighteenth Century. New  
York: Gordian P., 1968, p. 126. There he comments that Johnson claims that Shakespeare’s characters are 
always easily recognizable types o f humanity, and not merely individuals with the limited and temporary 
peculiarities o f place, profession, or fashion. According to Robinson, this point offers us a clear 
anticipation o f  Coleridge.
The word in the parenthesis is mine.
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Johnson’s defence of Shakespeare’s comedy is also related to his concept of nature;
Shakespeare’s plays are not in the rigorous and critical sense either tragedies or 
comedies, but compositions of a distinct kind; exhibiting the real state of sublunary 
nature, which partakes of good and evil, joy and sorrow, mingled with endless 
variety of proportion and imrumerable modes of combination; and expressing the 
course of the world, in which the loss of one is the gain of another; in which at the 
same time, the reveller is hasting to his wine, and mourner burying his friend; in 
which the malignity of one is sometimes defeated by the ho lick of another; and 
many mischiefs and many benefits are done and hindered without dQsigi\{Preface,
9).
For Johnson, Shakespeare’s tragi-coniedy is not a demerit of Shakespeare but a 
testimony that he follows nature faithfully. The world Is so complex that it is natural that 
the tragic and the comic ingredients should be mingled in a play which reflects the 
world. Thus, Johnson “dismisses with an appeal from criticism to nature the charge that 
Shakespeare had polluted his tragedy with comic diversions and indecorous scenes.” *^ 
Johnson’s defence of tragi-comedy is, according to Robinson, “a perfect anticipation of 
the view insisted upon by Coleridge—  almost in the very same words.
For Johnson, Shakespeare knows how to dramatise his plays in order to impress 
their reality on the mind of the audience. In Jolmson’s opinion.
Other dramatists can only gain attention by hyperbolical or aggravated characters, 
by fabulous and unexampled excellence or depravity, as the writers of barbarous 
romances invigorated the reader by a giant and a dwarf; and he that should form his 
expectations of human affairs from the play, or from the tale, would be equally 
deceived. Shakespeare has no heroes; his scenes are occupied only by men, who act 
and speak as the reader thinks that he should himself have spoken or acted on the 
same occasion: even where the agency is supernatural the dialogue is level with life. 
Other writers disguise the most natural passions and most frequent incidents; so that 
he who contemplates them in the book will not know them in the world:
Smallwood. Johnson’s Preface to Shakespeare. Bristol; Bristol Classical Press, 1985, p.xxvii. 
Robinson, English Shakespearean Criticism in the Eighteenth Century, p. 129.
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Shakespeare approximates the remote, and familiarizes the wonderful; the event 
which he represents will not happen, but if it were possible, its effects would 
probably be such as he has assigned; and it may be said, that he has not only shewn 
nature as it acts in real exigencies, but as it would be found in trials, to which it 
cannot be exposed {Preface, 7).
Johnson, here, not only emphasises realism in characterisation but also the 
naturalness of Shakespeare’s dramaturgy. What Johnson disapproves of is not the 
improbability of characters themselves such as a dwarf or a giant but the artificiality of 
the characterisation. That “Shakespeare has no heroes,” therefore, means that heroes in 
Shakespeare are not the fabulous ones found in romances but have solid real personality. 
For Johnson, “the characters and language of Shakespeare were woven in the colours of 
nature. They therefore resisted decay, and remained unfaded by time.”^^  Even though he 
takes supernatural themes, the story comes to life. The situation he creates might be 
beyond the boundaries of real life, but Shakespeare has the ability to make it appear 
natural. In doing so, “nature is the link between author and reader—  the common 
elements that guarantee truth and the accidental variations that produce variety being the 
basis for selection by the one and for comparison and judgment by the other.” "^^ In this 
respect Jolinson’s argument reminds us of the Coleridgean concept of “propriety”. For 
Coleridge, a drama, no matter how umealistic it may be, will gain reality if the audience 
accepts it.
Shakespeare’s composition, in Jolmson’s opinion, is not monotonous. It is 
composed of diverse ingredients. He sometimes makes the audience delighted and 
sometimes makes it sad “tlnough tracts of easy and familiar dialogue”(Pr<2yhce, 12). But
Smallwood, Johnson’s Preface to Shakespeare, p.xxvi.
Keist, “The Theoretical Foundations o f Johnson’s Criticism,”p.399.
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in Johnson’s thought, the audience is not an automaton which moves according to the 
author’s intention. Even though the audience laughs or mourns as the author commands 
it, it does not do it “without indifference.”
Shakespeare, Jolmson argues, knows how to retain the audience’s interest. His plays 
are full of incidents by which people are easily caught, whether they are groundlings or 
gentlemen. People become more curious as the plot unfolds. Their pleasure does not 
only come from the excellence of particular dialogues but from the action itself.
In Johnson’s opinion, on the stage “something must be done as well as said”. In 
Shakespeare’s plays, shows and bustles are not an extravagances but necessary parts. To 
Voltaire’s wonder at “how Shakespeare’s extravagances are endured”, Johnson answers 
that “Addison speaks of poets, and Shakespeare, of men.”
Shakespeare’s celebrated effectiveness can be linked to the problem of the reaction 
of the audience. Jolmson’s notion of illusion is here central. He begins by rejecting the 
possibility that “any representation is mistaken for reality”. For Neo-classicists, it is 
absurd for the scenes to be transported from Alexandria to Rome because the spectator 
really imagines himself at Alexandria and thus caimot cope with the shift of place. He 
dismisses the neo-classical rule of unity of place because it relies on an incoherent idea 
of delusion—  that is, “Delusion, if delusion be admitted, has no certain limitation; if the 
spectator can be once persuaded, that his old acquaintance are Alexander and Caesar, 
that a room illuminated with candles is the plain of Pharsalia, or the bank of Granicus, 
he is in a state of elevation above the reach of reason, or of truth, and from the heights 
of empyrean poetry, may despise the circumscriptions of terrestrial nature”(Prc/bce, 22). 
According to Jolmson, delusion of this kind is not possible:
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The truth is, that the spectators are always in their senses, and know, from the first 
act to the last, that the stage is only a stage, and that the players are only players. 
They come to hear a certain number of lines recited with just gesture and elegant 
modulation. {Preface, 22).
This argument frees Jolmson from neo-classical constraints, but, on the other hand, it 
left him unable to explain the absorption into which we are likely to fall during a 
theatrical performance. As a matter of fact, in Frederick Burwick’s opinion, “while he 
saw the possibility of the mind succumbing to the imagination, Johnson nevertheless 
insisted upon the coprescence of r e a s o n . J o h n s o n  explains that the audience “is 
moved only because the dramatic scene provokes the image-making faculty to conjure 
up the potentiality of the spectator’s participation in a similar scene, and not because the 
sufferings and joys of the actors appear real.”"  This explanation in a way demonstrates 
that he takes account of the operation of imagination on the spectator’s mind, 
considering that “the image-making faculty” means imagination at Johnson’s time.
Jolmson’s opinion of imagination is shown in the following passage:
Imitations produce pain or pleasure, not because they are mistaken for realities, 
but because they bring realities to mind. When the imagination is recreated by a 
painted landscape, the trees are not supposed capable to give us shade, or the 
fountains coolness; but we consider, how we should be pleased with such fountains 
playing besides us, and such woods waving over us. We are agitated in reading the 
history of Henry the fifth, yet no man takes his book for the field of 
Agincourt.(Pre/ace, 24)
Burwick, Frederick. Illusion and the Drama, p .31.
Wasserman, Earl R, “The Sympathetic Imagination in Eighteenth-Century Theories o f Acting.” Journal
o f  English and German Philosophy 46(1947): 264-272, p.271.
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Johnson’s concept of imitation does not mean an exact copy of reality. It is closer to the 
Romantic concept of imitation. Not only does Johnson indicate an operation in the 
audience’s mind but also in the author’s mind. According to Woodman, “the concept of 
‘nature’ obviously has crucial implications for ‘imagination’ too.”^^  For Johnson, 
Shakespeare is ‘a poet of nature’, which suggests that Shakespeare has, above all others, 
the faculty of understanding human nature in a fundamental and psychological sense. 
When Jolmson said that Shakespeare’s plays are a ‘mirror of life’, he surely kept in 
mind that Shakespeare’s plays not only reflect the real aspects of ordinary lives but also 
show dispositions in the characters which prompt the audience to find the same feelings 
in its own mind. The faculty which makes it possible to understand human nature is not 
merely the careful observation of life but the ability to put oneself in an other’s place 
and thus feel the other’s feelings; that is, the sympathetic imagination. Johnson’s 
concept of imagination W.J.Bate describes as “ able to penetrate the bamer which 
space puts between it and its object and, by actually entering into the objects, so to 
speak, secure a momentary but complete identification with it.”^^
Coleridge’s concept of illusion is different from Johnson’s. Nevertheless, Jolmson’s 
discarding of the possibility that “any representation is mistaken for reality” provided 
the turning point for future theories of illusion including Coleridge’s.
“The Preface,” Nichol Smith says.
deals with Shakespeare as a man and as a writer, and not with any single play. The 
purpose is to state in general, though with incidental detail, what the name of 
Shakespeare ought to suggest to every intelligent mind. The attitude is judicial,
Woodman. A Preface to Samuel Johnson, P. 119.
Bate, W.J. “The Sympathetic Imagination in Eighteenth-Century English Criticism.” Journal o f  English 
Literary History \2{1945): 144-164, p .144.
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‘without envious malignity or superstitious veneration’. Impartial examination 
would prove Shakespeare to be the greatest writer, or one of the two greatest 
writers, in the world’s literature; still he was a man who lived as other men do, and 
if he made mistakes he was chargeable with them as other men are.
Such is the older criticism, and its final exponent is Jolmson. On its own lines 
it is difficult to see that any advance was possible.
The advance was made on other lines, and Jolmson himself was one of its 
leaders. Just as his edition of Shakespeare is the pivot of the old and the new 
scholarship of the eighteenth centuiy, similarly we may take it as a rough mark for 
the begimiing of the new criticism. We need not look for this new criticism in the 
Preface. But it speaks out loud and bold in the Notes.
In these Notes Johnson did not confine himself to textual difficulties. Like 
Warburton before him, and Theobald, and Pope, he would draw attention to the 
beauty of a line or passage; and he would sometimes add his estimate of the play as 
a whole. He is at his happiest when he is moved to write about a character. "
By the older criticism Nichol Smith means that which has a neo-classical orientation. 
New criticism seems to mean the new kind of criticism that developed around the latter 
part of the eighteenth-centuiy, such as Johnson’s discarding of ‘the value of Unities’ 
based on his concept of nature, and ‘Character Criticism’.
Jolmson exemplifies, according to Smith, “the new subject-study of Shakespeare’s 
characters, and the study of Shakespeare tluough his characters; and this subject has 
remained the chief occupation of the best Shakespeare criticism to the time of Mr. 
A.C.Bradley.”"  Of Jolmson’s influence on Coleridge in the study of character, Smith 
indicates that Johnson’s account of Polonius “was borrowed by Coleridge, and not 
battered in the boiTowing.”*’'
1 ' iii David Garrick
Smith, Nichol. Shakespeare in the Eighteenth Century. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928, pp.78-79. 
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David Garrick is another crucial figure in Shakespeare s t ud i e s . He  is not merely 
the founder of the bardolatry of the romantic era but greatly contributed to new 
developments in acting, criticism, and the revival of the authentic texts of Shakespeare. 
Garrick, Stone says,
was the professed admirer, champion, and priest of Shakespeare. He was the one 
who more than any other, in Burke’s words, elevated the actor’s profession to that 
of a liberal art, and he could boast an international reputation for brilliancy and 
conviviality equal to that of any of his contemporaries.'^^
With regard to Shakespearean aesthetics, he is worthy of notice in several respects. 
First, the Jubilee which David Garrick held to pay tribute to Shakespeare was a crucial 
landmark in the resurgence of interest in Shakespeare. The Stratford Jubilee, according 
to M.W.England,
was the first Shakespeare festival to engage national interest, and there is much of 
interest even now in the staging of an eighteenth-century fete on the grandest scale. 
What is more interesting is the manner in which this celebration fired the public 
imagination. It was vilified and defended, reproduced on stage in varying moods of 
glorification and satire, entangled with the threads of English life.'^ '^
After the Jubilee, Shakespearean activities in all fields — i.e., criticism, painting, and 
acting, —  were boosted. “Garrick”, England says.
raised Shakespeare’s characters from the dead; when he retired, they all died, when 
he died, they all died again, mourned for him, welcomed him joyously to Heaven 
and Mount Olympus simultaneously. No mount of satire could halt the ectoplasmic 
emanations. Shakespeare and Garrick were deity and priest, father and son, twin 
brothers, Elijah and Elisha. Garrick was the reincarnation of Shakespeare. The
See, Raysor, Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism, p.xviii.
“  Stone, George Winchester, Jr. “David Garrick’s Significance in the History o f Shakespearean 
Criticism.” PMLA 65(1950); 183-197, p .185.
England, M. Winburn. Garrick's Jubilee. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964, p.3.
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relationship was stated in terms of many myths. The reiterated proof of their 
oneness was their mastery of both comedy and tragedy, a miraculous power found 
only in Shakespeare until Garrick proved he also possessed it, thereby proving he 
was Shakespeare.
This seems to be extreme praise for Garrick. But it reflects how greatly people were 
touched by his performances and how much he provoked people’s interest in 
Shakespeare’s plays. “His(Garrick’s)*^  ^ first appearance on the London stage,” Arthur 
Murphy comments.
was at Goodman’s Fields on the 19th of October 1741. The moment he entered the 
scene the character he assumed was visible in his countenance; the power of his 
imagination was such that he transformed himself into the very man; the passions 
rose in rapid succession, and before he uttered a word were legible in eveiy feature 
of that various face. Flis look, his voice, his attitude changed with eveiy 
sentiment...
That he was hailed as “the incarnation of Shakespeare” was in part a simple recognition 
of the greatness of his acting which satisfied the taste of the people. England comments 
that he
was peculiarly in a position to reflect the great minds of his day. In the history of the 
theater he is unique- unique in his genius, unique in his intimate association with 
genius. Perhaps he was nothing more than a mimic, a sounding board, a miiTor. At 
least he was a true miiTor.'’^
The spectators, according to Allardyce Nicoll,
from the begimiing of his career to its close, associated him with the concept of 
‘Nature’,... Assuredly he made his impact as an individual, but the excitement was 
largely generated by something else, by something, in fact, which was immediately
Ibid. p. 166.
The word in the parenthesis is mine.
Murphy, Arthur. The Life o f  D avid Garrick. Reprinted \\\ Shakesepare:The Critical Heritage. V ol.6. 
p.632.
England, G arrick’s Jubilee, p.4.
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related to the whole of the period’s culture. The eighteenth century, in life, painting, 
music, and literature, was dominated and enriched by ideas of taste and style; and 
those who watched Garrick derived their pleasure not only from appreciating the 
skill of the performer but also from recognising that his entire approach was 
founded on a style which, quite apart from his own excellence, could be savoured 
and defined in and for itself.*’^
Garrick was said to excel in understanding the character’s inner world and conveying it 
through his acting, which was so spontaneous and natural as to make the audience react 
spontaneously and sympathise with the character. However, his acting was not, of 
course, naturalistic in the manner of today’s movies or TV dram as.N evertheless, his 
natural style of acting was a change from the declamatory rhetoric of his predecessors.
Garrick’s acting greatly influenced theatre itself- from stage management to visual 
equipment and even the geme of painting.’ ' Literary criticism, especially Shakespearean 
criticism, could not avoid his influence. According to Stone, “In 1754 many contributors 
to Gray’s Inn Journal analyzed Shakespeare’s characters, after having seen Garrick act 
them.””  Thomas Whately is assumed to have reached his non-Aristotelian conclusions 
after he had observed Garrick’s representation of Shakespeare’s characters. Morgami
Nicoll, Allardyce. The Garrick Stage: The Theatres and Audience in the Eighteenth Centiiiy. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980, p.9.
™ See, Nicoll., p .l4  and Janet Ruth Heller, “The Bias Against Spectacle in Tragedy: The history o f  an 
idea.” The Eighteenth Centwy: Theory and Interpretation 23 (1982): 239-255, p.253. Both suggest that 
the naturalness o f his style was that o f the eighteenth century even though he gave his audience the illusion 
of reality.
See Bertelsen, Lance. “David Garrick and English Painting.” Studies in the Eighteenth Century 
11(1978): 308-324, p .316.
Stone, G.W.Jr. “David Garrick’s Significance in the History o f Shakespearean Criticism.” p .l9 1 . Also 
see Stone. “Garrick’s Production o f King Lear: A Study in the Temper o f the Eighteenth-Centuiy Mind.” 
Studies in Philology 45 (1948): 89-103, p.91. He states that: “His appearance in any role so powerfully 
influenced his audiences that contemporary critical statements on plays in which he performed became 
inextricably interwoven with his stage presentation.”
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inscribed to Garrick a presentation copy of his book, a tacit acknowledgement of 
Garrick’s contribution to the understanding of Shakespeare.’^
Garrick’s acting was not merely a spontaneous overflow of sensibility which was 
transmitted through the sympathetic imagination but also the result of his conscious 
artistic activity. In respect to an actor’s creating illusion, to quote from Wasserman ; 
“the central problem the eighteenth century attempted to answer is whether the illusion 
is a fiction to be achieved by conscious, artful deception or an authentic realization , 
through sympathetic imagination, of the artistically shaped role.”’'^  Those who 
emphasised the importance of the actor’s sensibility held that
if the actor’s sensibility is great enough, “the action and expression will arise from 
the occasion, unstudied, unpremeditated, and as it were natural to him; and being 
natural as well as great, it will affect every body: and this is the character of true 
sensibility.”’^
Garrick himself accepted the importance of the actor’s emotional ardour. Garrick, as 
Wasserman points out, believed that
the organic totality of a dramatic role is greater than the sum of its component parts, 
and that its totality can be sympathetically grasped only when the actor’s emotional 
ardor carries him beyond his rational and analytical self and identifies him with 
(what is greater than himself) the artistic objective.’^
His support of sensibility did not mean that he excluded judgement or self- 
consciousness. It is said that Garrick not only studied people carefully but gave full play
See Stone. “David Garrick’s Significance in the History o f Shakespearean Criticism,” pp. 192-196. 
Wasserman, Earl R. “The Sympathetic Imagination in Eighteenth-Century Theories o f Acting.” p.265. 
Ibid., p269.
Ibid., p.269.
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to his technique to make his acting seem natural and spontaneous. Here, technique, 
Leigh Woods explains,
suggests that the actor who employs it is working out of a structure of artifice, above 
all. Particularly in the atmosphere of self-conscious sincerity which attached to the 
theatre in Garrick’s time, and which he helped both to foster and to perpetuate, it 
would have been to his advantage to conceal his teclmical awareness and facility 
behind an appearance of nearly total spontaneity and emotional vulnerability, in 
character.”
If we study him more carefully, it is clear that he laiew that acting is an art and that in 
this respect, complete self-absorption is not desirable. While he was acting, he was both 
self-conscious and well-prepared.’  ^ Garrick’s conscious technique as an actor and his 
ability to calculate his effects in their precise impact on the audience enabled him to 
create and sustain many of his most powerful moments.’^
Garrick’s acting by relying both on sympathetic imagination and a self-consciously 
developed technique shows that the two factors were not mutually exclusive, but 
reciprocal. Coleridge’s ideal models of the artist are Shakespeare and David Gairick. In 
Omniana, Coleridge says,
The warmest admirers of historic merit would not willingly be supposed to 
overlook the difference, both in kind and degree, between an excellence that in its 
very nature is transient, or continuing, only as an echo, in the memory of a single 
generation, while the name alone remains for posterity, and a power, enduring as the 
Soul of Man and commensurate with the human language.
But without dreading the imputation of a wish to balance weights so unequal, 
we may assert that if ever two great men might seem to have been made for each
Woods, Leigh. Garrick Claims the Stage. Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, 1984, 
p. 121.
See Smith, Helen R. David Garrick. London: British Libraiy, 1979, p.32. She remarks that “the less 
analytical accounts o f  Gairick’s acting usually emphasize his seeming naturalness, although the keener 
critics were well aware that this was achieved by finely calculated preparation and technique. There is a 
familiar account o f how Garrick obtained ideas for some o f the most moving scenes in his performance as 
Lear by visiting a man who had gone mad when he accidentally killed his own child.”
See Woods, Garrick Claoms the Stage, p. 119.
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other, we have this correspondency presented to us in the instance of Garrick and 
Shakespeare. It will be sufficient for me to direct attention to one peculiarity, the 
common and exclusive characteristic of both,—  the union of the highest Tragic and 
Comic Excellence in the same individual. This indeed supersedes the necessity of 
mentioning the particular merits which it implies and comprehends, while it is 
eminently and in the exactes! sense of the word characteristic, inasmuch as this 
transcendent power sprung from the same source in both,—  from an insight into 
human nature at its fountain head, which exists in those creations of Genius alone, 
in which the substance and essential forms are the Gifts of Meditation and self­
research, and the individualizing accidents, and the requisite drapery, are supplied 
by observation and acquaintance with the world. We may then hope for a second 
Garrick or of an approach to Shakespeare where we find a knowledge of Man united 
to an equal laiowledge of Men, and both co-existing with the power of giving Life 
and Individuality to the products of both. For such a being possesses the rudiments, 
whatever character he may choose to represent. He combines in his own person at 
once the materials and the worlmian. The precious proofs of this rare excellence in 
our Greatest Dramatic poet are in the hands of all men. To exhibit the same 
excellence in our greatest actor, we can conceive no more lively or impressive way 
than by presenting him in two extreme Poles of his Creative and almost Protean 
Genius—  in his Richard the third and his Abel Drugger {TT&Om, 467).
The above passage gives us a sufficient indication of Gamck’s importance for 
Coleridge.
Another of Garrick’s contributions to Shakespeare studies was his effort to restore 
the true text of Shakespeare’s plays. ‘Authenticity’ is, of course, a relative concep t . I t  
is said that Garrick sometimes isolated and highlighted the characters more than 
Shakespeare or even Tate had done if he thought it necessary to his interpretation of the 
characters.^’ Nevertheless, he contributed to purifying Shakespeare’s texts. In Garrick’s 
time, Shakespeare’s plays were quite often performed in radically altered versions. For 
instance, Tate’s version of King Lear was more popular than the original. King Lear
See Vickers. Shakespearean: The Critical Heritage. Vol. 6., pp. 61-62. Vickers argues that Garrick’s 
contribution to the knowledge and appreciation o f Shakespeare is difficult to define. He points out Samuel 
Johnson’s comment on Garrick, Walpole’s dislike o f Garrick as a writer and adapter, and Steevens’s 
accusing him o f influencing the taste o f the age by pursuing his own interests. Vickers even insists that 
Garrick’s influence on the revival o f Shakespeare is proven to be false by modern scholarship.
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was one of Garrick’s main roles, and Stone describes the development in his renditions 
of the play thus;
Garrick started with Tate, but ended with a play much closer to Shakespeare. 
Thoroughly apprised of the mainsprings of tragic appeal as Pity and Fear, he 
alternately dissolved his audience in tears and froze them with horror(if we can 
credit the hyperbole of mid-century comment). But pity won, for Garrick saw in 
King Lear a Shakespearean play which could surpass competition from all writers 
of pathetic tragedy and could commend the emotional pleasure of tears more 
successfully than sentimental comedy. Tapping the strong vogue for the pathetic and 
sentimental, Garrick skilfully met public desire for these dramatic types in his 
production of King Lear, and without much sacrificing the sacredness of 
Shakespeare’s text. Study of his text and his performance in the title role reveals the 
extent of his skill.”
This shows that Garrick is an authority in both a theoretical and practical way; he is well 
acquainted with the audience’s taste and knows how to move it. At the same time, he 
had a thiough knowledge of the original texts. Flis enthusiasm extended to founding the 
Shakespeare library, to which many contemporary editors owed their information. 
Needless to say, his effort to restore the authentic Shakespeare texts was successful. 
“By gradual infiltration,” Stone says.
Garrick was restoring to the stage Shakespeare’s wording as well as Shakespeare’s 
character emphasis. In these two ways he was aligning himself with Addison and 
Foote, and was satisfying his own ideals concerning Shakespeare’s text.^^
Garrick’s effort to restore the authentic texts directed the taste of the contemporary 
audience to appreciate the authentic Shakespeare.
See Woods, Leigh. “Ganick’s King Lear and the English Malady.” Theatre Survey 27(1986): 17-35,
p.26.
Stone, G.W.Jr. Garrick’s Production o f King Lear: A Study in the Temper o f the Eighteenth-Century 
Mind.” p.91.
Ibid., p.94.
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1 • iv Character Criticism
Brian Vickers defines character criticism as a criticism that developed in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth-century devoted to study of the individual characters of 
Shakespeare’s plays, abandoning discussion of plot or language. According to him, in 
character criticism, the new and the traditional coexist: the interest in psychology is 
new, but the exponents of character criticism still adhered to neo-classical norms, i.e. 
the consistency of characters and the fulfilment of moral purpose in the characters. 
Within these norms, they tried to show how the characters are consistent and how they 
might be excused for their apparent immorality by explaining and analysing their 
psychology. Vickers suggests that character criticism arose as a means of defending 
those aspects of Shakespeare’s plays that had been condemned by rigid neo-classicists.^'’ 
Jolin Bligh disagrees with Vickers on several points. According to him, character 
studies (he does not agree that these constitute a distinct critical genre) are not confined 
to the late eighteenth-century but were common during the period from 1664 to 1800. 
And they did not necessarily conform to the neo-classical norms of character. For him, 
significant exponents of character studies are Pope, Whately, Johnson, Lord Kames, and 
Morgami. Pope suggests the method of comparison between characters, i.e., between 
Richard III and Macbeth, and Whately developed Pope’s method. Johnson points out 
Shakespeare’s deep understanding of human nature. Kames celebrates Shakespeare’s 
ability to express human passions. Finally Morgann argues that Shakespeare’s
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characters grew organically in the mind of their maker and, in Bligh’s opinion, this is 
an anticipation of the organicism of Kant and A.W.Schlegel. For Bligh, the first critic 
who did not apply Aristotlean rules in character studies is William Richardson. David 
Flume contributed to the new direction of character studies by his theoiy of the 
conversion or transformation of the passions. Bligh includes Kant and A.W.Schlegel as 
contributors to the new direction of Shakespearean criticism.
But we cannot deny that there was a school that focused on character criticism in 
the latter part of the eighteenth-century. And their critical method is closely related to 
the psychological analysis of human nature. Their defence of Shakespeare verges on 
bardolatry. “The method of mainstream bardolatry,” Howard Felperin says.
was in no way elitist or nostalgic but democratic and progressive, drawing as it did 
on emerging paradigms of a universally human subjectivity, common to the 
historical author, his timeless characters, and the contemporaiy audience.
Coleridge’s criticism of characters reflects many of their views. In some aspects of 
his criticism, as R.A.Foakes notes.
Coleridge can be shown to have been anticipated by some earlier writers, and yet the 
overwhelming impression his lectures give is of a new force, a new comprehensive 
vision of Shakespeare, offered to his audience at a time when the weight of the main 
eighteenth-century tradition still lay heavy on the age in a way it is now difficult to 
appreciate.^^
See Vickers, Brian. “The Emergence o f Character Criticism, 1774-1800.” Shakespeare Survey: an 
Annual Survey o f  Shakespeare Studies and Production 37(1984): 11-21, pp. 11-12.
86
See Bligh, John, “Shakespearean Character Study to 1800.” pp. 141-153.
Felprin, Howard. “Bardolatry then and Now.” The Appropriation o f  Shakespeare, Ed. Jean I.Marsden.
New York, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.129-144, p. 137. 
Foakes. C oleridge’s Criticism o f  Shakespeare, p.5.
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Among others, Whately and Richardson are said to have been read by Coleridge. 
Thomas Whately’s Remarks on Some o f the Characters o f Shakespeare is important in 
that “it is the first book to concern itself with the psychological analysis of 
Shakespearean c ha r ac te r s . F o r  him, Shakespeare is excellent beyond comparison for 
his deep and comprehensive laiowledge of the human heart. “Every play of 
Shakespeare,” he says,
abounds with instances of his excellence in distinguishing characters. It would be 
difficult to determine which is the most striking of all that he drew; but his merit 
will appear most conspicuously by comparing two opposite characters, who happen 
to be placed in similar circumstances.^^
Whately uses the technique of comparison between two characters in similar situations. 
In his comparison of Macbeth and Richard III, he demonstrates that both characters have 
similarities in that they are soldier kings who usurped the tlirone by the same means and 
were defeated by the lawful heir in the final battle. Whately, however, tries to indicate 
the disparities between them:
Thus, from the beginning of their history to their last moments are the characters 
of Macbeth and Richard preserved entire and distinct. And though probably 
Shakespeare, when he was drawing the one had no attention to the other, yet, as he 
conceived them to be widely different, expressed his conceptions exactly, and 
copied both from nature, they necessarily became contrasts to each other; and by 
seeing them together that contrast is more apparent, especially where the 
comparison is not between opposite qualities but arises from the different degrees, 
or from a particular display or total omission of the same quality.^’’
Robinson. English Shakespearean Criticism in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 180-181.
Whately, Thomas, Remarks on Some o f  the Characters o f  Shakespeare(\1^5). Reprinted in 
Shakespeare: The Critical Heritage. Vol.4. Ed. Brian Vickers. London, Boston and Henley: Routledge 
&Kegan Paul, 1981, p.409.
™ Ibid., pp.428-429.
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Tlxroughout the comparison, he demonstrates how Macbeth and Richard differ from 
each other. Macbeth, for example, has natural affections, only stifled upon great 
occasion, while Richard is totally destitute of every softer feeling. Whereas Macbeth is 
in agony when he thinks of his crime, Richard is delighted with his crime. When 
Macbeth is on the point of murdering King Duncan, he is hesitant and his further 
murders come from fear and insecurity, but, in the case of Richard, he is eager to put 
everything into execution. According to Robinson, Whately successfully demonstrated 
Shakespeare’s superior skill in bestowing individuality on characters superficially 
similar, and Coleridge was convinced that such a task as Whately’s was eminently 
worth while.
Coleridge, in his Lectures, uses a similar technique when he offers a comparison 
between Henry Bolingbroke and Richard III:
Next we come to Henry Bolingbroke, the rival of Richard II. He appears as a 
man of dauntless courage, and of ambition equal to that of Richard III.; but, as I 
have stated, the difference between the two is most admirably conceived and 
preserved. In Richard III. all that surrounds him is only dear as it feeds his inward 
sense of superiority: he is no vulgar tyrant—  no Nero or Caligula: he has always an 
end in view, and vast fertility of means to accomplish that end. On the other hand, 
in Bolingbroke we find a man who in the outset has been sorely injured: then, we 
see him encouraged by the grievances of his countiy, and by the strange 
mismanagement of the government, yet at the same time scarcely daring to look at 
his own views, or to acknowledge them as designs. He comes home under the 
pretence of claiming his dukedom, and he professes that to be his object almost to 
the last; but, at the last, he avows his purpose to its full extent, of which he was 
himself unconscious in the earlier stages(5'/zC //, 147).
Like Whately Coleridge establishes the similarity of the two characters only as a first 
step towards a more elaborate examination of differences.
Robinson. English Shakespearean Criticism in the Eighteenth Century, p. 179.
57
William Richardson has been called the first philosophical critic of Shakespeare 
and “the foremost psychological critic of Shakespeare in the late eighteenth century.
His study of the characters has its origin in his philosophical study of human nature. 
Richardson celebrates Shakespeare’s skill in characterisation and in imitation, which he 
regards as the two essential powers of dramatic invention. In his analysis of the 
characters of Hamlet, he says that we must examine the motives of the characters and 
the temper of mind that produces their behaviour in order to judge their propriety. In his 
opinion,
...the grief of Hamlet is for the death of a father: He entertains aversion against an 
incestuous uncle, and indignation at the ingratitude and guilt of a mother. Grief is 
passive: if its object be irretrievably lost, it is attended with no desires, and rouses 
no active principle. After the first emotions, it disposes us to silence, solitude, and 
inaction. If it is blended with other passions, its operations will pass unnoticed, lost 
in the violence of other emotions, though even these it may have originally excited, 
and may secretly stimulate. Accordingly, though sonow be manifest in the features 
and demeanour of Hamlet, aversion and indignation are the feelings he expresses. 
Aversion not only implies dislike and disapprobation of certain qualities, but also an 
apprehension of suffering by their communion; and consequently, a desire of 
avoiding them. As it arises on the view of groveling and sordid qualities, we treat 
the character they belong to with contempt, rather than with indignation. They 
influence the imagination; we turn from them with disgust and loathing, as if they 
were capable of tainting us by their contagion; and, if those that possess them 
discover any expectation of our regarding them, we are offended at their 
pretensions. Claudius, endeavouring to caress and flatter Hamlet, of whose virtues 
and abilities he is afraid, thinks of honouring him by a claim of consanguinity, and 
is replied to with symptoms of aversion and deep contempt. Yet Hamlet delivers 
himself ambiguously, inclined to vent his displeasure, but unwilling to incur 
suspicion.^^
Richardson, here, analyses the complex imier psychology of Hamlet and tries to find the 
motive of his irresolution. As Robinson notes, Richardson traces the irresolution in
Babcock, Robert Witbeck. The Genesis o f  Shakespeare Idolatry 1766-J 799. New York: Russell & 
Russell. Inc., 1964, p .l59.
Richardson, William. A Philosophical Analysis and Illustration o f  Shakespeare’s Characters. 
Edinburgh, 1774, pp.90-92.
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Hamlet to the weakness of his character caused by conflicting emotions and in his 
attention to what he regards as Hamlet’s wealaiess, he anticipates Goethe, Schlegel and 
Coleridge.^'’
Hemy Mackenzie also concentrates on character analysis. For him, Shakespeare’s 
superiority is in his powers of invention, his command over the passions, and his 
knowledge of nature. Shakespeare, he thinks, is frequently careless about structure and 
probability. But Shakespeare’s laiowledge of the human mind never forsakes him. In 
Mackenzie’s opinion, of ail the characters of Shakespeare, Hamlet is the most difficult 
to be reduced to any fixed or settled principle. “The basis of Hamlet’s character,” he 
argues,
seems to be an extreme sensibility of mind, apt to be strongly impressed by its 
situation, and over powered by the feelings which that situation excites. Naturally of 
the most virtuous and most amiable dispositions, the circumstances in which he was 
placed unhinged those principles of action which, in another situation, would have 
delighted mankind and made himself happy. That kind of distress which he suffered 
was, beyond all others, calculated to produce this effect. His misfortunes were not 
the misfortunes of accident, which, though they may overwhelm at first the mind 
will soon call up reflections to alleviate, and hopes to cheer; they were such as 
reflection only serves to irritate, such as rankle in the soul’s tenderest part, his sense 
of virtue and feelings of natural affection; they arose from an uncle’s villany, a 
mother’s guilt, a father’s murder
In order to define the peculiar notion of Hamlet’s revenge, he compares it with 
Orestes’s. Whereas Orestes’ revenge satisfies by persuading us that the wicked have 
been justly punished, Hamlet’s revenge and his death leave us sadly absorbed in our 
memory of that ‘sweet prince’. Hamlet’s madness is, he comments, always subject to 
the control of his reason except when he shows the temporary marks of real disorder at
Robinson. English Shakespearean Criticism  in the Eighteenth C en tw y, pp. 189-190.
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the grave of Ophelia. While distinguishing counterfeit madness and real distraction by 
comparing Hamlet and Lear, he explains why Hamlet shows real mental disorder at 
Ophelia’s death. It is Mackenzie’s analysis of Hamlet’s character, according to 
Robinson,
— which connects him with Goethe and Coleridge—  his explanation of the 
contradictory elements in his nature, his comparison between Hamlet and Orestes, 
(to the advantage of the former), his solution of Hamlet’s madness, his clear 
perception of Shakespeare’s skill in always discriminating between genuine and 
counterfeited mental disorder, his defence of the scene with the Grave-diggers, and 
his sympathetic apprehension of imagination in writing—all these as signs of a new 
order, are to be placed to Mackenzie’s credit.^'’
Mackenzie, Vickers also argues, by
attempting to reduce Hamlet’s character to a ‘fixed or settled principle’, defined it 
as marked by extreme sensitivity, tending towards weakness or inaction. Similar 
analyses were made by William Richardson and Thomas Robertson, who took the 
argument further, claiming that Shakespeare had arranged Hamlet’s contradictory 
qualities in such a way as to cancel each other out, rendering him unable to act. The 
Romantic conception of Hamlet, from Coleridge to Bradley and beyond, is born 
here.^^
Though it does not appear that Maurice Morgann’s An Essay on the Dramatic 
Character o f  Sir John Falstajf was known to Coleridge^^, it clearly anticipates 
romantic criticism. In this essay, Morgann suggests a new interpretation of the character 
of Falstaff, against the usually accepted idea that Falstaff was a coward. Morgann 
identified the leading quality of Falstaff; that is, a high degree of wit and humour, from 
which all the rest take their colour. Falstaff, he comments.
Mackenzie, Henry. The Mirror, nos 99 and 100(1780). Reprinted m ShaJcespeare: The Critical 
Heritage. Vol. 6. pp.273-274.
Robinson. English Shakespearean Criticism in the Eighteenth Century, p.220.
Vickers, Shakespeare: The Critical Heritage. Vol.6. p.26.
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seems, by nature, to have had a mind free of malice or any evil principle; but he 
never took the trouble of acquiring any good one. He found himself esteemed and 
beloved with all his faults; nay for  his faults, which were all connected with 
humour, and for the most part grew out of it. As he had, possibly, no vices but such 
as he thought might be openly professed, so he appeared more dissolute thro’ 
ostentation. To the character of wit and humour, to which all his other qualities 
seem to have conformed themselves, he appears to have added a very necessary 
support, that of the profession of a Soldier?^
Here, we can see his defence of Shakespeare against the accusation of a lack of moral 
purpose or insight. He analyses the pattern of Falstaff s behaviour by carefully showing 
the motivations and linldng the motivations to the progressive unfolding of his 
character. Besides, he indicates historical factors in Falstaff s character; that is, how a 
particular character such as Falstaff s grows from particular soils. This kind of 
interpretation, in a way, as Bligh suggests, reminds us of the theory of organicism.
Coleridge’s own study of Shakespeare’s characters may seem deeper and more 
complex than those of the eighteenth-century critics, but it remains the case that 
Coleridge owed much to the work of his British predecessors.
2. The German Connection
Stephen Prickett summarises the German influence on Coleridge as follows:
From evidence in his notebooks, he seems to have heard of Kant as early as 1796, 
but it was only on his arrival in Gottingen, and under the intense intellectual 
stimulation he found in the university circles there, that he was able to begin a 
serious study of Kantian and idealist philosophy. The result was a total reorientation
98 See Foakes, R.A. Coleridge’s Criticism o f Shakespeare, p.5. Also see Robinson. English
Shakespearean Criticism in the Eighteenth C en tw y, p.204.
99 Morgann, Maurice. “On the Dramatic Character o f Sir John Falstaff.” Eighteenth Century Essays on
Shakespeare. Ed. D.Nichol Smith. Galsgow: James MacLehose, 1903, pp.226-227.
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of his ideas. Indeed, it is not too much to say that this period in Germany, from 1798 
to 1800, was to produce a permanent and lasting transformation of Coleridge’s 
mental landscape...it is clear that passing from Hartley to Kant was, for Coleridge, 
like undergoing a change of state—as it were an intellectual boiling point. There 
was to be no return. Gone was the Hartieian system of vibrations, the earnest 
panglossian Optimism and the schemata of providentially regulated stages of growth 
towards the final summit of human insight, in what Hartley (rather prosaically) 
called the ‘moral sense’, and in its place were the distinctions between reality and 
appearance, ‘Pure’ and ‘Practical’ Reason, and an idea of the imagination, that were 
to haunt Coleridge’s thought for the rest of his life."’’’
For the German influence on Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism, the Schlegel 
brothers are central. Starting from De Quincey, a number of critics have tried to reveal 
Coleridge’s indebtedness or his plagiarism. Among them, Anna Augusta Helmholtz has 
placed side by side passages of Coleridge and Schlegel. She refers to De Quincey’s 
charge of plagiarism, but adds a defence:
De Quincey’s article called forth still another defender, James Gillman, with 
whom Coleridge made his home during the last eighteen years of his life. He says, 
“With regard to the charge made by Mr. De Quincey, of Coleridge’s so boiTowing 
the property of other writers as to be guilty of ‘petty larceny’; with equal justice 
might we accuse the bee which flies from flower to flower in quest of food, and 
which by means of an instinct bestowed upon it by the All-wise Creator, extracts its 
nourishment from the field and the garden, but digests and elaborates it by his own 
native powers.*** Coleridge, who was an honest man, was equally honest in 
literature; and had he thought himself indebted to any other author, he would have 
acknowledged the same.”""
Most critics have admitted the importance of the German influence on Coleridge, but, 
like Gilman, have insisted on Coleridge’s active role in ‘digesting’ and transforming it 
into a new form. Jonathan Bate, for instance, argues that in Coleridge, “borrowed
Prickett, Stephen. “Coleridge, Schlegel and Schleiermaclier: England, Germany (and Australia) in 
1798.” p .l71.
Helmholtz, Anna Augusta. The Indebtedness o f  Samuel Taylor Coleridge to A. W.SchlegelMev^ York: 
Haskell House, 1971, p.281.
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materials are constantly transformed and combined in new ways”.’”  In T.M.Raysor’s 
opinion, “the great influence of Schlegel confirmed and developed rather than suggested 
many of Coleridge’s ideas.” ’”  In Coleridge’s criticism, according to Abrams, “he 
appropriated nothing that he did not assimilate to his own principles, he restated little 
that he did not improve”.’”  The difference between Coleridge and Schelling, Foakes 
says,
is often (though certainly not always in the case of Schlegel) much the same as the 
difference between, say, Enobarbus’s description of Cleopatra, and its source in 
North’s Plutarch, or Katherine’s trial speech and its source in Holingshed. Like 
Shakespeare, Coleridge made memorable what he found; in this way, it might be 
said that he gave ideas life, and is therefore a true original.’”^
Baker even suggests that the German influence was a matter for congratulation rather 
than regret:
Whatever we may thinic of Coleridge’s metaphysics per se, of the manuscript 
philosophy that he bequeathed to his devoted disciple Green, or of the Kantian and 
post-Kantian philosophy in which he immersed himself, it is no matter of regret, it 
is a matter of congratulation, that he read German aesthetic theory. For this was the 
golden age of German aesthetic theory, the age of Lessing, of Herder, of 
Wincklemann, of Goethe, of Schiller, of the Schlegels, of Schelling, of Novalis, of 
Hegel, It was a point of the highest good fortune that Coleridge stayed in Germany 
at the turn of the eighteenth century and that he kept in touch thereafter with 
German literature and aesthetic. The reading that he did in German 
aesthetics— added to his own keen native sensibility—was partly responsible for the 
acuity of his critical perceptiveness.
One of the most important influences from the Germans is the a priori concept of 
unity. According to René Wellek, for Schlegel, literature forms a great completely
Bate, Jonathan. Shakespeare and the English Romantic Imagination, p.24.
Raysor. Shakespearean Criticism, p.xxx.
Abrams. The Mirror and the Lamp, p.218.
Foakes, R.A. “Repairing the Damaged Archangel.” Essays in Criticism 24(1974); 423-27, pp.426-427.
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coherent and evenly organised whole comprehending in its unity many worlds of art and 
itself forming a peculiar work of art."’'' This view of literature is not peculiar to 
Schlegel but implicit in German philosophy, especially of the Kantian kind. For Kant, 
art is an a priori concept, “where we realize a preconceived concept of an object which 
we set before ourselves as an end.”’”  Of artistic form, Kant says.
only the form of the presentation of a concept, and the means by which the latter is 
universally communicated. To give this form, however, to the product of fine art, 
taste merely is required. By this the artist, having practised and corrected his taste by 
a variety of examples from nature or art, controls his work and, after many, and 
often laborious, attempts to satisfy taste, finds the form which commends itself to 
him. Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or of a free swing of 
the mental powers, but rather of a slow and even painful process of improvement, 
directed to making the form adequate to his thought without prejudice to the 
freedom in the play of those powers (CJ, 174).
So much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is properly |
Kant, according to Abrams, “formulates the view of a natural organism as immanently 
but unconsciously teleological, a ‘self-organizing being’ which, possessing both its own 
'moving power’ and its own 'formative power,’ develops from the inside out, and in 
which the relations between the parts and the whole can be restated in terms of an yj
interrelationship of means and end.” ’”  This sort of aesthetics provides a turning point 
and we could say, quoting Margaret R. Higonnet,
Old assumptions about the appropriate context of interpretation or the nature of 
literary unity break down, and new norms take their place. Aristotle gives way to 
Kant and Fichte, ontology to epistemology, mimesis to expression.
Baker. The Sacred River, p.275.
Welleck, Rene. A History o f  Modern Criticism: 1750-1950. Vol.2. London: Cape, 1955, p.7.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique o f Judgement \n Kant's Critique o f  Aesthetic Judgment. Tr. James Creed 
Meredith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911, p.34.
Abrams. The Mirror and the Lamp, p.208.
Higonnet, Margaret R. “Organic Unity and Interpretative Boundaries: F.SchlegePs Theories and Their 
Application in His Critique o f Lessing.” SIR 19(1980): 163-192, p. 164.
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Friedrich Schlegel greatly contributed to elaborating the new aesthetics,—  
especially the theory of organicism: “his notes and essays of the 1790’s record the 
questioning and experimentation that preceded his commitment at the middle of his 
career to a primarily organicist paradigm.” ' ” According to Orsini, F.Schlegel found the 
possibility of the application of his organic theory to literature in Shakesepare’s 
dramatic works. “One of the most important critical applications of the principle of 
Organic Form,” Orsini says,
was effected when it was made to bear upon the question of the unity of 
Shakespeare’s plays. Critics who upheld the so-called Aristotelian dramatic unities 
maintained that Shakespeare’s plays, not observing those unities, did not possess 
any unity and hence were devoid of any form. By the middle of the eighteenth 
centuiy the unities were very largely discredited in English criticism, but for a time, 
no other concept of form was available in English criticism, and no unity could be 
claimed for Shakespeare’s plays, even the masterpieces. So, as I have shown 
elsewhere, there was a brief interregnum in English criticism during which the 
traditional unities were dead, but no other positive doctrine had arisen to take their 
place. In consequence, the critics were puzzled and did not know what to think.
Then came the Schlegels in Germany, and August Wilhelm wiote his famous 
defense of Shakespeare, based upon the concept of organic form, clearly 
contradistinguished from the concept of mechanical form: ...This was taken up by 
Coleridge and used by him as a powerful instrument of criticism tliroughout his 
critical work. Thus Shakespeare’s artistiy was vindicated and positive criticism of 
his work became possible again, and flourished.” ^
This opinion might be questioned, given that there were many discussions of form in 
Shakespeare’s plays in the eighteenth centuiy in Britain. Though they did not develop a 
theory such as organicism, they tried to defend Shakespeare’s form on the ground of its
Ibid., p. 168. She also says that “Schlegel believes himself to be effecting a change in definitions o f  
wholeness o f structure in literature; this change exactly corresponds to the shift in paradigms h orn 
mechanism to organism, from “mirror” to “lamp”, which M.H.Abrams has described so thoroughly”(Ibid.
p.166).
Orsini, G.N.G. “The Organic Concepts in Aesthetics.” Comparative Literature 2 \{\9 6 9 )\  1-29, p.2I.
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truth to nature. Nevertheless, we must admit that the German concept of organicism is 
different from the British concepts of form which were employed in the eighteenth- 
century.
F.Schlegel’s philosophical analysis of the relationsip between the finite and the 
infinite is also important for an understanding of Coleridge’s poetry and criticism. 
According to Wessel, “Finitude as a principle of unity, form, and simplicity and 
infinitude as a principle of riclmess, variety, and complexity constitute the basis for 
Schlegel’s concept of das Klassische and das Romantische and, hence, form the 
philosophical framework for any possible synthesis.” ' ”  F. Schlegel applies Fichte’s 
philosophy to his aesthetic theory. Fichte argues that man is both infinite and finite, 
finite insofar as he subjects himself to the objective or not-self, infinite within this finite 
because the boundary can be posited ever farther out, to infinity.” '' Fichte criticises Kant 
for his limitation of human knowledge to what is presented in sensuous intuition. He 
argues that there is also intellectual intuition and he refers to the immediate 
consciousness of the infinite as spiritual intuition, which he ultimately identifies with 
aesthetic experience.”  ^Directing Fichte’s argument to aesthetics, Schlegel seeks to fuse 
the finite and the infinite together into one embracing unity, whereas Kant reconciled 
them by dividing them into two ontologically distinct realms.” ^
The principle of synthesis of the infinite and finite is the concept of becoming. In the 
process of becoming, all the opposites are united into one, in which diversities are still
Wessel, Leonard P., Jr. “The Antinomic Structure o f Friedrich Schlegel's Romanticism.” SIR 
12(1973); 648-669, pp.656-657.
McNiece, Gerald. The Knowledge that Endures. London: Macmillan, 1992, p .l 14.
Wessel. “The Antinomic Structure o f Fredrich Schlegel's Romanticisn,” p.657.
Ibid., p.658.
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preserved. “Schlegel’s criticism, or what he occasionally refers to as “theory,”” Ginette 
Yerstrate states,
is the moment in which the opposition between the universal and the singular, 
between the spirit(GcA/) and the \QViQY{Biichstabe) dissolves, and their synthesis 
takes place. The synthesizing view of plurality thus presented is one that undoes not 
only the opposition between the two poles, but also the individuality of the two 
opposites, which in their mutual destruction, reaffirm their polarization on a higher 
synthetic level.'”
His theory of irony can be understood in the same context of his trying to fuse the 
infinite and the finite: that is, Schlegel’s sense of the incessant conflict of the infinite or 
absolute and the finite or relative, of aspiration and limitation is close to the core of his 
concept of irony. Schlegel’s irony is defined as a mode of reconciling opposition in 
an incessant interaction. In Romantic irony, se lf consciousness works in order to keep 
judgment within the creative process. “The ironist,” according to McNiece,
aspires to richness and fullness of meaning and beauty, but is aware that he is 
composing fictions. This consciousness, this true presence of mind, involves, as 
Friedrich Schlegel suggested, a kind of interior distance which fiirther refines and 
strengthens self-awareness.*'^
Flis theory of irony seems to be applied in A.W.Schlegel’s argument for Shakespeare’s 
conscious artistry in creating his plays.
A.W.Schlegel applied Friedrich’s literary theory to practical criticism. 
A.W.Schlegel’s Course o f Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature is important not 
only for the history of Shakespeare criticism but for the history of aesthetics in the
Verstraete, Ginette. “Friedrich Schlegel’s Practice o f Literary Theory.” The German Review  
69(1994);28-35, p.29.
McNiece. The Knowledge that Endures, p. 113.
Ibid., p .l 12.
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English speaking world. This text develops several key critical topics such as the 
relationship between a dramatic form and social and historical forces, the comparison of 
the ancient and the romantic drama, and of mechanical form and organic form.
All these topics come together in his concept of ‘organicism’. In organic theory, the 
Germans use the plant as the metaphor for the work of art. The characteristics of organic 
form as the term is used by Friedrich and A.W.Schlegel can be summarised in 
Appleyard’s words:
First, organic form is perceived in the individual thing. The development of the oalc 
is influenced by the circumstances in which it grows; its essence is known as 
identical with that of other oaks by abstraction but it is known first and primarily in 
the way in which it actually exists, that is, with its essence immersed in the 
individuality which it has by reason of all its particular determinations. Second, this 
special form is characterized by organization of parts with respect to the whole. In 
Coleridge’s terms, the parts are “outward symbols and manifestations of the 
essential principle.” They are parts by virtue of the principle which organized 
them.— Third, the unity of the work of art is like this organic unity. True organic 
unity is predicated of living things only; art imitates this unity.
The origin of drama, according to A.W.Schlegel, lies in the natural disposition to 
mimicry of human beings. He designates children’s natural inclination to mimicry as its 
ground: children always try to mimic grown people when they have the opportunity to 
do so. But in order for drama to come into being, a further step is needed; that is, to 
separate and extract the mimetic elements from the separate parts of social life, and to 
present them to itself again collectively in one mass. In this step, a social fact is added to 
the human disposition. Originating in such natural and social inclinations, drama has 
been widely diffused all over the world from ancient Egypt to China. Each country has
See, Orsini, G.N.G. “Coleridge and Schlegel Reconsidered.” Comparative Literature 16(1964): 97- 
118, p.lOO.
Appleyard, J.A. Coleridge’s Philosophy o f  Literature, pp.113-114.
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developed its own particular drama so that it shows different skills and talents in its 
dramatic art. Among the dramatic forms Schlegel first chooses Greek and Roman 
dramas to compare with each other;
We do not wonder at the contrast in this respect between the Greeks and the 
Romans, for the Greeks were altogether a nation of artists, and the Romans a 
practical people. Among the latter the fine arts were introduced as a corrupting 
article of luxuiy, both betokening and accelerating the degeneracy of the times. 
They earned this luxury so far with respect to the theatre itself, that the perfection in 
essentials was sacrificed to the accessories of embellislmient. Even among the 
Greeks dramatic talent was far from universal. The theatre was invented in Athens, 
and in Athens also was it brought to perfection (CDAL, 34).
Similarly, Schlegel compares the drama of the different nations of modern Europe- e.g. 
the drama of Spain and Portugal, and Germany.
His comparison of Classic and Romantic drama echoes F.Schlegel, who, Ernst 
Behler points out.
had based his studies on the assumption of an ‘absolute difference’ between the 
classical and the modern age and tried to present the fundamental opposition of 
classical and romantic poetry.” ^
The two forms of drama differ because of their social and historical circumstances. For 
A.W.Schlegel, the one is plastic, the other, picturesque; that is, the ancient tragedy is 
the sculpture, whereas the romantic is the picture.
In comparing the ancient tragedy to a sculptural group, he says that the figures 
correspond to the characters, and their grouping to the action, as being all that is 
properly exhibited. But, in a large picture, not only are figure and motion exhibited in 
larger, richer groups, but at the same time all that surrounds the figures must also be
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portrayed. Schlegel, while admitting sculpture’s superiority in the representation of 
figure, brings the merit of picture into relief: the picture gains more life “by colours 
which are made to imitate the lightest shades of mental expression in the countenance” 
and this enables us to read what is happening in the deeper mind.
Romantic drama, according to him,
does not (like the Old Tragedy) separate seriousness and the action, in a rigid 
manner, from among the whole ingredients of life; it embraces at once the whole of 
the chequered drama of life with all its circumstances; and while it seems only to 
represent subjects brought accidentally together, it satisfies the unconscious 
requisitions of fancy, buries us in the reflections on the inexpressible signification 
of the objects which we view blended by order, nearness and distance, light and 
colour, into one harmonious whole; and thus lends, as it were, a soul to the prospect 
before \xs{CDAL, 344).
For A. W. Schlegel, the paragon of romantic drama is Shakespeare. Shakespeare’s 
dramas, in his opinion, grew out of the peculiar conditions of his own age and cultural 
milieu. The age possessed a fullness of healthy vigour. In that age, the spirit of chivalry 
was not yet wholly extinct, and the Queen was qualified to inspire the minds of her 
subjects with an ardent enthusiasm that inflamed the spirit to the noblest love of glory 
and renown. Feudal independence still survived in some measure and the nobility vied 
with each other in splendour of dress and number of retinue, and in conversation, they 
took pleasure in quick and unexpected answers(CDHT, 349).
In Shakespeare’s work, he finds “indissoluble mixtures”, the combination of 
nature and art, verse and prose, seriousness and mirth, spirituality and the corporeal, etc. 
Each of Shakesepare’s composition, Schlegel states.
Behler, Ernst. “Origins o f  Romantic Aesthetics in Friedrich Schlegel.” Canadian Review o f  
Comparative Literature 7(1980): 47-66, p.61.
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is like a world of its own, moving in its own sphere. They are works of art, finished 
in one style, which revealed the freedom and judicious choice of their author( CD/If, 
378).
Schlegel, while dismissing the argument of those critics who consider the authority 
of the ancients as sufficient models for modern literature and argue that if nations have 
not followed the ancient models, they have produced only irregular dramas, suggests the 
necessity of an alternative kind of form. For him the poetic spirit requires to be limited 
within its proper precincts, as has been felt by all nations from the first invention of 
metric form, and must act according to laws derivable from its own essence because if it 
does not, its strength will evaporate in boundless vacuity(CDrtf, 339-340).
Schlegel insists that works of genius cannot be permitted to be without form, by 
which he means organic form. Here, he distinguishes organic form from mechanic form:
Form is mechanical when, through external force, It is imparted to any material 
merely as an accidental addition without reference to its quality; as, for example, 
when we give a particular shape to a soft mass that it may retain the same after its 
induration. Organical form, again is innate; it unfolds itself from within, and 
acquires its determination contemporaneously with the perfect development of the 
germ. We everywhere discover such forms in nature throughout the whole range of 
living powers, from the crystallization of salts and minerals to plants and flowers, 
and from these again to the human body. In the fine arts as well as in the domain of 
nature—  the supreme artist, all genuine forms are organical, that is, determined by 
the quality of the work(CZ)HT, 340).
If we apply this notion of organic form to drama,
something like the plot, in embryonic form, may pre-exist in the mind of the author 
or on paper as an outline, but the plot itself requires the presence of living characters 
and not abstractions. Plot and character thus come to form a unity, and neither of 
them pre-exists to this unity, which will determine the situations, the individual 
actions and speeches.
Orsini, G.N.G. “The Organic Concepts of Aesthetics,” p. 14.
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Of A.W.Schlegel’s effort to establish organic theory and apply it to literature, Abrams 
says:
The writings of August Wilhelm Schlegel provide a compendious summary of 
German concepts of organic invention,.... Unlike most of his contemporaries, the 
older Schlegel had a tidy mind. In the lectures he read in Berlin between 1801 and 
1804, he collected and ordered the ideas contributed by thinkers from Leibniz 
through Kant to Friedrich Schlegel and Schelling, trimmed away some of the 
accrued extravagance and a good deal of rhetoric, and most importantly, brought 
them down to the consideration of specific questions in the history and analysis of 
works of art. The true philosopher sees everything ‘as an eternal becoming, an 
unintermitted process of creation.’ No living organism can be understood from the 
standpoint of materialism alone, because its nature is such ‘that the whole must be 
conceived before the parts,’ and it can only be made intelligible as ‘a product which 
produces itself,’ exhibiting in the process ‘an endless reciprocation, in which each 
effect becomes a cause of its cause’.
We can see an example of Schlegel’s organic theory in his criticism of Romeo and 
Juliet. He begins by saying that Romeo and Juliet is a simple story, in which two 
persons feel mutual love at first glance and, under circumstances hostile to their union, 
unite themselves in a secret marriage, but they are forcibly separated from each other 
and by voluntai-y death are united in the grave to meet again in another world. He says 
that such a simple story, under Shakespeare’s handling, has become a glorious song of 
praise for the inexpressible feeling which eimobles the soul and gives to it its highest 
sublimity, and which elevates even the senses into soul, while at the same time it is a 
melancholy elegy. He celebrates Shakespeare’s excellent dramatic arrangement, the
Abrams. The Mirror and the Lamp, p.212.
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significance of every character in its place, the judicious selection of all the 
circumstances {CDAL, 401)/^^ Romeo and Juliet is also marked by its unity:
All that is most intoxicating in the odour of a southern spring,—  all that is 
languishing in the song of the nightingale, or voluptuous in the first opening of the 
rose, all alike breathe forth from this poem. But even more rapidly than the earliest 
blossoms of youth and beauty decay, does it from the first timidly-bold declaration 
and modest return of love hurry on to the most unlimited passion, to an irrevocable 
union; and then hastens, amidst alternating storms of rapture and despair, to the fate 
of the two lovers, who yet appear enviable in their hard lot, for their love survives 
them, and by their death they have obtained an endless triumph over every 
separating power. The sweetest and the bitterest love and hatred, festive rejoicing 
and dark forebodings, tender embraces and sepulchral horrors, the fiilness of life 
and self-annihilation, are here all brought close to each other; and yet these contrasts 
are so blended into a unity of impression, that the echo which the whole leaves 
behind in the mind resembles a single but endless sigh (CDAL, 400-401).
To create such a drama, Shakespeare must be a profound artist.
Shakespeare has reflected, and deeply reflected, on character and passion, on the 
progress of events and human destinies, on the human constitution, on all the things 
and relations of the world(CD^T, 359).’^ ^
Schlegel even takes anaclu'onism as an example of Shakespeare’s deliberate artifice. It is 
the means, he claims, by which Shakespeare moved the exhibited subject out of the 
background and brought it near to us. For example, Hamlet is an old Northern stoiy, but 
Shakespeare makes it a story of his own time.
Rene Welleck celebrates Schlegel’s paper on Romeo and Juliet as an example o f his organic theory. 
According to him, “Schlegel’s view o f Shakesepare is first developed in the remarkable paper on Romeo 
and Ju liet(ll91), which is all centered around the one idea that Shakespeare had “finer, more spiritual 
concepts o f dramatic art than one usually tends to ascribe to him.” Welleck, p.65.
See Rene Welleck. A History o f  Modern Criticism. Vol.2. p.45. There, he writes, “Schlegel repeated 
over and over again that Shakespeare was a “deep-thinking artist” and found in him “superb cultivation of 
mental powers, practised art, and worthy and maturely considered intentions.”
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Schlegel’s view of theatre and illusion is closely related to his organic view of 
dramatic form. Like other historical and social circumstances, dramatic form is 
influenced by the structure of the theatre:
With the Spanish theatre at the time of its formation, it was the same as with 
the English, and when the stage had remained a moment empty, and other persons 
came in by another entrance, a change of scene was to be supposed though none was 
visible; and this circumstance had the most favourable influence on the form of the 
dramas. The poet was not obliged to consult the scene-painter to Icnow what could 
or could not be represented; nor to calculate whether the store of decorations on 
hand were sufficient, or new ones would be requisite; he was not driven to impose 
restraint on the action as to change of times and places, but represented it entirely as 
it would naturally have taken place; he left to the imagination to fill up the intervals 
agreeably to the speeches, and to conceive all the surrounding circumstances. This 
call on the fancy to supply the deficiencies supposes, indeed, not merely benevolent, 
but also intelligent spectators of a poetical tone of mind. That is the true illusion, 
when the spectators are so completely carried away by the impressions of the poetry 
and the acting that they overlook the secondary matters, and forget the whole of the 
remaining objects around them. To lie morosely on the watch to detect every 
circumstance that may violate an apparent reality which, strictly speaking, can never 
be attained, is in fact a proof of inertness of imagination and an incapacity for 
mental illusion {CDAL, 453).
According to Schlegel, the Globe
is a massive structure destitute of architectural ornaments, and almost without 
windows in the outward walls. The pit was open to the sky, and the acting was by 
day-light; the scene had no other decoration than wrought tapestry, which hung at 
some distance from the walls, and left space for several entrances. In the back­
ground of the stage there was a second stage raised above it, a sort of balcony, 
which served for various purposes, and according to circumstances signified all 
manner of things.(CZ).4L, 450)
How profoundly the structure of the contemporary theatre influenced Shakespeare’s 
dramatic form is difficult to establish. But his stress on the role of the audience’s 
imagination was important in forming Coleridge’s view of illusion, especially the
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concept of ‘intelligent illusion’ and the reliance on ‘spectators of a poetical tone of 
mind’.
Schlegel argues that the attention of the audience is held by the play’s ‘unity of 
interest’. The unity of interest, Burwick writes,
is an organic unity that enlarges the scope of participation beyond the destiny of a 
single character and allows a total engagement of the audience in the dramatic 
situation. For Schlegel, unity is a meaningful criteria only in reference to the 
spectator’s sense of a total impression(“Gesamteindruck”). A logical cohesion of 
cause and effect is a means, not an end. The drama should excite the response of all 
the “Geisteskrafte”. If the understanding should balk at some casual improbability, 
the imagination and the feeling are not apt to follow. The “unity of interest” is never 
pulled along by a single tlii'ead of dramatic action, however, and the cumulative 
effect may well overwhelm the sceptical reason. Schlegel likens it to a river fed by 
many tributaries that continues to increase its turbulent strength until it pours forth 
into the vast sea.’^ ^
The unity of interest does not merely emphasise the role of the dramatist but of the 
audience. This concept of the ‘unity of interest’ is a concept which substitutes for the 
neo-classical unities, and provides the means by which Schlegel and Coleridge 
endeavour to explain the Romantic drama.
Schlegel is also interested in Shakespeare’s characterisation, Shakespeare’s 
knowledge of human nature, and his use of the supernatural. Compared with Jolinson 
and the British character critics, his thoughts on these matters do not seem 
extraordinary. In some points, he echoes the British critics. His view of Caliban and 
Ariel, however, is said to have been borrowed by Coleridge. Caliban, in Schlegel’s 
opinion,
has become a by-word as the strange creation of a poetical imagination. A mixture 
of gnome and savage, half daemon, half brute, in his behaviour we perceive at once
Burwick, Frederick. The Drama and Illusion, pp. 155-156.
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the traces of his native disposition, and the influence of Prospero’s education. The 
latter could only unfold his understanding, without, in the slightest degree, taming 
his rooted malignity: it is as if the use of reason and human speech were 
communicated to an awkward ape. In inclination Caliban is malicious, cowardly, 
false, and base; and yet he is essentially different from the vulgar knaves of a 
civilized world, as portrayed occasionally by Shakespeare. He is rude, but not 
vulgar; he never falls into the prosaic and low familiarity of his drunken associates, 
for he is, in his way, a poetic being; he always speaks in verse....The delineation of 
this monster is throughout inconceivably consistent and profound, and, 
notwithstanding its hatefulness, by no means hurtful to our feelings, as the honour 
of human nature is left untouched.
In the zephyr-like Ariel the image of air is not to be mistaken, his name even 
bears an allusion to it; as, on the other hand Caliban signifies the heavy element of 
earth. Yet they are neither of them simple, allegorical personifications but beings 
individually determined(CZ)HZ, 395-396).
Benziger argues that “Schlegel develops his entire doctrine of organic unity from the 
consideration of precisely this point, how an artist can create characters who do not 
behave as mere p u p p e t s . T h i s  argument is problematic, since such critics as Johnson 
also suggested the naturalness and individuality of supernatural beings in Shakespeare’s 
dramas. Rather, Schlegel explains Shakespeare’s dealing with the supernatural world as 
a kind of demonstration of his ability to pierce even the inward life of nature and to 
reveal it to us thus:
In general we find in The Midsummer Night’s Dream, in The Tempest, in the 
magical part of Macbeth, and wherever Shakespeare avails himself of the popular 
belief in the invisible presence of spirits, and the possibility of coming in contact 
with them, a profound view of the inward life of nature and her mysterious springs, 
which, it is true, can never be altogether unknown to the genuine poet, as poetry is 
altogether incompatible with mechanical physics, but which few have possessed in 
an equal degree with Dante and himself(CD/4Z, 396).
As I have suggested so far, Schlegel’s Shakespearean criticism is important chiefly 
because of his concept of organicism. His account of the influence of historical and
a :
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social circumstances in shaping dramatic form, the comparison between mechanical 
form and organic form, his view of Shakespeare as an artist, and his theory of unity of 
interest, were all borrowed by Coleridge.
Schlegel’s aesthetic orientation in Shakespeare criticism is quite different both 
from Jolmson’s, based on the concept o f ‘nature’, and from those of the character critics, 
largely based on human psychology. It can be said that the former is an expression of 
Continental Transcendentalism and the latter, of British empiricism. For the former, art 
is an independent being having its own space, but for the latter, it is a kind of reflector. 
Therefore, the main interest of the former is focused on an a priori concept of art itself, 
whereas the latter is focused on how faithfully art reflects the world. These two 
positions are united in Coleridge. Coleridge, in his Shakespearean criticism, combines 
the German frame and the British tenor. He, in other words, keeps the aesthetics of the 
German idealists which takes art as an independent being, but in practical criticism, he 
follows his British predecessors in many aspects.
Benziger, Janies. “Organic Unity: Leibniz to Coleridge.” PMLA 66(1951): 24-48, p.39.
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Chapter 2. Coleridge’s Concept of Nature and His Poetic Principles
As I discussed in the preceding chapter, Coleridge’s criticism of Shakespeare is 
derived from various sources. However, the material is not reproduced in the absence of 
any system. Rather, his Shakespearean criticism is written on the basis of certain 
principles. In fact, it might not be an exaggeration to say that Coleridge dedicated 
himself to establishing such principles. The principles he tried to establish were not 
merely applicable to literary criticism but to all subjects with which he dealt,—  i.e., 
science, philosophy, politics, and religion, etc.
Coleridge’ s thought, whether, religious, poetic, political, or scientific, always 
aspires towards the systematic, but critics have differed as to how far the aspiration is 
matched by achievement. Some, such as M.H.Abrams see Coleridge’s Biographia 
Literaria as “a romantic Buildungsgeschichte, representing the growth of the poet- 
philosopher-critic’s mind.”  ^ H.J.Jackson characterises features such as continual and 
progressive expansion, comprehension and productivity— the essential features of the 
spiral—  as the significant forms of Coleridge’s mature thought.^ Dorothy Emmet argues 
that
' Abrams, M.H. “Coleridge and the Romantic Vision o f the World.” Coleridge’s Variety. Ed. John Beer. 
Pittsburg: University o f Pittsburg Press, 1975. 101-133. p. 104. Also see MacFarland, Thomas. “So 
Immethodical a Miscellany; Coleridge’s Literary Life.” Modern Philology^ 83(1986): 405-413, p.407. 
MacFarland takes Biographia Literaria as the counteipart o f  Wordsworth’s Prelude. According to him, 
“Coleridge’s use o f an autobiographical framework was a device with a twofold efficacy; it was likely to 
find favor with an intellectual public already conditioned by Rousseau’s Confessions ( compare the 
parallel situation o f de Quincey’s Confessions o f  an English Opium-Eater), and it afforded him an 
organizing principle for his thoughts, which were at the time somewhat ambivalent and unresolved.”
 ^Jackson, FI.J. “Turning and turning’: Coleridge on Our Knowledge o f the External World.” PMLA 
101(1986): 848-856, p.855.
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the heart of Coleridge’s philosophical interest lay in trying to understand the powers 
he found operative in his own mind, especially in creative work. Then he tried to see 
these powers as connatural (his word, and also an older medieval word) with 
powers of life and growth in nature, and finally tried to see powers in the mind and 
in nature as alike depending on a spiritual ground.^
Coleridge, tlri'oughout his life, tried to locate a single principle embracing both the 
universe and man, and that principle is most easily explained by considering 
Coleridge’s concept of nature. In Coleridge’s system, the concept of nature is closely 
related to his poetic principles. The concepts of polarity, or opposites reconciled, and of 
organism are all embraced in the concept of nature. In this chapter, first, I will examine 
Coleridge’s concept of nature, and then try to link to it his ideas of ait, organic unity, 
imitation and copy, and of the reconciliation of opposites. Coleridge’s concept of 
imagination can also be deduced from his concept of nature. All of these concepts are 
crucial to understand Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism and will demonstrate in what 
way Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism is unique.
1. The concept of nature
In his notes and lectuies on Shakespeare, one of the terms Coleridge uses most 
often is nature. As in Jolmson, nature in Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism is a basic 
concept propping his further arguments. Raimonda Modiano argues that Coleridge’s 
writings on natural philosophy
 ^Emmet, Dorothy. “Coleridge on Powers in Mind and Nature.” Coleridge’s Variety. 166-182. p.167.
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reveal the essential features of a coherent and integrated system that is thoroughly 
structured and even conceptually rigid, notwithstanding the fact that it is dispersed 
in bits and pieces tlii'oughout Coleridge’s works A
Douglas Brownlow Wilson also notes that in Coleridge’s later prose works he 
elaborated the idea of nature philosophically and this elaboration is central to an 
understanding of his aesthetic view.^ Coleridge was said to be influenced by the 
naturphilosophen such as Schelling and Steffens. According to Modiano,
The Naturphilosophen generally conceived the universe as a complicated web 
of polar forces, operating in distinct though related modes, in both inorganic and 
organic nature, matter and spirit. They commonly rejected the Newtonian atomistic 
conception of nature, proposing instead a dynamic theory which explained the 
manifestations of given phenomena on the basis of original forces opposed to one 
another.^
Coleridge found some errors and inconsistencies in the Natui*philosophen and recast 
their systems in a new mould.^
1 • i Nature as Natura Naturans
For Coleridge, nature is of two kinds- natura naturans and natura naturata. 
Though this distinction can be traced to Spinoza’s Ethics, Coleridge’s use of it is 
individual. According to Coleridge,
Modiano, Raimonda. Coleridge and the Concept o f  Nature. London and Basingstoke: the Macmillan 
Press, 1985, p. 188.
 ^ Wilson, Douglas Brownlow. “Two Modes of Apprehending Nature: A Gloss on the Coleridgean
Symbol.” PMLA 87(1972): 42-52, p.44.
 ^Modiano. Coleridge and the Concept o f  Nature, p. 141. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 188.
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The word Nature has been used in two senses, viz. actively and passively; 
energetic (=forma formans), and material (=forma formata). In the first (the sense in 
which the word is used in the text) it signifies the inward principle of whatever is 
requisite for the reality of a thing, as existent: while the essence, or essential 
property, signifies the inner principle of all that appertains to the possibility of a 
thing....In the second, or material sense, of the word Nature, we mean by it the sum 
total of all things, as far as they are objects of our senses, and consequently of 
possible experience—  the aggregate of phaenomena, whether existing for our 
outward senses, or for our imier sense.(F I, 467’^ )^
Natura naturans is not supernatural but supersensuous.^ It is “living and actuating 
Powers” of nature. Natura naturans, as David Vallins points out, is “an eternal and 
infinite essence of which the forms of passive nature (or natura naturata) are 
modifications.” '  ^Therefore, all nature,
all the mighty world 
Of eye and ear—
presents itself to us, now as the aggregated material of duty, and now as a vision of 
the Most High revealing to us the mode, and time and particular instance of 
applying and realizing that universal rule, pre-established in the heart of our 
reason! (F I, 112)
“In seeking to discover natura naturans", Douglas Brownlow Wilson says,
Coleridge directs his inquiiy nor primarily toward the outward appeaiances of nature, 
but rather to these outward forms as manifestations of their inner creative principles."
For Coleridge, the universe is one productive unity. According to Trevor H Levere, 
Coleridge’s notion of the universe
® See Vallins, David. “Production and Existence: Coleridge’s Unification o f Nature.” Journal o f  the 
History o f  Ideas 56(1995 ): 107-24, p. 111. According to him, the concept o f natura naturans has much in 
common with the ideas o f productive energy employed by Coleridge. The concept o f God or Nature is not 
mystical in intention but leads logically to the view that eveiy single thing in the universe belongs to , or 
falls within, a single, intellectual, causal system.
 ^Barfield, Owen. What Coleridge Thought. London: Oxford University Press, 1972. p.25.
is like Schelling in his Einleitung zu seinem Entwurfeines Systems der 
Natiirphilosophie (Jena and Leipzig, 1799), a copy of which Coleridge annotated. 
But whereas the universe of Schelling and of Steffens produces itself by an inner 
logical necessity, Coleridge’s universe is produced according to divinely created 
laws following an initiating divine act— so both pantheism and atheism are avoided, 
and God’s will governs all."
Coleridge, in his system, tried to develop a scheme to explain the formation and 
operation of the universe. His starting question concerns the powers of Nature; that is, 
“what are the powers, or what are the primary constituent powers of nature, into some 
modification or combination of which all other powers are to resolve?” According to 
him, all the primary powers of nature may be reduced to two and each of these produces 
two others and a third as the union of both. The first two are “distinctive power” and 
“agglomerative power”. The nature of the former is to manifest, therefore it tends to 
draw out and to distinguish. The nature of the latter is to hide or keep hidden, therefore 
it tends to draw back and to bring into one mass. Coleridge characterises agglomerative 
power as inward, intro-active, centripetal, distinctive power as outward, extroitive, 
centrifugal. Following the Bible, he calls distinctive power light, and agglomerative 
power, lack of light, or, opacity.
Here, light does not mean visual light or solar light but the light spoken of in 
Genesis I.v.3. Coleridge explains it as that which ^"goes forth to declare, like a word 
spoken', or remains on the surface ( or ow/'side) to distinguish, like a word written', and in 
both cases, makes the thing ow/ward, and outers (now spelt, utters) its nature. The 
agglomerate power is the principle of weight, gravity or gravitation.
Vallins. “Production and Existence: Coleridge’s Unification and Nature,” p. 111.
” Wilson. “Two Modes o f Apprehending Nature: A Gloss on the Coleridgean Symbol,” p.44.
Levere, Trevor H. “Coleridge, Chemistiy, and the Philosophy ofNature.” SIR 16(1977): 349-79, p.367.
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Each power has two other powers: under gravity there are attraction and repulsion 
and under light the powers of contraction and dilation. Then there is the third power; 
that is, the union of the two powers: from the union of the attractive and repulsive 
powers there results solidity or the solidifie power and from the union of contraction and 
dilation results in fluidity. For Coleridge,
these are Constituent Powers—  that is, all things are constituted by them, and of 
course presuppose them. But after the Things are made, the same Powers re-appear 
in the things, but differently modified—  and may therefore be called the Real 
Powers, ((from Res, a thing)) and the former Ideal Powers.—  Thus the ideal Power 
of Gravity re-appears in the Real Power of Magnetism: the I.P. of light in the R.P. of 
electricity; while the union of the two is the Real Power of Galvanism. And so the
I.P. of Attraction is the R.P. of Negative Magnetism; the I.P. of Repulsion re­
appears in the R.P. of Positive Magnetism— & so 
Contraction == Neg. Electricity 
Dilation = Pos. Electricity. {TL, 851)
For Coleridge, in nature there is a law by which the powers operate. Coleridge 
explains the process by which law operates in nature by drawing an example from 
Erasmus Darwin. In Coleridge’s opinion, the substances of nature
are the symbols of elementary powers, and the exponents of a law, which as the root 
of all these powers, the chemical philosopher, whatever his theory may be, is 
instinctively labouring to extract. The instinct, again, is itself but the form, in which 
the idea, the mental Con-elative of the law, first announces its incipient germination 
on his mind: and hence proceeds the striving after unity of principle through all the 
diversity of forms, with a feeling resembling that which accompanies our 
endeavours to recollect a forgotten name; when we seem at once to have and not to 
have it; which the memoiy feels but cannot fmd.(FI, 470-1)
Here, we notice that a law or an idea is an rz priori concept. For him.
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the very impulse to universalize any phaenomenon involves the prior assumption of 
some efficient law in nature, which in a thousand different forms is evermore one 
and the same; entire in each, yet comprehending all; and incapable of being 
abstracted or generalized from any number of phaenomena, because it is itself 
presupposed in each and all as their common ground and condition; and because 
every definition of a genus is the adequate definition of the lowest species alone, 
while the efficient law must contain the ground of all in all. It is attributed, never 
derived.{F 467*)
For him, what is contemplated objectively is called a law and the same contemplated 
subjectively is called an idea. He argues that Plato names ideas laws and Bacon 
describes the laws of the material universe as the ideas in nature. {C&S, 13)"
Coleridge assumes that polarity is the law of nature. In a fragment, he notes,
1. Polarity is a Law and a Necessity of Nature exclusively—  of Hades 
actualized and actualizing.
2.Polarity always supposes a Contrariety in the Origins of its antagonist 
Forces—  always pre-supposes a contradiction in its Ground. For its end is to 
reconcile a contradiction, which yet must remain as long as Nature remains, and the 
solution of which would be the evanescence of Nature, and is its true End, Finis 
Naturae est Naturae Finis. Nature’s End(cessation) is the true End (final Cause) of 
Nature. But to this Conciliation, this Solution Polarity is a tendency to approximate.
3. Nevertheless, Polarity is not a Composite Force, or Vis tertia constituted 
by the momenta of two c o u n t e r - a g e I t  is 1 manifested in 2, not 1+1=2. A divine 
Energist indeed is the antecedent causative Conditio sine qua non (Indispensable 
condition) of the Polarity; but the Polarity itself is the (immediate) Act of the 
Energoumenos alone—  i.e. of Nature, or Hades potentiated by the energic WORD. 
The polar forces are the two forms, in which a one Power works in the same act and 
instant. Thus it is not the Power, Attraction and the Power Repulsion at once 
hugging and tugging like two sturdy Wrestlers that compose the Magnet; but the 
Magnetic Power working at once positively & negatively. A. and R. are the two 
Forces of the one magnetic Power....{Sh&F, 784-5)
According to Barfield, polar forces are not physical forces though they give rise to 
physical forces. The two forces, then,
Also see The Friend /., p.492.
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are not parts of phenomenal nature; they are not body, nor in any conventional sense 
the “causes” of what is bodily. They are not material in the sense that, for instance, 
the forces of electricity and magnetism are material. These ‘constituent 
powers’,...are acts or energies that are “suspended and, as it were, quenched in the 
product.” They are the inside of anything to which we can apply the noun matter or 
the adjective material}'^
For Coleridge, “in Man the centripetal and individualizing tendency of all Nature is 
itself concerned and individualized— he is Revelation of Nature!”(7X, 551) Man, for 
Coleridge,
shares the condition of growth and becoming with the animals, of course, but 
through his power of self-consciousness—properly activated by the will—man may 
further approach nature tlirough the medium of reason and apprehend it as natura 
naturans.
Coleridge himself— in epitomizing his own peculiar claims for the mind as a 
religious faculty—envisions it as uniquely fitted, in its most august powers, to 
entertain self-consciously nature’s powers of growth and becoming ."
The power in man which enables him to recognise nature as natura naturans is the same 
kind of power in nature. Wilson points out that Coleridge’s originality in his concept of 
nature is “neither in his definition of the symbol, nor in his sacramentalism, but in his 
psychological explication of both.”"  This idea is well demonstrated thus:
In a self-conscious and thence reflecting being, no instinct can exist, without 
engendering the belief of an object corresponding to it, either present or future, real 
or capable of being realized: much less the instinct, in which humanity itself is 
grounded; that by which, in eveiy act of conscious perception, we at once identify 
our being with that of the world without us, and yet place oui'selves in contra­
distinction to that world. Least of all can this mysterious pre-disposition exist 
without evolving a belief that the productive power, which is in nature as nature, is 
essentially one (i.e. of one kind) with the intelligence, which is in the human mind 
above nature; however disfigured this belief may become, by accidental forms or 
accompaniments, and though like heat in thawing of ice, it may appear only in its
Barfield. What Coleridge Thought, p.33.
Wilson. “Two Modes o f Apprehending Nature: A Gloss on the Coleridgean Symbol,” p.45.!6 Ibid., p.50.
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effects....In all aggregates of construction therefore, which we contemplate as 
wholes, whether as integral parts or as a system, we assume an intention, as the 
initiative, of which the end is the correlative.
Hence proceeds the introduction of final causes in the works of nature equally as 
in those of man.(F I, 497-8)
Elsewhere Coleridge demonstrates this connection between spiritual power in man and
power in nature;
I feel an awe, as if there were before my eyes the same Power, as that of the 
REASON—  the same Power in a lower dignity, and therefore a symbol established 
in the truth of things. I feel it alike, whether I contemplate a single tree or flower, or 
mediate on vegetation throughout the world, as one of the great organs of the life of 
nature. Lo!— with the rising sun it commences its outward life and enters into open 
communion with all the elements, at once assimilating them to itself and to each 
other. At the same moment it strikes its roots and unfolds its leaves, absorbs and 
respires, steams forth its cooling vapour and finer fragrance, and breathes a 
repairing spirit, at once the food and tone of the atmosphere, into the atmosphere 
that feeds it. Lo!—  at the touch of light how it returns an air akin to light, and yet 
with the same pulse effectuates its own secret growth, still contracting to fix what 
expanding it had refined. Lo!—  how upholding the ceaseless plastic motion of the 
parts in the profoundest rest of the whole it becomes the visible organismus of the 
whole silent or elementary life of nature and, therefore, in incorporating the one 
extreme becomes the symbol of the other; the natural symbol of that higher life of 
reason, in which, the whole series (known to us in our present state of being) is 
perfected, in which therefore, all the subordinate graduations recur, and are re­
ordained “m more abundant honor."{LS, 72)
Dorothy Emmet argues that this notion of Coleridge differentiates him from Kant.
According to her,
whereas Kant confines knowledge to the phenomenal world and has to rest agnostic 
about things in themselves beyond the phenomenal world (he has as it were an iron 
curtain between the phenomenal and noumenal), Coleridge wants to take these 
‘facts of the mind’ as clues to the character of a really existent nature, not just of 
nature as a phenomenal construct. And he tries to do this by seeing the same powers 
at work in the mind and in nature beyond the mind."
17 Emmet, Dorothy. “Coleridge on Powers in Mind and Nature,” p. 169. Also see Wendling, Ronald C. 
C oleridge’s Progress to Christianity. London: Bucknell University Press, 1995, p. 138. According to 
Wendling, in the conception o f nature naturing, “resides Coleridge’s essential difference from Kant, 
whatever his hesitancies about it in 1815. He agrees with Kant that the understanding shapes the 
phenomena represented in the senses and it cannot know the noumena. But in arguing the existence o f a
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Coleridge, borrowing from Jacobi and Henisterhuis, defines Reason as “an organ 
bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the
Necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phaenomena. To him, it “is an
organ identical with its appropriate objects.”(F I, 156) Therefore, “God, the soul, eternal 
Truth, &c are the objects of Reason; but they are themselves reason."{Fl, 156)
In The Friend, he claims for this view the authority of Bacon:
But that there is potentially, if not actually, in every rational being, a somewhat, call 
it what you will, the pure reason, the spirit, lumen siccum, vouq, cpœç voepov, 
intellectual intuition, &c. &c.; and that in this are to be found the indispensable 
conditions of all science, and scientific research, whether mediative, contemplative, 
or experimental; is often expressed, and every where supposed, by Lord Bacon. And 
that this is not only the right but the possible nature of human mind, to which it is 
capable of being restored, is implied in the various remedies prescribed by him for 
its diseases, and in the various means of neutralizing or converting into useful 
instrumentality the imperfections which cannot be removed. There is a sublime truth 
contained in his favourite phrase— Idola intellectus. He thus tells us, that the mind 
of man is an edifice not built with human hands, which needs only be purged of its 
idols and idolatrous services to become the temple of the true and living Light. Nay, 
he has shown and established the true criterion between the ideas and the idol of the 
mind—namely, that the former are manifested by their adequacy to those ideas in 
nature, which in and through them are contemplated.(FI, 491)
This power in man enables him to see the outer world as a symbol of natura naturans. 
In his Notes, we can see his approach to nature as penetrating its symbolism;
In looking at objects of Natine while I am thinking, as at yonder moon dim- 
glimmering tlii'o’the dewy window-pane, I seem rather to be seeking, as it were 
asking, a symbolical language of something within me that already and forever
noumenal power shaping phenomena from within (a formal plastic power outside the categories o f  the 
understanding) and the knowability of that power by a power in the whole mind other than the 
understanding, namely reason, Coleridge differs crucially from Kant. A noumenal world exists for both, 
but only for Coleridge can it be known as well as assumed.”
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exists, than observing anything new. Even when that latter is the case, yet still I 
have always an obscure feeling as if that new phaenomeon were the dim Awakening 
of a forgotten or hidden Truth of my inner Nature/ It is still interesting as a Word, a 
Symbol! It is Aoyos, the Creator! (and the Evolver!>(CAII 2546, April 1805).
Coleridge describes the relation between natural symbol and our soul:
all the merely bodily Feelings subservient to our Reason, coming only at its call, and 
obeying its Behests with a gladness not without awe, like servants who work under 
the Eye of their Lord, we have solemnized the long marriage of our Souls by its 
outward Sign & natural Symbol. It is now registered in both worlds, the world of 
Spirit and the world of Senses.(CAII 2600, May-Jun 1805)"
1 ■ ii Organic Nature
For Coleridge, nature is an organic unity, not a mechanical one. According to Levere,
Coleridge’s cosmos was a living one, informed by the power of life, and reaching its 
climax in man at the summit of the terrestrial creation. Coleridge’s concern with the 
ascent of life complemented his probing into his human nature and his fascination 
with the relations between mind and body."
See Engell, James & W.Jackson Bate, eds, “Editor’s Introduction.” BL, p.lxxxiii: “A symbol is also 
“conatural” or “consubstantial”: it fuses the nature o f mind with the reality o f nature. Symbols are thus 
esempiastic, shaping into one. The symbols o f perception grow so habitual that fi'equently we fail to 
regard them as symbols. But language, numbers, and mental images are all symbolic reflections o f what 
we originally perceive. (Coleridge came to believe that our symbols o f perception are constitutive with 
nature; they truly represent the ideal form and divine power responsible for creating nature and nature’s 
law.)” Also see Prickett, Coleridge and Wordsworth: The Poetry o f Growth, p. 187. “A symbol is only a 
part o f the greater whole it reveals, but it implies the totality. The way in which it does this he attempts to 
describe by the idea o f ‘translucence’. In a symbol, he suggests, the material and temporal become as it 
were a lens whereby we can bring into focus for a moment the eternal abstraction o f which it is a 
fractional and incomplete part. By insisting that a symbol was above all a living part o f the unity it 
represents, Coleridge was able to perform the astonishing feat o f bringing together his Platonism and his 
knowledge o f optical science.”
Levere, Trevor H. Poetry Realized in Nature: Samuel Taylor Coleridge and early nineteenth-centwy 
science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.201. Also see the same book, p.220. Levere 
writes that “Coleridge possessed an imaginative sympathy with the enterprise o f science. Because he had a 
unified vision o f the natural world, he had no need to confine his inquiries within the traditional 
compartments respected by scientists. He was able to utilize the work o f chemists, geologists, and 
physiologists, without insisting on the complete separation o f their disciplines. Freedom fl om the 
limitations imposed by disciplinary boundaries enabled him to ask questions and suggest research in areas
Self-knowledge required complementary laiowledge of nature. David Vallins says,
Once we have the faith of unity, any part of nature, whether living or dead in the 
physical sense, can recall the infinite totality to which it belongs. This totality can be 
nothing other than that of a living whole—of the world or the universe as an 
organism only a tiny portion of which we can perceive, yet the principle of whose 
existence can be recalled by the parts, raising these above the limited and 
fragmentary nature of perception.^''
In organic nature, in Coleridge’s opinion, from the plant to the highest order of 
animals, each higher implies a lower as the condition of its actual existence. In his 
scheme, in nature there are vital and organic powers. As the condition of its existence, 
each higher power implies a lower power.
For him the first power of these organic powers is that of growth, or productivity. 
The second power is that of locomotion and it is also called irritability. Without the first 
power, the second could not exist or could not manifest itself. Therefore productivity is 
the necessary antecedent of irritability, and in the same manner, irritability of sensibility. 
The lower power derives its intelligibility from the higher and the highest inheres 
latently or potentially in the lowest. Thus in sensibility a power in every instant goes out 
of itself and in the same instant retracts and falls back on itself.
For him, the pure sense or inward vision must be assumed as truth of fact in all 
living growth. For example, the growth of a plant differs from that of a ciystal. Whereas 
the latter is formed wholly ab extra, in the former the movement ab extra is, in order of
avoided by many o f his contemporaries, and skepticism about conclusions based on atomism made him a 
trenchant critic o f the cruder explanations o f contemporary mechanistic science. Coleridge’s philosophy 
and his knowledge o f  science repeatedly led him to point out inconsistencies, and to identify as significant 
problems avoided or ignored by contemporary natural philosophers.
Vallins. “Production and Existence: Coleridge’s Unification ofNature,” p.l 13.
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thought, consequent on, and yet constantaneous with the movement ab intra. He finds 
sensibility to be the general character of life. It supplies not only the way of conceiving, 
but the insight into the possibility of irritability and growth. Thus growth taken as 
separate and exclusive of sensibility would be unintelligible. Even when it is not 
actually, it must be involved potentially. Even where life does not manifest itself in the 
highest dignity, it has an evident tendency thereto and this has two epochs, or 
intensities. Potential sensibility in its first epoch, or lowest intensity, appears as giowth 
and in its second epoch, it demonstrates itself as irritability, or vital instinct. In both, the 
sensibility must have pre-existed as latent. For him, growth is that which appears in the 
stamina of the plant during the act of impregnating the germane and irritability has its 
first appearance of nerves and nervous bulbs, in the lowest orders of the insect realm. In 
Coleridge’s view, evolution as contradistinguished from apposition, or superinduction 
from elsewhere, is implied in the conception of life.(C&F, 179-181)
On the basis of this idea, Coleridge explains how each shape is formed. In his 
opinion, there is an essential difference between an organism and a machine in that in an 
organism
not only the characteristic Shape is evolved from the invisible power, but the 
material Mass itself is acquired by assimilation. The germinal power of the Plant 
transmutes the fixed air and the elementary Base of Water into Grass or Leaves; and 
on these the Organific Principle in the Ox or the Elephant exercises an Alchemy still 
more stupendous. As the unseen Agency weaves its magic eddies, the foliage 
becomes indifferently the Bone and its MaiTOW, the pulpy Brain, or the solid Ivory. 
That what you see is blood, is flesh, is itself the work, or shall I say, the 
translucence, of the invisible Energy, which soon surrenders or abandons them to 
inferior Powers, (for there is no pause nor chasm in the activities of Nature) which 
repeat a similar metaphorsis according to their kind;— These are not fancies, 
conjectures, or even hypotheses, but facts', to deny which is impossible, not to 
reflect on which is ignominious.(Hi?, 398)
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This notion differs from the concept of the great chain of being. Arthur 0 . Lovejoy in 
his The Great Chain o f Being explFms the concept thus:
—  the conception of the universe as a “ Great Chain of Being,” composed of an 
immense, or —  by the strict but seldom rigorously applied logic of the principle of 
continuity—of an infinite, number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the 
meagerest kind of existents, which barely escape non-existence, tlnough “every 
possible” grade up to the ens perfectissimum— or, in a somewhat more orthodox 
version, to the highest possible kind of creature, between which and the Absolute Being 
the disparity was assumed to be infinite— every one of them differing from that 
immediately above and that immediately below it by the “least possible” degree of 
difference.^'
According to Lovejoy, the Great chain of Being embodies three principles—the 
principle of plenitude, the principle of continuity, and the principle of unilinear 
gradation. He explains the principle of plenitude by referring to Plato’s thesis that “the 
universe is a plenum formarum in which the range of conceivable diversity of kinds of 
living things is exhaustively exemplified,” and to the assumption that “no genuine 
potentiality of being can remain unfulfilled, that the extent and abundance of the 
creation must be as great as the possibility of existence and commensurate with the 
productive capacity of a ‘perfect’ and inexhaustible Source, and that the world is the 
better, the more things it c o n t a i n s . T h e  principle of continuity which Lovejoy traces 
to Aristotle is that “all quantities— lines, surfaces, solids, motions, and in general time 
and space—  must be continuous”, that “the qualitative difference of things must 
similarly constitute linear or continuous series,” and that “all organisms can be aiTanged
Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain o f  Being. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1964, p.59.
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in one ascending sequence of f o r m s . T h e  principle of unilinear gradation is that “all 
individual things may be graded according to the degree to which they are infected with 
[mere] potentiality.’"'' According to Lovejoy, this vague notion of an ontological scale 
was combined with the more intelligible conceptions of zoological and psychological 
hierarchies. Craig C.Miller notes that the concept of the great chain of being differs 
from Coleridge’s view of nature as “ascending” in her striving for individuation.^^
In considering each individual life, Coleridge describes it as an organic unity. He 
defines life as "The principle o f individuation, or the power which unites a given all into 
a whole that is presupposed by all its parts.”(7X, 510) He explains the relation between 
parts and the whole as follows:
a whole composed, ab intra, of different parts, so far interdependent that each is 
reciprocally means and end, is an individual, and the individuality is most intense 
where the greatest dependence of the parts on the whole is combined with the 
greatest dependence of the whole on its parts; the first (namely, the dependence of 
the parts on the whole) being absolute; the second (namely, the dependence of the 
whole on its parts) being proportional to the importance of the relation which the 
parts have to the whole, that is, as their action extends more or less beyond 
themselves. For this spirit of the whole is most expressed in that part which derives 
its importance as an End from its importance as a Mean, relatively to all paits under 
the same copula.(7%, 512)
He compares organic parts and mechanical ones. Of individuals, he writes.
the living power will be most intense in that individual which, as a whole, has the 
greatest number of integral parts presupposed in it; when, moreover, these integral 
parts, together with a proportional increase of their interdependence, as parts, have
Ibid., p.52. 
Ibid., pp.55-56.
24 Ibid., p.59.
Miller, Craig W. “Coleridge’s Concept ofNature.” Journal o f  the History o f  Ideas 25(1964): 77-96, 
p.85. Also see, Levere, Poetty Realized in Nature:Samuel Taylor Coleridge and early nineteenth-centwy 
science, p. 107.
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themselves most the character of wholes in the sphere occupied by them. A 
mechanical point, line, or surface, is an ens rationis, for it expresses an intellectual 
act; but a physical atom is ens fictitium, which may be made subservient, as ciphers 
are in aritlmietic, to the purpose of hypothetical construction, per regiilam falsi; but 
transferred to Nature, it is in the strictest sense an absurd quantity; for extension, 
and consequently divisibility, or multeity, (for space cannot be divided,) is the 
indispensable condition, under which alone anything can appear to us, or even be 
thought of, as a thing. But if it should be replied, that the elementary particles are 
atoms not positively, but such a hardness communicated to them as is relatively 
invincible, I should remind the assertor that temeraria citatio supernaturalium est 
pulvinar intellectûs pigri, and that he who requires me to believe a miracle of his 
own dreaming, must first work a miracle to convince me that he had dreamt by 
inspiration.(7Z, 513)
Here, we can notice that Coleridge admits the necessity of parts mechanically divided 
for our commonsensical notion of the world. But he dismisses a mechanical concept of 
the world as merely an assemblage of atoms.
Coleridge states his organic view as follows:
We had seen each in its own cast, and we now recognize them all as co-existing in 
the unity of a higher form, the Crown and Completion of the Earthly, and the 
Mediator of a new and heavenly series. Thus finally, the vegetable creation, in the 
simplicity and uniformity of its internal structure symbolizing the unity of nature, 
while it represents the omniformity of her delegated functions in its external variety 
and manifoldness, becomes the record and clironicle of her ministerial acts and 
inchases the vast unfolded volume of the earth with the hieroglyphics of her 
history.(Z.5',72-73)
2. Coleridge’s Artistic Principles 
2 • i Art
Coleridge in “Poesy or Art,” defines art
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Now Art, used collectively for painting, sculpture, architecture and music, is the 
mediatress between, and reconciler of, nature and man. It is therefore, the power of 
humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into every thing 
which is the object of his contemplation; colour, form, motion, and sound, are the 
mould of a moral idea.(M4I, 42)
Art is the inevitable consequence of the human mind. He argues that “as soon as the 
human mind is intelligibly addressed by an outward image exclusively of articulate 
speech, so soon does art commence.”(MHL,43) He comments that art is the effect 
produced by the union of the animal impression with the reflective powers of the mind; 
that is, art is the result of the union of the impression of the outer things gained through 
the senses and the intellectual power of the human mind. For him, art is not merely the 
thing presented, but that which is represented by the thing. In other words, art is the 
representation of the essence of nature captured by the human mind. In his opinion, 
nature itself is the art of God. And for the same cause.
art itself might be defined as of a middle quality between a thought and a thing, or 
as I said before, the union and reconciliation of that which is nature with that which 
is exclusively human. It is the figured language of thought, and is distinguished 
from nature by the unity of all the parts in one thought or idea. Hence nature itself 
would give us the impression of a work of ait, if we could see the thought which is 
present at once in the whole and in eveiy part; and a work of art will be just in 
proportion as it adequately conveys the thought, and rich in proportion to the variety 
of parts which it holds in unity. {MAL, 44)
From such a concept of art as the reconciliation of nature and man, does his 
concept of imitation and copy derive. He followed Aristotle in thinking of poetry as 
being an imitation of nature. “When Coleridge maintains with Aristotle that art is 
essentially ideal,” Thorpe puts it:
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he means not necessarily that art is better than life or that it depicts nature as more 
beautiful than it is, but that before anything can become art it must become 
completely a thing of the mind. Art imitates nature, he tells us. Yes, but how does it 
imitate nature? By making copies of individual objects, or by selecting the details of 
many objects and combining them into ideal form more nearly perfect than any one 
of them in itself could be, as disciples of the neo-classic theory of ideal imitation 
believed? No, Coleridge would have no traffic with notions of such mechanical 
processes. The ideality he sought was that in which the mind through observation 
and reflection, and tlirough the wonderful workings of the unconscious self, came 
into complete possession of not the externality but the internal meanings of the 
object—a possession so close that the mind and the object attained a harmonious 
unity.^^
His concept of imitation is distinct from what he means by copy:
The impression on the wax is not an imitation, but a copy, of the seal; the seal itself 
is an imitation. But, further, in order to form a philosophic conception, we must 
seek for the kind, as the heat in ice, invisible light, &c., whilst, for practical 
purposes, we must have reference to the degree. It is sufficient that philosophically 
we understand that in all imitation two elements must coexist, and not only coexist, 
but must be perceived as coexisting. These two constituent elements are likeness 
and unlikeness, or sameness and difference, and in all genuine creations of art there 
must be a union of these disparates. The artist may take his point of view where he 
pleases, provided that the desired effect be perceptibly produced,—that there be 
likeness in the difference, difference in the likeness, and a reconcilement of both in 
one.(M4I,45)
Here, he tries to define imitation philosophically rather than practically. He once again 
uses the comparison of “the heat in ice,” or “invisible light.” Though we can not sense 
heat in thawing ice, we can notice its effect. Likewise, in imitation, there must be the 
production of effect. If the artist copies mere nature— natura naturata, the result is 
empty and even unreal. He argues that an artist must master the essence, “the natura 
naturans, which presupposes a bond between nature in the higher sense and the soul of 
man.”(M 4I, 46)
Thorpe, Clarence D, “Coleridge As Aesthetician and Critic,” pp.399-400.
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His notion of a good portrait is a proper example of his distinction between copy 
and imitation. According to him, each living thing has its moment of self-exposition, 
and so has each period of each thing. To expose this is the business of ideal art whether 
it is the image of childhood, or youth, or age. A good portrait is the abstract of the 
personal. It is not a likeness for actual comparison, but for recollection. A person’s 
abstraction is unlikely to be captured by the people who are familiar with the subject as 
a result of the constant pressure and check imposed on their minds by the actual 
presence of the original. Therefore, sometimes, the portrait may not be recognised by 
them.(M4T, 49) In imitation we can catch the essence of the subject but, on the other 
hand, in copy, we tend to see a superficial likeness of the subject.
He dislikes modern copies of antique sculpture for the following reasons:
— 1st, generally, because such an imitation cannot fail to have a tendency to keep 
the attention fixed on externals rather than on the thought within;— 2ndly, because, 
accordingly, it leads the artist to rest satisfied with that which is always imperfect, 
namely, bodily form, and circumscribes his views of mental expression to the ideas 
of power and grandeur only;— 3rdly, because it induces an effort to combine 
together two incongruous things, that is to say, modern feelings in antique forms; 
— 4thly, because it speaks in a language, as it were, learned and dead, the tones of 
which, being unfamiliar, leave the common spectator cold and unimpressed;— and 
lastly, because it necessarily eauses a neglect of thoughts, emotions, and images of 
profounder interest and more exalted dignity, as motherly, sisterly, and brotherly 
love, piety, devotion, the divine become human,—the Virgin, the Apostle, the 
Christ.(M4f, 50)
In other words, such copies are valueless because thought or feeling or emotion and 
object are not properly unified.
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2 ■ ii Organic Unity
In defining art as the imitation of nature, Coleridge argues that we must imitate the 
beautiful in nature. He defines beauty thus; “It is, in the abstract, the unity of the 
manifold, the coalescence of the diverse; in the concrete, it is the union of the shapely ( 
formosum) with the vital.”(M4Z, 46) For him, the beautiful, “not originating in the 
sensations, must belong to the intellect”(MHjf, 30) and “arise from the perceived 
harmony of an object, whether sight or sound, with the inborn and constitutive rules of 
the judgment and imagination: and it is always intuitive.”(^4Z , 31)
Having said that beauty is “Multeity in Unity,” he finds an example of beauty in a 
wheel:
An old coach-wheel lies in the coaclimaker’s yard, disfigured with tar and dirt ( 1 
purposely take the most trivial instances) :— if I turn away my attention from these, 
and regard the figure abstractly, “still,” 1 might say to my companion, “there is 
beauty in that wheel, and you yourself would not only admit, but would feel it, had 
you never seen a wheel before. See how the rays proceed from the centre to the 
circumferences, and how many different images are distinctly comprehended at one 
glance, as forming one whole, and each part in some harmonious relation to each 
and to all.” But imagine the polished golden wheel of the chariot of the Sun, as the 
poets have described it: then the figure, and the real thing so figured, exactly 
coincide. There is nothing heterogeneous, nothing to abstract from: by its perfect 
smoothness and circularity in width, each part is (if 1 may borrow a metaphor from a 
sister sense) as perfect a melody, as the whole is a complete harmony. This, we 
should say, is beautiful tliroughout. Of all “the many,” which 1 actually see, each 
and all are really reconciled into unity: while the effulgence from the whole 
coincides with, and seems to represent, the effluence of delight from my own mind 
in the intuition of 20-21)
He describes his experience of sailing as another example of beauty:
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Every one of these sails is known by the Intellect to have a strict & necessary 
action & reaction on all the rest, & that the whole is made up of parts, each part 
referring at once to each & to the whole/—and nothing more administers to the 
Picturesque than this phantom of complete visual wholeness in an object, which 
visually does not form a whole, by the influence ab intra of the sense of its perfect 
Intellectual Beauty or Wholeness.— To all this must be added the Lights & Shades, 
sometimes sunshiny, sometimes snowy: sometimes shade-coloured, sometimes, 
dingy—whatever effect distance, air tints, reflected Light, and the feeling comiected 
with the Object (for all Passion unifies as it were by natural Fusion) have in 
bringing out, and in melting down, differences & contrast, accordingly as the mind 
finds it necessary to the completion of the idea of Beauty, to prevent sameness or 
discrepancy.— (C/VII2012, April 1804)
A poet would put this experience of beauty into a poem and a painter would recreate it 
into a picture. But the organic unity of art is not the same as the organic unity of nature. 
Fogle points out that for the organic imity of art, there must be the conscious will and 
the intelligent effort of the artist. Sometimes critics take Coleridge’s comparison of a 
poem to a plant too literally. He did not identify a poem with a plant completely.^^ 
Nevertheless, the comparison indicates what is most distinctive in his notion of art.
The thought that an artistic work, especially a poetic work, is an organic unity or a 
whole is a traditional Western concept derived from ancient Greece. Aristotle, in his 
Poetics, defines tragedy:
Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete, and whole, and of a certain 
magnitude; for there may be a whole that is wanting in magnitude. 3. A whole is 
that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end. A beginning is that which does 
not itself follow anything by causal necessity, but after which something naturally is 
or comes to be. An end, on the contraiy, is that which itself naturally follows some 
other thing, either by necessity, or as a rule, but has nothing following it. A middle
is that which follows something as some other thing follows it 4. As therefore, in
the other imitative arts, the imitation is one when the object imitated is one, so the 
plot, being an imitation of an action, must imitate one action and that a whole, the
Fogle. The Idea o f  Coleridge’s Criticism, p. 10.
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structural union of the parts being such that, if any one of them is displaced or 
removed, the whole will be disjointed and disturbed.^^
“In ancient criticism,” Harold Osborn says, “the idea of organic unity became current 
under the name Aongruity’ or ‘concinnity’ and it has ever remained a subsidiary 
principle of criticism though never clearly co-ordinated with the other principles by 
which critics have judged and assessed the excellence of particular works of art.”^^  
Aristotle’s theory of plot and tragedy as a unity was a model for succeeding critics.
Aristotle, in his definition of Epic, says that “the construction of its stories should 
clearly be like that in a drama; they should be based on a single action, one that is a 
complete whole in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end, so as to enable the work to 
produce its own proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living c r e a t u r e . I n  
some ways, Coleridge’s idea of poetry as an organic unity echoes Aristotle’s idea. But 
Aristotle seems to use the term in order to emphasise the coherence between the parts. 
He conceives a poem as a thing made, Terry 1 L. Givens points out that Aristotle’s “real 
(though uiuecognized) accomplisliment was to have redirected critical theory to the 
issue of artistic transformation—how representation restructures our experiences of 
reality, not how art parallels reality.” *^ Reality for Aristotle is not a Platonic idea but 
something similar to natura naturata. To restructure reality into art, Aristotle establishes 
some norms such as unity of action. He insists that all incidents must be consistent with 
the unity of action and that all other incidents should be omitted. In addition, he gives
Aristotle. Poetics. Reprinted in Criticism: The Major Texts, pp.24-25.
Osborne, Harold. Aesthetics and Criticism. London: Routledge & K.Paul, 1955, p.239.
Aristotle. Poetics in Aristotle on the Art o f Poetry. Ed. Ingram Bywater. New York and London;
Garland, 1980, pp.71-73.
Givens, Terry 1 L. “Aris 
Studies.2S(\99[): 121-136, p. 133.
istotle’s Critique o f Mimesis: The Romantic Prelude.” Comparative Litei'ature
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some indication of the proper length, scale, and diction of poetry. Even though he 
emphasises the coherence of the parts, he gives priority to the whole rather than the 
parts. In his concept of unity, the whole as the combination of the parts has a greater 
status than the parts.
The idea that a poetic work must be a unity was also presented by Horace. Horace 
suggests a painting would be a jumble if a painter drew things randomly; that is, to join 
the neck of horse to a human head cannot produce a unity and neither can the torso of a 
woman joined to the tail of a dark, grotesque fish. Likewise, a book cannot have unity if 
the materials are randomly assembled like the dreams of a sick man, in which neither 
head nor foot can be properly ascribed to any one shape. He allows a licence to painters 
or poets provided that their works do not bring together heterogeneous ingredients; for 
instance, savage animals with tame ones, serpents with birds, lambs with tigers.
In addition, Horace insists on the consistency of a work; for example, works with 
solemn beginnings must not admit the trivial. And there must be a correlation between 
materials. Also the artist’s intention should be consistently maintained. In brief, Horace 
says, “whatever your work may be, let it at least have simplicity and unity.”^^  He 
emphasises propriety and decorum as necessary to achieve unity and in this he 
established the principles that later informed the criticism of neo-classicists.
Such neo-classicists as Dryden and Pope followed Aristotle and Horace in 
presupposing that poetry is a whole. In the case of Dryden, in the preface to Troilus and 
Cressida, he says that “After the plot, which is the foundation of the play, the next thing
Horace. Art o f  Poetry. Reprinted in Criticism: The Major Texts. Ed. W.J.Bate. New York, Chicago, San 
Francisco, Atlanta: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970, p.51.
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to which we ought to apply our judgment, is the m a n n e r s . A  unified plot, for him, 
was the most important aspect of a play. But he did not adhere to the dogmatic three 
unities maintained by his French contemporaries; rather, he defended Shakespeare’s 
tragi-comedy, by arguing that a dramatic poem is a whole in which a variety of 
ingredients are united. In An Essay o f Dramatic Poesy, he supports the variety of 
English drama, using Meander’s argument:
Our plays, besides the main design, have under-plots or by-concernments, of less 
considerable persons and intrigues, which are carried on with the motion of the 
main plot: Just as they say the orb of the fixed stars, and those of the planets, though 
they have motions of their own, are whirled about by the motion of the primiim 
mobile, in which they are contained.^"^
However various the plots of English drama may seem, the sub-plots remain subordinate 
to the main plot.
We cannot say that the concepts of unity described so far are merely mechanical. 
Even Dryden did not support the mechanical concept of unity. He complains of a drama 
that offers only “the mechanic beauties of the plot, which are the observation of thi’ee 
Unities, Time, Place, and Action”.^  ^ And yet it is significant that Dryden describes his 
concept of unity by analogy with the Newtonian cosmos, which is, for Coleridge itself 
an expression of a mechanical view of the world.
Coleridge’s concept of unity is defined in opposition to mechanical unity. For him, 
a legitimate poem “must be one, the parts of which mutually support and explain each 
o t h e r . 11, 13) “A poem,” he says, “is that species of composition, which is opposed
Diyden, "Preface to Troilus and Cressida.'"’ Reprinted in Essays o f  John Dryden. Vol.I. Ed. W.P.Ker. 
Oxford: Clarenon Press,1926, p.213.
Diyden. An Essay o f  Dramatic Poesy. Reprinted in Essays o f  John Dryden. Vol.I. p.70.
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to works of science, by proposing for its immediate object pleasure, not truth; and from 
all other species (having this object in common with it) it is discriminated by proposing 
to itself such delight from the whole, as is compatible with a distinct gratification from 
each component partf{BL  11, 13) From this point of view, we can see that the whole and 
the parts are of equal importance in giving pleasure.
The same relation between the whole and its parts governs his conception of poetic 
criticism:
The philosophic critics of all ages coincide with the ultimate judgment of all 
countries, in equally denying the praises of a just poem, on the one hand, to a series 
of striking lines or distiches, each of which absorbing the whole attention of the 
reader to itself disjoins it from its context, and makes it a separate whole, instead of 
an harmonizing part; and on the other hand, to an unsustained composition, from 
which the reader collects rapidly the general result unattracted by the component 
parts.(BT II, 13-14)
Presupposing that a poem is a whole, he insists that "if an harmonious whole is to be 
produced, the remaining parts must be preserved in keeping with the poetry.”(^T II, 15) 
Coleridge’s notion of the relationship between parts and the whole is not manifestly 
distinct from those of Aristotle and his followers. In a way, he echoes their theories. 
What makes his notion different from theirs is his insistence that a poem should be a 
living body. "The Spirit of Poetry like all other living Powers,”
must of necessity circumscribe itself by Rules, were it only to unite Power with 
Beauty. It must embody in order to reveal itself; but a living Body is of necessity an 
organized one—& what is organization, but the coimection of Parts to a whole, so 
that each Part is at once End & Means!— {Lect 1, 494)
Dryden, “Preface to Troilus and Cressida,” p.2l2.
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Benziger. “Organic Unity: Leibniz to Coleridge,” p.28.
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He takes a poem as a thing growing, not as something made. Just as all other organic 
beings grow from their germs, so does poetry. He asks: “What is germ? guttula 
Seminaiis, or a dust-glouble of farina? Answer: A(n organic) Differential: of which 
Growth is the Integration.” {Sh&FU, 872) We can think of a tree as an example. A seed 
has the predisposition to be a tree in it. But as it grows into a tree, it is influenced by the 
outer environment, i.e., the weather, nutrition, and the natural soil, etc. Likewise, a 
poetic work grows from a germ within the poet’s mind. During the process of its 
growth, the predispositions of the germ are united with outer things, becoming a poetic 
work. Benziger argues that “ the organic poet’s idea develops only at the same time that 
it expresses itself outwardly in the work of art being created; the organic poet, as it were,
does not know very clearly what he is doing until he has done it.” '^’ The poet may be f;
.j
conscious of what he is doing but he does not preconceive completely what he will 
produce. According to a Note taken by Collier,
Coleridge here explained the difference between what he called mechanic and 
organic regularity. In the former the copy must be made as if it had been formed in 
the same mould with the original—In the latter there is a law which all the parts 
obey conforming themselves to the outward symbols & manifestations of the 
essential principle. He illustrated this distinction by referring to the growth of Trees, 
which from peculiar circumstances of soil air or position differed in shape even 
from trees of the same kind but every man was able to decide at first sight which 
was an ash or a poplar.— {Lect 1, 358)
Coleridge’s organic criticism relates an artistic work to the environmental circumstances 
of the artist, both in terms of how an artist is united with the artistic work and how 
organically each part is related to the whole.
The difference between Coleridge’s notion of organic unity and the notions of unity 
to be found in his predecessors has been well defined by Fogle. Organic unity, Fogle 
comments.
involves the reconciliation of the concept of life with the concept of beauty, or, in 
the simpler terms of the great account of the imagination, of art with nature, the 
manner with the matter. It presents an ideal life, a translucence which is the fusion 
of image and idea, matter and spirit, in pure substance. Its reconciliation of artistic 
purpose with artistic material, or the potential with its realization, might fitly be 
illustrated in the old notion of the perfect statue that awaits the sculptor’s hand in 
the block of marble— it is there in nature, but must be formed and heightened into 
ait?’
2 ■ iii Reconciliation of Opposites
Organic unity, according to Fogle, “manifests itself in the reconciliation of 
opposites, which Coleridge variously describes as equilibrium, balance, equipoise, 
polarity, harmony, mesothesis, interpenetration, identity, indifference, fusion, blend, 
coexistence, consubstantiation, coordination, and intermediation—to list some 
representative t e r m s . S t e p h e n  Prickett notes that Coleridge saw “the principle of 
organic growth as operating in conjunction with the principle of ‘polarity’— progressing 
by ‘contraries’, and ‘reconciling opposites or discordant qualities’”.^  ^ Just as in nature, 
so, in art which is in a sense the reconciliation of opposites, there exists polarity. The 
reconciliation of opposites, according to Fogle,
Fogle. The Idea o f  Coleridge's Criticism, p.67.
Ibid., p.34.
Prickett, Stephen. Coleridge and Wordsworth: The Poetry o f  Growth, p47.
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is the Archimedes lever of Coleridge’s criticism. His procedure and his terminology 
are dialectical or “polar.” Reality is always organic unity or wholeness, but this 
reality can only be discursively revealed as two, in the form of polar opposites 
reconciled, or of centripetal and centrifugal forces in equilibrium. In aesthetics this 
principle involves the full acceptance of the doctrine of organic unity of form and 
content, but at the same time it preserves their distinctness as concepts, for without 
their twoness organic unity would be structureless and unintelligible.'^®
Underneath Coleridge’s ideas of art, method, symbol, and imitation lies the principle of 
the reconciliation of opposites. Many examples of opposites are offered, for example, 
subject and object, the artist and the artistic work, the spiritual world and the physical 
world, our body and mind, man and nature. According to Coleridge, a man “has already 
made no mean progress in Wisdom, who has learnt and learnt to apply the difference 
between CONTRARIES that preclude or destroy, and OPPOSITES that require and support 
each other.” {Sh&F, 960) Opposites, as he explains, do not exclude each other but tend 
to include. He explains the concept of opposites by taking taste as an example. Whereas 
bitter and sweet are contraries, acid and sweet are opposites. Whereas bitter and sweet 
cancel each other, sweet and acid are combined to make a third taste— e.g. sherbet and 
lemonade. The reconciliation of opposites is the third state in which two opposites are 
united. The unification of opposites does not mean the combination of two opposite 
qualities in which each ingredient remains distinct, but the production of a third in 
which polarity exists.
The reconciliation of subject and object is the starting point of his system. For him, 
the question o f ‘T is the flmdamental problem to be solved:
Fogle, The Idea o f  C oleridge’s Criticism, p.4.
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If it were asked of me to justify the interest,.... Where am I? What and for what 
am I? What are the duties, which arise out of relations of my Being to itself as heir 
of futurity, and to the World which is its present sphere of action and 
impression?— 1 would compare the human Soul to a Ship’s Crew cast on the 
unknown island ( a fair Simile; for these questions could not suggest themselves 
unless the mind had previously felt convictions, that the present World was not its 
whole destiny and abiding Country)— ....
The moment, when the Soul begins to be sufficiently self-conscious, to ask 
concerning itself, & its relations, is the first moment of its intellectual arrival into 
the World—Its Being—enigmatic as it must seem— is posterior to its Existence— . 
Suppose the shipwrecked man stunned, & for many weeks in a state of Ideotcy or 
utter loss of Thought & Memory—& then gradually awakened/(C# 111 3593, 
August-September 1809)
Coleridge’s life-long interrogation of this problem naturally leads him to the problem of 
the object;
Object = that which lies before us, or is present to our Senses. The matter perceived 
in relation to the percipient-—the same therefore as Phenomenon relatively to the 
Beholder—Quod jacet ob. In the first and simplest meaning attached to the word, 
the accusative understood as belonging to the preposition was probably—oculos— . 
Soon however, as the power of abstraction was activated, the oh became the antithet 
to sub, so that in certain cases Object and Subject were both applied to the same 
body— Object, that which was perceived; Sub]Qci, that within or beneath the 
appearance inferred as the Ground and as it were Upbeaier of the 
Appearance. (5/? cf A,894)
If we take object to mean what is perceived and subject to mean perceiver, perception 
itself becomes an example of the reconciliation of opposites. Coleridge, in Biographia 
Literaria, dismisses the two following prepositions: “EITHER THE OBJECTIVE IS TAKEN 
AS THE FIRST, AND THEN WE HAVE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SUPERVENTION OF THE 
SUBJECTIVE, WHICH COALESCES WITH IT.”(BT I, 255) “2. OR THE SUBJECTIVE IS TAKEN 
AS THE FIRST, AND THE PROBLEM THEN IS, HOW THERE SUPERVENES TO IT A 
COINCIDENT OBJECTIVE.”( m  1, 257) He, instead, argues that
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an objective is inconceivable without a subject as its antithesis. Omne perceptum 
percipientem supponit.
But neither can the principle be found in a subject as a subject, contra­
distinguished from an object: for unicuique percipient! aliquid objicitur perceptum. 
It is to be found therefore neither in object or subject taken separately, and 
consequently, as no other third is conceivable, it must be found in that which is 
neither subject nor object exclusively, but which is the identity of both.(.511, 271)
Art, for him, is an example of the reconciliation of subject and object:
In regard to Mixed Sciences, and to the first class of Applied Sciences, the Mental 
initiative may have been received from without; but it has escaped some Critics, that 
in the Fine Arts the Mental initiative must necessarily proceed from within. Flence 
we find them giving, as it were, recipes to form a Poet, by placing him in certain 
directions and positions; as if they thought that every deer-stealer might, if he 
pleased, become a Shakespeare, or that Shakespeare’s mind was made up of the 
slneds and patches of the books of his day, which by good fortune he happened to 
read in such an order that they successively fitted into the scenes of Macbeth, 
Othello, The Tempest, As you like it &c. Certainly the Fine Arts belong to the 
outward world, for they all operate by the images of sight and sound, and other 
sensible impressions; and without a delicate tact for these, no man ever was, or 
could be, either a Musician or a Poet; nor could he attain to excellence in any one of 
these Arts; but as certainly he must,always be a poor and unsuccessful cultivator of 
the Arts if he is not impelled first by a mighty, inward power, a feeling, quod 
nequeo monstrae, et sentio tantum; nor can he make great advances in his Art, if, in 
the course of his progress, the obscure impulse does not gradually become a bright, 
and clear, and living ldea!(7M, 62-63)
His definition of poetiy also demonstrates his principle of the reconciliation of 
opposites:
What is poetry? is so nearly the same question with what is a poet? that the answer 
to the one is involved in the solution of the other. For it is a distinction resulting 
from the poetic genius itself, which sustains and modifies the images, thought, and 
emotions of the poet’s own mind. The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the 
whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, 
according to their relative worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone, and spirit of unity, 
that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical 
power, to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination. This 
power, first put in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their 
irremissive, though gentle and umioticed, controul {laxis effectur habenis) reveals
107
itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities; of 
sameness, with difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the 
image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, 
with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than 
usual order; judgment ever awake and steady self-possession, with enthusiasm and 
feeling profound or vehement; and while it blends and harmonizes the natural and 
the artificial, still subordinates art to nature; the manner to the matter; and our 
admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry.(j5f 11, 15-17)
2 ' iv Imagination
In the above passage, we see imagination as the mediating power which makes the 
reconciliation of opposites possible. Coleridge defines its disposition as “esemplastic”. 
In Biographia, he says: "'Esemplastic. The word is not in Johnson, nor have 1 met with it 
elsewhere.'^' Neither have 1! I constructed it myself from the Greek words, sîç ev TrXazTsiv 
i.e. to shape into one; because, having to convey a new sense, 1 thought that a new term 
would both aid the recollection of my meaning, and prevent its being confounded with 
the usual import of the word, imagination.”(i5L 1, 168-170)
Imagination, of course, is not a new concept.'^ ^ Locke, in his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, argues that the imagination is based on human perception:
Thus the first capacity of human intellect is,—that mind is fitted to receive 
the impressions made on it; either tlirough the senses by outward objects, or by its 
own operations when it reflects on them. This is the first step a man makes towards 
the discovery of anything, and the ground work whereon to build all those notions 
which ever he shall have naturally in this world. All those sublime thoughts which 
tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and 
footing here: in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote
41 See Wordsworth, Jonathan. “The Infinite I Am: Coleridge and the Ascent of Being.” The Wordsworth 
Circle 16(1985): 74-84, p.76. He argues that Coleridge’s ideas o f imagination derive from a native 
English tradition, not a German one. He points out the main sources o f Coleridge’s imagination came from 
Akenside, Addison and Milton.
108
speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas 
which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation/^^
Locke, even though he does not use the term in this passage, admits that in the human 
mind, there is a faculty of imagination, by which sublime thought towering above the 
clouds is possible. In his opinion, however, imagination cannot exist separated from 
sense perception. For him, sensation and reflection are the origin for all faculties of the 
human mind. These two faculties are not “too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of 
man to expatiate in, which takes its flight further than the stars, and cannot be confined 
by the limits of the world; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost 
expansion of Matter, and makes excursion into that incomprehensible I n a n e . A l l  this 
is made possible by the faculty of imagination.'*'*
Addison, like Locke, explains that imagination originally arises from sight. But he 
divides the pleasures of the imagination into two kinds, so that it is possible for him
to discourse of those primary pleasures of the imagination, which entirely proceeded 
from such objects as are before our eyes; and in the next place to speak of those 
secondary pleasures of the imagination which flow from ideas of visible objects, 
when the objects are not actually before the eye, but are called up into our
Locke, John. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Vol.I. Ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser. Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1894, p. 142.
Ibid, p. 164.
On the importance that Locke attached to the imagmation, see Engell, James. The Creative 
Imagination: Enlightment to Romanticism. Cambridge, Mas., London: Harvard University Press, 1981 
p. 19. “Locke expresses, too, the mind’s formation o f many ideas and elements into one integrated whole, 
a notion that became central for theories o f poetic imagination and symbolism. It played an important part 
in mid-century and romantic concepts o f the way genius designs the overall plan o f  a system or an art 
work, and also in the German approach to Einbildungskraft, which Tetens, Kant, Schelling and others 
envisioned as a power o f  complete synthesis, as in Schelling’s ""In-Eins-Bidldingf where he takes eins to 
mean “one.” Locke’s own phrasing is terse but unmistakable. The mind “unites” many ideas and 
associations into one. Some ideas are “complicated of various simple ideas or complex ideas made up o f  
simple ones, yet are, when the mind pleases, considered each by itself as one entiring thing, and signified 
by one name.”
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memories, or formed into agreeable visions of things that are either absent or 
fictitious.'*^
He also distinguishes imagination from sense and understanding. The pleasures of 
imagination are not so gross as those of sense nor so refined as those of understanding. 
He prefers the pleasures of understanding because they are founded on some new 
knowledge or improvement in the mind of man. But he finds pleasures of imagination as 
delightful as those of the understanding. A description in Homer has charmed more 
readers than one in Aristotle. So it is that imaginative pleasure appeals more widely than 
the pleasure of the understanding. In addition, the pleasures of imagination are more 
obvious and more easily acquired. He explains the process of the operation of 
imagination:
It is but opening the eye, and the scene enters. The colours paint themselves on the 
fancy, with very little attention of thought or application of mind in the beholder. 
We are struck, we know not how, with the symmetry of any thing we see, and 
immediately assent to the beauty of an object, without enquiring into the particular 
causes and occasions of it.'*®
This passage reminds us of Coleridge’s primary imagination though Addison does not 
link the operation of imagination with the divine.
Duff, in his An Essay on Original Genius, identifies the power defining genius as 
imagination. Imagination, “ being that faculty which lays the foundation of all our 
knowledge, by collecting and treasuring up in the repository of the memory those 
materials on which Judgment is afterwards to work, and being peculiarily adapted to the 
gay, delightful, vacant season of childhood and youth, appears in those early periods in
Addison, Joseph. “Taste and the Pleasures of Imagination.” Critical Essays from the Spectator. Ed. 
Donald F. Bond. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, p .176.
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all its puerile brilliance and simplicity, long before the reasoning faculty discovers itself 
in any considerable degree.”'*^ This concept of imagination is similar to Wordsworth’s in 
that imagination operates more readily in childhood and it becomes the foundation of 
knowledge by collecting and treasuring up experience in the memory.
It is D uffs idea of invention, however, that reminds us of Coleridge’s secondary 
imagination. Duff explains invention as lying far beyond the reach of ordinary faculties. 
Invention is a faculty confined to those “whose minds are capacious enough to contain 
that prodigious croud of ideas, which an extensive observation and experience supply; 
whose understandings are penetrating enough to discover the most distant comiections 
of those ideas, and whose imaginations are sufficiently quick, in combining them at 
pleasure.”'*^
Mark Akenside’s notion of imagination remains empiricist in that he considered 
imagination to come from the stimuli of external things. But when he attributes “plastic 
power” to the imagination, he comes close to the romantic concept of imagination. In 
his The Pleasures o f Imagination^'^, he describes the process from enlivening emotions
Ibid., p. 176.
Duff, William. An Essay on Original Genius. Ed. John L. Mahony. Delmar, N.Y.: Scholar’s Facsimiles 
& Reprints, 1978, p.29.
Ibid., p. 128. See Engell, James. The Creative Imagination, p.87. He links D uffs notion o f  imagination 
to Coleridge’s as; “The philosophic genius, adding to his imagination greater reason and judgment than 
are necessary in the poet, unlocks the secrets o f things. Through reason and imagination, the philosopher 
approaches the religious aspect o f  nature and the ultimate unity o f God. This idea, greatly elaborated, 
Coleridge later made central to his thinking.”
See Akenside, Mark. The Pleasures o f Imagination(Book III). The Poetical Works o f  Mark Akenside. 
Ed. Robin Dix. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickson University Press & London: Associated University 
presses, 1996. LL.382-4I4. When the plastic power begins to act,
.. .blind emotions heave 
His bosom; and with loveliest frenzy caught.
From earth to heav’n he rolls his daring eye,
From heav’n to earth. Anon ten thousand shapes.
Like spectres trooping to the wisard’s call,
Flit swift before him. From the womb of earth,
From the ocean’s bed they come: th’eternal heav’ns
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and forming images to making an artistic work by adducing the power of imagination. 
When imagination begins to work, thousands of images dawn on the mind. Imagination 
operates by blending, dividing, enlarging, and extenuating the images. Only then does 
the chaos of sensation begin to be organised into a conception within the mind of artist 
which then obtains artistic form. Interestingly, Akenside conceives the poet as a divinely 
inspired bard “with loveliest frenzy caught,” “rolls his daring eye,” “to the wisard’s 
call,” “at the voice divine,” and “with Promethean art”. His definition of the 
imagination as a power of blending, dividing, enlarging images to order to organise, and 
his insistence that in a work of art conception and form are unified are ideas found in 
Coleridge.
Disclose their splendors, and the dark abyss 
Pours out her births unknown. With fixed gaze 
He marks the rising phantoms. Now compares 
Their different forms; now blends them, now divides; 
In larges and extenuates by turns;
Opposes, ranges in fantastic bands,
And infinitely varies. Hither now.
Now thither fluctuates his constant aim.
With endless choice perplex’d. At length his plan 
Begins to open. Lucid order dawns;
And as from Chaos old the jarring seeds 
O f nature at the voice divine repair’d 
Each to its place, till rosy earth unveil’d 
Her fragrant bosom, and the joyful sun 
Sprung up the blue serene; by swift degrees 
Thus disentangled, his entire design 
Emerges. Colours mingle, features join.
And lines converge: the fainter parts retire;
The fairer eminent in light advance;
And eveiy image on its neighbour smiles.
A while he stands, and with Promethean art
Into its proper vehicle he breathes
The fair conception; which imbodied thus.
And permanent, becomes to eyes or ears 
An object ascertain’d:....
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The treatments of the imagination so far discussed tend to have an empirical basis 
even though some approach nearer to the Romantic concept of the imagination. Another 
notion of the imagination, which we might call the transcendental concept of
. "1
imagination, arose in Germany. Here, the crucial figure is Kant.
Kant, in Critique o f Judgment, defined several kinds of imagination. According to ?
him, imagination is “the agent employed, as in the case of art, where we realize a 
preconceived concept of an object which we set before ourselves as an end.”(CJ, 34)
Next is the concept he called reproductive imagination. This imagination, “in a manner 
quite incomprehensible to us, is able on occasion, even after a long lapse of time, not 
alone to recall the signs for concepts, but also to reproduce the image and shape of an 
object out of a countless number of others of a different, or even of the very same, 
kind.”(Cy, 77) Of productive imagination, he writes: “If, now, imagination must in the 
judgment of taste be regarded in its freedom, then, to begin with, it is not taken as 
reproductive, as in its subjection to the law of association, but as productive and 
exerting an activity of its own (as originator of arbitrary forms of possible 
intuitions).”(CJ, 86) Productive imagination, being a power free from sense experience, 
is evidently transcendental. For Kant, the imagination is also an agent of creation:
The imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition) is a powerful agent for 
creating, as it were, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual 
nature. It affords us entertaimnent where experience proves too commonplace; and 
we even use it to remodel experience, always following, no doubt, laws that are 
based on analogy, but still also following principles which have a higher seat in 
reason (and which are every whit as natural to us as those followed by the 
understanding in laying hold of empirical nature). By this means we get a sense of 
our freedom from the law of association (which attaches to the empirical 
employment of the imagination), with the result that the material can be borrowed 
by us from nature in accordance with that law, but be worked up by us into 
something else—namely, what surpasses nature.(CJ, 176)
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Coleridge’s concept of imagination agrees with Kant’s in establishing the imagination 
as a powerful agent in the creation of a second nature, namely an artistic work, and in 
granting imagination the power to remodel experience freely, that is, released from the 
law of association/®
Despite Coleridge’s claims, his conception of the imagination is not wholly 
original. Rather, his concept of imagination is a development of ideas that had already 
been advanced. In a Note, he writes:
Strange Self-power in the Imagination, when painful sensations have made it their 
Interpreter, or returning Gladsomeness from convalescence, gastric and visceral, 
have made its chilled and evanished Figures & Landscape bud, blossom, & live in 
scarlet, and green & snowy white, (like the Fire screen inscribed with nitrate & 
muriate of Cobalt)—strange power to represent the events & circumstances even to 
the Anguish or the triumph of the quasi-ovodonX Soul, while the necessary 
conditions, the only possible causes of such contingencies are known to be 
impossible or hopeless, yea, when the pure mind would recoil from the very (eve- 
lengthened) shadow of an approaching hope, as from a crime—yet the effect shall 
have place & Substance & living energy, & on a blue Islet of Ether in a whole Sky 
of blackest Cloudage shine, like a firstling of creation.(C# 111 3547, July-September 
1809)
Here, the ‘strange self-power’ seems to be what Dorothy Emmet terms ‘his creative 
moods’. She argues that Coleridge’s concern was to construct a psychology which 
would be true to his creative moods, and that he did not find this in Hartley, or for that
See, Prickett, Stephen, Coleridge and Wordsworth: The Poetiy o f  Growth, p.77. He compares Kant’s 
three kinds o f imagination with Coleridge’s: “o f Kant’s three functions o f the ‘Imagination’, the 
‘reproductive’, the ‘productive’, and the ‘aesthetic’, the first is nearly the same as Coleridge’s ‘fancy’, in 
that it remains a mechanism; the second, the ‘productive’, is a spontaneous and active power, and might be 
said to correspond to the Primary imagination o f Coleridge; while the last, the ‘aesthetic’, which 
transforms the objects into material for a possible act o f cognition, may be said to correspond to the 
Secondary Imagination. Like the other two, the correspondence is not exact: Coleridge’s Secondary 
Imagination has, for instance, a much greater influence that Kant could have allowed.”
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matter in K an t/’ The creative mood is linked to the unconscious activity of our mind. 
Stephen Prickett argues that Coleridge’s concept of the imagination was fundamentally 
a psyehological theory but that what he meant by psychology differed from Locke or 
Hartley in kind.®  ^ Owen Barfield notes that no very sharp distinction transpires between 
the act of thinking, the “act of self-consciousness” and the “act of imagination”. 
According to him, imagination is “a vaiying interplay between active and passive 
elements in the relation between self and world, of such a nature that the two elements 
themselves may change, the one into the other.” He argues that the boundary between 
man and nature is not that of a fixed “outness”. Rather, the possible interaction between 
active man and passive nature occurs at or within the skin. The interplay, namely 
imagination, is not the creature of body and space, though the interplay is involved with 
both elements. In Barfield’s opinion, the interplay occurs in man just as it occurs in 
nature. Here, we can link the interplay between man and nature to that between God and 
nature. Barfield writes:
We have seen that the life of nature is at all levels a power of “separative 
projection,” and separative projection (“the eternal act of creation”) is what the act 
of self-consciousness—what the act of imagination—is. The underlying reality (sub­
stance) of things is thus not matter, nor any equivalent inanimate base, but 
immaterial relationship. For Coleridge, because man did not create himself, there is 
indeed an actual ( 1-Thou) relation between subject and natural object; but, since 
man is to be free, it is also a genetic and progressive one. Phylogenetically that 
progressive relation is nature. Ontogenetically it is imagination.
This offers an explanation of Coleridge’s most famous statement on the imagination:
See Emmet, Dorothy, “Coleridge on Powers in Mind and Nature.” p. 170. 
Prickett. Coleridge and Wordsworth: The Poetiy o f Growth, p.71. 
Barfield. What Coleridge Thought, pp.76-77.
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The IMAGINATION then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary 
IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human 
Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the 
infinite I AM. The secondary 1 consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with 
the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, 
and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, 
dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet 
still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as 
all objects {as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.(BT 1, 304)
For Coleridge, human perception itself effects a reconciliation of subject and object by 
the power of imagination, which is itself a creative act, as he makes clear by describing 
it as “a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite 1 AM.” 
There is a crucial analogy drawn between the human being’s creativity and that of God. 
Every act of perception involves an exercise of a quasi-divine imagination.
According to Engell, the primary imagination, or the primary perception
is common to all people. In fact, it is taken for granted and not even called 
“imagination,” just as a sense of balance is taken for granted and not mentioned 
while we are walking. The primary imagination is the ''necessary Imagination.” It 
automatically balances and fuses the iimate capacities and powers with the external 
presence of the objective world that the mind receives through the senses.®'*
The secondary imagination is peculiar to artistic creation. The secondary 
imagination is the power with which an artist creates an artistic work. Coleridge writes 
that it is not different from the primary imagination in kind, but in degree. Unlike the 
primaiy imagination, though, the secondary imagination is self-conscious, and operates 
by an act of will.
That the secondary imagination is not different from the primary in kind means 
that both share the same faculty as that exercised by God in his creation of the world.
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The notion that the mind is creative in perception attributes to the mind divine power 
and similarly the artist in creating an artistic work may be said quite literally to exercise 
divine powers. Hence Coleridge’s description of Shakespeare, for him, the supreme 
artist as a deity.
In addition, the notion that ordinary people are as creative as the artist in 
perception is the condition of Coleridge’s insistence on the centrality in drama of the 
relation between the play and its audience.
Coleridge, in order to explain the unifying mode of imagination, distinguishes 
imagination from fancy. “The Fancy”, according to him,
is indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and 
space; and blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, 
which we express by the word CHOICE. But equally with the ordinary memory it 
must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association.(5T I, 305)
The chief difference between fancy and imagination is that fancy arbitrarily blends 
memories regardless of the order of time and space whereas imagination organically 
unites materials into a unity. Coleridge explains the difference between fancy and 
imagination repeatedly:
The Imagination is the synthetic Power—
motives, and a Judgment which divested of that choice had chiefly attended to the 
resemblances of different objects, and regarded the differences in mass only as far as 
they rendered the resemblance more pregnant, by law of Contrast—& we have 
Fancy— and if there exist no intermediate Power between the Active and Passive, 
Fancy must be the one peculiar Power of poetry— .{Sh&F, 289)
Engell. The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism, p.344.
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Here, Coleridge makes it clear that imagination is a “synthetic”, or “intermediate” 
power.
However, in the absence of imagination, it is fancy that operates in the writing of 
poetry.
4.‘Fancy, or the aggregate Power— 13®^'^ ’’— Full gently now &c—the bringing 
together Images dissimilar in the main by some one point or more of 
Likeness— distinguished—read from Pocket book— /both common in the writers of 
Shakespeare’s time/
5.That power of & energy of what a living poet has grandly & appropriately. 
To flash upon that inward Eye Which is the Bliss of Solitude—& to make every 
thing present by a Series of Images—This an absolute Essential of Poetry, & of 
itself would form a poet, tho’not of the highest Class—It is however a most hopeful 
Symptom, & V. & A. is one continued Specimen/ (CNUl 3247, Spring 1808)
From this passage, it is clear that Coleridge did not at all deny the value of fancy. Indeed 
his concept of fancy is rather similar to what his British predecessors defined as 
imagination.
He accuses those whom he calls modern philosophers of making an idol of the 
image, which is, for him, equivalent to a reverence for the letter rather than the spirit:
The image-forming or rather re-forming power, the imagination in its passive sense, 
which I would rather call Fancy = Phantasy, a (paiv^siv,^ this, the Festisch & 
Talisman of all modern Philosophers (the Germans excepted) may not inaptly be 
compared to the Gorgon Head, which looked death into every thing—and this not by 
accident, but from the nature of the faculty itself, the province of which is to give 
consciousness to the Subject by presenting to it its conceptions objectively but the 
Soul differences itself from any other Soul for the purposes of symbolical 
knowledge by form  or body only—but all form as body, i.e. as shape, & not as 
fonna efformans, is dead—Life may be inferred, even as intelligence is from black 
marks on white paper—but the black marks themselves are truly “the dead letter”. 
Here then is the error—not in the faculty itself, without which there would be no 
fixation, consequently, no distinct perception or conception, but in the gross idolatry 
of those who abuse it, & make that the goal & end which should be only a means of 
arriving at it. Is it any excuse to him who treats a living being as inanimate Body,
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that we cannot arrive at the knowledge of the living Being but thro’the Body which 
is its Symbol & outward & visible Sign?— (C # 111 4066, April 1811)
Fancy is an “image-forming” or “re-forming” power. But it is “the worth & dignity of 
poetic Imagination, of fusing power, that fixing unfixes & while it melts & bedims the 
Image, still leaves in the Soul its living meaning— '\C N  111 4066). It is imagination that 
reconciles thought and form: “Form is factitious being, and thinking is the process; 
imagination the laboratory in which the thought elaborates essence into existence.”(HP, 
186)
“Imagination,” for Coleridge, is “the power of modifying one image or feeling by the 
precedent or following ones.” It combines “many circumstances into one moment of 
thought to produce that ultimate end of human Thought, and human Feeling, Unity and 
thereby the reduction of the Spirit to its Principle & Fountain, who alone is the truly 
one.”(Lect 1, 68)
The imagination is sharply distinguished from the understanding, which is
the faculty of knowledge tlii'o’ Notions or conceptions. A notion or conception is 
that Act of the mind by means of which a multitude of Impressions (or 
Representations[)] are arranged and combined, and the different Representation 
acquire Unity. In this function of unity the Act of Understanding consists.(6'AÆF II, 
1004)
He argues that understanding has two organs; that is, the outward sense and the mind’s 
eye which such writers as Hooker, Lord Bacon, and Hobbes call discourse or the 
discursive faculty. It may be defined as being the faculty by which we generalize and 
arrange the phenomena of perception. The functions of the faculty contain the rules and 
constitute the possibility of outward Experience. The understanding, differentiated by
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Coleridge from the organ of Reason, is often taken as ordinary reason. Coleridge 
explains the tlii’ee- fold operation of Understanding:
The Sense, (vis sensitive vel intuitiva) perceives: Vis regulatrix ( the understanding, 
in its own peculiar operation) conceives: Vis rationalis ( the Reason or rationalized 
understanding) comprehends. The first is impressed through the organs of sense; the 
second combines these multifarious impressions into individual Notions, and by 
reducing these notions to Rules, according to the analogy of all its former notices, 
constitutes Experience: the third subordinates both these notions and the mles of 
Experience to ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLES of necessary LAWS: and thus concerning 
objects, which our experience has proved to have real existence, it demonstrates 
moreover, in what way they are possible, and in doing this constitutes Science.{F 1 
157)
Imagination, for Coleridge, is the bridge between Reason and the physical world. 
Imagination, Fogle suggests, is “a higher faculty akin to the reason, but unlike the reason 
it images the ideal, and unlike the understanding it idealizes rather than abstracts from 
images.”®®
The key distinction between Coleridge’s notion of the imagination and that held by 
his predecessors on the one hand and Kant on the other can be briefly indicated by the 
word that Coleridge coined, esemplastic. Coleridge’s conceives the imagination as the 
agent which unites the Noumenon and the Phenomenon.
Barfield well demonstrates how Coleridge’s notion of the imagination brings 
together art and nature:
“The power which discloses itself from within as the principle of unity in the 
many,” the “productive unity” of nature, results in a manifold of parts having an 
“organic” relation with the whole and, tinough that {totus in omni parte) with each 
other. In apprehending this we are moved by the beauty of nature. The same power, 
at the level of imagination, creates another manifold having a similar relation
55 Fogle. The Idea o f C oleridge’s Criticism, p.9.
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between parts and whole; and in apprehending it we are moved by the imagination 
of the poet.®®
We might even say that this reconciliation of art and nature is the point to which 
Coleridge’s repeated attempts to define the imagination drive and it is a point realised in 
practice in the work of the writer always recognised by Coleridge as the supreme 
imaginative artist, in the work, that is, of Shakespeare.
Coleridge’s concept of nature might be termed mythical though he insists that it is 
grounded in fact. Whether it is a mythical system or a fact, it is ‘the Archimedes lever of 
Coleridge’s criticism’. It would be hard to claim that Shakespeare is “a guide to 
Coleridge’s philosophy”^^  in terms of his concept of nature, but it is a concept at which 
Coleridge arrived in large part tlii'ough his study of Shakespeare’s work.
Barfield. What Coleridge Thought, p.80. 
Hamilton. C oleridge’s Poetics, p. 180.
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Chapter 3. Shakespeare: Nature Humanized
In the eighteenth century Shakespeare was conventionally described as “a poet of 
nature”, but “nature”, like most concepts, is a concept at once unstable and subject to 
historical change. ’ In the eighteenth century alone, the notion expresses several different 
meanings. As Basil Willey points out, to account fully for the differences would be a 
complicated task. Willey, however, tries to explain the changes in the concept that 
developed during the eighteenth century as the result of two relevant forces. One is the 
scientific explanation of the world. Due to the scientific movements of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, for example, the work of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Bacon, 
Harvey, and Newton, the universe came to be regarded as a Great Machine and the 
scientists conceived themselves as studying God’s work. A second impetus was supplied 
by the religious conflicts produced by the Reformation, following which a desire to 
establish religion in a new framework arose. A Natural Religion developed, which takes 
nature as the evidence of divine activity. In natural religion, the law of nature is 
synonymous with the law of God. Of course, the law of God is differently conceived by 
different ages.
' See Willey, Basil. The Eighteenth Century Background. London; Chatto & Wiudus, 1940, p.2. Willey 
insists on the bewildering variety o f senses in which the word nature is used in the period.: “Leslie 
Stephen has said that ‘Nature is a word contrived in order to introduce as many equivocations as possible 
into all the theories, political, legal, artistic or literary, into which it enters’. An American scholar has 
recently distinguished sixty different senses o f the term. Even in the seventeenth century Robert Boyle, the 
natural philosopher, could enumerate eight senses o f the word as used in philosophy and natural science, 
and Pierre Bayle, complaining o f the ambiguity o f the same word, mentions that eleven different meanings 
for it can be discovered in Corinthians. Nevertheless in our period it was not the ambiguity o f ‘Nature’ 
whieh people felt most strongly; it was rather the clarity, the authority, and the universal acceptability o f  
Nature and Nature’s laws.”
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With the rise of empiricism, nature tends to be identified with human feelings, or 
sentiments or passions rather than with reason.^ Basil Willey notes that David Hume can 
be represented as the defender of nature against reason. Willey also regards Hartley as 
another important figure in that he showed how our nature is the product of a process by 
which the mind moves from sensation, tlnough imagination to reflection. Willey offers a 
broad definition:
‘Nature’ may be conceived rationally or emotionally. Indeed the history of the idea 
in the eighteenth century can be described in the most general terms as its 
development from a rational into an emotional principle. Nature and Reason are 
noiinally associated in the earlier part of the century. Nature and Feeling in the later. 
This change is associated with the growth of the cult of sensibility, the substitution 
of ‘je sens, done je suis’ for ‘cogito, ergo sum’, the increasing value attributed to 
impulse and spontaneity, and the decreasing importance attached to pure reason.^
When critics describe Shakespeare as a poet of nature, they do not always mean by 
this the same thing. When Dryden says that “All the images of Nature were still 
presented to him, and he drew them not laboriously, but luckily,” or when he comments 
that “ he was naturally learn’d ; he needed not the spectacles of Books to read Nature; he 
look’d inwards, and found her there”'^ , he emphasises Shakespeai-e’s innate genius. 
Nature is what need not be learned. Similarly Pope notes that “The Poetry of 
Shakespeare was Inspiration indeed: he is not so much an Imitator as an Instrument of
 ^ See Jackson, Wallace. Immediacy: The Development o f A Critical Concept from Addison to Coleridge. 
Amsterdam: Rodipl NV, 1973, p. 11. According to Jackson, “By 1700 classical rationalism was in the 
throes o f a death agony, its confident assumptions o f right reason as a ruling principle o f  mind already 
under serious attack. Surely no dedicated effort was made to “subvert” the neoclassical system, but the 
implications o f sensationalism and empiricism opened the way for inquiries into the nature o f man that 
were not in harmony with that neoclassical image o f man.”
 ^ Willey, pp.207-208.
Diyden, John. O f Dramatick Poesie, An Essay. Reprinted in Shakespeare: The Critical Heritage. Vol. 1. 
p. 138.
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Nature; and ‘tis not so just to say that he speaks from her as that she speaks thro’ him.”  ^
Johnson too lent his authority to the notion that Shakespeare was above all a natural 
poet.^
Coleridge too repeats the notion. In doing so, he sometimes echoes his predecessors, 
especially when he celebrates Shakespeare’s natural genius. But in most cases, the 
notion is based on his own definitive concept of nature. His concept of genius, the 
relationship between genius and judgment, his metaphor describing Shakespeare as a 
Spinozistic deity or as Proteus, Shakespeare as the poet of method, Shakespeare as a 
prophet, and Shakespeare as a man of his age and of no age are all related to his concept 
of nature. In this chapter, I would like to link Coleridge’s concept of nature to his notion 
of Shakespeare as a poet.
1. “A Child of Nature”
Eighteenth-century critics followed Dryden or Pope in celebrating Shakespeare’s 
divine or natural gift by calling him “a child of nature”. He is celebrated as “a single 
Instance of the force of Nature, and the Strength of Wit.”  ^Critics such as Joseph Warton 
describe him as the Muse’s darling child:
What are the Lays of artful Addison,
Coldly correct, to Shakespeare''s Warblings wild?
 ^Pope, Alexander. The Works o f  Shakespeare, Collated and Corrected. Reprinted in Shakespeare: the 
Critical Heritage. Vol.2., pp.403-4.
 ^ See the section on Samuel Johnson in chapter one o f this thesis.
 ^Felton, Hemy. A Dissertation on Reading the Classics, And Forming a Just Style. Reprinted in 
Shakespeare: the Critical Heritage. Vol.2., p .215.
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Whom on the winding Avon's willow’d Banks 
Fair Fancy found, and bore the smiling Babe 
To a close Cavern. (Still the Shepherds shew 
The sacred Place, whence with religious Awe 
They hear, returning from the Field at Eve,
Strange Whisperings of sweet Music tliro’ the Air.) 
Here, as with Floney gather’d from the Rock,
She fed the little Prattler, and with Songs
Oft sooth’d his wond’ring Ears, with deep Delight
On her soft Lap he sat, and caught the Sounds.^
This notion of Shakespeare as ‘child of nature’ is inseparable from that of Shakespeare 
as natural genius. Edward Young recognises two exemplary poets; among the moderns, 
Shakespeare, among the ancients, Pindar. Their genius, according to Young, is an 
entirely natural endowment:
For Genius may be compared to the Body’s natural strength. Learning to the 
Superinduced Accoutrements of Arms; if the First is equal to the proposed exploit 
the Latter rather encumbers than assists, rather retards than promotes the Victory. 
Sacer nobis inest Dens, says Seneca. With regard to the Moral world Conscience, 
with regard to the Intellectual Genius is that God within. Genius can set us right in 
Composition without Rules of the Learned, as Conscience sets us right in Life 
without the Laws of the Land. This, singly, can make us Good as Men: That, singly, 
as Writers can sometimes make us Great.
I say sometimes because there is a Genius which stands in need of Learning to 
make it shine. Of Genius there are two species, an Earlier and a Later, or call them 
infantine and Adult. An Adult Genius comes out of Nature’s hand, as Pellas out of 
Jove’s head, at full growth and mature: Shakespeare's Genius was of this kind .^
This notion of Shakespeare was continuous throughout the eighteenth century. Joseph
® Warton, Joseph, The Enthusiast: or the Lover o f  Nature (1744). Reprinted in Shakespeare: The Critical 
Heritage. Vol.3., p. 121.
Also see Sherlock, Martin. A Fragment on Shakespeare. Reprinted m Shakespeare : The Critical 
Heritage. Vol.6., p.436. “It is she who was thy book, O Shakespeare; it is she who was thy study day and 
night; it is she from whom thou hast drawn those beauties which are at once the glory and delight o f thy 
nation. Thou wert the eldest son, the darling child, o f Nature; and like thy mother enchanting, astonishing, 
sublime, graceful, thy variety is inexliaustible. Always original, always new, thou art the only prodigy 
which Nature has produced.
 ^Young, Edward. Conjectures on Original Composition. Reprinted in Shakespeare: The Critical 
Heritage. V61.4., p.406.
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Addison classified genius into two kinds. The first consists of the natural geniuses: 
“those few draw the admiration of all the world upon them, and stand up as the 
prodigies of mankind, who by the mere strength of natural parts, and without any 
assistance of art or learning, have produced works that were the delight of their own 
times and the wonder of posterity.” '® Such geniuses are “like a rich soil in a happy 
climate, that produces a whole wilderness of noble plants rising in a thousand beautiful 
landscapes without any certain order or regularity.”"  For him, Shakespeare is an 
outstanding instance of this first kind of genius.'^
When the critics of the eighteenth century call Shakespeare a child of nature, they 
tend to indicate also his lack of learning. William Duff takes Shakespeare’s lack of 
learning as a mark of his merit as a poet.'^Jolm Dennis also saw Shakespeare as lacking 
learning, knowledge of poetic art, and knowledge of h i s t o r y . H e  insists on the
Addison, Joseph. Critical Essays from the Spectator. Ed. Donald F. Bond. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1970, p.250.
" Ibid., p.252.
Addison’s second kind o f  genius are “those that have formed themselves by rules, and submitted the 
greatness o f their natural talents to the corrections and restraint o f art.” (Ibid, p.252.)
See Duff, William. Critical Observations on the Writings o f  the Most Celebrated Original Geniuses in 
P o e tty {m O ). Delmar, N.Y.: Scholar’s Facsimiles & Reprints, 1973, pI95, “Want o f learning, or rather 
knowledge o f the learned languages, hath been considered by many as a great disadvantage to 
Shakespeare; but it should seem to have been very improperly considered as such. For my own part, I am 
persuaded, that had Shakespeare’s learning been greater, his merit as Poet had been less. Conscious o f  the 
greatness o f his own powers, he had no occasion for the adventitious aid o f books, and observations of 
others. He had nothing to do but to look upon nature and man, and he, at one glance, caught a perfect idea 
of every object and character which he viewed, o f which his imagination enabled him to present a 
complete resemblance; as well as by its creative power to present objects and characters which never 
existed in nature, nor in any human imagination but his own.”
See Dennis, John. An Essay On the Genius and Writings o f  Shakespeare, in The Critical Works o f  John 
Dennis. Vol. 2. Ed.Edward Hooker. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1939-1943, p.4. “One may say 
o f  him as they did o f Homer, that he had none to imitate, and is himself inimitable. His imaginations were 
often as just, as they were bold and strong. He had a natural Discretion which never cou’d have been 
taught him, and his Judgment was strong and penetrating. He seems to have wanted nothing but Time and 
Leisure for Thought, to have found out those Rules o f  which he appears so ignorant. His characters are 
always drawn justly, exactly, graphically, except where he fail’d by not knowing History or the Poetic Art. 
He has for the most part more fairly distinguish’d them than any o f his Successors have done, who have 
falsified them, or confounded them, by making Love the predominant Quality in all. He had so fine a 
Talent for touching the Passions, and they are so lively in him, and so truly in Nature, that they often touch 
us more without their due Preparations, than those o f other Tragick Poets,who have all the Beauty o f
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slenderness of Shakespeare’s classical learning: “If then Shakespeare was qualify’d to 
read Plautus with Ease, he could read with a great deal more Ease the Translation of 
Sophocles and Euripides.”"  Richardson is typical in insisting that Shakespeare’s 
ignorance was a condition of his greatness."
Coleridge was hostile to this kind of notion:
...it was a happy medium & refiige, to talk of Shakespeare as a sort of beautiful 
Lusus Naturae, a delightfiil Monster—wild indeed, without taste or judgment, but 
like the inspired Idiots so much venerated in the East, uttering amid the strangest 
follies the sublimest truths. In nine places out of ten in which I find his awful name 
mentioned, it is with some epithet of wild, irregular, pure child of nature, &c &c 
&c— .— If all this be true, we must submit to it: tho’ to a thinking mind it cannot but 
be painful to find any excellence merely human thrown out of all human Analogy, 
and thereby leaving us neither rules (for imitation) nor motives to imitate; but if 
false, it is a dangerous falsehood—for it affords a refuge to secret self- 
conceit—enables a vain man at once to escape his readers’ Indignation by general 
swoln panegyrics on Shakespeare, merely his ipse dixt to treat what he has not 
Intellect enough to comprehend or soul to feel, as contemptible without assigning 
any reason or referring his opinion to any demonstrated Principle/ and so has left 
Shakespeare, as a sort of Tartarian Delay Lama, adored indeed & his very 
excrescences prized as relics, but with no authority, no real Influence— (CV III 3288 
March 1808)
Coleridge, throughout his Notes and Lectures, insists that Shalcespeare is a learned 
writer. He approvingly quotes a certain ‘professor Wilde’:
“His information,” says professor WILDE, “was great and extensive, and his reading
Design and all the Advantage o f Incidents. His Master-passion was Terror, which he has often mov’d so 
powerfully and so wonderfully, that we may justly conclude, that if he had the Advantage o f Art and 
Learning, he wou’d have surpass’d the very best and strongest o f the Ancients.”
" Ibid., p. 13.
See Richardson, William. Essays on Shakespeare’s Dramatic Characters. London: printed for Samuel 
Bagster, 1812, pp.425-426. “Had he been well acquainted with the poets and critics o f antiquity, he would 
probably have been more attentive to unity, and studied greater simplicity in the form of his fables. Not 
that he would have adopted the practice o f ancient poets, in its fullest extent; for this would have been too 
opposite to the public taste, and too inconsistent with his own luxuriant fancy. We may also add, that some 
departure from the strict rules o f  unity enacted by ancient critics, and some deviation from the simplicity 
o f Grecian poets, is no loss to the drama. Shakespeare, however, by having known them, and by having 
adhered to them in some degree, would have been less irregular and incoherent.”
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as great as his Icnowledge of Languages could reach. Considering the bar which his 
education and circumstances placed in his way, he had done as much to acquire 
Imowledge as even Milton. A thousand instances might be given of the intimate 
knowledges that Shakespeare had of facts. I shall mention only one. I do not say, he 
gives a good account of the Salic law, though a much worse has been by many 
antiquaries. But he who reads the Archbishop of Canterbury’s speech in Hemy the 
Fifth, and who shall afterwards say that Shakespeare was not a man of great reading 
and information, who loved the thing itself, is a person whose opinion I would not 
ask or trust upon any matter of investigation.” Then was all this reading, all this 
information, all this Imowledge of our greatest dramatist, a mere rudis indigestaque 
moles'liTM, 26)
Coleridge cites Love’s Labour’s Lost to demonstrates Shakespeare’s learning:
What was the Love's Labour's Lostl Was it the production of a person accustomed 
to stroll as a Vagabond about streets, or to hold horses at a Play-house door, and 
who had contented himself with making observation of nature in Shakespeare’s 
earliest works. The dialogue consisted, either of remarks upon what is grotesque in 
language, or mistaken in literature—all bore the appearance of being written by a 
man of reading and learning, & the force of genius early saw what was excellent, or 
what was ridiculous.
Hence the wonderful activity of this kind in the first scene of Loves labour lost. 
Such thoughts would never have occurred to a man ignorant & merely an observer 
of nature.(Leer I, 275)
Shakespeare’s mind, according to Coleridge, was “rich in stores of acquired 
knowledge,” and he “commanded all these stores and rendered them disposable, by 
means of his intimate acquaintance with the great laws of Thought, which form and 
regulate Method.”(7tW, 35-36).
2. Shakespeare: Nature Humanized
Shakespeare remained for Coleridge a poet of nature but a poet of what we might call 
“Nature humanized”. He is a poet who expresses the inner principles or inner law of
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nature; namely, natiira naturans}^ An artist, according to Coleridge, “must master the 
essence, the natura naturans, which presupposes a bond between nature in the higher 
senses and the soul of man.”(d7/iL, 46) With regard to the bond between man and 
Nature, Coleridge says;
In Man the centripetal and individualizing tendency of all Nature is itself concentred 
and individualized—he is a Revelation of Nature! Henceforward, he is referred to 
himself, delivered up to his own charge; and he who stands the most on himself, and 
stands the firmest, is the truest, because the most individual, Man. In social and 
political life this acme is inter-dependence; in moral life it is independence; in 
intellectual life it is genius.”(7%, 551)
Shakespeare, for Coleridge, is this man: “the revelation of nature”, “nature humanized”. 
Coleridge compared Shakespeare with Beaumont and Fletcher to demonstrate this:
What had a grammatical and logical consistency of the Ear, what could be put 
together and represented to the Eye, these Poets took from the Ear and the eye/ 
unchecked by any intuition of an inward impossibility—just as a man might fit 
together a quarter of an orange, a quarter of an Apple, and the like of a Lemon and 
of a Pomegranate, and make it look like one round diverse colored fruit—but Nature 
who works from within, by evolution and assimilation according to a law, cannot do 
it—nor could Shakespeare: for he too worked in the spirit of Nature, by evolving the 
Germ within by the imaginative Power according to an Idea— : for as the Power of 
Seeing is to Light, so is an Idea (in mind) to a Law in Nature—they are correlatives 
that suppose each character, more or less will happen to be in correspondence with 
nature, and still more in apparent compatibility—but yet the false source is always 
discoverable, first by the (gross) contradictions to Nature in so many other parts, 
and secondly by the want of the impression, which Shakespear makes, that the thing 
said not only might have been said but that nothing else could be substituted to 
excite the same sense of its exquisite propriety— illustrated from lago when brought 
into Othello’s sight— {Lect II, pp. 147-8)
Another interpretation of “Nature Humanized” focuses on the difference between
17 See chapter two o f this thesis.
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man and nature. Coleridge explains Shakespeare with a double focus, focusing both on 
his conforming with the spirit of nature and at the same time on his possession of a 
consciousness which does not exist in nature.
The wisdom in nature is distinguished from that in man by the coinstantaneity of 
the plan and the execution; the thought and the product are one, or are given at once; 
but there is no reflex act, and hence there is no moral responsibility. In man there is 
reflexion, freedom, and choice; he is therefore, the head of the visible creation. In 
the objects of nature are presented, as in a mirror, all the possible elements, steps, 
and processes of intellect antecedent to consciousness, and therefore to the full 
development of the intelligential act; and man’s mind is the very focus of all the 
rays of intellect which are scattered throughout the images of nature.(AML, 47)
For Coleridge the genius reconciles all these things and his imier self; “Now so to place 
these images, totalized, and fitted to the limits of the human mind, as to elicit from, and 
to superinduce upon, the forms themselves the moral reflexions to which they 
approximate, to make the external internal, the internal external, to make nature thought, 
thought nature,— this is the mystery of genius in the Fine Arts.’’(Ibid., 47) The following 
passage can be understood in this context:
The organic form on the other hand is innate, it shapes as it developes itself from 
within, and the flillness of its development is one & the same with the perfection of 
its outward Form. Such is the Life, such the form—Nature, the prime Genial Artist, 
inexhaustible in diverse powers is equally inexhaustible in forms— each Exterior is 
the physiognomy of the Being within, its true Image reflected & tlu’own out from 
the concave mirror—& even such is the appropriate Excellence of her chosen Poet, 
of our own Shakespear/ himself a Nature humanized, a genial Understanding 
directing self-consciously a power & a (implicit) wisdom deeper than 
Consciousness— {Lect I, 495)
It is not too much to say that all Coleridge’s evaluations of Shakespeare as a poet are 
based on the double focus that he expresses in the plnase “Nature Humanized”.
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Coleridge’s notion of Shakespeare as a genius, for instance, is also based on these two 
focuses.
2 ■ i Shakespeare as A Genius
First, Coleridge argues that a genius must create according to the severe laws of the 
intellect, in order to generate in himself a co-ordination of freedom and law. He 
recommends obedience not to cold notions (lifeless teclmical rules) but living and life- 
producing ideas, which shall contain their own evidence, the certainty that they are 
essentially one with the germinal causes in nature.(AML, 47-8) Thus, genius acts as a 
preservative against those who do not follow the natural law, especially “when the 
imagination and preconstructive power have taken a scientific or philosophic direction: 
as in Plato, indeed in almost all the first-rate philosophers—in Kepler, Milton, Boyle, 
Newton, Leibniz, and Berkley.” (F I, 416)
In genius, Coleridge wiites:
Something new, however, it must be, quite new and quite out of themselves! for 
whatever is within them, whatever is deep within them, must be as old as the first 
dawn of human reason. But to find no contradiction in the union of old and new, to 
contemplate the ANCIENT OF DAYS with feelings as fresh, as if they then sprang 
forth at his own fiat, this characterizes the minds that feel the riddle of the world, 
and may help to umavel it! To cany on the feelings of childhood into the powers of 
manliood, to combine the child’s sense of wonder and novelty with the appearances 
which eveiy day for perhaps forty years had rendered familiar,
With Sun and Moon and Stai*s throughout the year,
And Man and Woman—
This is the character and privilege of genius, and one of the marks which distinguish 
genius from talents. And so to represent familiar objects as to awaken the minds of 
others to a like freshness of sensation concerning them (that constant 
accompaniment of mental, no less than of bodily, convalescence)— to the same 
modest questioning of a self-discovered and intelligent ignorance, which, like the
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deep and massy foundations of a Roman bridge, forms half of the whole structure 
(prudens interrogatio dimidiiim scientiae, says Lord Bacon)— this is the prime merit 
of genius, and its most unequivocal mode of manifestation. (FI, 109-110)
Coleridge suggests a boy’s feeling for candle light as an example of “the feelings of 
childhood”; A boy, before going to bed, carelessly blows out his candle and he, lying 
upon his bed in the ensuing darlcness, has the opportunity to see the sullen light 
surviving the extinguished flame. The candle light fades and revives, gathers to a point 
as it is about to disappear, but becomes brighter than before. It continues to shine with 
an endurance which in its apparent weakness is a mystery. It protracts its existence so 
long, clinging to the power which supports it, that it gives the boy a feeling of sadness 
and melancholy. His sympathies are touched: It looks to him the image of a departing 
human life, which is the life of a parent or a brother who has gone to the grave.
Coleridge asks if there are any powers by which he could call to mind the same 
image and hang over it with an equal interest as a visible type of his own spirit when the 
boy comes to his adolescence. Coleridge locates such a power in the primary sense of 
duty; that is, if duty begins from the point of accountableness to our conscience, and 
through that, to God and human nature. Another condition of maintaining the power is 
the soul’s transcendence of the animal functions. Then the image of the dying candle 
light may be recalled and contemplated without the same sensuous feelings of childhood 
but with a melancholy in the soul, a sinldng inward into ourselves from thought to 
thought, a steady remonstrance and a high resolve.
The youth will gain a world of fresh sensation through the help of nature 
admonished by reason. New sensations, Coleridge affirms, will open out sanctioned by 
the reason that is their original author and precious feelings of disinterested joy and love
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may be regenerated and restored. And with the study of the visible universe and ancient 
books, the youth now perceives beauty with his thinking mind. The youth, now, is 
content to look at his mind and endeavour to look through the system of his being with 
the organ of reason summoned to go, as far as it has power, in discovery of the impelling 
forces and the governing laws.(FI, 398-399)
Coleridge also defines genius by contrasting it with talent and sense:
In short, I define GENIUS, as originality in intellectual construction: the moral 
accompaniment, and actuating principle of which consists, perhaps, in the cai'iying 
on of the freslmess and feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood.
By TALENT, on the other hand, I mean the comparative facility of acquiring, 
arranging, and applying the stock furnished by others and already existing in books 
or other conservatories of intellect. By SENSE I understand that just balance of the 
faculties which is to the judgment what health is to the body. The mind seems to act 
en masse, by a synthetic rather than an analytic process: even as the outward senses, 
from which the metaphor is taken, pereeive immediately, each as it were by a 
peculiar tact or intuition, without any consciousness of the mechanism by which the 
perception is realized.(FI., 419)
Secondly, Coleridge emphasises the conscious activity of the faculties of the mind 
especially in creative works. Shakespeare, for Coleridge, is a genius who possessed both 
nature’s unconsciousness and human consciousness. In every work of art, according to 
Coleridge, there is a reconciliation of the external with the internal; that is, the 
conscious is so impressed on the unconsciousness as to appear in it. The conscious is to 
the unconscious as the mere letters inscribed on a tomb are to the figures themselves 
constituting the tomb. He who combines the two, for Coleridge, is the man of genius. 
Coleridge insists that there is in genius an unconscious activity. He adds that the artist 
must first distance himself from nature in order to return to her with effect.
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This idea is well demonstrated in his classification of genius into two kinds, namely, 
the absolute genius and the commanding genius. In the commanding genius, “the 
conceptions of the mind may be so vivid and adequate, as to preclude that impulse to the 
realizing of them, which is strongest and most restless in those, who possess more than 
mere talent (or the faculty of appropriating and applying the knowledge of others) yet 
still want something of the creative, and self-sufficing power of absolute Genius.”(FL I, 
31 ) While the absolute genius can
rest content between thought and reality, as it were in an intermundium of which 
their own living spirit supplies the substance, and their imagination the ever-vaiying 
form; the latter(the commanding genius)" must impress their preconceptions on the 
world without, in order to present them back to their own view with the satisfying 
degree of clearness, distinctness, and individuality.(FL I, 32)
For Coleridge, Shakespeare is the prime example of the absolute genius. His idea of 
poetic genius is largely explained in this context. He enumerates four qualities of genius 
and argues that all of them are evident in Venus and Adonis and Lucrece despite their 
immaturity. In these two poems.
the first and most obvious excellence is the perfect sweetness of the versification; its 
adaptation to the subject; and the power displayed in varying the march of the words 
without passing into a loftier and more majestic rhythm, than was demanded by the 
thoughts, or permitted by the propriety of preserving a sense of melody 
predominant.(FL II, 19-20)"
Here, Coleridge emphasises Shakespeare’s fundamental excellence in versification and 
identifies the organic relation between concept and versification as the first condition of
** Words in parenthesis are mine. 
See also Anima Poetae, p. 178.
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genius. Shakespeare is, above all, “the man who has music in his soul”. A man who 
does not have music in his soul cannot be a true poet. A man of talent by incessant effort 
might be able to arrive at an ability to produce poetic imagery, for instance, from books, 
and from his appreciation of nature. He, however, can never obtain the sense of musical 
delight with the power of producing it. The sense of musical delight
is a gift of imagination; and this together with the power of reducing multitude into 
unity of effect, and modifying a series of thoughts by some one predominant thought 
or feeling may be cultivated and improved, but can never be learnt. It is in these that 
“poeta nascitur non fit.”(Ibid.,20)
Here, Coleridge accepts that skill in versification is innate rather than acquired.
Coleridge suggests that a choice of subjects remote from the private interests and 
circumstances of the writer is a second indication of genius. But this does not mean that 
the writer should choose a subject totally outside personal experience. Rather, he 
emphasises the writer’s self-sufficing creativity. Coleridge finds Shalcespeare’s poetic 
power in Venus and Adonis.
It is tliroughout as if a superior spirit more intuitive, more intimately conscious, 
even than the characters themselves, not only of every outward look and act, but of 
the flux and reflux of the mind in all its subtlest thoughts and feelings, were placing 
the whole before our view; himself meanwhile unparticipating in the passions, and 
actuated only by that pleasurable excitement, which had resulted from the energetic 
fervor of his own spirit in so vividly exhibiting, what it had so accurately and 
profoundly c o n t em p l a t ed . I I ,  21)
Coleridge points out the handling of images as another proof of genius. The images
become proofs of original genius only as far as they are modified by a predominant 
passion; or by associated thoughts or images awakened by that passion; or when 
they have the effect of reducing multitude to unity, or succession to an instant; or 
lastly, when a human and intellectual life is transferred to them from the poet’s own
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spirit,
Which shoots its being through earth, sea, and air.(FL 11,23)
Coleridge presents several poems of Shakespeare as exquisite examples of this quality. 
One of them is Sonnet 98^ ®, which expresses a feeling of love. Another example is 
Venus and Adonis lines 811-13:
With this he breaketh from the sweet embrace 
Of those fair arms, that held him to her heart.
And homeward tlnough the dark lawns runs apace:
Look how a bright star shooteth from the sky!
So glides he through the night from Venus ’ eye.
He comments on these last two lines :
How many Images & feelings are here brought together without effort & without 
discord— the beauty of Adonis—the rapidity of his flight—the yearning yet 
hopelessness of the enamoured gazer—and a shadowy ideal character tin-own over 
the whole— ! or it acts by impressing the stamp of humanity, of human feeling, over 
inanimate Objects. (CV III 3290, March 1808)
“  From you have I been absent in the spring,
When proud pied April drest in all its trim 
Hath put a spirit o f  youth in every thing;
That heavy Saturn laugh’d and leap’d with him.
Yet nor the lays o f birds, nor the sweet smell 
Of different flowers in odour and in hue,
Could make me any summer’s story tell,
Or from their proud lap pluck them, where they grew; 
Nor did 1 wonder at the lilies white,
Nor praise the deep vermillion in the rose;
They were, tho’ sweet, but figures o f delight,
Drawn after you, you pattern o f all those.
Yet seem’d it winter still, and you away,
As with your shadow I with these did play!
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For Coleridge, another quality of genius is depth and energy of thought. When 
Coleridge finds an example of a poet and philosopher in Shakespeare, he focuses on 
Shakespeare’s creative power and intellectual energy.
For poetry is the blossom and the fragrancy of all human Imowledge, human 
thoughts, human passions, emotions, language. In Shakespeare’s poems, the creative 
power, and the intellectual energy wrestle as in a war embrace. Each in its excess of 
strength seems to tln*eaten the extinction of the other. At length, in the DRAMA they 
were reconciled, and fought each with its shield before the breast of the other. Or 
like two rapid streams, that at their first meeting within narrow and rocke banks 
mutually strive to repel each other, and intermix reluctantly and in tumult; but soon 
finding a wider channel and more yielding shores blend, and dilate, and flow on in 
one current and with one voice.(FL II, 26)
He finds this aspect of Shakespeare in The Rape o f Lucrece. Just as in Venus and 
Adonis, vivid and minute imagery is united with vigorous thought, but there is a wider 
range of knowledge and reflection. In these Shakespeare’s earliest poems, “the poet and 
philosopher perpetually struggling with each other—till found unified when they were 
blended & flowed in sweetest harmony & strength.”(Lec^ II., 121) Coleridge argues that 
Shakespeare, “possessed by the Muse not possessing, first studied, deeply meditated, 
understood minutely—the knowledge become habitual gradually wedded itself with his 
habitual feelings, & at length gave him that wonderful Power by which he stands alone, 
with no equal or second in his own class, any where—seated him on one of the two 
Golden Thrones of the English Paranassus, with Milton on the other.”(Lccf I, 244)
Shakespeare accords with Coleridge’s definition of the metaphysician. In a letter to 
William Sotheby, he writes:
It is easy to cloathe Imaginary Beings with our own Thoughts & Feelings; but to
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send ourselves out of ourselves, to think ourselves in to the Thoughts and Feelings 
of Beings in circumstances wholly & strangely different from our own/ hoc labor, 
hoc opus/ and who has atchieved it? Perhaps only Shakespere. Metaphisics is a 
word, that you, my dear Sir! are no great Friend to/ but yet you will agree, that a 
great Poet must be, implicite if not explicité, a profound Metaphysician. He may not 
have it in logical coherence, in his Brain & Tongue; but he must have it by Tact! for 
all sounds, & forms of human nature he must have the ear of a wild Arab listening 
in the silent Desart, the eye of a North American Indian tracing the footsteps of an 
Enemy upon the Leaves that strew the Forest— ; the Touch of a blind Man feeling 
the face of a darling Child—(CL II, 13 July 1802)
Here, Coleridge proposes a crucial faculty of a poet—the reconciliation of sense and 
thought. In his notion of metaphysician, the metaphysician does not only deal with 
something beyond the physical;
What is that I employ my metaphysics on? To perplex our clearest notions and 
living moral instincts? To extinguish the light of love and of conscience, to put out 
the life of arbitrement, to make myself and others worthless, soulless. Godless"! No, 
to expose the folly and the legerdemain of those who have thus abused the blessed 
organ of language, to support all old and venerable truths, to support, to kindle, to 
project, to make the reason spread light over our feelings, to make our feelings 
diffuse vital warmth tlnough our reason—these are my objects and these my 
subjects.— {AP, 42-43)
This highly tactical definition pushes the purpose of metaphysics towards the revelation 
of truth and the reconciliation of human faculties—i.e., the reconciliation of reason and 
feeling, the reconciliation of sense and spirit.
Shakespeare, Coleridge says, "was a person who balances sameness with 
difference— and triteness with novelty—who reconciles judgment with enthusiasm & 
vehemence with feeling—Art with Nature—the manner with the matter, & our 
admiration of the poem with the sympathy with the characters & incidents of the poem.” 
{Lect I, 255)
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2 • ii Genius: Summing Whole Mental Faculties
Coleridge, in Biographia, says that " in advanced stages of literature, when there 
exist many and excellent models, a high degree of talent, combined with taste and 
judgment, and employed in works of imagination, will acquire for a man the name of a 
great genius.”(BL I, 37) He also says that “GOOD SENSE is the BODY of poetic genius, 
FANCY its DRAPERY, MOTION its LIFE, and IMAGINATION the SOUL that is every where, 
and in each; and forms all Into one graceful and intelligent whole.”(FLII, 18)
As we see in these passages, genius does not signify a single or a few particular 
faculties but a whole made up of all mental faculties. For Coleridge, a genius, “who is 
the ideal perfection of the poet, not only puts the whole soul of man into activity but 
also, and more fundamentally, indemnifies a wholeness of soul which can be put into 
activity.”^' Shakespeare is the supreme example of such a genius;
I would try Shakespear compared with any other writer by this criterion—Make 
out your amplest Catalogue of all the Human Faculties— as Reason or Moral Law, 
the Will, the feeling of the coincidence of the two (a feeling sui generis, & 
demonstratio demonstrationum) called, the Conscience, the Understanding or 
Prudence, Wit, Fancy, Imagination, Judgment/—  and then the Objects on which 
these can be employed, as the Beauties of Nature, the terrors or seeming Caprices of 
Nature, the Realities & the Capabilities, i.e. the actual & the Ideal of the Human 
Mind, conceived as Individual, or as Social Being—as in Innocence, or in guilt, in a 
Play-Paradise or War-field of Temptation/ & then compare with him under each of 
these Heads—I abhor Beauties & Selections in general—& even here if the effect of 
the Poetry were considered—but as Proof Positive of umivalled Excellence I should 
like to see it— fle e t  I, 127-128)
This passage emphasises Shakespeare’s ‘unrivaled excellence’ in employing all human 
faculties, and this in itself implies Coleridge’s dislike of the collections of Shakespeare’s
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memorable sayings.
Coleridge’s notion of genius is distinguished from his eighteenth-century 
predecessors in that their notions of genius tend to be focused on some few particular 
faculties. Gerald, for instance, holds invention as the leading quality of genius. For him, 
invention consists in comprehensiveness of imagination; that is, in a readiness in 
associating the most distantly related ideas.U n like  Coleridge’s concept of imagination 
as a unifying principle with the function of ‘dissolving, diffusing, and dissipating in 
order to recreate’, Gerald’s imagination selects ‘the ferruginous particles’ from the 
quality of matter. Gerard specifies the peculiar propeity of genius, which is a capacity to 
express its designs in apt materials. In the case of poetry, the ideas assembled by fancy 
are expressed in appropriate language to excite strong ideas in its readers.
In the case of Duff, one of the offices of genius is vivid description and imparting 
lively and fervid feelings to the mind of the reader.^^ This view of genius is reflected in 
his evaluation of Shakespeare:
...I would say that sublimity, both in imagery and description, is most conspicuous
Christensen, Jerome C. “The Genius in the Biographia Literaria.” SIR, 17(1978);215-31, p.220.
See Gerard, Alexander. An Essay on Taste(1759). Scolar Press, 1971, p. 173-174. For him, “In
a man o f genius the uniting principles are so vigorous and quick, that whenever any idea Is present to the 
mind, they bring into view at once all others, that have the least connection with it. As the magnet selects 
from a quality o f matter the ferruginous particles, which happen to be scattered through it, without making 
an impression on other substances; so imagination, by a similar sympathy, equally inexplicable, draws out 
from the whole compass o f nature such ideas as we have occasion for, without attending to any others; and 
yet presents them with a great propriety, as if all possible conceptions had been explicitly exposed to our 
view, and subjected to our choice.
See Duff, William, An Essay on Original Genius, pp. 159-160. “A poet,... who is possessed o f original 
Genius, feels in the strongest manner every impression made upon the mind, by the influence o f external 
objects on the senses, or by reflection on those ideas which are treasured up in the repository of the 
memoiy, and is consequently qualified to express the vivacity and strength o f his own feelings. If we 
suppose a person endued with this quality to describe real objects and scenes, such as are either 
immediately present to his senses, or recent in his remembrance; he will paint them in such vivid colours, 
and with so many picturesque circumstances, as to convey the same lively and fervid ideas to the mind of 
the Reader, which possessed and filled the imagination o f the Author.
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in the character of Homer, that Ossian is most eminently distinguished by the 
pathetic both in sentiment and description, particularly that species of the pathetic 
which is calculated to melt the heart into tenderness; and that Shakespeare discovers 
the strength of his Genius most signally in a certain wild and picturesque manner of 
describing every object he intends to exhibit, which is peculiar to himself.
The aesthetics of the eighteenth century tends to give priority to the capacity to 
provoke immediate passion or feeling. Lord Karnes, in Elements o f Criticism, 
emphasises how difficult a job awakening passion is:
To awake passion by an internal effort merely, without an external cause, requires 
great sensibility: and yet that operation is necessary, no less to the writer than to the 
actor; because none but those who actually feel a passion, can represent it to the life. 
The writer’s part is more complicated: he must add composition to passion; and 
must, in the quickest succession, adopt every different character. But a very humble 
flight of imagination, may serve to convert a writer into a spectator; so as to figure, 
in some obscure manner, an action as passing in his sight and hearing. In that 
figured situation, being led naturally to write like a spectator, he entertains his 
readers with his own reflections, with cool description, and florid declamation; 
instead of making them eye witness, as it were, to a real event, and to every 
movement of genuine passion. Thus most of our plays appear to be cast in the same 
mould; personages without character, the mere outlines of passion, a tiresome 
monotony, and pompous declamatory style.
Kames demonstrates Shakespeare’s excellence in dealing with passion by describing his 
poetry as “the legitimate offspring of passion” which is ‘the sentiment dictated by a 
violent and perturbed passion.’ According to him, Shakespeare imitates this passion 
most perfectly in Lear’s speech accusing his daughters of ingratitude(Act 3, sc.5) and 
Othello’s soliloquy after he has strangled Desdemona. In his opinion, “passions seldom 
continue uniform any considerable time: they generally fluctuate, swelling and subsiding 
by turns, often in a quick succession; and the sentiment cannot be just in expressing a
Duff, William, Critical Observations on the Writings o f the Most Celebrated Original Geniuses in 
P oetry{\llC ), pp. 184-5.
Home, Henry ( Lord Kames). Elements o f  Criticism. Vol.I. London: Roiitledge/ Thoemmes Press, 1993,
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swelling passion.” ®^ So, according to him, the different stages of a passion and its 
different directions must be carefully represented in their order. Then, he suggests that a 
person can be dominated by different passions at once. In this case, his mind is 
oscillating like a pendulum. Kames finds examples in the Queen’s passion in Henry 
VIII, and again in Othello. Another kind is immoderate passion which is against nature 
or in contradiction to reason and conscience. For the representation of this sort of 
passion, the characters must hide or dissemble their feelings as much as they can. 
Kames offers an example in a speech of the usurping Duke of Milan in The Tempest{ 
Act 2, sc.l) and in the speech of King Jolm’s instigating Hubert to murder Arthur.
William Richardson finds Shakespeare’s genius in his characterisation. Richardson 
argues that Shakespeare’s eminent distinction is.
... imitating the passion in all its aspects, by pursuing it through all its windings and 
labyrinths, by moderating or accelerating its impetuosity according to the influence 
of other principles and of external events, and finally by combining it in a judicious 
mamier with other passions and propensities, or by setting it aptly in opposition. He 
thus unites the two essential powers of dramatic invention, that of forming 
characters; and that of imitating, in their natural expressions, the passions and 
affections of which they are composed,^^
2 • iii Genius and Judgment
Coleridge differs from his eighteenth-century predecessors in insisting that 
Shakespeare’s genius appears in his judgment. His British predecessors of the 
eighteenth-century usually thought Shakespeare’s genius separate from his judgment or
pp.454-455.
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even considered the two faculties contradictory. Gerard, for example, writes that 
“soundness and strength of judgment may be possessed without considerable genius”. 
William Duff, assuming that a genius aspires to achieve some object, accepts that genius 
must be allied with imagination, judgment, and taste. According to him.
The proper office of JUDGMENT in composition, is to  compare the ideas which 
imagination collects; to observe their agreement or disagreement, their relations and 
resemblances; to point out such as are of homogeneous nature; to mark and reject 
such as are discordant; and finally, to determine the truth and utility of the 
inventions or discoveries which are produced by the power of imagination. This 
faculty is, in all its operations, cool, attentive, and considerate. It canvasses the 
design, ponders the sentiments, examines their propriety and connection, and 
reviews the whole composition with severe impartiality. Thus it appears to be in 
eveiy respect a proper counterbalance to the RAMBLING and VOLATILE power of 
IMAGINATION. The one, peipetually attempting to soar, is apt to deviate into the 
mazes of error; while the other arrests that wanderer in its vagrant course, and 
compels it to follow the path of nature and of truth.
Coleridge insists on a quite different relation between genius and judgment:
The science of criticism dates its restoration from the time when it was seen that an 
examination and appreciation of the end was necessarily antecedent to the formation 
of the rules, supplying at once the principle of the rules themselves and of their 
application to the given subject. From this time we have heard little (among 
intelligent persons, I mean) of the wildness and irregularity of our Shakespeare. 
Nay, when once the end which our myriad-minded bard had in view and the local 
accidents that favoured or obstructed or in any way modified its manifestation are 
once thoroughly comprehended, the doubt will arise whether the judgment or the 
genius of the man has the stronger claim to our wonder, or rather it will be felt that 
the judgement was the birth and living offspring of his genius, even as the symmetiy 
of a body results from the sanity and vigour of the life as the organising 
power. (Logic, 67)
Here we can see his belief in the organic relationship of genius and judgment. In his
Ibid., p.462.
27 Richardson, William. Essays on Shakespeare’s Dramatic Characters. London, 1812, pp.32-33. 
Gerard. An Essay on Taste, p. 179.
143
lecture, Coleridge daims that “ In all successive Courses, delivered by me, since my 
first attempt at the Royal Institution, it has been and it still remains my Objective to 
prove that in all points from the most important to the most minute, the Judgment of 
Shakespeare is commensurate with his Genius— nay, that his Genius reveals itself in his 
Judgment, as in its most exalted Vonn.'fLect II, 263-4) Elsewhere he insists: “Great as 
was the genius of Shakespeare, his judgment was at least equal,”(Lcc/‘ I, 517)
The excellence of Shakespeare’s judgment is especially visible in his management of 
the first scenes of his plays. Shakespeare, according to Coleridge, places before us at 
one glance both the past and the friture, as in the feuds and party spirit of the servants of 
the two houses in the first scenes of Romeo and Juliet. Or the first scenes at once begin 
to excite curiosity as to what follows, as in the storm of wind, the waves, and the 
boatswain in the Tempest.
Another example of the excellence of Shakespeare’s judgment is the seemingly 
casual communication of Edmund’s origin, by means of which we are prepared for his 
character in an easy and natural way. Coleridge explains the germ and growth of 
Edmund’s pride— i.e., his powerful intellect and strong energetic will combined with 
being the known and acknowledged son of Gloucester and jealousy of his legitimate 
brother. He suggests that such pride, combined with the consciousness of the baseness 
of his own birth, is a main spring of the action.
3. Shakespeare: Poet of Method
Duff, An Essay on General Genius, p.6.
144
“The word METHOD(//é’/9o^ oç-),” according to Coleridge,
being of Grecian origin, first formed and applied by that acute, ingenious, and 
accurate People, to the purposes of Scientific arrangement, it is in the Greek 
language that we must seek for its primary and fundamental signification. Now, in 
Greek, it literally means a way, or path, o f transit. Plence the first idea of Method is 
a progressive transition from one step in any course to another; and where the word 
Method is applied with reference to many such transitions in continuity, it 
necessarily implies a Principle of UNITY WITH PROGRESSION.(TM, 2)^ ®
A transition implies a unification of opposites, unity with progression. For Unification, 
there must be an act of mind. Coleridge calls the act of mind the instigator of all 
method. He, presupposing a universal method, by which every step in our progress in 
Art and Science should be directed, suggests that we should seek it in the human 
intellect. Coleridge argues that we should not apply the word method to a dead and 
arbitrary arrangement, containing itself no principle of progression. He notes that “all 
from in-attention to the method dictated by nature herself, to the simple truth, that as the 
forms in all organized existence, so must all true and living Imowledge proceed from 
within; that it may be trained, supported, fed, excited, but can never be infused or 
impressed.”(F I, 500) And “All method supposes a union of several things to a common 
end, either by disposition, as in the works of man; or by convergence, as in the 
operations and products of nature.”(F I, 497)
Coleridge again explains method in terms of relations:
All things, in us, and about us, are a Chaos, without Method: and so long as the 
mind is entirely passive, so long as there is an habitual submission of the 
Understanding to mere events and images, as such, without any attempt to classify 
and arrange them, so long the Chaos must continue. There may be transition, but 
there can never be progress; there may be sensation, but there cannot be thought; for
See also F.I, p.457.
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the total absence of Method renders thinking impracticable; as we find the partial 
defects of Method proportionably render thinking a trouble and a fatigue. But as 
soon as the mind becomes accustomed to contemplate, not things only, but likewise 
relations of things, there is immediate need of some path or way of transit from one 
to the other of the things related;— there must be some law of agreement or of 
contrast between them; there must be some mode of comparison; in short, there 
must be Method. We may, therefore, assert that the relations o f things form the 
prime objects, or, so to speak, the materials o f Method', and that the contemplation 
of those relations is the indispensable condition of thinldng Methodically. (rA/,3)
This passage warns us of the danger of a mechanical arrangement of Imowledge or 
thought. Coleridge, not merely in The Friend but also in Biographia, repeatedly attacks 
the superficiality of mechanical philosophy. The methodical relations in things are not 
mechanical but organical, as shown in nature.
Coleridge demonstrates the role and the importance of method, by showing the 
consequences of its lack:
For the absence of Method, which characterizes the uneducated, is occasioned by an 
habitual submission of the understanding to mere events and images as such, and 
independent of any power in the mind to classify or appropriate them. The general 
accompaniments of time and place are the only relations which persons of this class 
appear to regard in their statements. As this constitutes their leading feature, the 
contrary excellence, as distinguishing the well-educated man, must be referred to 
the contrary habit. METHOD, therefore, becomes natural to the mind which has been 
accustomed to contemplate not things only, or for their own sake alone, but likewise 
and chiefly the relations of things, either their relations to each other, or to the 
observer, or to the state and apprehension of the hearers. To enumerate and analyze 
these relations, with the conditions under which alone they are discoverable, is to 
teach the science of Method.(F I, 451)
Judging from the above passage, method is closely related to the power of mind. To 
employ method means to unify our mind and our experience so as to make possible a 
transition to a higher step. Coleridge explains the two kinds of relations of things. One is 
the relation by which we understand a thing must be; namely, the relation of LAW. The
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other is the relation by which we merely perceive that it is; namely, the relation of 
Theory. The relation of Law, according to him, “is in its absolute perfection conceivable 
only of God, that Supreme light, and Living Law”. The human mind, however, is only 
capable of viewing some relations of things as predetermined by a truth in the mind 
itself but the mind can find other truths in an indefinite progression. The second relation 
is called that of theory, “in which the existing forms and qualities of objects, discovered 
by observation, suggest a given arrangement of them to the Mind, not merely for the 
purposes of more easy remembrance and communication; but for those of 
understanding, and sometimes of controlling them. Medicine, Chemistry, and 
Physiology are examples of a Method foimded on the second sort of relation.(TM, 4-5) 
Coleridge placed the Fine Ai1s between the Method of relation of Law and that of 
relation of Principle. For him, the Method of the Fine Arts is that “in which certain great 
truths, composing what are usually called the Laws o f Taste, necessarily predominate; 
but in which there are also other Laws, dependent on the external objects of sight and 
sound, which these Arts embrace.”(7jV/, 5) The Method of the Fine Arts is , therefore, 
the reconciliation of the Method of relations of Law and that of the relations of 
Principle. Coleridge shows what a man of method is like, taking Plato as an example:
.. .with the clear insight that the purpose of the writer is not so much to establish any 
particular truth, as to remove the obstacles, the continuance of which is preclusive 
of all truth; the whole scheme assumes a different aspect, and justifies itself in all its 
dimensions. We see, that to open anew a well of springing water, not to cleanse the 
stagnant tank, or fill, bucket by bucket, the leaden cistern; that the EDUCATION of 
the intellect, by awakening the principle and method of self-development, was his 
proposed object, not any specific information that can be conveyed into it from 
without: not to assist in storing the passive mind with the various sorts of 
knowledge most in request, as if the human soul were a mere repositoiy or 
banqueting-room, but to place it in such relations of circumstance as should
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gradually excite the germinal power that craves no knowledge but what it can take 
up into itself, what it can appropriate, and reproduce in fruits of its own(F I, 472- 
473)
If Plato is “the poetic philosopher” who removed obstacles and showed the way of self- 
development, Shakespeare is “the philosophical poet” who accomplished the same job.
According to Coleridge, there is Method in poetry and “those who tread the 
enchanted ground of POETRY, often times do not even suspect that there is such a thing 
as Method to guide their steps.”(TM, 25) Shakespeare’s mind, according to Coleridge, 
was “rich in stores of acquired laiowledge, commanded all these stores and rendered 
them disposable, by means of his intimate acquaintance with the great laws of Thought, 
which form and regulate Method.”(TM, 35)
Shakespeare, in Coleridge’s opinion, was pursuing two Methods at once; one 
psychological and the other poetical. Psychological Method is especially employed in 
dealing with the psychological aspect of characters. Shakespeare’s Poetical Method is 
revealed by a preponderance of pleasurable feeling; for example, where the interest of 
the events and characters and passions is too strong to be continuous without becoming 
painful. Poetical Method is required so that our distress is alleviated.(TM, 32)
For Coleridge, Shakespeare is the poet following the method of nature, “For, in many 
instances, the predominance of some mighty passion takes the place of the guiding 
Thought, and the result presents the method of Nature, rather than the habit of the 
Individual.”(F I., 456) Shakespeare, Coleridge notes, is methodical in the delineation of 
character, in the display of passion, in the conceptions of moral being, in adaptation of 
language, in the connection and admirable intertexture of his ever-interesting fable.
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4. Shakespeare: Proteus and Spinozistic Deity
Coleridge has two main images for Shakespeare’s creativity: Proteus and the 
omniprescence of Spinoza’s God. The idea of Shakespeare as Proteus was also 
suggested by Richardson and some German critics such as Schlegel and Schelling. “The 
genius of Shakespeare,” Richardson writes, “is unlimited. Possessing extreme 
sensibility, and uncommonly susceptible, he is the Proteus of the drama; he changes 
himself into every character, and enters easily into every condition of human nature.” *^ 
A.W. Schlegel concurs:
The whole of Shakespeare’s productions bear the certain stamp of his original 
genius, but yet no writer was ever farther removed from eveiy thing like a 
mannerism derived from habit and personal peculiarities. Rather is he, such is the 
diversity of tone and colour, which varies according to the quality of his subjects he 
assumes, a very Proteus.(CDz(T, 378)
Hazlitt also compares Shakespeare to Proteus. For him Shakespeare’s genius “consisted 
in the faculty of transforming himself at will into whatever he chose: his originality was 
the power of seeing every object from the exact point of view in which others would see 
it.”^^  Hazlitt, like the above critics, emphasises Shakespeare’s ability in sympathising 
with other minds and thus his ability to create very different characters.
Coleridge’s argument accommodates these opinions in that Shakespeare is allowed 
the ability to enter into every character and every situation. Frederick Burwick points 
out that for Coleridge the metaphor implies the divine status of the poet. “For
Richardson, William. Essays on Shakespeare’s Dramatic Characters, p .31.
Hazlitt, William. On Genius and Common Sense. Reprinted in Criticism : the Major Texts, p.329.
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Coleridge,” Burwick argues, “the artist retains his identity as the divine centre of his 
creation_.Coleridge insists on the controlling presence of the artist’s imagination.”^^  
However, I would like to understand the metaphor with reference to Coleridge’s concept 
of the relation of man and nature. Coleridge writes that “The genuine naturalist is a 
dramatic poet in his own line: and such as our myriad-minded Shakespeare is, compared 
with the Racines and Metastasios, such and by a similar process of self-transformation 
would the man be, compared with the Doctors of the mechanic school, who should 
construct his physiology on the heaven-descended. Know Thyself.”(TY, 79) Before 
arriving at this conclusion, he identifies the “I am” as the substance and the life of all 
our knowledge:
Without this latent presence of the “I am,” all modes of existence in the external 
world would flit before us as colored shadows, with no greater depth, root, or 
fixture, than the image of a rock hath in a gliding stream or the rain-bow on a fast- 
sailing rain-storm. The hmnan mind is the compass, in which the laws and 
actuations of all outward essences are revealed as the dips and declinations. (The 
application of Geometry to the forces and movements of the material world is both 
proof and instance.)(T<S', 78-79)
At this point Coleridge relates the laws of nature to the mind of man. And from the fact 
that the mind of man represents the law of nature, he tries to find the “I am,” and nature 
as the symbol of God’s power. Coleridge finds some similarity between the natural 
philosopher and the poet:
They (the assumed indecomponible substances of the laboratory)^"  ^ are the symbols 
of elementary powers, and the exponents of a law, which, as the root of all these 
powers, the chemical philosopher, whatever his theory may be, is instinctively
Burwick, Frederick, “Coleridge and Schelling on Mimesis.” The Coleridge Connection. Eds. Richard 
Gravil and Molly Lefebre. Hampshire, London: The Macmillan Press, 1990. 178-199, p. 190.
The words in the parenthesis are mine.
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labouring to extract. This instinct, again, is itself but the form, in which the idea, the 
mental Correlative of the law, first announces its incipient germination in his own 
mind: and hence proceeds the striving after unity of principle through all the 
diversity of forms, with a feeling resembling that which accompanies our endeavors 
to recollect a forgotten name; when we seem at once to have and not to have it; 
which the memory feels but cannot find. Thus, as “the lunatic, the lover, and the 
poet,” suggest each other to Shakespeare’s Theseus^^, as soon as his thoughts 
present him the ONE FORM, of which they are but varieties; so water and flame, 
the diamond, the charcoal, and the mantling champagne, with its ebullient sparkles, 
are convoked and fraternized by the theory of the chemist.(FI, 470-1)
Coleridge, in his Lectures, says that “Proteus who now flowed, a river; now raged, a 
fire now roared, a lion— .. .assumed all changes, but still in the stream, in the fire, in the 
beast, it was not only the resemblance but it was the Divinity that appeared in it, & 
assumed the character.”(Lcc/ I, 225) He made a similar claim for Shakespeare: 
“Shakespeare always Master of himself and his Subject—a genuine Proteus— we see all 
things in him, as Images in a calm Lake—  most distinct most accurate— only more 
splendid and more glorified— "\Lect I, 528)
See Shakespeare Midsummer N ight’s Dream V i 1-17 
Hip. ’Tis strange, my Theseus, that these lovers speak of. 
The. More strange than true. I never may believe 
These antique fables, nor these fairy toys.
Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend 
More than cool reason ever comprehends.
The lunatic, the lover, and the poet 
Are o f imagination all compact:
One sees more devils than vast hell can hold;
That is the mad man: the lover, all as frantic,
Sees Helen’s beauty in a brow o f Egypt:
The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven; 
And as imagination bodies forth 
The forms o f  things unknown, the poet’s pen 
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing 
A local habitation and a name.
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Elsewhere he directly relates nature and Proteus:
There are men who can write most eloquently, and passages of deepest pathos & 
even Sublimity, on circumstances personal & deeply exciting their own passions; 
but not therefore poets—Mothers— Deborah’s Song—Nature is the Poet here—but 
to become by power of Imagination another Thing—Proteus, a river, a lion, yet still 
the God felt to be there/—Then his thinking faculty & thereby perfect abstraction 
from himself—he writes exactly as if of an other planet, or as describing the 
movement of two Butterflies— .{Lect I, 69-70)
Here, “perfect abstraction from himself,” is nothing but “essence Proteus”, as shown in 
the following passage:
Hard to express that sense of the analogy or likeness of a Thing which enables a 
Symbol to represent it, so that we think of the Thing itself—& yet knowing that the 
Thing is not present to us. — Surely, on this universal fact of words & images 
depends by more or less mediations the imitation instead of copy which is illustrated 
in the very nature Shakespearianized/—that Proteus Essence that could assume the 
very form, but yet known & felt not to be the Thing by that difference of the 
Substance which made every atom of the Form another thing/—that likeness not 
identity—an exact web, every line of direction miraculously the same, but the one 
worsted, the other silk.(C# II 2274, November 1804)
Coleridge’s second metaphor for Shakespeare’s mode of creativity is Spinoza’s 
pantheistic God. There is no essential difference between the two metaphors. Spinoza’s 
concept of God, according to McFarland, is “a being absolutely infinite—that is, a 
substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite 
essentiality”.^  ^For Spinoza,
The existence of particular things is only modally possible; substantially, in terms of 
an answer to the question of what they really are, they have no existence as ‘things’. 
And it further follows that the substance of any given thing, by this reduction, will
McFarland, Thomas. Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition. London: Oxford University Press, 1969, 
p.63.
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be indistinguishable from the substance of any other thing, and that consequently, by 
the law of identity of indiscernibles, there could not be a multiplicity of substances, 
or theoretical answers to the question ‘what is it?’, but one substance only. ‘Setting 
the modifications aside’, says Spinoza, ‘and considering substance in itself, that is, 
truly, there cannot be conceived one substance different from another—that is, there 
cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.’^^
If we accept this definition, the metaphors of Proteus and the Spinozistic deity can be 
seen to figure the same truth. But Coleridge seems to emphasise the mode of 
Shakespeare’s characterless objectivity in creating his works more when he uses the 
metaphor of Spinoza’s God.
To demonstrate this characteristic of Shakespeare, Coleridge often compares 
Shakespeare with Milton:
Shakespeare is the Spinozistic deity— an omnipresent creativeness. Milton is the 
deity of prescience; he stands ab extra, and drives a fiery chariot and four, making 
the horses feel the iron curb which holds them in. Shakespeare’s poetry is 
characterless; that is, it does not reflect the individual Shakespeare; but John Milton 
himself is in every line of the Paradise Lost.(TT&Om (May 12, 1830), 92)
Whereas Milton is “the poet appearing and wishing to appear as the poet, and likewise, 
as the man, as much as, though more rare than, the father, the brother, the preacher, and 
the patriot,”(vff, 296) Shakespeare is a poet who does not reveal his personal 
characteristics in his poetry. Though Shakespeare and Milton, for Coleridge, are 
opposed to each other in the mode of their writing, they are not different in telling us 
“the identity of truth and fact”. Coleridge, while explaining the concept of objectivity, 
discusses the different modes by which Shakespeare and Milton arrive at this quality:
Ibid., pp.65-6.
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.. .1 must premise that there is a synthesis of intellectual insight including the mental 
object, the organ of the correspondent being indivisible, and this (O deep truth!) 
because the objectivity consists in the universality of its subjectiveness— as when it 
sees, and millions see even so, and the seeing of the millions is what constitutes to A 
and to each of the millions the objectivity of the sight, the equivalent to a common 
object—a synthesis of this, I say, and of proper external object which we call /he/. 
Now, this it is which we find in religion. It is more than philosophical truth—it is 
other and more than historical fact; it is not made up by the addition of the one to 
the other, but it is the identity of both, the coinherence.
Now, this being understood, I proceed to say, using the term objectivity 
(arbitrarily, I grant), for this identity of truth and fact, that Milton hid the poetry in 
or transformed (not trans-substantiated) the poetry into this objectivity, while 
Shakespeare, in all things, the divine opposite or antithetic correspondent of the 
divine Milton, transformed the objectivity into poetry.(Ibid., 296-7)
Here, we can notice that, for Coleridge, both Shakespeare and Milton tell something 
essential in their poetry which he describes as ‘objectivity’. Keats’s insistence on the 
poet’s characterlessness could be understood in the same context as Coleridge’s concept 
of Shakespeare as a Spinozistic deity. “A poet,” Keats says, “is the most unpoetical of 
any thing in existence; because he has no Identity—he is continually infor[ming] and 
filling some other Body—The Sun, the Moon, the Sea and Men and Women who are 
creatures of impulse are poetical and have about them an unchangeable attribute—the 
poet has none; no identity—he is certainly the most unpoetical of all God’s creatures. 
Keats names this kind of poet the chameleon Poet and Shakespeare is his supreme 
example. “As to the poetical character itself, he argues.
(I mean that sort of which, if I am anything, I am a Member, that sort distinguished 
from the Wordsworthian or egotistical sublime; which is a thing per se and stands 
alone) it is not itself—it has no self—it is everything and nothing—It has no 
character—it enjoys light and shade; it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, 
rich or poor, mean or elevated—It has as much delight in conceiving an lago as an 
Imogen. What shocks the virtuous philosopher, delights the chameleon poet.^^
Keats, John. From the Letters(October 27, 1818), in Criticism: the Major Texts, p.350. 
Ibid., p.349.
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Here, Coleridge would have agreed with Keats on Shakespeare’s objective mode of 
creating characters. But he would not have agreed with Keats about the chameleon 
poet’s delight in creating everything, even evil characters. For him, “No man was ever 
yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher.”(5L II, 25)
5. Shakespeare as A Prophet
Coleridge’s concept of the prophet or seer is focused on the ability to penetrate the 
essential law of things. In Essay I in The Friend he explains the state of the golden age; 
that is, the age when “Conscience acted in Man with the ease and uniformity of Instinct; 
when Labour was a sweet name for the activity of sane Minds in healthful Bodies, and 
all enjoyed in common the bounteous harvest produced, and gathered in, by common 
effort; when there existed in the Sexes, and in the Individuals of each Sex, just variety 
enough to permit and call forth the gentle restlessness and final union of chaste love and 
individual attachment, each seeking and finding the beloved one by the natural affinity 
of their Beings; when the dread Sovereign of the Universe was known only as the 
universal Parent, no Altar but the pure Heart, and Thanksgiving and grateful Love the 
sole Sacrifice— ’’(F I, 7). One day a rain of madness fell on all the people except a 
prophet who warned the people of this disaster. As a result, people totally changed, 
becoming selfish, idolatrous, and murderous. The prophet also watched a whole troop of 
his fellow men famished and in fetters, led by one of their fellow men who had enslaved 
them. But the mad people in turn see the prophet as a mad man. A man exclaimed:
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“Who is this man? How strangely he looks! how wild!— a worthless idler!” In this fable 
we can see the Coleridgean concept of the seer. He has the ability to penetrate 
appearance and the ability to know impending danger and he can advise on the right way 
to avoid the disaster. Nevertheless, in the sight of the “normal” people he looks mad, 
wild, and idle.
Coleridge sees prophets in different fields. He recognises seers or prophets of 
science in those who find the laws of organic nature. Contrary to the received notion that 
the highest and most perfect vegetable, and the lowest and rudest animal forms ought to 
be considered the links of the two systems, some scientists discovered that the 
resemblance would be as the proximity, greatest in the first and rudimental products of 
vegetable and animal organization. According to Coleridge,
From these men, or from minds enkindled by their labours, we hope hereafter to 
receive it, or rather the yet higher ideas to which it refers us, matured into laws of 
organic nature; and thence to have one other splendid proof, that with the 
knowledge of LAW alone dwell Power and Prophecy, decisive Experiment, and, 
lastly, a scientific method, that dissipating with its earliest rays the gnomes of 
hypothesis and the mists of theory may, within a single generation, open out on the 
philosophic Seer discoveries that had baffled the gigantic, but blind and guideless 
industry of ages.(FI, 470)
He also sees an example of the seer or prophet in Edmund Burke. In Burke’s 
speeches and writings at the commencement of the American war, and at the 
commencement of the French Revolution, he found the same principles though the 
practical inferences are almost opposite. Here, principles is “a term with a specific 
meaning for Coleridge, i.e., “ideas” in the Platonic sense.”"^  ^ He asks some questions
Headley, Douglas. “Coleridge’s Intellectual Intuition, the Vision of God, and the Walled Garden of
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about why the speeches and writings are more interesting now than they were found at 
the time of their first publication. His answer is that
Edmund Burke possessed and had sedulously sharpened that eye, which sees all 
things, actions, and events, in relation to the laws that determine their existence and 
circumscribe their possibility. He referred habitually to principles. He was a 
scientific statesman; and therefore a seer. For every principle contains in itself the 
germs of prophecy; and as the prophetic power is the essential privilege of science, 
so the fulfillment of its oracles supplies the outward and (to men in general) the only 
test of its claim to the title.(FE I, 191-192)
Likewise, prophets in religion, for Coleridge, are those who gain an insight into God’s 
power rather than those who can see into the friture. He defines God’s power thus:
It is absolutely one, and it IS, and affirms itself TO BE, is its only predicate. And yet 
this power, nevertheless, is! In eminence of Being it IS! And he for whom it 
manifests itself in its adequate idea, dare as little arrogate it to himself as his own, 
can as little appropriate it either totally or by partition, as he can claim ownership in 
the breathing air, or make an enclosure in the cope of heaven. He bears witness of it 
to his own mind, even as he describes life and light: and, with the silence of light, it 
describes itself and dwells in us only as far as we dwell in it. The truths, which it 
manifests are such as it alone can manifest, and in all truth it manifests itself. By 
what name then canst thou call a truth so manifested? Is it not REVELATION? Ask 
thyself whether thou canst attach to that latter word any consistent meaning not 
included in the idea of the former. And the manifesting power, the source and the 
coiTelative of the idea thus manifested—is it not GOD? Either thou knowest it to be 
God, or thou hast called an idol by that awful name! Therefore in the most 
appropriate, no less than in the highest, sense of the word were the earliest teachers 
of humanity inspired. They alone were the true seers of GOD, and therefore 
prophets of the human race.(FI, 515-6)
Tim Fulford, in Coleridge s Figurative Language, discusses the influence of the esoteric 
tradition and Coleridge’s idea of himself as a prophet. According to Fulford, “Coleridge 
himself was able to portray himself as an inspired interpreter, about to be visited by new
“Kubla Khan”.” Journal o f the History o f  Ideas 59 (1998): 115-134, p. 132.
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‘powers of Insight’ into the prophet’s inner sense, and hearing like Isaiah ‘the sound of 
[the ] wing’s of the seraphim(NB 52, f, 19v).”^^
In the case of poetry, Coleridge’s concept of the prophet can be understood with 
reference to his idea of the prophet in other fields. But at the same time, Coleridge 
maintains the traditional concept of the poet as prophet.
Like all western literature, English poetry has traditionally accorded to the poet a 
prophetic function.
From Langland, the Gawain poet, and the Chaucer of the great dream visions; 
through Spenser, the Shakespeare whose career concludes in the visionary Tempest, 
and Milton; and down through Smart, Gray, Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley 
and Yeats, the English poet has been concerned with how and what man sees and 
has been determined to reveal or uncover—whether in dreams, vision, opium state, 
or psychic trance—the world beyond the one the average man sees but that actually 
determines the moral and spiritual significance of the quotidian."^^
The Romantic concept of the poet insistently identifies him as a seer or prophet. Robert 
Lowth’s Lectures on Hebrew  ^ Poetry is recognised as a profound influence on the 
Romantic poets. In the Lectures, Lowth suggests that “the word Nabi was used by the 
Elebrews in an ambiguous sense, and that it equally denoted a prophet, a poet, or a 
musician, under the influence of Divine inspiration.”'^  ^The prophetic office, he argues.
had a most strict connexion with the poetic art. They had one common name, one 
common origin, one common author, the Holy Spirit. Those in particular were 
called to the exercise of the prophetic office, who were previously conversant with 
the sacred poetiy. It was equally a part of their duty to compose verses for the 
service of the church, and to declare the oracles of God; it cannot, therefore, be 
doubted, that a great portion of the sacred hymns may properly be termed
Fulford, Tim. Coleridge’s Figurative Language. Basingstoke; Macmillan, 1991, pp.150-1.
Wojcik,J. & Frontain, R. eds. “introduction; The Prophet in the Poem.” Poetic Prophecy in Western 
Literature. Rutherford, Madison, Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1984. 13-30, p.21.
Lowth, Robert. Lectures on The Sacred Poetry o f the Hebrews. London: Chadwick, 1847, p.200.
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prophecies, or that many of the prophecies are in reality hymns or poems. Since, as 
we have already proved, it was from the first a principal end and aim of poetry, to 
impress upon the minds of men the sayings of the wise, and such precepts as related 
either to the principles of faith, or the laws of morality, as well as to transmit the 
same to posterity; it ought not to appear extraordinary, that prophecy, which in this 
view ranks as a principal, and is of the highest importance, should not disdain the 
assistance of an art so admirably calculated to effect its purposes.' '^^
Terence Hoagwood identifies tlii'ce strands in the notion of prophecy, that is, the story of 
the universe, the story of the age, and finally, the story of the perceiving mind. He argues 
that in classical or romantic works the tlii'ee strains are not disentangled.'^^ Lowth’s 
definition of prophecy can be understood in a similar context. “The immediate design of 
all prophecy,” according to him, “ is to inform or amend those generations that precede 
the events predicted; and it is usually calculated either to excite their feai'S and 
apprehensions, or to afford them consolation.”'^  ^These roles of the prophet accord with 
the role of poet as it is construed by the Romantic poets. The major Romantic poets 
aspired to write a quasi-epic which not only dealt with the problem of the universe but 
also diagnosed the present time and offered a vision of the future, but their focus is on 
the need to transform the maimer in which the world is perceived. The poets, Hoagwood 
says, “are engaged in renovating the forms of thought tlii’ough the transformation of 
perception. The denial of externally imposed authority, including the conventional 
concept of time, is based on the cognitive activity of the human mind.”'^ ^
Shelley’s definition of poetry identifies it as prophecy in this sense. Shelley in A 
Defence o f Poetry, says,
Ibid., pp.201-202.
See Hoagwood, Terence Allen. Prophecy and the Philosophy o f  Mind: Traditions o f  Blake and Shelley 
[n.p.]: The University o f Alabama Press, 1985, p.4.
Lowth. Lectures on the Sacred Poetry o f  the Hebrews, p.224,
Hoagwood. Prophecy and the Philosophy o f  Mind, p. 189.
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...poetry defeats the curse which binds us to be subjected to the accident of 
surrounding impressions. And whether it spreads its own figured curtain, or 
withdraws life’s dark veil from before the scene of things, it equally creates for us a 
being within our being....It reproduces the common universe of which we are 
portions and percipients, and it purges from our inward sight the film of familiarity 
which obscures from us the wonder of our being. It compels us to feel that which we 
perceive, and to imagine that which we know. It creates anew the universe, after it 
has been amiihilated in our minds by the recurrence of impressions blunted by 
reiteration.^^
Coleridge’s definition of the poet is similar:
The poet is not only the man made to solve the riddle of the Universe, but he is 
also the man who feels where it is not solved and which continually awakens his 
feelings being of the same feeling. What is old and worn out, not in itself, but from 
the dimness of the intellectual eye brought on by worldly passions he makes new: he 
pours upon it the dew that glistens and blows round us the breeze which cooled us 
in childhood.(Tec/1, 327)
Solving the riddle of the universe is traditionally said to be the business of a prophet. 
Shakespeare, Coleridge’s ideal poet, possessing the most powerful imagination, is also 
the supreme prophet.
Shakespeare, above all, has an insight into truth and he is “the philosopher, the 
grand Poet who combined truth with beauty and beauty with truth. .F{Lect I, 335). In his 
note on Coleridge’s lecture, Collier writes,
Coleridge concluded by a panegyric upon Shakespeare whom he declared to be 
the wonder of the ignorant part of mankind but much more the wonder of the 
learned who at the same time that he possessed profundity of thought could be 
looked upon as no less than a Prophet—Yet at the same time with all his wonderftil 
powers making us feel as if he were unconscious of himself & of his mighty 
abilities: disguising the half-god in the simplicity of a child or the affection of a dear
‘18 Shelley. A Defence o f  Poetry. Ed. Albert S. Cook. Boston, Mass.: Ginn, 1890, p.42.
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companion— {Lect I, 367-368)
For him, to seek for intuitive knowledge is the job of the philosopher. Quoting from the 
Emiead, he writes:
“it is not lawful to enquire from whence it sprang, as if it were a thing subject to 
place, motion, for it neither approached hither, nor again departs from hence to 
some other place; but it either appears to us or it does not appear. So that we ought 
not to pursue it with a view of detecting its secret source, but to watch in quiet till it 
suddenly shines upon us; preparing ourselves for the blessed spectacle as the eye 
waits patiently for the rising sun.” {BL I, 241)
This does not mean that intellectual intuition is passively received. It needs 
philosophical imagination. The people who possess philosophical imagination which he 
calls the sacred power of self-intuition are those “who within themselves can interpret 
and understand the symbol, that the wings of the air-sylph are forming within the skin of 
the caterpillar; those only, who feel in their own spirits the same instinct, which impels 
the chrysalis of the horned fly to leave room in its involucrum for antennae yet to 
come.”(5T I, 241-242) These people “Icnow and feel, that the potential works in them, 
even as the actual works on them!”(FZ I, 242)
For Coleridge, Shakespeare has the intuitive power and this intuition is incarnated in 
appropriate imagery. Shakespeare is a poet-prophet who “has placed the greater number 
of his profoundest maxims and general truths, both political and moral, not in the 
mouths of men at ease, but of men under influence of passion, when the mighty 
thoughts overmaster and become the tyrants of the mind that has brought them 
forth.”(Z5', 15) He writes, “In his Lear, Othello, Macbeth, Hamlet, principles of deepest 
insight and widest interest fly off like sparks from the growing iron under the loud
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anvil.’’(Ibid., 15).
6. A Man of His Age and of No Age
It is said that Coleridge was one of the first critics to consider Shakespeare from the 
historical view-point. The historical premise is, according to Appleyard, that “aesthetic 
form is largely determined by historic context, and that the best clue to the explanation 
of literary artifacts is often the study of the circumstances in which they were created”'^  ^
Coleridge often explained Shakespeare’s excellence by relating it to his age. But 
Coleridge’s attitude is bifocused; one is that Shakespeare was influenced by his age and 
the other is that Shakespeare is beyond his age:
...I confess, that one main object of this Lecture was to prove that Shakespeare’s 
eminence is his own, and his age’s—as the Pine Apple, the Melon, and the Gourd 
may grow in the same bed—nay, the same circumstances of warmth and soil may be 
necessary to their full development—but does not account for the golden hue, the 
ambrosial flavor, the perfect shape of the Pine Apple, or the tufted Crown on its 
head— Would that those who would twist it off could but promise us in this instance 
to make it the germ of an equal Successor— {Lect II, 147)
Shakespeare, Beaumont, and Fletcher are the playwrights of the Elizabethan and 
Jacobean period and we can find the common characteristics of the age and its 
circumstances in their work but they are different as the pine apple and the melon are 
different in their taste, colour, and form.
Coleridge explains how far a poet is influenced by accidental circumstances. “A 
poet,” he claims.
Appleyard, J.A. Coleridge's Philosophy o f  Literature, p. 124.
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writes not for past ages, but for that in which he lives, and that which is to follow. It 
is natural that he should conform to the circumstances of his day; but a true genius 
will stand independent of these circumstances:... (Zgcf I, 516)
Coleridge points out the difference of literary circumstances and the traces of the age or 
their literary environment in figures such as Dante and Ariosto:
Whilst Dante imagined himself a copy of Virgil, and Ariosto of Homer, they were 
both unconscious of that great power working within them, which carried them 
beyond their originals; for their originals were polytheists. All great discoveries bear 
the stamp of the age in which they were made... .(Ibid., 516)
In Shakespeare’s case, his age favoured him. Coleridge writes that Shakespeare
lived in an age in which from the religious controversies carried on in a way of 
which we have no conception. There was a general energy of thinking, a pleasure in 
hard thinking & an expectation of it from those who came forward to solicit public 
praise of which, in this day, we are equally ignorant. Consequently the judges were 
real amateurs. The author had to deal with a learned public, & he had no idea of a 
mixed public— it was divided, in truth, between those who had no taste at all & who 
went merely to amuse themselves— and those who were deeply versed in the 
literature to which they gave encouragement.(Tecf I, 228)
Coleridge’s evaluation of the age of Shakespeare differs significantly from that of his 
predecessors. They argued that Shakespeare’s age was rather disadvantageous for 
Shakespeare. Duff, for example, admits the influence of the age on Shakespeare but his 
conclusions are at odds with Coleridge’s. The age of Elizabeth, according to him, “justly 
renowned for the wisdom of her councils, and the terror of her arms, was certainly not 
the aera of correct and refined taste; and it may not be amiss to observe that the writings 
of Shakespeare, with all their uncommon excellence, have taken a strong tincture of the 
antithesis, the witticisms, and the rudeness of the times; a circumstance, which, if
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properly attended to, will account for, and extenuate the far greatest part of the 
blemishes which have been imputed to him.” ®^ John Dennis has a similar opinion. 
Shakespeare, he insists, “was neither Master of Time enough to consider, correct, and 
polish what he wrote, to alter it, to add to it, and to retrench from it, nor had he Friends 
to consult upon whose Capacity and Integrity he could depend.” '^
Coleridge, on the other hand, sometimes argues that Shakespeare transcends his age:
His predecessors ( the Poets of Italy France England & > drew their aliment from the 
soil. There was a nationality—they were of a country of a genius— grafted with the 
chivalrous spirit & sentiment of the north—and with the wild magic imported from 
the East. Not so Shakespear—He bore no obvious witness of the soil from whence 
he grew—-compare him with mountain Pine.
Self-sustained—deriving his genius immediately from heaven— independent of 
all earthly or national influenee
That such a mind involved itself in a human form is a problem indeed which my 
feeble powers may witness with admiration but cannot explain. My words are 
indeed feeble when I speak of that myriad minded man who all artists feel above all 
praise—  {Lect II, 119)
At first sight, this passage seems to contradict his recognition of Shakespeare as the poet 
of his age. This passage, as the metaphor of the mountain pine shows, should be 
understood as an argument for Shakespeare as the poet of nature. Therefore, the notion 
that Shakespeare was “Self-sustained—deriving his genius immediately from 
heaven—independent of all earthly or national influence” does not accord with the 
notion of Shakespeare as “a mere child of nature”. Once again, Coleridge emphasises 
that Shakespeare’s adherence to the permanent law of nature frees him from 
parochialism, idiosyncrasy, or regionalism:
Duff, Critical Observations on the Writings o f the Most Celebrated Original Geniuses in Poetry, 
pp. 194-5.
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Least of all poets antients or modern does Shakespear appear to be coloured or 
affected by the age in which he lived—he was of all times—& countries, true to the 
great & enduring eternal of our nature
North the chivalrous of the North art was a mere accident, a subordin[ate] to his 
genius & nothing (of) the importation of the East—
He drew from the eternal of our nature— (Ibid., 119)
If we say that Shakespeare’s plays and Sophocles’s are different, we might be able to 
find reasons in the differences between the historical circumstances under which the 
plays were written. But if we say that they are the same in that they contain the universal 
and permanent truths of the human condition, we can say that they are both poets 
beyond time. While Coleridge points out the differences between King Lear and 
Oedipus the King, he argues that “the great men of Greece & the great man of England 
proceeded in the same process.”(Lecf I, 210)
Coleridge writes,
Poetiy in its essence a universal Spirit but which in incorporating itself adopts & 
takes up the surrounding materials, & adapts itself to existing Circumstances. What 
it cloaks itself in, it glorifies— like a plant, dependent on Soil for many things, yet 
still retaining its original Line—Essentials therefore—accidents are the two grounds 
of judgment— (Led  I, 511)
This passage sums up his argument that Shakespeare is both of his age and of no age. 
Coleridge’s statement that “he is of no age—nor, I may add, of any religion, or paity, or 
profession. The body and substance of his works came out of the unfathomable depths 
of his own oceanic mind; his observation and reading, which was considerable, supplied 
him with the drapeiy of his figures”(TT(&Gm, (March 15, 1834), 296) can be understood
Dennis. An Essay On the Genius and Writings o f  Shakespeare, p. 15.
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in this context.
So far, I have discussed Coleridge’s representation of Shakespeare as a poet. I started 
from the commonest epithet for Shakespeare, ‘a child of nature’. Almost unanimously, 
the eighteenth-century Shakespearean critics hold Shakespeare’s genius to be ‘a natural 
gift’ which implies that it is wild, irregular, and exuberant. For Coleridge, Shakespeare 
is also a poet of nature, which he describes as ‘Nature Humanized’. But his notion of 
Shakespeare as a poet of nature is distinguished from those of his eighteenth- century 
predecessors.
First, I tried to define his description of Shakespeare as ‘Nature Humanized’ based 
on his concept of nature. Then, I discussed the Coleridgean concept of genius and in 
what aspects Shakespeare is the ideal example of this genius. For Coleridge, genius is 
not merely a divine gift, but involves an active unity of the human faculties. The 
insistence on the co-presence of genius and judgment is also peculiar to Coleridge.
Next, I considered Coleridge’s idea of Shakespeare as a poet of Method. As he 
defines it in Treatise on Method, method is a progressive transition from one step to 
another and it is a way of operating in nature. Coleridge’s notion of Shakespeare as a 
prophet is based on his notion of the prophet. Shakespeare, as a poet who awakens the 
mind’s eye of the people, who sends us principle, maxim and truth, is consistent with 
the Coleridgean meaning of prophet.
Then, I tried to interpret Coleridge’s metaphors for Shakespeare, namely, 
Shakespeare as a Proteus and Shakespeare as a Spinozistic deity. But I distinguished 
them from each other in that one is more focused on Shakespeare’s identity according to 
the principle of nature while paying attention to his power to create everything without
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revealing his personal peculiarities and the other is focused on Shakespeare’s objective 
mode, as compared to Milton’s.
Finally, Coleridge suggests that Shakespeare was influenced by his age but at the 
same time that he is beyond time. I considered these apparently contradictory arguments 
from different aspects. Shakespeai’e is a poet of an age in that he created works different 
from those of Sophocles. Fie, however, is not the poet of the age in that he created works 
marked by their universality and truth beyond time and place.
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Chapter 4. Shakespeare’s Poetic Work; Nature Shakespearianized
In Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism, the most distinctive words describing 
Shakespeare’s works are ‘natural’ and ‘contrived’. These apparently contradictory terms 
best sum up Coleridge’s idea of Shakespeare’s achievement. For him, those of 
Shakespeare’s works which appear most natural have needed the most contrivance. In 
order to produce such work, a supremely qualified artist is required. Shakespeare is the 
best qualified of all.
Coleridge argued that a poetic work can be defined by the nature of the poet. 
Hence, he defines Shakespeare’s work by way of defining the poet himself. Flis 
understanding of Shakespeare’s genius, for instance, defines his understanding of the 
poetic works; they are the products not only of his divine gift but of his wisdom and 
experience. As Coleridge argues, all the faculties such as wit, subtlety, fancy, 
profundity, imagination, moral and physical susceptibility to pleasure are combined in 
Shakespeare: his works are the results of the combination of these faculties. Likewise, 
his artistic works can be described as of his age and at the same time beyond his age; in 
his work, we notice both the peculiarities of his age and a universality transcending 
that age. And his work has a prophetic chaiacter; it not only diagnoses the human 
situation but points the way to its betterment. Finally, if he is depicted as ‘Nature 
Humanised’, his works can be seen as ‘Nature Shakespearianized’.
One of the merits of Coleridge’s criticism of Shakespeare lies in his method of
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appreciating Shakespeare’s works. He defines the general principles of art and shows 
how well Shakespeare’s poetry is congruent to the principles/ As shown in his notes, 
articles, and lectures, he tried to define the concept of the fine arts and to establish the 
relationship between them and poetry. In his opinion, poetry and the other arts share 
some common characteristics; he included “Music and Painting under the great Genus 
of Poetry”(Zec/ 1, 225). The comparison of Shakespeare’s work to painting or music is 
an important indication of his general view of Shakespeare’s poetic works.
Coleridge’s criticism of Shakespeare’s work is closely related to his principle of 
nature. Generally, for Coleridge, Shakespeare’s works are analogous to nature, an 
incarnated organic unity of idea. Shakespeare’s artistic works are exquisite examples of 
the reconciliation of opposites, i.e. the natural and the artificial. To achieve its organic 
status, his work needs to be well contrived. Coleridge focuses on how well each part is 
contrived to be an organic whole as if he were describing how each cell or each blood 
vessel works in our body.
In this chapter I will first discuss Coleridge’s view of the general characteristics of 
Shakespeare’s work by comparison with other fine arts, namely, painting, architecture, 
and music. I will describe his notion of Shakespeare’s work as an organic whole and 
then how each part works within the whole; his ideas of form, characterisation, 
language, metre, pun, and wit will be discussed in this respect.
' See Heller, Janet Ruth. Coleridge, Lamb, Hazlitt, and the Reader o f  Drama. Columbia and London: 
Columbia University Press, 1990, p.56. Heller points to Coleridge’s method of lecturing thus: “He 
explains to his auditors that he has “taken the great names o f Milton and Shakespeare rather for the 
purpose o f illustrating great principles than for any minute examination o f their works”. These principles 
were designed to stimulate his audience to develop skill in reflective thought, which Coleridge viewed as 
an art, and he wished to make his students capable o f drawing their own conclusions about literature and 
other topics.”
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1. Fine Arts and Shakespeare’s Poetic Works
Coleridge defines the fine arts as “the translation of man into nature”. For him, art is 
“the power of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into 
every thing which is the object of his contemplation; colour, form, motion, and sound, 
are the elements which it combines, and it stamps them into unity in the mould of a 
moral idea.”(M 4f, 42) In his opinion, “the art of communicating whatever we wish to 
communicate so as to express and to produce excitement”(CiV III 3827, May 1810) is 
the common faculty shared by all the fine arts. Fine arts are not a copy but an imitation; 
all fine arts are essentially ideal; the purpose of the communication of mental 
excitement is immediate pleasure; the basic principle is unity in diversity. In notes taken 
by J. Tomalin, this notion is propounded;
Coleridge included Music & Painting under the great Genus of Poetry, & we 
could not understand those, unless we first impressed upon the mind that they are 
ideal & not the mere copy of things, but the contemplation of mind upon 
things.(fee/1, 225)
Coleridge’s understanding of the fine arts as belonging to a single genus is 
occasionally shown in his application of his definition of art to painting and music and 
poetry in its exclusive sense. For instance, he applies his definition of poetry to 
“Raphael & Handel equally as to Milton”(CV III 3827). This unified notion of art is not 
unrelated to his comprehensive sense of beauty. He notes;
— Of the veiy many fine Sunsets (we have had of late—) that of this evening most
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glorious— and now what a lovely Moonlight Night with these soft flakes of white 
clouds, (the cloudlets & bands immediately over the Moon /) died in tenderest Blue 
and on my table the two flower-glasses and one flower pot, in an oblique line;/, 
raised each over the other, so that the 2"  ^had the cylinder-glass of the first, and the 
Flower-pot, almost concealed by the Jasmines & Honeysuckles, hides that of the 
Second—I was looking out of my window, saying to myself—What a beautiful 
Scene! when the Maid came in to my room & said—What beautiful Flowers!— and 
it immediately occurred to me to ask myself—how many portions of a barley-corn 
T. Phillips’s(R.A.) Musical Scale of Proportions would go to explain the sense & 
sensation o f Beauty excited by either! {CNÏV  5433, August 1826)^
This notion of beauty is, in a broad sense, connected to his concept of organicism. In 
his survey of the natural world, he relates a bird’s colour to a flower’s fragrance;
Hence the feathery vegetation of the Birds—the rich colors—and a sustitute for the 
fragrancy of the Plant .— we have Light in the form (under the power) (sub ditione) 
of Gravity in Color, and Gravity sub forma et ditione Lucis in Sounds & sweet 
yearning varied by quick provoking challenging sounds are the surrogates of the 
Vegetable Odors— & like these, are the celebrations of the Nuptial moments, the 
hour of Love.— Music is to Fragrance, as Air to Water/ Milton’s Comus.—fSh&F, 
1455-1456)
His notion of synesthesia as shown in “A light in sound, a sound-like power in 
Iight”(The Eolian Harp) seems to be linked to his notion of organic relations.
Coleridge’s idea of the kinship among the fine arts is not original to him. As usual, 
he absorbed traditional thought and recreated it as his own. The comparison of 
Shakespeare’s drama to Raphael’s or Titian’s painting is not just the result of the 
influence of Schlegel. From his youth, he was keen on painting, architecture, and music 
and tried to establish the relationship between poetry and the other fine arts. To
 ^ See C N IV, 5432n, Kathleen Coburn notes that Thomas Phillips is the author o f Lectures on the Histoty 
& Principles o f  Pam/mgf 1833). According to Coburn Coleridge had known Phillips at least from 1819 
when Phillips painted his portrait. “In Lect VI “On Design” he argued that there is in us an inherent sense 
of beauty and in many things ‘a resident beauty; principally the result o f well-regulated proportion’ (266). 
He referred to architecture, Greek vases, flowers, the visual, and then said, ‘For the ear, proportion and 
combinations o f sound producing beautiful, or rather delightful, music have been mathematically
171
understand the way he compares them is, I thinlc, a good introduction to Coleridge’s 
appreciation of Shakespeare’s works.
I ■ i Shakespeare’s Works and Painting
From ancient Greek aesthetics, the relationship between poetry and painting as sister 
arts has been discussed, but at different periods different kinds of relationship have been 
suggested. Plato, in his The Republic, places the poet by the side of the painter because, 
in Plato’s opinion,
he is like him in two ways: first, in as much as his creations have an inferior degree 
of truth—  in this, I say he is like him; and he is also like him in being concerned 
with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit 
him into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens 
the feelings and impairs the reason.^
Though Plato took the poet and the painter as inferior beings because they appeal to the 
feelings which he thought inferior to reason, he points to the important role of both 
poetry and painting, especially in Romantic aesthetics. Aristotle also maintains the 
sisterhood of the two arts:
The poet being an imitator, like a painter or any other artist, must of necessity 
imitate one of tlmee objects,—  things as they were or are, things as they are said or 
thought to be, or things as they ought to be....First as to matters which concern the 
poet’s own art. If he describes the impossible, he is guilty of an error; but the error 
may be justified, if the end of the art be thereby attained (the end being that already 
mentioned),—  if, that is, the effect of this or any other part of the poem is thus 
rendered more striking.'*
demonstrated’. He cited Beethoven’s ability to compose (mathematically) when deaf.”
 ^ Plato. The Republic. Reprinted in Criticism: The Major Texts,, p.47.
'* Aristotle. Poetics. Reprinted in Criticism: The Major Texts., p.36.
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Aristotle’s distinction between different kinds of imitation had a profound impact on 
later poets and painters. Horace too compares poetry to painting: “a book may be like 
just such a picture if it portray idle imaginings shaped like the dreams of a sick man, so 
that neither head nor foot can be properly ascribed to any one shape.H orace , unlike 
Aristotle, does not have a place for the pure imaginary world. For him, plausibility and 
verisimilitude are crucially important for both poetry and painting.
The concept “a poem like a painting”, or “a painting like a poem” has been 
important in the traditions of both poetry and painting. Poetry provided good subject 
matter for painting and painting, in turn, had a profound impact on the description of 
images in poetry.^ In the Renaissance poets and painters shared common ideas and 
ornaments. Philip Sidney defines a poem as ‘a speaking picture’^ According to 
Hagstrum,
One striking characteristic of the poetry of the English Renaissance was its 
delight in long and sensuous descriptions of works of art, in which the poet vied 
with the painter in creating pictorial vividness and verbal color.®
In Shakespeare himself, the notion of sisterhood between picture and poem is shown. 
In Lucrece, the stanzas in which Lucrece compares her situation after being raped with 
the fall of Troy demonstrates Shakespeare’s idea of a picture as a dumb poem:
To this well-painted piece is Lucrece come.
 ^ Horace. Art o f Poetry. Reprinted in Criticism: The Major Texts., p.51.
 ^The relationship between poetry and painting is elucidated by Jean H. Hagstrum in her The Sister Arts: 
The Tradition o f  Literary Pictorialism and English Poetry from Dryden to Gray. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1958.
’ Sidney. An Apology fo r Poetry. Reprinted in Criticism : The Major Texts, p.86.
® Hagstrum. The Sister Arts, p. 112.
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To find a face where all distress is stelled.
Many she sees where cares have carved some,
But where all distress and dolour dwelled,
Till she despairing Hecuba beheld.
Staring on Priam’s wounds with her old eyes,
Which bleeding under Pyrrhus’ proud foot lies.
In her the painter had anatomized
Time’s ruin, beauty’s wrack, and grim care’s reign;
Her cheeks with chaps and wrinkles were disguised;
Of what she was no semblance did remain.
Her blue blood changed to black in every vein,
Wanting the spring that those shrunk pipes had fed.
Showed life imprisoned in a body dead.(Lucrece, 1443-1456)
Though this tradition weakened in the periods of metaphysical poetry and the era of 
Milton, we can see some sensual images in Richard Crashaw’s poetry and there are 
pictorial aspects in the description of the garden in Paradise Lost. In eighteenth-century 
poetry, the description of nature in detail is not unrelated to the rise of landscape 
painting. Painting is even placed in the superior position as it is more immediate and 
more powerRil in provoking feeling. Eighteenth-century writers therefore valued the 
pictorial aspects in their poetry. This is not true just of poetry but of the novel. Fielding, 
for example, in Tom Jones, describes Allworthy’s garden as if it is a painting. In the 
Romantic period, it is said that poetry found its kinship with music rather than in 
painting, as attention shifted to the expression of feeling from the imitation of nature.^ 
Coleridge, however, still pays a lot of attention to painting. Though we can find his 
unique musical rhythm in his poetry, we can also see many scenes of painting in it; for 
example, Kubla Khan’s pleasure dome and his garden, and several scenes in The 
Ancient Mariner, which Dorée, like several others, has illustrated. Coleridge’s
See Chapter IV. “The Development o f the Expressive Theory of Poetry and Art,” in M.H.Abrams’ The
174
evaluation of Venus and Adonis enables us to trace his view on ut pictura poesis. He 
conjectured in such poems as “Venus and Adonis” and “Rape of Lucrece”
that even then the great instinct, which impelled the poet to the drama, was secretly 
working in him, prompting him by a series and never broken chain of imagery, 
always vivid and because unbroken, often minute; by the highest effort of the 
picturesque in words, of which words are capable, higher perhaps than was ever 
realized by any other poet, even Dante not excepted; to provide a substitute for that 
visual language, that constant intervention and running comment by tone, look and 
gesture, which in his dramatic works he was entitled to expect from the players.(#L 
11, 21)
When Coleridge defined the difference between the poets of his age and those of the 
15th and 16th centuries, he remarked that the difference may be extended to “the sister 
art of painting”(i?L II, 29). For him modern poetry is characterised by “new and striking 
IMAGES; with INCIDENTS that interest the affections or excite the curiosity”(RL 11,29). 
Fie offers this description of the general tendency of the modern poets:
Both his characters and his descriptions he renders, as much as possible, specific 
and individual, even to a degree of portraiture. In his diction and metre, on the other 
hand, he is comparatively careless. The measure is either constructed on no previous 
system, and acknowledges no justifying principle but that of the wiiter’s 
convenience; or else some mechanical movement is adopted, of which one couplet 
or stanza is so far an adequate specimen, as that the occasional differences appear 
evidently to arise from accident, or the qualities of the language itself, not from 
meditation and an intelligent purpose.(BL II, 29-30)
He finds an analogy for the materials and structure of modern poetry in the 
contemporary landscape painters:
Their foregrounds and intermediate distances are comparatively unattractive: while 
the main interest of the landscape is thrown into the back ground, where mountains
Mirror and the Lamp.
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and torrents and castles forbid the eye to proceed, and nothing tempts it to trace its 
way back again. But in the works of the great Italian and Flemish masters, the front 
and the middle objects of the landscape are the most obvious and determinate, the 
interest gradually dies away in the background, and the charm and peculiar worth of 
the picture consists, not so much in the specific objects which it conveys to the 
understanding in a visual language formed by the substitution of figures for words, 
as in the beauty and harmony of the colours, lines and expression, with which the 
objects are represented. Hence novelty of subject was rather avoided than sought 
îoxfBL  II, 32)
The relationship between poetry and painting helps Coleridge to explicate the unity 
in multitude and “nature idealized into poetry”(T I, 471) that he finds in Shakespeare’s 
works. His comparison of Shakespearean drama to painting, Greek drama, and statuary 
is often presented as an instance of A.W.Schlegel’s influence on Coleridge’s lectures on 
Shakespeare. Coleridge pointed out that statuary was characterised by a high degree of 
abstraction requiring that what is undignified must not be brought into company with 
what is dignified. He compares Shakespearean drama to a picture by Raphael or Titian 
which creates the same degree of harmonious effect with a large variety of figures and 
with less abstraction and more truth to nature. Though Schlegel and Coleridge both 
compare Shakespearean drama (Schlegel calls it the Romantic drama) to painting, and 
the Greek drama to statuary, we cannot say that their perspectives are the same. Schlegel 
focused on the ways a drama is unfolded; that is, the Greek drama emphasised 
characters and action from a single point of view but the Romantic drama shows a 
chequered life with its circumstances, in which we can see the slightest movements of 
the characters.
Coleridge goes far beyond Schlegel. Uvedale Price’s Essays on the Picturesque,
176
which Coleridge probably read"*, suggests what is different in Coleridge’s idea of 
painting and sculpture. According to Price,
In Sculpture, and the whole work being of one uniform colour, the figures, whether 
single or grouped, without any accompaniments, there is nothing to seduce or 
distract the eye from the form; to which therefore the efforts of the sculptor are 
almost exclusively directed; whereas in painting, the charm of general effect or 
impression, of whatever kind it may be, will often counterbalance the greatest 
defects in point of form, and makes amends for the want of grandeur, beauty, and 
correctness. ‘ '
Coleridge uses a similar metaphor in his comparison of Shakespearean drama to 
Westminster Abbey;
The Greeks reared a structure, which in its parts and as a whole, filled the mind with 
calm and elevated impression of perfect beauty and symmetrical proportion. The 
moderns, blending materials, produced one striking whole; this may be illustrated 
by comparing the Pantheon with York Minster or Westminster Abbey. Upon the 
same scale we may compare Sophocles with Shakespeare;— in the one there is 
completeness, a satisfying, an excellence, on which the mind can rest; in the other 
we see a blended multitude of materials; great and little; magnificent and mean: 
mingled, if we may so say, with a dissatisfying, or falling short of perfection: yet so 
promising of our progression, that we would not exchange it for that repose of the 
mind, which dwells on the forms of symmetry in acquiescent admiration of 
grace.(Lecr 1 ,517)
To illustrate the concept of the picturesque, Price also compares Greek architecture 
with the Gothic:
A temple or palace of Grecian architecture in its perfect entire state, and with its 
surface and colour smooth and even, either in painting or reality is beautiful; in ruin 
it is picturesque...in Grecian buildings, the general lines of the roof are strait; and 
even when varied and adorned by a dome or a pediment, the whole has a character
See Modiano. Coleridge and the Concept o f  Nature., p.9.
’’Price, Uvedale. Essays on the Picturesque. Vol.I. London: Printed for J.Mawman, 1810, p. 139.
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of symmetry and regularity.... In Gothic buildings, the outline of the summit presents 
such a variety of forms, of turrets and pinnacles, some open, some fretted and 
variously enriched, that even where there is an exact correspondence of parts, it is 
often disguised by an appearance of splendid confusion and irregularity. In the doors 
and windows of Gothic churches, the pointed arch has as much variety as any 
regular figure can well have: the eye too is less strongly conducted, than by the 
parallel lines in the Grecian style, from the top of one aperture to that of another: 
and every person must be struck with the extreme richness and intricacy of some of 
the principal windows of our cathedrals and ruined abbeys. In these last is displayed 
the triumph of the picturesque; and their charms to a painter’s eye are often so great, 
as to rival those which arise from the chaste ornaments, and the noble and elegant 
simplicity of Grecian architecture.'^
Price’s concept of the picturesque, which has the two characteristics of variety and 
intricacy, parallels Coleridge’s. For Coleridge, the picturesque is achieved “when the 
Parts by their harmony produce an effect of a Whole, but there is no seen form of an 
Whole producing or explaining the Parts”.(iS'/zÆF’, 353) At this point it is necessaiy to 
recollect that he described Modern drama or Shakespearean drama as picturesque.
Coleridge’s comparison of Shakespearean drama to Raphael’s or Michael Angelo’s 
paintings focuses on another perspective; namely, its aspect of “nature idealized”. His 
differentiation between ‘copy’ and ‘imagination’ is applied to paintings as well as to 
poetiy. According to him,
Painting went on in Power till in Raphael it attained the apex, and in him too I 
think it began to turn down the other side. The Painter began to think of overcoming 
difficulties.
After this the descent was rapid, till sculptors began to work inveterate 
likenesses of perriwigs in marble—  as see Algarotti’s tomb in the cemetery at 
Pisa—  and painters did nothing but copy, as well as they could, the external face of 
Nature.(FT I, 25 June 1830, 170)
Like Raphael’s paintings, Shakespeare’s work is the ideal example of ‘imitation’. “What
Ibid., pp.51-54.
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Shakespeare proposed to realize was”, he says,
an imitation of human Action in connection with sentiments, passions, characters, 
incidents and events for the purpose of pleasurable emotion; so that whether this be 
shewn by Tears of Laughter or Tears of Tenderness, they shall still be Tears of 
Delight, and united with intellectual Complacency.(CMIII, 894)
In Raphael’s or Titian’s or Michael Angelo’s paintings Coleridge finds something 
ideal. For him, “the Italian masters differ from the Dutch in this that ages in their 
pictures are perfectly ideal: the infant that a Madonna holds in her arms cannot be 
guessed of any particular age—it is humanity in fancy.”(FF I, 24 July 1831, 1299) 
According to him.
Ideal = the subtle hieroglyphical felt-hy-dX\ though not without abstruse and difficult 
analysis detected & understood, consonance of the physiognomic total & substance 
(Stoff) with the obvious Pathognomie! herein equi-distant from Opie-ism, i.e. 
passions planted in a common face (or portrait) that might equally well have been 
the accidental Substance of any other Passion, and the insipid personified passions 
of Lebrun, or the unmeaning abstraction of the true Ideal Michael Angelo's 
despairing Woman at the bottom of the Last Judgment/ {C N II 2828, March-April 
1806)
Coleridge in explaining the close correspondence of some predominant system of 
philosophy and taste and character, the whole tone of manners and feeling, and religious 
and political tendencies, points to the coincidence of the revival of Platonism by Dante 
and Petrarch with the appearance of Giotto and the six other strong masters, and the 
culmination of what he calls ‘divine Philosophy’ with Michael Angelo, Rafael, Titian, 
and Correggio.(Cl IV, 28 July 1817 ) According to him,
He for whom Ideas are constitutive, will in effect be a Platonist— and in those, for 
whom they are regulative only. Platonism is but a hollow affectation. Dryden could
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not have been a Platonist,—  Shakespeare, Milton, Dante, Michael Angelo, & Rafael 
could not have been other than Platonists.(CZ,V, 14 January 1820 )
Coleridge compares Act. Ill, sc.iv of King Lear, to a Michael Angelo:
What a World’s Convention of Agonies— surely, never was such a scene conceived 
before or since—Take it but as a picture, for the eye only, it is more terrific than any 
a Michael Angelo inspired by a Dante could have conceived, and which none but a 
Michael Angelo could have executed—Or let it have been uttered to the Blind, the 
bowlings of (convulsed) Nature would seem concerted in the voice of conscious 
Humanity— (Lect II., 333)
As the idea of despair is incarnated in Michael Angelo’s The Last Judgment, so the idea 
of agony is embodied in a scene of Shakespeare’s drama. Shakespeare’s drama is 
described as the incarnation of idea: “— Shakespeare’s plays might be separated into 
those where the real is disguised in the ideal; & those where the ideal is hidden from us 
in the real.”(Z,ec/1, 357)
In appreciating Shakespeare’s drama it is wrong to emphasise too strongly its 
themes; for example, the idea of Othello is jealousy, Macbeth, ambition. King Lear, 
ingratitude. Description of this kind is not merely superficial but distorts the true 
meaning of the dramas. When Coleridge says that he can see humanity in the infant in 
Raphael’s Madonna, he reads within the figure the whole human story from the creation 
and the fall and the redemption by God’s incarnation. When he says there is ideal 
despair in the woman of Michael Angelo’s the ‘Last Judgement’, he locates in the figure 
not just despair but the religious meaning of despair. Likewise, he took Shakespeare’s 
works as symbols embodying a permanent ideal or truth. Coleridge, in his system of
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logic, proposed the Logical Pentad; prothesis, thesis, antithesis, mesothesis, and 
synthesis. He explains that prothesis is both as one in one and in the same relation, and 
mesothesis is the indifference of thesis and antithesis, that which is both in either but in 
different relations. According to him,
Painting is the Mesothesis of thing and thought. A coloured wax peach is one 
thing passed off for another thing—  a practical lie, and not a work appertaining to 
the Fine Arts—  a delusion—  not an imitation. Every imitation as contra­
distinguished from a copy, is a Mesothesis, but which according to the variable 
propiority to the Thesis or the Antithesis may be called the liberating Mesothesis. 
Thus, Real and Ideal are the two poles, the Thesis and Antithesis. The Sophoclean 
drama, or the Samson Agonistes is the Mesothesis in its propiority or comparative 
proximity to the ideal— the tragedies of Heywood, Ford, &c. {ex. gr., The Woman 
killed by Kindness,) is the Mesothesis in comparative proximity to the Real, while 
the Othello, Lear, &c., is the Mesothesis as truly as possible êv /.lécrw though with a 
clinamen to the ideal.(C 17^ '^ C, 606)
I • ii Shakespeare’s Works and Music
The idea that poetry and music are sister arts was a comparatively recent theory 
though Aristotle had presented music as a more valuable and essential form of imitation 
because it can imitate the moral habits and state of feeling that take place in the human 
mind or soul. Longinus’s On the Sublime is considered as originating the theory of 
poetry as the expression of feeling. But his work was not known until it was published 
in 1554. It was during the 18th century that the relationship between poetry and music 
was first investigated. At this time, the theory that poetry is the expression of feeling, 
not an imitation of nature came to the fore. Jolm Brown’s Dissertation on the Rise, 
Union and Powder, the Professions, Separations, and Corruptions o f Poetry and Music
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not only elucidated the relationship between poetry and music but also had an important 
influence on Romantic poetics both in Germany and England V
Jolm Brown, in the Dissertation, finds the origin of dance, music and poetry in the 
expression of passion. He argues that agreeable passions and disagreeable passions are 
expressed by the three powers of action, voice, and articulate sounds. The savages who 
are at the lowest scale of human kind show the passions suited to their wretched state: 
their gestures are uncouth and horrid: their voice is tluown out in howls and roaring; 
their language is like the gabbling of geese. But if the state of savage life ascends a step 
or two, this chaos of gesture, voice and speech rises into an agreeable order and 
proportion. The natural love of measured melody, which time and experience produce, 
turns the voice into song, the gestures into dance, the speech into verse or numbers. He 
is concerned to explain the generation and natural alliance of what he calls three sister- 
graces, music, dance, and poem.'"
Hugh Blair, who also had an influence on poetical theory around Coleridge’s time, 
sets out to define poetry: its origin, and progression and versification. He thought the 
most just and comprehensive definition of poetry is that it is the language of passion, or 
of enlivened imagination, formed, most commonly, into regular numbers.'^ For him, like 
Brown, poetry and music had the same origin:
Man is both a poet and a musician by nature. The same impulse which 
prompted the enthusiastic poetic style, prompted a certain melody, or modulation of 
sound, suited to the emotions of joy or grief, of admiration, love, or anger. There is 
a power in sound, which, partly from nature, partly from habit and association.
'®See Schueller, Herbert M. “Literature and Music as Sister Arts.” Philological Quarterly 26(1947): 193- 
205, p.204.
'" Brown, John. A Dissertation on the Rise, Union, and Power, the Professions, Separations and  
Corruptions o f  Poetry and Music. London: J.Murray, 1773, pp.27-28.
Blair, Hugh. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Letters. London: Baynes, 1824, p.482.
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makes such pathetic impressions on the fancy, as delight even the most wild 
barbarians. Music and poetry, therefore, had the same rise: they were prompted by 
the same occasions; they were united in song; and as long as they continued united, 
they tended, without doubt, mutually to heighten and exalt each other’s power. The 
first poets sung their own verses: and hence the beginning of what we call 
versification, or words arranged in a more artful order than prose, so as to be suited 
to some tune or melody."^
Robert Lowth says that “poetry itself is indebted for its origin, character, complexion, 
emphasis, and application, to the effects which are produced upon the mind and body, 
upon the imagination, the senses, the voice, and respiration, by the agitation of 
passion.” ’’
Coleridge himself insists that “Music may be divided from poetry.”(F I, 444) For 
him they share an origin in that both ai e the expression of passion. According to him.
The (so called) Music of Savage Tribes as little deserves the name of Art to the 
Understanding, as the Ear warrants it for Music— . Its lowest step is a mere 
expression of Passion by the sounds which the Passion itself necessitates— its 
highest, a voluntary re-production of those Sounds, in the absence of the 
occasioning Causes, so as to give the pleasure of Contrast—ex. gr. the various 
outcries of Battle in the song of Triumph, & Security.
Poetry likewise is purely human—all its materials me from the mind, and all the 
products are for the mind. It is the Apotheosis of the former state—viz. Order and 
Passion—N.6. how by excitement of the Associative Power Passion itself imitates 
Order, and the order resulting produces a pleasurable Passion (whence Metre) and 
thus elevates the Mind by making its feelings the Objects of its reflection/_(CA' III 
4397 March 1818)
In Biographia, he also insists that poetry always implies passion in its most general 
sense, as an excited state of the feelings and faculties.(RF II, 71)
Judging from his idea of the relationship between poetry and music, and between
Ibid., p.485.
”  Lowth, Robert. Lectures on The Sacred Poetry o f  the Hebrews, p. 183.
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poetry and painting, we notice that he is neither exclusively inclined to ut pictura poesis 
nor ut musica poesis. Rather he tries to find the common characteristics shared by all the 
arts including poetry. As he finds pictorial aspects in Shakespeare, or some analogous 
points to Shakespeare’s work in painting, so he enjoys musical aspects in him and also 
compares his work to a musical composition. If we consider his ideas on the nature of 
music, we can comprehend his interest in the musical aspects in Shakespeare more 
easily:
What is music?— Sounds organized —
All Passions & human emotions have their characteristic actions & physiognomical 
features in the movements of the body, the changes of the features, the tones 
transitions & rythmus of the voice.—Nature has her changes & actions, (& if not 
really yet poetically) man infuses into them the same soul, of the effects of which he 
is conscious in his own phaenomenal or corporeal existence.—
Sounds have their qualities (characterized by terms) expressing their effect upon 
the organs of hearing, as loud soft—  these when agreeable are termed melodious—  
They have their agreements & relative proportions = Concords (or vice versa) 
The(y) have according to a loss of human perception measure, rythmus— &when 
sounds, being concords form a measured series with certain proportions it is 
harmony.— Melody, concord & harmony are the body of music, but its soul is 
passion, emotion feeling.—(F'/z&F II, 960-961)
This idea of music may be applied to the tone, rhythm, and metre of the speech of 
Shakespeare’s characters. He insists, “To please me, a poem must be either music or 
sense—  if it is neither, I confess I cannot interest myself in it.”(TF(60m, (April 5, 1833), 
219) As music is constituted by feelings and passion as well as melody and harmony, 
poetry should keep metre and rhytlmi congruent with human feelings and passion. As I 
suggested in the preceding chapter, Coleridge claims that Shakespeare has music in his 
soul. He, in Venus and Adonis, found a perfect sweetness of versification perfectly
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adapted to the subject, refusing more majestic rhytlim than the subject required. 
Another important point for Coleridge is that both poetry and music are symbols of
ideas:
The term Idea, is an instance in point; and I hazard this assertion, together with 
the preceding sentences, in the full consciousness, that they must be unintelligible to 
those who have yet to learn, that an Idea is equi-distant in its signification from 
Sensation, Image, Fact, and Notion: that it is the antithesis not the synonyme of 
s’{ÔoûA,ov. The magnificent son of Cosmo was wont to discourse with Ficino, 
Politian, and the princely Mirandula on the Ideas of Will, God, and Immortality. 
The accomplished author of the Arcadia, the Star of serenest brilliance in the 
glorious constellation of Elizabeth’s court, our England’s Sir Philip Sydney! He the 
paramount gentleman of Europe, the poet, warrior, and statesman, held high 
converse with Spencer on the Idea of Supernatural beauty; an all “earthy fair and 
amiable,” as the Symbol of that Idea; and on Music and Poesy as its living 
Educts\{LS, 100-102)
Coleridge compares himself with such composers as Mozart and Beethoven. In terms of 
the representation of an idea, music is more immediate than painting. He thinks that
a great Composer, a Mozart, a Beethoven must have been in a state of Spirit much 
more akin, more analogous, to mine own when I am at once waiting for, watching, 
and organically constructing and inwardly constructed by, the Ideas, the living 
Truths, that may be re-excited but cannot be expressed by Words, the Transcendents 
that give the Objectivity to all Objects, the Form to all Images, yet are themselves 
untranslatable into any Image, unrepresentable by any particular Object than I can 
imagine my self to be to a Titian, or a Sir C.Wren.(FS, 214)
In music, “there is always something more and beyond the immediate 
expression,”(M4F, 51), which is the proof that man is designed for a higher state of 
existence.
Responding to those who try to find Shakespeare’s faults, he compares Shakespeai'e
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with such musicians as Mozart and Haydn:
... Shakespeare understood the true language and external workings of passion better 
than his critics. He had a higher, and a more ideal, and consequently a more 
methodical sense of harmony than they. A very slight Icnowledge of music will 
enable any one to detect discords in the exquisite harmonies of HAYDN or 
MOZART;.. .but to know why the minor note is introduced into the major key, or the 
nominative case left to seek for its verb, requires an acquaintance with some 
preliminary steps of the methodical scale, at the top of which sits the author, and at 
the bottom the critic.(5'/zcS:F, 654-655)
When he compares Sophocles’s plays and Shakespeare’s, he also applies the 
comparison to music. He says whereas the ancient music consisted of melody produced 
by the succession of pleasing sounds, the modern embraces harmony, which is produced 
by combination. (Fee/1, 517)
Coleridge’s appreciation of Cimarosa’s symphonies is also congruent with his notion 
of Shakespeare’s work:
If we listen to a symphony of CIMAROSA, the present strain still seems not only to 
recal, but almost to renew, some past movement, another and yet the same! Each 
present movement bringing back, as it were, and embodying the spirit of some 
melody that had gone before, anticipates and seems trying to overtake something 
that is to come: and the musician has reached the summit of his art, when having 
thus modified the Present by the past, he at the same time weds the Past in the 
Present to some prepared and corresponsive Future. The auditor’s thoughts and 
feelings move under the same influence: retrospection blends with anticipation, and 
Hope and Memory (a female Janus) become one power with a double aspect. A 
similar effect the reader may produce for himself in the pages of History, if he will 
be content to substitute an intellectual complacency for pleasurable sensation. The 
events and characters of one age, like the strains in music, recal those of another, 
and the variety by which each is individualized, not only gives a charm and 
poignancy to the resemblance, but likewise renders the whole more intelligible. 
Meantime ample room is afforded for the exercise both of the judgment and the 
fancy, in distinguishing cases of real resemblance from those of intentional 
imitation, the analogies of nature, revolving upon herself, from the masquerade 
figures of cunning and vanity.(FI, 129-130)
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For Coleridge, the beginnings of Shakespeare’s works “strike at once the key-note, and 
give the predominant spirit of the play.”(M  II, 208) “The variety by which each is 
individualized” and “analogon of nature” are two of Coleridge’s key phrases for 
Shakespeare’s work.
2. Shakespeare’s Poetic Work
In The Friend, Coleridge describes his plan to wiite a “Travelling Conversation”, 
taking place during a tour to the northern counties with a man named Satyrane and 
several others. In describing how such conversations might achieve unity, he exhibits 
his fundamental notion of writing.
Independent of the delightful recollections, the lively portraiture and inward music, 
which would enliven my own fancy during the composition, it appeared to me to 
possess the merit of harmonizing an infinite variety of matter by that unity of 
interest, which would arise from the Characters remaining the same throughout, 
while the Tour itself would supply the means of introducing the most different 
topics by the most natural connections.(FII, 186)
The stability of characters and the changing of the scenery could be combined, it seems, 
to produce that balance between sameness and variety from which, Coleridge believes, 
the unity of a work of art follows. He finds a similar balance in Shakespeare’s work.
In Coleridge’s opinion, there is a predominance of ideas in poetry in its 
comprehensive sense.(F I, 464) Likewise, he defines the noblest poem thus:
Frame a numeration table of the primary faculties of Man, as Reason, unified per 
Ideas, Mater Legum (Arbitrement, Legibilitatis mater) Judgment, the
discriminative, Fancy, the aggregative, Imagination, the modifying & fusive, the
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Senses & Sensations—and from these the different Derivatives of the Agreeable 
from the Senses, the Beautiful, the Sublime/ the Like and the Different—the 
spontaneous and the receptive—the Free and the Necessary-—And whatever calls 
into consciousness the greatest number of these in due proportion & perfect 
harmony with each other, is the noblest Poem.— (C # III 3827, May 1810)
Shakespeare’s poetry, for him, best satisfies the above definition of poetry as he finds 
Shakespeare’s works “nature idealized” in terms of both the predominance of ideas and 
their organical unity. For him, “it would be scarcely more difficult to push a stone out 
from the pyramids with the bare hand, than to alter a word, or the position of a word, in 
Milton or Shakespeare, (in their most important works at least) without making the 
author say something else, or something worse, than he does say.”(FF I, 23)
Another of Coleridge’s definitions of poetry extends this notion:
The ideal of earnest Poetry consists in the Union & harmonious melting down—  
the fusion—of the sensual into Spiritual, of the Man as an animal into man as a power 
of reason & self-government—which we have represented to us most clearly in their 
Plastic Art, or Statuary—where the Perfection of Form is an outward Symbol of inward 
Perfection, and the most elevated Ideas—where the Body is wholly penetrated by the 
Soul, & spiritualized even to a state of Glory— Like a perfectly transparent Body, the 
matter in its own nature darkness becomes [ ] a vehicle & fixture of Light, a
means of developing [ ]Beauties & unfolding its unity, into all its ex{ ]
wealth of various Colors without which [ ] or division of Parts— {Lect I, 457)
Here, Coleridge emphasises the union of meaning and form. He says that the spirit of 
poetry like all other living powers, must of necessity circumscribe itself by rules. For 
him poetry is a “living Body”(Fec/1, 494), which is of necessity an organised one. He 
describes organization as the connection of parts to a whole, so that each part is at once 
end and means. Metre and measured sounds as the vehicle of poetry, he remarks, are a
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fellow- growth from the same life as the bark is to the tree.
2 • i Form
Shakespeare’s poetic works, whether they are poems or dramas, satisfactorily meet 
Coleridge’s definition of ideal poetry. He actually expressed the opinion that 
“Shakespeare produced Dramatic Poems, not Tragedies nor Comedies.”(CM III, 894) 
Shakespeare’s works, in Coleridge’s opinion, are organic wholes in which “the 
heterogeneous is united, as it is in nature”(FFII, 83). This is not the same as Jolinson’s 
notion when he defends Shakespeare’s drama by insisting that it is “true to nature”. 
Whereas Johnson compares the play with nature as shown or experienced, Coleridge’s 
defence is based on nature’s invisible law or principle.
Coleridge compares Shakespearean drama to Raphael’s or Titian’s paintings in order 
to describe how its construction differed from Sophoclean drama. Coleridge explains the 
difference by means of another aspect of organicism:
We call, for we see & feel, the Swan & the Dove both transcendently beautiful—As 
absurd, as it would be, to institute a comparison between their separate claims to 
Beauty from any abstract Rule common to both without reference to the life & being 
of the animals themselves, say rather if having first seen the Dove we abstracted its 
outlines, gave them a false generalization, called them principle or ideal of Bird- 
Beauty & then proceeded to criticize the Swan or the Eagle—not less absurd is it to 
pass judgment on the works of a Poet on the mere ground that they have been called 
by the same class-name with the works of other poets of other times & 
circumstances, or any ground indeed save that of its inappropriateness to its own 
end & being, its want of significance, as symbol and physiognomy.(Fec/1, 465)
Likewise, the rules of the Greek drama cannot be applied to Shakespearean drama. For
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him, among the tloi'ee unities, time, place and action, the two former were mere 
conveniences attached to the local peculiarities of the Athenian drama, and the last alone 
deserved the name of a principle, and in this Shakespeare stood pre-eminent. Of the 
unity of action, he says.
...instead of Unity of Action I should great prefer the more appropriate tho’ 
scholastic and uncouth words—Homogeneity, proportionateness and totality of 
Interest.—  The distinction or rather the essential difference betwixt the Shaping 
skill of mechanical Talent, and the creative Life-power of inspired Genius. In the 
former each part [is] separately conceived and then by a succeeding Act put 
together—not as Watches are made for wholesale—for here each part supposes a 
preconception of the Whole in some mind—but as the pictures on a motley 
Screen—(N.b. I must seek for a happier illustration.)
Whence the harmony that strikes us in the wildest natural landscape? In the 
relative shapes of rocks, the harmony of colours in the Heath, Ferns, and Lichens, 
the Leaves of the Beech, and an Oak, the stems and rich choc[ol]ate-brown 
Branches of the Birch, and other mountain Trees, varying from vaiying Autumn to 
returning Spring—compared with the visual effect from the greater number of 
artificial Plantations?— The former are effected by a single energy, modified ab 
intra in each component part— . Now as this is the particular excellence of the 
Shakespearean Dramas generally, so is it especially characteristic of Romeo and 
Juliet. {Lect II, 362)
According to him, the law of unity which has its foundation not in the factitious 
necessity of custom, but in nature itself is every where and at all times obseiwed by 
Shakespeare in his plays.
Coleridge, as I discussed in chapter two, insisted on the difference between 
mechanical regularity and organic regularity. In the case of the former, the author 
constructs the framework in advance and then builds the parts step by step, usually 
according to the conventional rules, but in the case of the latter, the plot grows as a 
sprout grows into a tree. Or we can compare the former to assembling a radio or an
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automobile. The final production might look a perfect one in which every part engages 
with another part. But we cannot feel life in it.'® His comment on French tragedies 
demonstrates the aspect of mechanical regularity'k
...however meanly I may think of the French serious Drama, even in i f  s most 
perfect specimens; and with whatever right I may complain of i f  s most perpetual 
falsification of the language, and of the connections and transitions of thought, 
which Nature has appropriated to states of passion: still, however, the French 
Tragedies are consistent works of art, and the Offspring of great intellectual power. 
Preserving a fitness in the parts, and a harmony in the whole, they form a nature of 
their own, though a false nature.(FII, 216)
For him, the beginning of Shakespeare’s every play is well prepared and well 
calculated as a germ or sprout of the whole play:
With the single exception of Cymbeline, they either place before us at one glance 
both the past and the future in some effect, which implies the continuance and full 
agency of its cause, as in the feuds and party-spirit of the servants of the two houses 
in the first scene of Romeo and Juliet; or in the degrading passion for shews and 
public spectacles, and the overwhelming attachment for the newest successful war- 
chief in the Roman people, already become a populace, contrasted with the jealousy 
of the nobles in Julius Caesar;— or they at once commence the action so as to excite 
a curiosity for the explanation in the following scenes, as in the storm of wind and 
waves, and the boatswain in the Tempest, instead of anticipating our curiosity, as in 
most other first scenes, and in too many other first acts;— or they act, by contrast of 
diction suited to the characters, at once to heighten the effect, and yet to give a 
naturalness to the language and rhythm of the principal personages, either as that of 
Prospero and Miranda by the appropriate lowness of the style,— or as in King John, 
by the equally appropriate stateliness of official harangues or narratives, so that the
See Simpson, David. “Coleridge on Wordsworth and the Form of Poetry.” Coleridge’s Theory o f  
Imagination Today. Ed. Christine Gallant. New York: AMS Press, 1989. 211-225, p.216. Simpson argues 
that “Mechanic or fanciful form displays the joints that have been necessary to shape it; organic or 
imaginative form effaces the details of its own coming into being. Mechanic form leaves on its surface the 
signs o f  its own construction; organic form has no visible histoiy, but exist wholly in the present.”
See Bate, Jonathan. “The Politics of Romantic Shakespearean Criticism: Germany, England, France.” 
European Romantic /?ev/evr 1(1990): 1-26, p.6. Bate sees political meaning behind organic and mechanical 
form. “It has, however, been insufficiently recognized that the distinction is a deeply political one. Given 
that its context is Schlegel’s anti-GalHcism, the attack on mechanical form is an attack not only on neo­
classical aesthetics but also on such systematic formulations as the Declaration o f the Rights o f Man, the 
Civil Constitution o f the Clergy, and, preeminently, the Civil Code which Napoleon had promulgated on 
21 March 1804.”
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after blank verse seems to belong to the rank and quality of the speakers, and not to 
the poet ;— or they strike at once the key-note, and give the predominant spirit of the 
play, as in the Twelfth Night and in Macbeth or finally, the first scene comprises 
all these advantages at once, as in Hamlet.(FF II, 207-8)
For example, Polixenes’ obstinate refusal of Leontes in Winter's Tale is an admirable 
preparation for the whole play. After Polixenes says that “There is no tongue that 
moves, no none in the world”, he yields to Flermione, which is at once perfectly natural 
from mere courtesy to her sex and the exhaustion of his will by Leontes’s efforts. 
Coleridge took this first scene as well calculated to set In nascent action the jealousy of 
Leontes. In the first scene of Richard II, there is the germ of the ruling passion which 
was to be developed thereafter. Richard’s hardness of mind, arising from kingly power, 
his weakness and debauchery from continual and unbounded flattery, and the haughty 
temper of the Barons are all glanced at in the first scenes.(FF II, 166-167) The first 
scene of Love’s Labour’s Lost is rendered natural by the choice of the characters and in 
this scene the whimsical determination on which the drama is founded is expounded.
The Tempest, according to Coleridge, opens with a busy scene admirably 
appropriate to a drama of this kind and giving the key-note to the whole harmony. It 
prepares and initiates the excitement required for the entire piece. In the second scene, 
Prospero’s speeches, till the entrance of Ariel, give all the information necessary for the 
understanding of the plot. The moment chosen by Prospero to tell the truth to his 
daughter is, Coleridge says, perfectly timed because anything which might have been 
disagreeable to us in the magician is completely merged in the humanity and natural 
feelings of the father.(FF II, 95-96)
In Hamlet, Horatio’s initial scepticism about the ghost in Act I, sc.l prepares for his
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appearance. The armour, the dead silence, the watchfulness that first interrupts it, the
welcome relief of the guard, the cold, the broken expressions of compelled attention to
bodily feelings, all these excellently accord with and prepare for the subsequent gradual
rise into tragedy. The presence together on stage of Horatio, Marcellus, and Bernardo is
judiciously contrived for it renders the courage of Hamlet and his impetuous eloquence
perfectly intelligible, and the apparition of itself has by its previous appearances been
brought nearer to a thing of this world. Coleridge says that the accretion of objectivity in
a Ghost that yet retains all its ghostly attributes and fearful subjectivity is truly
wonderful.(FF II, 209-221) In Othello, the introduction of Roderigo in the first scene as
the dupe on whom lago first exercises his art, and in so doing displays his own character
is an example of the admirable preparation characteristic of Shakespeare. The first tliree
lines, in Coleridge’s opinion, show in lago the coolness of a preconceiving
experimenter.(Fee/ II, 313)
In King Lear, the whole tragedy is founded on the first four or five lines, and all
things are prepared. As to the triple division of the country, Coleridge observes that it is
not unnatural. He carefully analyses the motive as a
mixture of selfishness, sensibility, and habit of feeling derived from, and fostered 
by, the particular rank and usages of the individual;—the intense desire of being 
intensely beloved,—  selfish, and yet characteristic of the selfisliness of a loving and 
kindly nature alone; —  the self-supportless leaning for all pleasure on another’s 
breast; —  the craving after sympathy with prodigal disinterestedness, frustrated by 
its own ostentation, and the mode and nature of its claims;—  the anxiety, the 
distrust, the jealousy, which more or less accompany all selfish affections, and are 
amongst the surest contradistinctions of mere fondness from true love, and which 
originate Lear’s eager wish to enjoy his daughter’s violent professions, whilst the 
inveterate habits of sovereignty convert the wish into claim and positive right, and 
an incompliance with it into crime and treason;—- these facts, these passions, these 
moral verities, on which the whole tragedy is founded, are all prepared for, and will 
to the retrospect to be found implied, in these first four or five lines of the play.(FF 
II, 186)
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From this germ, ail other parts grow organically to form the whole work. Coleridge is 
content to illustrate Shakespeare’s mastery of plot by an examination of Shakespeare’s 
opening scenes. He goes on to explain the characterisation, language, humour, and wit 
from the organic view point.
Norman Fruman points to Coleridge’s failure to reveal the reconciliation of 
opposites or organic form in his Shakespearean criticism.’” Coleridge’s failure to analyse 
the organic unity of the plays is well explained by Simpson: “Changes in natural 
organisms occur at levels that are beyond question and often control; the mystery of the 
transition from caterpillar to butterfly merely enhances our tendency to wonder and to 
acquiesce.’” '
2 • ii Characterisation
Raysor, in his introduction to Coleridge’s Shakespearean Criticism, suggests that 
“The unhappiness which turned inward his superb analytical powers and forced him to 
explore his own soul as few men ever have, created an introspective psychologist of 
supreme genius, and gave him the basis for a knowledge of human motives which no 
English critic has ever surpassed.’”’ It is true that Coleridge possesses a rare ability to 
analyse human psychology. In that respect, he was influenced by his British 
predecessors. But if we deal with his psychological insight independently, we are likely
20 Fruman, Norman. “Ozymandias and the Reconciliation of Opposites.” Coleridge’s Theory o f  
Imagination Today. 49-54, p.54.
21 Simpson. “Coleridge on Wordsworth and the Form of Poetry,” p.215.
”  Raysor, Shakespearean Criticism /, p.lxi
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to miss the genuine value contained in his analysis of characters, which derives from 
Coleridge’s insistence that the characters should be studied in relationship to the play as 
a whole. As “in drawing his characters he(Shakespeare)” regarded essential, not 
accidental relations”(Fcc/ I, 319), so, in his character analysis, Coleridge never loses 
sight of the essential relationship to the whole. In dealing with Coleridge’s analysis of 
characterisation, my focus is on two notions; one is the “universality in particularity” of 
characterers, and the other is the organical relation of characterisation to the whole 
work.
I have said that Coleridge understood Shakespeare’s poetic work as the symbol of
ideas. Likewise in Coleridge’s opinion, “Shakespeare’s characters from Othello or
Macbeth down to Dogberry are ideal: they are not (the) things but the abstracts of the
things which a great mind may take into itself and naturalize to its own heaven.”(Fec/1,
351) He explains his notion of the ideal thus:
He explained the ideal beauty as being formed from observing what is common to 
all individuals of a class, taking away from each individual that which is the result 
of accident in him. This explanation resolves the ideal into universality and 
generality. I observed to Coleridge that I had remarked that the caricature is the 
converse of the ideal, being the individuality of the thing caricatured without the 
general character. As, viz. it would be a perfect caricature which should give a 
likeness of a person, which should resemble the individual and yet have nothing 
human in i t . . . . ( m i ,  482)
The above passage is from Henry Crabb Robinson’s account of Coleridge’s criticism of 
a picture by Benjamin West. Elsewhere Coleridge claims that “All Genius is 
metaphysical. The ultimate end is ideal, however it may be actualized by incidental and 
accidental circumstances.”(FF I, 11 August 1832, 322) The concept of the ideal is
”  The words in parenthesis are mine.
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closely connected with universality and generality. He also stated that “the universal is 
an Idea. Shakespeare, therefore, studied manlcind in the Idea of the human race; and he 
followed out that Idea into all its varieties, by a Method which never failed to guide his 
step aright.”(FM, 27) Shakespeare
shaped his characters out of the Nature within—but we camiot so safely say, out of 
his own Nature, as an individual person.—No! this latter is itself but a natura 
naturata—an effect, a product, not a poM^er. It was S’s prerogative to have the 
universal which is potentially in each particular, opened out to him—the homme 
générale not as an abstraction of observation (from a variety of men;) but as the 
Substance capable of endless modifications of which his own personal Existence 
was but one—& to use this one as the eye that beheld the other, and as the Tongue 
that could convey the discovery—No greater or more common vice in Dramatic 
Writers than to draw out of themselves— {Lect II, 148)
Coleridge says that “Shakespeare’s characters are all genera intensely individualized; 
the results of meditation, of which observation supplied the drapery and the colors 
necessary to combine them with each other.”(Fec/ II, 273)
It is Shakespeare’s peculiar excellence, that throughout the whole of his splendid 
picture gallery (the reader will excuse the confest inadequacy of this metaphor), we 
find individuality every where, mere portrait no where. In all his various characters, 
we still feel ourselves communing with the same nature, which is eveiy where 
present as the vegetable sap in the branches, sprays, leaves, buds, blossoms, and 
fruits, their shapes, tastes, and odours, Speaking of the effect, i.e., his works 
themselves, we may define the excellence of their method as consisting in that just 
proportion, that union and interpenetration, of the universal and the particular, 
which must ever pervade all works of decided genius and true science. (FI, 457)
In Biographia, he attacks materialism and insists that we are born idealists. He insists 
that the philosophers of the school of materialism or empiricism
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know nothing, or despise the faith as the prejudice of the ignorant vulgar, beeause 
they live and move in a crowd of phrases and notions from which human nature has 
long ago vanished. Oh, ye that reverence yourselves, and walk humbly with the 
divinity in your own hearts, ye are worthy of a better philosophy! Let the dead bury 
the dead, but do you preserve your human nature, the depth of which was never yet 
fathomed by a philosophy made up of notions and mere logical e n t i t i e s . I ,  263)
Here, human nature is something like the divinity in our own hearts or some potential
common to nature and human nature. His comparison of a plant in a hot house and the
young Pitt depends upon this notion of human nature:
— A plant sown and reared in a hot-house, for whom the veiy air that surrounded 
him, had been regulated by the thermometer of previous purpose; to whom the light 
of nature had penetrated only through glasses and covers; who had had the sun 
without the breeze; whom no storm had shaken; on whom no rain had pattered; on 
whom the dews of heaven had not fallen!— A being, who had had no feelings 
connected with man or nature, no spontaneous impulses, no unbiassed and desultory 
studies, no genuine science, nothing that constitutes individuality in intellect, 
nothing that teaches brotherhood in affection! Such was the man—such, and so 
denaturalised the spirit, on whose wisdom and philantlii’opy the lives and living 
enjoyments of so many millions of human beings were made unavoidably 
dependent.(/S', 271)
Therefore, when Coleridge claims that we see human nature in Shakespeare, the nature 
he refers to is that which he describes as natura natiirans. In all Shakespearean women, 
according to Coleridge, there is the same foundation and principle, in other words, 
human nature. The distinct individuality and variety are merely the result of the 
modification of circumstances, whether in Miranda, in Imogen or in Queen Katherine. 
Similarly, the character of Biron in Love's Labours Lost, for instance, in Coleridge’s 
opinion, was seen again in the Mercutio of Romeo and Juliet, Benedick in Much Ado 
about Nothing and several others.
Though Coleridge suggests that Shakespeare’s characters are the result of meditation
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and observation, he gives the priority to meditation, as, for example, in his comments on 
the Nurse in Romeo and Juliet,
He appealed to the auditors whether the observation of one or two old nurses would 
have enabled Shakespeare to draw this character of admirable generalization?—No 
surely not: Were any man to attempt to paint in his mind all the qualities that could 
possibly belong to a nurse he would find them there.(Zec^ I, 307-8)
Drawing such a character is not just the result of the observation of several nurses but 
the result of observation and meditation. Such characters are different from those 
described by "(a man) going about the world with his Pocket book, noting down what he 
hears and observes and by practice obtains a facility of representing what he has heard & 
observed— "\Lect I, 306).
Coleridge finds a similarity between Shakespeare and Cervantes in that their 
characters are at once individual and general:
We know Don Quixote, as we do Hamlet: and yet they both partake so much of the 
permanent part of human nature that they are as fresh, and as probable, and as 
interesting, now in the 19th century, as they were, when they were first delineated, 
in the sixteenth. As the melancholy traits of Hamlet, too, are relieved, by the coarse 
humour, and low-bred common-sense of the grave diggers; so is Don Quixote 
relieved by Sancho; and in the exquisite contrasts, which these two chai’acters bring 
out, we constantly see the superiority of moral refinement over the mixture of good 
humour and low cunning, which constitute genuine v u l g a r i t y . I I ,  165)
R.W.Babcock, in The Genesis o f Shakespeare Idolatry, argues that the 
psychologizing of Shakespeare from 1766 to 1799 may be divided into two types: "the 
analysis of Shakespeare’s interpretation of the passion, and the application of the
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concept of association to aspects of Shakespeare’s art.”-‘ In Coleridge, the psychological 
analyses of characters are closely related to the unfolding and development of the form. 
For Coleridge tries to find the seeds of their behaviour in their character, searching for 
psychological motives. One of the great excellencies of Shakespeare, Coleridge says, is 
that he availed himself of his psychological genius to develop all the minutiae of the 
human heart.
In Richard //, according to Coleridge, Shakespeare contrived to bring the character 
Richard, with all his prodigality and hard usage of his friends, still within the compass 
of our pity. In Bolingbroke, Shakespeare is sowing seeds, the full development of which 
appears only in Henry IV. In Richard III, Richard’s ambition is also psychologically 
explained. The inferiority of Richard’s physical person makes him seek consolation in 
the superiority of his mind, so that Richard presents his very deformities as a boast.
The psychological interpretation of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth demonstrates 
Coleridge’s critical insight in this respect. Macbeth finally murders King Duncan in
Babcock, Robert Witbeck. The Genesis o f  Shakespeare Idolatiy 1766-1799. New York: Rusell & 
Rusell, INC, 1964, p. 157. Also See Henry Mackenzie. Mirror nos 99and 100(1780). Reprinted in 
Shakespeare: the Critical Heritage. Vol. 6., p.275. Like others, Mackenzie points to the complexity o f  
Hamlet’s character. However, as Babcock suggests, he locates Hamlet’s character under the dominance o f  
one particular passion, namely, melancholy. According to him, “Hamlet, from the very opening o f the 
piece, is delineated as one under the dominion o f melancholy, whose spirits were overborn by his feelings. 
Grief for his father’s death, and displeasure at his mother’s marriage prey on his mind, and he seems, with 
the weakness natural to such a disposition, to yield to their controul.” Also see, “Unsigned essay on 
jealousy in Othello,” op. cit. Vol.3, p.210. In this essay (Vickers conjectures the author to be Akenside), 
Othello is depicted as being dominated by jealousy: “I conclude, therefore, that our Poet has preserved his 
Character, has painted the Passion of Jealousy as it ought to be painted in such a Man; has copied 
faithfully, without exceeding or exaggerating; and has frighted us(which, by the way, is the very Essence 
of Tragedy) not with an imaginary Scene but with a real Spectacle o f a wise and worthy Man made mad 
by Jealousy, and becoming a wild, ungovernable, brutal and bloody-thirsty monster; and yet accompanied 
with Circumstances that deservedly excite Compassion.” Also see William Richardson, A Philosophical 
analysis and Illustration o f  Some o f  Shakespeare’s Remarkable Characters. Reprinted in Shakespeare: 
The Critical Heritage.Vo\.6., p. 120. Richardson sees the dominant passion o f Macbeth as ambition. In 
Macbeth, according to Richardson, all the other principles seem to have undergone a violent and total 
change. “His ambition, however, has suffered no diminution. On the contrary, by having become 
exceedingly powerful, and by rising to undue pretensions, it seems to have vanquished and suppressed
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spite of the inner voice of conscience. In Coleridge’s opinion, “Macbeth mistranslates 
the recoilings— and ominous whispers of Conscience into prudential and selfish 
Reasonings.”(Lec/ I, 529) After the murder, the terrors of remorse rise into fear, which 
in turn drives him to further murder and he suffers from the phantoms his inner 
conscience has made. In the case of Lady Macbeth, Coleridge rejects the prejudiced idea 
of Lady Macbeth as a monster. He remarks that she constantly makes efforts to bully her 
conscience. “Lady Macbeth”,
like all in Shakespeare, is a class individualized:—  of high rank, left much alone, 
and feeding herself with day-dreams of ambition, she mistakes the courage of 
fantasy for the power of bearing the consequences of the realities of guilt. Hers is 
the mock fortitude of a mind deluded by ambition; she shames her husband with a 
superhuman audacity of fancy which she cannot support, but sinks in the season of 
remorse, and dies in suicidal agony.(L7? II, 244)
Compared to A.W.Schlegel’s characterisation of Lady Macbeth, Coleridge’s 
demonstrates his thoroughgoing understanding of human psychology and the play itself.
Romeo’s love of Juliet at first sight is not the kind of love often ridiculed in 
Shakespeare. On the contraiy, it is based on his understanding of human psychology and 
is also related to the progress of the plot. He defines love as not like hunger, not like an 
appetite under the influence of which a mere animal thinks of nothing but its 
satisfaction. Rather, love is something which gives to every object in nature a power of 
the heart without which it would be spiritless. So, Shakespeare did not begin by making 
Romeo and Juliet fall in love at first glance, Romeo first feels a sense of imperfection, 
which yearns to combine itself with something lovely. Romeo, he suggests, becomes
every amiable and virtuous principle.”
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enamoured of the ideal he has formed in his own mind and then recognises the first real 
being that he encounters as that which he has desired. His seemingly being in love with 
Rosaline is in truth his being in love only with his own idea. All these facts justify 
Romeo’s sudden forgetting of Rosaline. Shakespeare then introduces Romeo to Juliet 
and makes it not only a violent but permanent love.
Coleridge, in Shakespeare’s depiction of the jealousy of Leontes in the Winter's 
Tale, finds the philosophical meaning of jealousy:
the mind, in its first harbouring of it, became mean and despicable, and the first 
sensation was perfect shame, arising from the consideration of having possessed an 
object unworthily, of degrading a person to a thing—the mind that once indulges 
this passion has a predisposition, a vicious weakness, by which it kindles a fire from 
every spark, and from circumstances the most imiocent and indifferent, finds fuel to 
feed the flame; this he exemplified in an able manner from the conduct and opinion 
of Leontes, who seized upon occurrences of which he himself was the cause, and 
when sparking of Hermione, combined his anger with images of the lowest 
sensuality, and pursued the object with the utmost cruelty.(Z,ecf I, 555)
This kind of jealousy, for Coleridge, is totally different from Othello’s. “Jealousy”, of 
which he writes that it
does not strike me as the point in his passion; I take it to be rather an agony that the 
creature, whom he had believed angelic, with whom he had garnered up his heart, 
and whom he could not help still loving, should be proved impure and worthless. It 
was the struggle not to love her. It was a moral indignation and regret that virtue 
should so fall; 'But yet the pity of it, lago!— O lago! the pity of it, lago! In addition 
to this, his honour was concerned: lago would not have succeeded but by hinting 
that his honour was compromised. There is no ferocity in Othello; his mind is 
majestic and composed. He deliberately determines to die; and speaks his last 
speech with a view of showing his attachment to the Venetian state, though it had 
superseded him.(7T & Om, Dec.29, 1822, 33)
Hamlet, for Coleridge, is the character tlnough whom we can trace “Shakespeare’s
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deep and accurate science in mental philosophy.”(id? II, 204) Coleridge like others 
explains Hamlet’s delay by reference to his character. He points out the lack of a due 
balance between the real and the imaginary world in Hamlet. His interpretation of 
Hamlet’s character might have been influenced both by German critics such as Goethe 
and the eighteenth-century English critics. But Coleridge’s interpretation of it shows his 
remarkable psychological ability to read Shakespeare’s characters. “His mind”
unseated from its healthy balance, is for ever occupied with the world within him, 
and abstracted from external things: his words give a substance to shadows: and he 
is dissatisfied with commonplace realities. It is the nature of thought to be 
indefinite: while definiteness belongs to reality. The sense of sublimity arises, not 
from the sight of an outward object, but from the reflection upon it: not from the 
impression, but from the idea. Few have seen a celebrated waterfall without feeling 
something of disappointment: it is only subsequently, by reflection, that the idea of 
the waterfall comes full into the mind, and brings with it a train of sublime 
associations. Hamlet felt this: in him we see a mind that keeps itself in a state of 
abstraction, and external objects as hieroglyphics. His soliloquy “O that this too, too 
solid flesh would melt,” arises from a craving after the indefinite: a disposition or 
temper which most easily besets men of genius; a morbid craving for that which is 
not. The self-delusion common to this temper of mind was finely exemplified in the 
character which Hamlet gives of himself: “It cannot be, but I am pigeon-liver’d, and 
lack gall, to make oppression bitter.” He mistakes the seeing his chains for the 
breaking of them: and delays action, till action is of no use: and he becomes the 
victim of circumstances and accident.(Zcc71, 544)
lago is another example. He has the coolness suitable for manipulating another 
person’s mind. He has a high self-opinion and thus contempt for whoever does not 
display intellectual power. In Othello, lago’s motive for ruining Othello remains 
obscure. Though Coleridge defines the two passions which are made to act upon him as 
disappointed vanity and envy, his act is too fiendish to be explained by the two passions. 
Coleridge finds “motive-hunting for a motiveless malignity”(Li? II, 260) when lago
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seeks to explain his own motivation."^
Besides main characters, other minor characters, in Coleridge’s opinion, have a no 
less important role in the construction of his work. The fool in King Lear, for instance, 
is not a comic buffoon to make the groundlings laugh. Coleridge insists that accordingly 
the fool is prepared for, that is brought into living connection with the pathos of the 
play, and with its suffering.(Tec/ II, 331)
2 ■ hi Language
Language, according to Coleridge, “is the armory of the human mind; and at once 
contains the trophies of its past, and the weapons of its future conquests.”(BL II, 30-31) 
In the Notes taken by J. Tomalin, Coleridge describes language as ‘living words’ “for 
words are the living products of the living mind & could not be a due medium between 
the thing and the mind unless they partook of both. The word was not to convey merely 
what a certain thing is, but the very passion & all the circumstances which were 
conceived as constituting the perception of the thing by the person who used the
Othello (l.iii, 377-396) Thus do I ever make my fool my purse; 
For I mine own gained knowledge should profane 
If I would time expend with such a snipe 
But for my sport and profit. I hate the Moor;
And it is thought abroad that ’twixt my sheets 
H’as done my office. I know not i f  t true;
Yet I, for mere suspicion in that kind,
Will do as if for surety. He holds me well;
The better shall my purpose work on him.
Cassio’s a proper man. Let me see now:
The Moor is o f a free and open nature 
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so;
And will as tenderly be led by tlf nose 
As asses are.
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word."(Tec/1, 2 7 3 f
In explaining the meaning of the word ‘poetry’, he notes.
...as all languages perfect themselves by a gradual process of desynonymizing 
words originally equivalent, I have cherished the wish to use the word ‘poesy’ as the 
generic or common term, and to distinguish that species of poesy which is not muta 
poesis by its usual name ‘poetry;’ while of all other species which collectively form 
the Fine Arts, there would remain this as the common definition,— that they all, like 
poetry, are to express intellectual purposes, thoughts, conceptions, and sentiments 
which have their origin in the human mind,— {MAL, 44)
Coleridge’s criticism of Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads is based on his idea of 
language. Fie sets out the reasons why he does not agree with Wordsworth’s argument 
that from the objects with which the rustic hourly communicates, the best part of 
language is formed. Among the reasons given by him, the second reason presents his 
notion of language well:
Secondly, I deny that the words and combinations of words derived from the 
objects, with which the rustic is familiar, whether with distinct or confused 
knowledge, can be justly said to form the best part of language. It is more than 
probable, that many classes of the brute creation possess discriminating sounds, by 
which they can convey to each other notices of such objects as concern their food, 
shelter, or safety. Yet we hesitate to call the aggregate sounds a language, otherwise 
than metaphorically. The best part of human language, properly so called, is derived
26 See Prickett, Stephen. Words and The Word. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986, p. 147. According to 
Prickett, the development o f Coleridge’s view of language can be seen in three phases: “In the first, 
following Locke and Hartley, he was willing to accept a fairly simple and essentially a-historical view o f  
the logical relationship between words and things. In the second, which we would associate with the 
influence o f Horne Took, he became aware o f the illogical complexities o f etymology, and saw words 
primarily in relation to their supposed semantic roots rather than to external objects. In the third, he came 
to see language as a process o f continual semantic change and evolution, with words related not so much 
to things as changes in human consciousness itself.” Also see Barfield. “Coleridge’s Enjoyment o f  
Words.” C oleridge’s Variety. 204-218, p.212. “Coleridge’s feeling for words was an integral part o f his 
whole deeply-felt philosophy o f the true relation between words and thoughts, between thoughts and 
things, and thus, and thus only, between words and things. Language does not reproduce things; it gives 
 ^outness to thoughts’. Also see Wallace, C.Miles. “Coleridge’s Theory of Language.” Philological 
Quarterly.59{\9S0y. 338-352, p.339. “Coleridge’s definition of “word” represents language as 
participating intimately in the complex relation between mind and world: the process of naming and the 
process o f knowing ( in the strict sense) are represented as a single process.”
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from reflection on the act of mind itself. It is formed by a voluntary appropriation of 
fixed symbols to internal acts, to processes and results of imagination, the greater 
part of which have no place in the consciousness of uneducated man;....(5T II, 53- 
54)
In Aids to Reflection, he recommends that we reflect on the words we use; “— accustom 
yourself to reflect on the words you use, hear, or read, their birth, derivation and history. 
For if words are not THINGS, they are LIVING POWERS, by which the things of most 
importance to manlcind are actuated, combined, and h u m a n i z e d . 10)
This view of language is reflected in his Shakespearean criticism. Shakespeare’s 
thoughts, he says, “were harmony itself, and they naturally created a language suitable to 
themselves.”(T<?u/ II, 275) The most conspicuous epithet for Shakespeare’s language 
which Coleridge uses is “the language of nature”, but this is not a language that denies 
historical or social difference, for “the different modes of expression it should be 
remembered frequently arose from dif[ference] of situation & education: a black guard 
would use very different words to express the same thing, to those a gentleman would 
employ and both would be natural & proper: the difference arose from the feeling: the 
gentleman would speak with all the polished language and regard to his own dignity 
which belonged to his rank, while the blackguard who must be considered almost a half 
brute and would speak like a brute having respect neither for himself or others.— ”{Lect 
I, 366)
This view of language seems to reflect the neoclassicist’s theoiy of decorum. For 
the neoclassists, a gentleman must use polished expressions. For Coleridge a gentleman 
only uses polished expressions if he is a ‘real gentleman’. The language in which the 
properties of the drama are expressed should not be “drawn from any set of fashion”(Tf?
205
II, 102) but from feeling, which distinguishes his from the neoclassisfs sense of 
decorum. For Coleridge, one of Shakespeare’s excellences
was in the language o f nature, so correct was it that we could see ourselves in all he 
wrote; his style and manner had also that felicity, that not a sentence could be read 
without its being discovered if it were Shakespearean,{Lect I, 521)
In contrast to Shakespeare’s language of “nature”, he describes ‘unnatural’ language 
thus:
Language—it cannot be supposed that the Poet should make his characters say 
all that they would, or taking in his whole Drama, that each Scene or Paragraph 
should be such, as on cool examination we can conceive it likely, that men in such 
situations would say, in that order and in that perfection! & yet according to my 
feeling it is a very inferior kind of Poetry, in which—as in the French Tragedies—  
Men are made to talk what few indeed even of the wittiest men can be supposed to 
converse in, & which both is & on a moment’s reflection appears to be the natural 
Produce of the Flot-bed of Vanity, namely an Author’s Closet, who is actuated 
originally by a desire to excite Surprize & Wonderment at his superiority to other 
Men, instead of having felt so deeply on certain subjects or in consequence of 
certain Imaginations, as makes it almost a necessity of his Nature (to) seek for 
Sympathy—no doubt, with that honorable desire of permanent action which 
distinguishes &c—{Lect I, 85-86)
The language of nature, contrastingly, must be produced naturally from the character, 
without the impression that the author artificially devises it. If the language is not 
natural, the characters commonly use some particular tone and style in which we can 
feel the colour of the author. In the contrary case, the language the characters are using 
is inherent to each character’s personality; i.e., his spirit, passion, status, and situation, 
and it is produced out of the inner necessity of the development of the plot or the 
character. Coleridge, though he honoured and loved Fielding, finds the soliloquies in the 
novel or the interview between Tom Jones and Sophia before reconciliation so unnatural
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because the words are without spirit and thus are wholly incongruous and without any 
psychological truth. Contrastingly, for him, “Shakespeare would ever be found to speak 
the language of nature.”(Tec/ I, 309) But the language of nature is not necessarily the 
one which is commonly and daily used. If some particular language is used in some 
particular situations with effect, it is natural in that situation. Coleridge observed that 
“there was no form of language that might not be introduced by a great Poet with great 
effect in particular situations because they were true to nature and without an original 
they never could have existed.”(Teu/1, 312)
Such a concept of the language of nature is neither the same as the neo-classical 
ideal of decorum nor the sentiment clothed in language that some critics such as 
William Duff and Lord Kames referred to. Duff also describes Shakespeare’s language 
as the ‘language of nature’. He means by this language, however, only the outpouring of 
passion. He says of Othello’s language for example that “The tumult, the torment, and 
the fury of Othello’s mind, after he had perpetrated the horrid murder, and was 
convinced of the innocence of his wife, are conveyed to us in the language of the most 
impetuous and distracting passion, abandoned to the most dreadful despair.” ’^ In a sense, 
his view is not totally different from Coleridge’s in that both argue that Shakespeare’s 
language is produced by the character’s state of mind. But whereas Duff takes it as the 
immediate product of a tumultuous state of mind, Coleridge takes it as what is suitable 
for the composition of the whole play poetically as well as psychologically.
In this respect, Shakespeare’s language is, Coleridge suggests, methodically 
connected to the whole drama. Shakespeare, Coleridge believes, “was himself
^^Duff, William. Critical Observation on the Writings o f  the Most Celebrated Original Genius in Poetry.,
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Methodical in the delineation of character, in the display of Passion, in the conceptions 
of Moral Being, in the adaptations of Language, in the connection and admirable 
intertexture of his ever-interesting Fable.”(TM, 35-6) He denounces those who were 
critical of Shakespeare’s breaking the principle of decorum:
Purblind critics, whose mental vision could not reach far enough to comprise the 
whole dimensions of our poetical Hercules, have busied themselves in measuring 
and spanning him muscle by muscle, till they fancied they had discovered some 
disproportion. {TM, 31-2)
I have remarked that Coleridge describes Hamlet’s character as produced by an 
imbalance between the outside world and the inner world. Hamlet is himself, then, a 
character lacking method. Shakespeare, however, methodically connects Hamlet’s 
personality and his language. Hamlet, in describing his voyage to England and the 
events that interrupted it to Horatio, reveals his character, i.e., the tendeney to generalise 
and to be meditative to excess:
Ham. ... —Let m  know,
Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well,
When our deep plots do fail: and that should 
teach us,
There’s a divinity that shapes our ends, 
Rough-hew them how we willfHamlet V ii 7-11)"
Such a tendency of Hamlet’s character is shown in that “all the digressions and 
enlargements consist of reflections, truths, and principles of general and permanent 
interest, either direetly expressed or disguised in playful satire.”(E I, 452) Coleridge
p.159.
28 F I, 451-2.
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points to a series of expressions that show such a tendency:
I  once did hold it, as our statists do,
A baseness to write fair, and laboured much 
How to forget that learning;
As love between them like the palm, might flourish;
As peace should still her wheaten garland \\>ear.
And many such like As's o f great charge-...{Hamlet v ii 33-46)"'^
Hamlet’s meditation at the grave also well reveals Hamlet’s character/" This 
meditation, according to Coleridge, exhibits to us the character of Hamlet, flying from 
the sense of reality, and seeking a reprieve from the pressure of its duties, in that ideal 
activity, the overbalance of which, with the consequent indisposition to action, is his 
disease.(FI, 455)
Coleridge’s view of language is also demonstrated in Hamlet’s first 
soliloquy(Hamlet I ii 129 : “O that this too too solid flesh would melt”). “The 
prodigality of beautiful words”, in his analysis, is “the half embodyings of Thought, that 
make them more than Thought, give them an outness, a reality sui generis and yet retain 
their correspondence and shadowy approach to the Images and Movements
The Friend /.pp. 452-3.
(Hamlet, V 1213-227)
Ham.To what base Uses we may return,
Horatio? Why may not imagination trace the 
Noble Dust o f Alexander, till’a find it stopping a 
Bunghole?
Hor. T’ were to consider too curiously to 
consider so.
Ham. No faith, not a jot; but to follow him 
thetlier with Modestly enough, and Likelihood to 
lead it, as thus: Alexander died, Alexander was 
buried, Alexander returneth to Dust, the Dust 
is Earth; o f Earth we make Loam: and why o f  
that Loam, where to he was converted might they 
not stop a Beer-barrel?
Imperious Caesar, dead and turn’d to Clay,
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within.”(Tec/1, 540)
As example of a charaeter who lacks method in a quite different sense from Hamlet 
is the Hostess in Henry IV, Part II. Mrs Quickly, for Coleridge, is defined by an habitual 
submission of the understanding to mere events and images, independent of any power 
in the mind to classify or appropriate them. Shakespeare, according to him, correlates 
her character with her language’' methodically. If she were a methodical person, she 
would have realised that Falstaff made use of her both materially and physically 
throughout her life. But she mentions only the one incident of Falstaff s false promise to 
her.
Horatio’s speech about old Hamlet’s spirit in arms is, Coleridge points out, “a 
perfect model of the true style of dramatic narrative;— the purest poetry, and yet in the 
most natural language, equally remote from the ink-horn and the plough.”(TF II, 217) 
Coleridge describes Floratio’s character as “high yet healthful-minded”(F I, 455). As 
Coleridge suggests, Horatio’s manner of speech, unlike Hamlet’s, is methodical with 
“due abatement and reduction”."" Horatio’s speech notes the facts and gives his own
Might stop a Hole to keep the Wind away.
(Henry IV, part II, II i 82-95)
Falstaff. What is the gross sum that I owe thee?
Mrs. Quickiey. Marry, if thou wert an honest man, thyself and the money too. Thou didst swear to 
me upon a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, 
on Wednesday in Wheesun week, when the Prince broke thy head for liking his father to a singing- 
man in Windsor, thou didst swear to me then, as I was washing thy wound, to many me and make 
me my lady thy wife. Canst thou deny it? Did not goodwife Keech, the butcher’s wife come in then 
and call me gossip Quickiey?- coming in to borrow a mess of vinegar: telling us she had a good 
dish o f prawns, whereby thou didst desire to eat some, whereby I told thee they were ill for a green 
wound?
(Hamlet, 1 ii, 195-212)
Horatio
Two Nights together had these Gentlemen,
Marcellus and Barnado, on their Watch,
In the dead Wast and Middle o f the Night,
Been thus encount’red. A Figure like your Father,
Arm’d at Point, exactly Cap a pea,
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opinion without digressions and reflections and generalisation.
Shakespeare’s language is also natural for the situation. Coleridge gives as an
example Hamlet’s interview with the Ghost. Here are Hamlet’s words:
Angels and ministers of grace defend us!
Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damned,
Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell,
Be thy intents wicked or charitable,
Thou com’St in such a questionable shape 
That I will speak to thee. I’ll call thee Hamlet,
King, father, royal Dane. O answer me!
Say, why is this? Wherefore? What should we do? (I.iv, 18-37)
Shakespeare, according to Coleridge, “adapts himself to the situation so admirably (and 
as it were put himself into the situation) that though poetry, his language (is the 
language) of nature: no words, associated with such feeling, can occur to us but those 
which he has employed (especially) on the highest, the most august & the most awflil 
subject that can interest a human being in this sentient world.’’(Tec/1, 387)
In The Tempest, in the first speech of Miranda, Coleridge suggests, the simplicity 
and tenderness of her character are laid open. In Love's Labour’s Lost, he finds logic 
clothed in rhetoric in Biron’s speech"" and observes how Shakespeare, in his two-fold
Appears before them, and with solemn March 
Goes slow and stately by them. Thrice he walked 
By their oppress’d and Fear-surprised Eyes 
Within his Tronche on’s length, whil’st they, distill’d 
Almost to Jelly with the Act o f Fear,
Stand dumb and speak not to him. This to me 
In dreadful Secrecy impart they did,
And 1 with them the third Night kept the Watch, 
Where, as they had deliver’d, both in Time,
Form of the Thing, each Word made true and good. 
The Apparition comes. 1 knew your Father;
These Hands are not more like.
^{Love’s Labour's Lost IV, iii, 299-340)
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being of poet and philosopher, uses it to convey profound truths in the most lively 
images. The images in themselves, in Coleridge’s opinion, remain faithful to the 
character supposed to utter the lines, and the expressions themselves constitute a further 
development of that character.(IF II, 105) In Richard II, the scene of the quarrel 
between Bolingbroke and Mowbray exemplifies the characters of both Richard and 
Bolingbroke. For Coleridge, this scene seems to be introduced for the purpose of 
showing by anticipation their characters. In Bolingbroke, a decorous and courtly 
checking of his anger in subservience to a predetermined plan is observable, especially 
in his calm speech after receiving sentence of banislimenff In Richard’s speech"" , the 
selfish weakness of Richard’s character opens. In the play from beginning to end, 
Coleridge says, Richard scatters himself into a multitude of images and in the 
conclusion endeavours to shelter himself from that which is around him by the cloud of
Other slow arts entirely keep the brain,
And therefore, finding barren practisers,
Scarce show a harvest o f their heavy toil;
But love, first learned in lady’s eyes.
Lives not alone immured in the brain;
But, with the motion of all elements 
Courses as swift as thought in every power,
And gives to every power a double power.
Above their functions and their offices.
It adds a precious seeing to the eye:
A lover’s eyes will gaze an eagle blind.
And who can sever love from charity?
Richard 11,1 iii 144-7)
Bolingbroke. Your will be done. This must my comfort be—  
That sun that warms you here shall shine on me,
And those his golden beams to you here lent 
Shall point on me and gild my banishment.
""( Richard II, I iii 188-190)
King. Nor never by advised purpose meet 
To plot, contrive, or compost any ill 
‘Ganst us, our state, our subjects, or our land.
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his own thought.(Tec/ I, 382) In lago’s speech"", Coleridge observes his passionless 
character, whereas Othello’s speech"^ reveals a capacity for strong emotion quite 
different from the speech of Leontes to his true friend Camillo.
The characters’ speech is also instrumental in developing the plot. The conversation 
between Brabantio and lago about Desdemona’s choice of Othello for a husband reveals 
Shakespeare’s consciousness of the oddity of her choice. Shakespeare, to Coleridge’s 
mind, suggests that Desdemona’s falling in love with Othello is explicable only if she 
has been a victim of magic until Desdemona’s speech persuades us otherwise.
In Shakespeare’s work, he also notes the importance of particular words. He takes 
the conversation"^ between Oliver and Orlando in the wrestling scene in As You Like It 
for instance. For him, the word ‘boy’ naturally provokes and awakens in Orlando the 
sense of his manly powers. On the retort of the ‘elder brother,’ he grasps him with firm 
hands, and makes him feel he is no boy. Likewise, in Cordelia’s speech"", in King Lear, 
Coleridge points out that Cordelia’s reply, ‘nothing’, shows Cordelia’s feeling of disgust 
at the hypocrisy of her sisters, and some little faulty admixture of pride and sullenness. 
And her tone is well contrived to lessen the glaring absurdity of Lear’s conduct.(TF II, 
194)
""( Othello, 1111,319) lago. Virtue? a fig! ‘TIs in ourselves that we are thus or thus. 
"’(Ohello, 1 iii, 294) Othello. My life upon her faith!
As You Like It, 1 i 55-58 )
Oliver. What Boy!
Orlando. Come, come, elder brother, you are too young in this.
Oliver. Wilt thou lay hands on me, Villain?
""( King Lear, I I 88-94)
Cor. Nothing, my Lord.
Lear. Nothing?
Cor. Nothing.
Lear. Nothing will come o f Nothing, speak again.
Cor. Unhappy that 1 am, I cannot heave 
My Heart into my Mouth: I love your Majesty
213
Coleridge also finds the characteristics of a whole play in a single speech. In 
Romeo’s speeclf" while he awaits his secret marriage with Juliet, for instance, there is a 
precipitance which Coleridge considers as the presiding characteristic of Romeo and 
Juliet, One of Coleridge’s favourite characters, Mercutio, is also revealed by his 
speech.'" His speech, for Coleridge, both exhibits his witty character and serves to 
justify Romeo’s passionate revenge on Tybalt.
In Macbeth, Coleridge observes the exquisite judgment of Shakespeare in the 
speeches of the characters. Macbeth’s ambition is shown tlnough Banquo’s speeclTf 
Banquo, not Macbeth, directs our notice to the effect produced on Macbeth's mind, 
rendered vulnerable by previously harbouring ambitious thoughts.(TF II, 239) For 
Coleridge, the witches are beings in whom the Fates and Furies of the ancient Greek 
drama are blended with the sorceresses of Gothic and popular superstition. They are 
mysterious natures; fatherless, motherless, sexless: they appear and disappear: they lead 
evil minds from evil to evil and have the power of tempting those who have been the 
tempters of themselves. Their speech is different when they talk with each other and 
when they talk to others. The former"^ ", according to Coleridge, displays a certain fierce
According to my Bond, no more nor less.
‘^ ^{Romeo and Juliet, II vi 6-8)
Romeo. Do thou but close our hands with holy words,
Then love-devouring death do what he dare.
It is enough I may but call her mine.
‘^ \Rotneo and Juliet, III i 97-99)
Mercutio. N o,‘tis not so deep as a well, nor so wide as a church door but t’s enough: ’twill 
serve. Ask. for me to-morrow, and you shall find me a grave man. 
f lM a c b e th ,\\ \\5 \-5 A )
Ban. Good, Sir, why do you start, and seem to fear 
Things that do sound so fair?—-I’ th’name o f truth.
Are ye fantastical, or that indeed 
Which outwardly ye know?
‘‘"For example, ( Macbeth I iii, 3-10)
1 Witch. A sailor’s wife had chestnuts in her lap,
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familiarity, with grotesqueness mingled with terror, and the latter'"' is solemn, dark, and 
mysterious.(Tec/1,531)
2 • iv Metre
Coleridge did not insist that metre is necessary to poetry. He says that the writings of 
Plato and Bishop Taylor and the Theoria Sacra of Burnet give undeniable proofs that 
poetry of the highest kind may exist without metre. But if metre is superadded, all other 
parts must be made consonant with it. They must be such as to justify the perpetual and 
distinct attention to each part, which an exact recurrence of accent and sound are 
calculated to excite.(FT II, 12-3) Whether it has metre or not, according to Coleridge, if 
an harmonious whole is to be produced, the parts must be in keeping with the poetry and 
this can only be achieved by a studied selection and artificial arrangement.
His interest in the metre of Shakespeare’s work is a distinctive feature of his 
criticism. For him, the human mind naturally attempts to give balance to passion, which 
is the origin of metre. If we call the spontaneous effort to hold in check the workings of 
passion antagonism, the balance effected by the antagonism is organized into metre. 
From the principles of metre, Coleridge deduces two conditions:
And mounch’d, and moiinch’d, and mounch’d: ‘Give me,’ quoth I;—  
‘Aroynt thee, witch!’ the rump-fed ronyon cries.
Her husband’s to Aleppo gone, master o ’th’ Tiger.
But in a sieve I’ll thither sail,
And like a rat without tail;
I’ll do, I’ll do, and I’ll do.
'"*For example, the witches tell the fortune of Banquo as:
(Macbeth, I iii 65-68)
1 witch. Lesser than Macbeth, and greater.
2Witch. Not so happy, yet much happier, 
sw itch. Thou shalt get kings, though be none:
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First, that as the elements of metre owe their existence to a state of increased 
excitement, so the metre itself should be accompanied by the natural language of 
excitement. Secondly, that as these elements are formed into metre artificially, by a 
voluntary act, with the design and for the purpose of blending delight with emotion, 
so the traces of present volition should thi'oughout the metrical language be 
proportionally discernible.(FT II, 65)
In his practical criticism, he investigates how well these conditions are satisfied. He 
considers how well metre correlates to the character, i.e. his rank, his passion, his 
purpose. For him, even the prose has in the highest and lowest dramatic personage, 
whether the character is a Cobbler or Hamlet, a rhythm so felicitous and so severally 
appropriate, as to be a virtual metre. (TT II, 137) Coleridge judges Love's Labour’s Lost 
as early work by “the frequency of the rhymes, the sweetness as well as the smoothness 
of the metre”(TF II, 103).
In his criticism of Julius Caesar, he points to the metre of Brutus’s words : “A 
soothsayer bids you beware the Ides of March.” He argues that; “If my ear does not 
deceive me, the metre of this line was meant to express that sort of mild philosophic 
contempt, characterizing Brutus even in his first casual speech.”(TF II, 137) For 
Coleridge, in Shakespeare’s metre, there is always some logic either of thought or 
passion to justify it. In Antony's speech, he points to some lines as not being 
Shakespeare’s:
Pardon me, Julius— here wast thou bay’d brave hart; 
Here didst thou fall, and here thy hunters stand 
Sign’d in thy spoil, and crimson’d in thy death.
O M’orldl thou wast the forest to this hart,
So all hail, Macbeth and Banquo!
216
And this, indeed, O world! the heart o f thee.
I doubt the genuineness of the last two lines;— not because they are vile; but 
first, on account of the rhythm, which is not Shakespearean, but just the very 
tune of some old play, from which the actor might have interpolated them;—  and 
secondly, because they interrupt, not only the sense and comiection, but likewise 
the flow both of the passion, and (what is with me still more decisive) of the 
Shakespearean link of association.(TF II, 140-141)
2 • V Pun
Lord Kames describes a play on words as ‘being low and childish’ and ‘unworthy of 
any composition, whether gay or serious, that pretends to any degree of elevation’"’"But 
Shakespeare, in his opinion, “when he descends to a play of words, is not always in the 
wrong”''". Jolmson was critical of Shakespeare’s wordplay. “A quibble”, he says,
is to Shakespeare, what luminous vapours are to the traveller; he follows it all 
adventures; it is sure to lead him out of his way, and sure to engulf him in the mire. 
It has malignant power over his mind, and its fascinations are irresistible. Whatever 
be the dignity or profundity of his diction, whether he be enlarging knowledge or 
exalting affection, whether he be amusing attention with incidents, or enchaining it 
in suspense, let but a quibble spring up before him, and he leaves his work 
unfinished. A quibble, poor and barren as it is, gave him such delight, that he was 
content to purchase it, by the sacrifice of reason, propriety and truth. A quibble was 
to him the fatal Cleopatra for which he lost the world, and was content to lose
But for Coleridge, a pun is far more than a mere play on words. Punning links the 
word with the working of the human mind.''^ Punning for him, like other linguistic
“'"Henry Home (Lord Kames). Elements o f Criticism. Vol.l, p.514.
'"Ibid., p.516.
'hohnson, Samuel. Johnson on Shakespeare. Ed. Walter Raleigh. London, 1949, pp.23-4. 
'^See Fulford, Tim. Coleridge’s Figurative Language. Basingstock: Macmillam, 1991, 
p.24.
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effects, may reveal the inner mind of the characters:
Critics who argues against the use of a thing from its abuse, have taken offence 
to the introduction in a tragedy of that play on words which is called punning, but 
how stands the fact with nature? Is there not a tendency in the human mind, when 
suffering under some great affliction, to associate everything around it with the 
obtrusive feeling, to connect and absorb all into the predominant sensation; thus Old 
Gaunt, discontented with his relation, in the peevislmess of age, when Richard asks 
“how is it with aged Gaunt,” breaks forth.(Tec/ 1, 564)
He explains that on a death bed there is feeling which may make all things appear but 
as puns and equivocations, so a passion carries off its own excess by plays on words as 
naturally, and therefore as appropriately to drama as by gesticulations, looks, or 
tones.(TF II, 172) He points out that something of Shakespeare’s pumiing must be 
attributed to his age because at this time direct and formal combats of wit were a 
favourite pastime of the courtly and accomplished. He believes that “a pun, if it be 
congruous with the feeling of the scene, is not only allowable in the dramatic dialogue, 
but often times one of the most effectual intensives of passion.”(Ti? II, 173)
He points out that Hamlef s play on words is not only logical but also an integral 
part of the play. Hamlet’s plays on words'", according to him, may be attributed either
Coleridge’sidea o f the function o f pun is explained: “If the mind did produce alterations of 
meaning by making small alterations to the sound and spelling o f existing words, then we 
should expect a similarity in sound and shape between words to indicate a similarity of 
meaning. However, if the process forming the new word from the old had occurred 
hundreds o f years ago, then the similarity in meaning had often been forgotten. Poetry, 
however, could force recognition o f that original similarity by using its licence to exploit the 
sound o f words— a licence not given to prose or to the ordinary speech from which 
Wordsworth wanted to derive poetry. By punning, or by juxtaposing two similar-sounding 
or similarly spelt words o f apparently different meaning, poetry did not just create a musical 
effect. These ‘new combinations of language’ allowed to poetry enabled it to suggest 
unexpected relationship between the meanings as well as the sounds and spellings.”
{Hamlet, I ii, 65-67)
Hamlet. A little more than Kin, and less than Kind.
Claudius. How is it that the Clouds still hang on you?
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to an exuberant activity of mind, as in the higher comedy of Shakespeare generally, or to 
his suppressed passion, and especially to a hardly smothered personal dislike. Punning, 
he diagnoses, generally arises from a mixture of a sense of injury and contempt and it is 
a very natural way of expressing that mingled feeling. He argues that puns in 
Shakespeare are as natural as in the beginning of language.(Tcc/1, 292-3)
2 • vi Wit
Coleridge considers wit an example of activity of thought. In his opinion, “wit 
consists in presenting thoughts or images in an unus(u)al comiection with each other, for 
the purpose of exciting pleasure by the surprise”(Tcc/ II, 416). In his comment on 
Domie, he explains wit: “Wit!— Wonder-exciting vigour, intenseness and peculiarity of 
thought, using at will the almost boundless stores of a capacious memory and exercised 
on subjects, where we have no right to expect it,— ^\MAL, 135). He classifies wit into 
tliree kinds according to the manner of connection. First, when the connection is real 
and the conscious object is truth not amusement, he calls it scientific wit, in which 
Samuel Butler excels. The second kind is when the connection is apparent and transitory 
and produced by mere combination of words, of which Voltaire is an exponent. The 
third kind is when the connection is of thoughts, or by words or by images, which we 
often call fancy, and which constitutes the larger and more peculiar part of 
Shakespeare’s wit.(Tec/ II, 416)
Shakespeare’s wit, he observes, is blended with the other parts of his work and is 
by its nature capable of being blended with them and it is evident in all parts of his
Hamlet. Not so, my Lord, I am too much in
works whether tragic or comic. The character of Falstaff, for example, is witty. He says 
that we can scarce turn to a single speech of Falstaff s without instances of it. Coleridge 
points out,
The speeches of Falstaff Prince Henry would, for the most part, be equally 
proper in the mouth of either, and might indeed, with undiminished effect, proceed 
from any person. This is owing to their being composed almost wholly of wit, which 
is impersonal, and not of humour, which always more or less partakes of the 
character of the speaker. The Character of Parson Evans, on the other hand, is one 
of humour throughout.(Tec/ II, 178)
For him real wit always appeals to the understanding, and does not necessarily produce 
laughter.
Humour, for him, is of more difficult definition. Humour does not consist wholly in 
the understanding and the senses. No combination of thoughts, images, or words will of 
itself constitute humour unless some peculiarity of character can be indicated thereby. 
Parson Adams, for him is a good example of humour.
He points out that the greater part of what passed for wit in Shakespeare was not 
exquisite humour heightened by a figure and made humorous by being attributed to a 
particular character. He suggests Falstaff s comparison of a flea on Bardolf s nose to a 
damned soul suffering in purgatory as an example. The comparison is pleasurable not 
because it comes from a particular personality but from the images themselves. 
Coleridge suggests that the employment of wit is a norm which distinguishes an author 
of talent from one of genius. The former gives “a kind of electric surprize by a mere turn 
of phi'aze” and the latter produces “surprize by a permanent medium and always leaves 
something behind it which gratifies the mind."(Lect I, 295) The turns of phrases
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employed by the man of talent please in company but pass away with the moment. He 
compares this kind of man to “a man who squandered away his estate in farthings but 
distributed so many that he needs must have been very rich.”(Ibid., 295)
He compares the wit of Shakespeare to the flourishing of a man’s stick when he is 
walking along in the full flow of animal spirits.
It was a sort of overflow of hilarity which disburdened us & seemed like a 
conductor to distribute a portion of our joy to the surrounding air by carrying it away 
from us. While too it disburdened us it enabled us to appropriate what remained to 
what was most important and most within our direct aim. {Lect I, 294-5)
He compares Shakespeare’s wit to salt in our meat, Ben Jonson’s, to salt instead of 
meat.
In this sense, Falstaff s wit is crucial to the construction of the play. Henry /H Parts 
I and II belong to historical drama. “In order that a drama may be properly historical”, he 
says,
it is necessary that it should be the history of the people to whom it is addressed. In 
the composition, care must be taken that there appear no dramatic improbability, as 
the reality is taken for granted. It must, likewise, be poetical;—  that only, I mean, 
must be taken which is permanent in our nature, which is common, and therefore 
deeply interesting to all ages. The events themselves are immaterial, otherwise than 
as the clothing and manifestation of the spirit that is working within. In this mode, 
the unity resulting from succession is destroyed, but is supplied by a unity of a 
higher order, which connects the events by reference to the workers, gives a reason 
for them in the motives, and presents men in their causative character. It takes, 
therefore, that part of real history which is the least known, and infuses a principle 
of life and organization into the naked facts, and makes them all the framework of 
an animated whole.(IF II, 160)
In this sense, such a character as Falstaff is necessary because his wit animates the
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whole work like salt in meat.
Coleridge’s idea of Shakespeare’s poetic work is closely linked to his notion of 
nature. From his thought that poetry in its comprehensive sense is the reconciliation of 
nature and human consciousness, we can deduce his notion of Shakespeare’s poetic 
work. For Coleridge, Shakespeare’s poetic work is the embodiment of ideas organically 
united into a whole.
In Shakespeare, form is analogous to natural form, usually represented by Coleridge 
as a plant. The beginning of Shakespeare’s plays is a kind of germ from which a sprout 
develops and grows into a mature tree. The characters of the plays are natural in terms 
both of their containing an essence congruent with nature and of their being natural 
ingredients for the whole. He describes Shakespeare’s language as that of nature. The 
language of nature, for him, is the language innate to the characters, which reflects the 
character’s personality, situation, feeling, and thought. In addition, the language of 
nature must not retain the trace of the author. Above all he showed how natural and 
appropriate each character’s speech is for the purpose and the construction of the drama. 
Metre in Shakespeare’s drama expresses the passion and mood of the characters. 
Coleridge pays attention to how Shakespeare commanded metre according to the 
passion or feeling of the characters in particular situations. Pun and wit, for Coleridge, 
are also important ingredients making up the whole. In Shakespeare’s punning, his 
activity of thought is revealed.
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Chapter 5. Appreciation of Shakespeare
To see or to read a drama is an emotional experience. Poetical theorists have 
always been interested in the impact dramatic poetry has on the reader or the audience. 
Plato admits the influence of drama on the feelings of the audience although he 
dismisses the audience’s sympathetic reaction as disgraceful.^ Aristotle, in Poetics, 
describes the emotional change wrought on the audience as ‘catharsis’. Longinus, in On 
the Sublime, argues about the effect of elevated language upon an audience.
Theorists and critics, in other words, have tried to explain dramatic poetry in terms 
of its reception. Drama is peculiar in that it cannot be conceived of without the 
existence of the audience, although, strictly speaking, all criticism might be termed 
reception criticism in so far as the critics themselves constitute a kind of audience.
In this chapter, I would like to focus on Coleridge’s exploration of the reception of 
Shakespeare’s dramatic work by the audience as well as by himself as a professional 
critic. In doing so, I will discuss the question of whether or not he is appropriately 
termed a ‘closet critic’. Some critics such as J.R de J.Jackson and R.A.Foakes disagree 
with the notion^. Critics such as Jonathan Bate, on the other hand, tend to accept it.  ^My
' Plato. The Republic. Reprinted in Dramatic Theory and Criticism. Greeks to Grotowski. Ed. Bernard F. 
Duroke. New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974, p.30.
 ^See Jackson, J.J.de J. “Coleridge on Dramatic Illusion and Spectacle in the Performance o f  
Shakespeare’s Plays.” Modern Philology 62(1964-65):13-21, pp.13-21. He challenges the assessment that 
Coleridge is hostile to theatrical performance. Also see R.A.Foakes, Coleridge's Criticism o f  
Shakespeare, p. 15. In response to the accusation o f Coleridge’s having no interest in the plays as 
performed on the stage, Foakes argues that “This is not strictly true, as his wrestling with the nature of 
dramatic illusion shows...and in fact he obviously enjoyed and appreciated good performances in the 
theatre”.
 ^ See Bate, Jonathan. “The Romantic Stage.” Shakespeare: An Illustrated Stage History. Jonathan Bate 
and Russell Jackson eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 92-111, p.93. He relates Coleridge’s
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own view is that Coleridge assumes that performance before an audience is constitutive 
of the dramatic genre. I will begin by examining his concept of theatre and his idea of 
the origin of tragedy. Then, I will look at his opinion of the Elizabethan stage and of the 
theatrical performance of his own times.
It must be accepted that Coleridge’s dissatisfaction with the theatrical performances 
available to him leads him to choose to read Shakespeare rather than to see him, which 
contributes to his reputation as a ‘closet critic’. But it does not follow that he rejects 
theatrical performance in itself. We need to recollect that his theory of illusion is largely 
focused on theatrical illusion though he also applies his theory to the experience of 
reading. His comparison of drama to dreams is distinctive despite the comparison being 
in itself so traditional. In order to reveal the complexity of the theory, the traditional 
Western notion of dream and illusion will be discussed. I will then assess the 
distinctiveness of Coleridge’s argument. Finally, I will focus on Coleridge’s idea of the 
audience. For Coleridge, the proper reception of dramatic work presupposes the 
reconciliation of the author and the audience. He, like the other Romantics, demands 
that the audience employ an active imagination. But in doing so, the author’s intention 
still remains crucial in the triangular relationship of author-work-audience. Coleridge’s 
notion of the relationship of author-work-audience is closely related to his notion of 
Shakespeare as a poet and of his poetic works.
l.The Concept of Theatre
idealism to his hostility to theatrical performance. According to Bate, for Coleridge, an idea o f  Hamlet, a 
thing-in-itself, is independent o f its phenomenal manifestations in the particulars o f individual 
performances.
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Ill Coleridge’s idea of theatre, there is the concept of co-experience or shared 
experience. In his Lectures, he defines theatre as, “the general Term for all places of 
amusement thro’ the Eye or Ear, when people assemble in order to be entertained by 
others, all at the same time & in common."(Tec/1, 129) He further defines theatre as “a 
combination of several, or of all the Fine Arts, to an harmonious Whole, having a 
peculiar end of its own, to which the peculiar end of each (component part, taicen 
separately) is made subordinate and subservient: namely, that of imitating real Objects 
or Actions under a semblance of reality, for the gratification of assembled Spectators.” 
{Lect I, 129)
In this definition, we need to pay attention to such expressions as ‘people 
assemble’ ‘entertained all at the same and in common,’ ‘a combination of all the fine 
arts to an harmonious whole’ and ‘imitating reality’. These expressions best sum up his 
idea of theatre or the stage. This definition reminds us of A.W.Schlegel’s idea of drama 
though there is no direct link between them."  ^ Schlegel, in his Lectures, defines the 
object of drama as “to produce an impression on an assembled multitude, to rivet their 
attention, and to excite their interest and sympathy.”(C£>HT, 37) According to him, the 
tears the audience shed for persecuted innocence, or a dying hero, make friends and 
brothers of them all and the effect produced by seeing a number of others share in the 
same emotions is peculiarly powerful.
Coleridge’s idea of theatre as something to be shared and as a composite art is 
also demonstrated in his opinion of the origin of tragedy. In addition, we know that he
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was keenly interested in the spiritual impact theatrical performances have on the 
audience. In his Lectures, he explains that tragedy first appeared as the Hymn of the 
Goat, the victim offered to Bacchus. Bacchus, according to him, was one of the most 
awful and mysterious of deities. He is, in his earthly character, the conqueror and 
civilizer of India and at the same time, allegorically, the symbol of festivity. But more 
importantly he was worshipped as representative of the organic energies of the universe 
and as the cause or condition of skill and contrivance. Bacchus, aided by his traditional 
history as an earthly conqueror, was honoured as the presiding genius of the heroic 
temperament and character, which is considered something innate, divine, and 
possessing a felicity above and beyond prudence.(Leer I, 45)
R.A.Foakes has suggested the possibility that Coleridge could have found a similar 
account of the origin of tragedy in Thomas Franlclin’s A Dissertation on the Ancient 
Tragedy and Hugh Blairs’s Lectures on Rhetoric.^ Dr. Johnson, in The Rambler, also 
suggests that tragedy originated in a monody or solitary song in honour of Bacchus.^
Whatever the influence may have been, we can recognise some characteristics of 
public worship in Coleridge’s notion of tragedy. Or, in other words, tragedy is defined 
as an organisational unity which is the concrete being of something spiritual. In 
Coleridge’s opinion, in the earliest drama, actors, chorus and the audience were not 
divided. They all took part in celebrating the god. Fie points to the different voices in the 
hymn as the origin of dialogue. The narrative parts of the hymn were composed of the 
god’s action and the reaction of those who feaied or were rewarded by the god, and the
Coleridge’s definition o f theatre came before Schlegel’s Lectures on Dramatic Literature. 
See Lect I. p.44 n2
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parts were narrated sometimes in chorus, and sometimes individually. As the 
performance was proceeding, the expressions of the spectator’s excitement and curiosity 
began to be divided from the lyric or choral parts. In other words, sometimes the chorus 
expressed the excitement and curiosity of the narration from the position of spectator. 
Coleridge explains the ancient Greek stage thus:
In the front of the Orchestra, directly over against the middle of the Scene, there 
stood an elevation with steps in the shape of a larger Altar, as high as the boards of 
the Stage/ this was named the Thymele, & recalled the origin & original purpose of 
the chorus, as an altar Song in honor of the presiding Deity.— Here and on these 
steps the (persons of the) Chorus sate collectively, when they were not singing, & 
attended to the Dialogue as Spectators, and as (what in truth they were) the ideal 
representatives of the real Audience, and of the Poet in his own character assuming 
the supposed impressions made by the drama in order to direct & guide them. But 
when the Chorus itself formed part of the Dialogue, then the Leader of the Band or 
Foreman, ascended the level summit of the Thymele, in order to command the stage 
& speak with the Dramatis Personae there acting.— {Lect I, 440)
Here, we need to keep our eyes fixed on his explanation of the chorus as the ideal 
representatives of the audience. Coleridge’s ideal audience is an agent actively 
participating in the performance. Another symbolic role of the chorus is its embodying 
of the union of the poet and the audience, which pervades the performance.
Coleridge’s idea of the origin of tragedy, dialogues, and chorus is interestingly 
similar to Friedrich Nietszche’s. According to him,
Original tragedy is only chorus and not drama at all. Later an attempt was made to 
demonstrate the god as real and to bring the visionary figure, together with the 
transfiguring frame, vividly before the eyes of every spectator. This marks the
 ^ Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, No. 156. Sept.4, 1751. Selections from Dr. Johnson's ‘Ram bler’. Ed. 
with pref. & notes Hale White. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.
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beginning of drama in the strict sense of the word. It then became the task of the 
dithyrambic chorus so to excite the mood of the listeners that when the tragic hero 
appeared they would behold not the awkwardly masked man but a figure born of 
their own rapt vision.^
It is unlikely that Nietzsche could have been directly influenced by Coleridge. Rather, 
their ideas belong to the common trend of Romantic thought lasting tlnough the century. 
Nietzsche defines tragedy as the Apollonian embodiment of a Dionysiac insight and 
powers, or of something like the powerful approach of spring which penetrates with joy 
the whole frame of nature. He also compares drama to “the Apollonian dream state, in 
which the daylight world is veiled and a new world-clearer, more comprehensible, more 
affecting than the first, and at the same time more shadowy-fails upon the eye in ever- 
changing shapes.”  ^Tragedy, in his interpretation, is a transformation into defined shape 
of some energetic power pervading the universe. Coleridge’s idea of Bacchus as symbol 
of the organic energy of the universe is clearly very similar.
Nietszche’s and Coleridge’s interest in tragedy is focused on tragedy as a concrete 
shaping of something spiritual and on the impact it has on the assembled spectators. 
According to Coleridge, Christian drama reveals the same truth. In the establishment of 
Christianity, some Scriptural history was adapted to drama. Coleridge argues that after 
the darkness of the Middle Ages, drama recommenced in England in religion as it did in 
Greece, People were not able to read the Bible and the priests wanted the people to 
know Scriptural history. Therefore they presented it in scenes, which were developed 
into the Mystery plays. To have their effect on the people the mysteries must be not only
 ^Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth o f Tragedy. Reprinted in Dramatic Theory and Criticism, p. 824. 
® Ibid., p.824.
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instructive but also entertaining. And when the mysteries became so, the people began 
to enjoy taking part by acting the roles themselves. As in the Greek drama, in the 
beginnings of drama in England , the roles of the actor and the audience were not 
divided
In the mysteries, the Devil and vice were awful but, at the same time, ludierous and 
they developed into the harlequin and clown. Coleridge, disagreeing with Malone, 
insists that such scenes as the vice leaping upon the Devil’s back caught people’s 
attention and made them laugh heartily. In the mixture of high seriousness and mirth in 
the mysteiy plays, in his opinion, can be found the origin of tragi-comedy in the English 
theatre. From the period of the mysteries drama in England has adopted itself to new 
circumstance and has become, in his words, “a representation of human Events more 
lively, more near the truth, & permitting a larger field of moral instruction, a more 
ample exhibition of the recesses of the human Heart under all the trials & circumstances 
that most concern us, than was laiown or guessed at by Eschylus, Sophocles, and 
Euripides "\Lecl I, 52)
In the account of the beginnings of the Greek drama and English drama, and of 
their evolution, we can find the germ of Coleridge’s idea of theatre, the audience, and 
the purpose of drama. Interestingly, the ritualistic aspect of drama continues to engage 
modern critics. Robert J. Nelson points out that “the religious origins of drama have in 
recent years predisposed many students of the theatre to think of dramatic art in varying
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degrees of identification with ritual.”  ^ J.L.Styan suggests a similarity between the 
theatre or cinema and the church :
The congregation in a church and the audience in a cinema may both be a mixture 
of all sorts of people, but their purpose in meeting together in a church for worship and 
in a cinema for entertainment affects everything. Since in church it is important to know 
what to expect, the service takes a ritual and repeated form; in a cinema it is just as 
important not to be able to anticipate the pattern of the ceremony. In a church, the 
building is so arranged and lit that there is every inducement to participate in the 
service; in a cinema we sit in darkness and submit to the illusion of the bright screen.
This view is an echo of Coleridge’s or Schlegel’s though they do not explicitly compare 
theatre and church.
2. Elizabethan Stage versus the Contemporary Stage
It is clear from his account of the origin of theatre that Coleridge recognises 
performance before an audience as integral to drama. It is because of this that a 
dramatist needs to be something more than a poet. Shakespeare, in Coleridge’s opinion, 
learns to be a dramatist only after he has proved himself a poet.(Tec^ I, 82) This view is 
implicit in Coleridge’s comments on the Elizabethan stage. He describes the 
Elizabethan stage as ‘the infant stage’. For Coleridge, like Wordsworth, the word 
‘infant’ has a positive meaning, suggesting the powerful imagination that distinguishes 
childhood, simplicity, and comparative freedom from the rigidity of the laws regarding 
dramatic form. He often emphasises the absence of artificiality in the Elizabethan
Nelson, Robert J. Play within a Play. New York: Da Capo Press, 1971, p.3.
" Styan, J.L. The Dramatic Experience. Cambridge: Campbridge University Press, 1965, p. 15.
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theatre and the ‘nakedness’ of the stage. The Elizabethan stage, he says, ‘had nothing 
but curtains for its scenes, and the Actor as well as the author were obliged to appeal to 
the imagination & not to the senses’.(Zee/ 1, 348-9) The actor frequently addresses the 
audience directly and his implied demand is that the audience should listen to him with 
its minds, not with its eyes on the scenery.(Zee/ II, 122)
Coleridge’s preference for the infant stage is of a piece with his rejection of 
empiricism, but it was the product, too, of his disgust with the contemporary state of the 
stage. “It was natural”, he says
that Shakespeare should avail himself of all that imagination afforded. If he had 
lived in the present day & had seen one of his plays represented, he would the first 
moment have felt the shifting of the scenes—Now, there is so much to please the 
senses in the performance & so much to offend them in the play, that he would have 
constructed them no doubt on a different model—“We are grateful” said Coleridge 
“that he did not— since there can be no comparative pleasure between having a great 
man in our closet & on the stage. All may be delighted that Shakespear did not 
anticipate, & write his plays with any conception of that strong excitement of the 
senses, that inward endeavour to make everything appear reality which is deemed 
excellent as to the effort of the present day.(Zee/1, 228-229)
Since ‘the infant stage’, the English stage has seen the development of stage 
machinery and spectacular stage sets had become the major attraction for audiences. 
Commercial rivalry prompted productions to resort to other attractions than good acting 
to appeal to their audiences.^' The fashion for sentimentalism might be one reason that 
the English stage seemed undesirable to some critics such as Addison. Oliver
' ' See Dobson, Michael. “Improving on the Original.” Shakespeare: An Illustrated Stage History. Eds. 
Jonathan Bate and Russell Jackson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.45-68, pp.59-60.
Addison, Joseph. The Spectator, 40(April 16, 1711). Reprinted in Dramatic Theory and Criticism. 
P.389. Addison criticises the English stage thus; “There is also another particular, which may be reckoned 
among the blemishes, or rather the false beauties, o f our English tragedy; 1 mean those particular speeches
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Goldsmith criticised the immorality and corruption of the stage of his time and offered 
an argument similar to that of the romantics: “the reader receives more benefit by 
perusing a well written play in his closet than by seeing it acted.” He also criticised the 
revival of Shakespeare’s works as harmful to Shakespeare.^’
The Romantics share a dislike of the theatrical performance of Shakespeare’s plays. 
Hazlitt, himself a theatre reviewer, is often critical of Shakespearean actors. Hamlet, for 
example, in his opinion, is a character hardly capable of being acted, even by the best of 
contemporary actors.’"^ For Hazlitt, whether a drama is a suitable to be played or not, 
depends on whether the characterisation can be fully expressed on the stage. King Lear,
which are commonly known by the name of rants. The warm and passionate parts o f a tragedy are always 
the most taking with the audience; for which reason we often see the players pronouncing in all the 
violence o f action, several parts o f the tragedy which the author writ with greater temper, and designed 
that they should have been so acted. 1 have seen Powell very often raise himself a loud clap by this 
artifice. The poets that were acquainted with this secret, have given frequent occasion for such emotions in 
the actor, by adding vehemence to words where there was no passion, or inflaming a real passion into 
fustian. This hath filled the mouths o f our heroes with bombast; and given them such sentiments as 
proceed rather from a swelling than a greatness o f mind. Unnatural exclamations, curses, vows, 
blasphemies, a defiance o f mankind, and an outraging o f the gods, frequently pass upon the audience for 
towering thoughts, and have accordingly met with infinite applause.
Goldsmith, Oliver. ‘O f the STAGE’ in An Enquiry into Present State o f  Polite Learning in 
Eiirope{\159). Reprinted in Shakespeare: The Critical Heritage. Vol.4, p.373. He argues that “ the 
revival o f those pieces of forced humour, far-fetch’d conceit, and umiatural hyperbole which have been 
ascribed to Shakespeare, is rather gibbeting than raising a statue to his memory; it is rather a trick o f  the 
actor, who thinks it safest acting in exaggerated characters, and who by out-stepping nature chuses to 
exhibit the ridiculous outre of an harlequin under the sanction of this venerable name.”
See Hazlitt, William. Lectures on the Literature o f  the Age o f  Elizabeth, and Characters o f  
Shakespeare’s Plays. London: Bell, 1884, p.81. According to him, “Mr. Kemble unavoidably fails in this 
character from a want o f ease and variety. The character o f Hamlet is made up o f undulating lines; it has 
the yielding flexibility o f “a wave o ’th’ sea.” Mr. Kemble plays it like a man in armour, with a determined 
inveteracy o f purpose, in one undeviating straight line, which is as remote from the natural grace and 
refined susceptibility o f the character, as the sharp angles and abrupt starts which Mr. Kean introduces 
into the part. Mr. Kean’s Hamlet is as much too splenetic and rash as Mr. Kemble’s is too deliberate and 
formal. His manner is too strong and pointed. He throws a severity, approaching to virulence, into the 
common observations and answers. There is nothing o f this in Hamlet. He is, as it were, wrapped up in his 
reflections, and only thinks aloud. There should therefore be no attempt to impress what he says upon 
others by a studied exaggeration of emphasis or manner; no talking at his hearers. There should be as 
much of the gentleman and scholar as possible infused into the part, and as little o f the actor. A pensive air 
o f sadness should sit reluctantly upon his brow, but no appearance of fixed and sullen gloom. He is full o f  
weakness and melancholy, but there is no harshness in his nature. He is the most amiable o f  
misanthropes.”
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for example, aecording to him is not possible to be acted not merely because the 
machinery with which the storm is mimicked is not adequate but because ‘the greatness 
of Lear is not in the corporal dimension, but in the intellectual’^^ . Richard I I I , however, 
in his opinion, can be considered as a proper stage-play because Richard can be 
successfLilly represented on stage though the characterisation might be differently 
rendered by different actors. He compares Kean with Cooke: the former is more refined 
than the latter; more bold, varied, and original than Kemble.
Though Hazlitt points out the limits of the stage for a full presentation of 
Shakespeare’s dramas, he is not hostile to stage performance. Another contemporaiy 
critic, Charles Lamb, however, argues that Shakespeare’s dramas are almost impossible 
to be acted. Like Hazlitt, he points out that the profundity, complexity, and subtlety of 
Hamlet cannot be represented on the stage. ‘In fact’, he says,
the things aimed at in theatrical representation, are to arrest the spectator’s eye upon 
the form and gesture, and so to gain a more favourable hearing to what is spoken: it 
is not what the character is, but how he looks ; not what he says, but how he speaks 
it....Hamlet would still be a youthful accomplished prince, and must be gracefully 
personated; he might be puzzled in his mind, wavering in his conduct, seemingly- 
cruel to Ophelia, he might see a ghost, and start at it, and address it kindly when he 
found it to be his father; all this in the poorest and most homely language of the 
servilest creeper after nature that ever consulted the palate of an audience; without 
troubling Shakespeare for that matter: and I see not but there would be room for all 
the power which an actor has, to display itself.'^
In Lamb’s opinion, the actor’s performance not only does not present the original 
intention of the dramatist but sometimes distorts the character. For instance, if an actor
Ibid., p. 124, quoted from Charles Lamb’s “On the Tragedies o f Shakespeare” in The Works o f  Charles 
and Mary Lamb, V ol.l, p. 107.
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taking the role of Hamlet expresses a vulgar scorn and contempt ‘in its very grossest 
and most hateful form’ at Polonius and cruelty to Ophelia, it will degrade Hamlet’s 
gentility and genuine feeling. In acting Richard III, actors usually emphasise nothing but 
his crime, cruelty, and wickedness. But Richard in Shakespeare’s drama is a complex 
figure in whom we feel horror blended with the admiration induced by ‘his wit, his 
buoyant spirits, his vast knowledge and insight into characters’.
He remarks that the full complexity of Shakespeare’s characters is available only 
through reading. Lear, for example, is impossible to be represented on a stage. Whereas 
we can see only ‘corporal infirmities and wealmess, the impotence of rage’ on the stage, 
when we read the play, we become the king.'^ According to him, ‘upon the stage, the 
imagination is no longer the ruling faculty, but we are left to our poor unassisted 
senses’.'^ He points out.
It requires little reflection to perceive, that if those characters in Shakespeare 
which are within the precincts of nature, have yet something in them which appeals 
too exclusively to the imagination, to admit of their being made objects to the 
senses without suffering a change and a diminution,—that still stronger the 
objection must lie against representing another line of characters, which 
Shakespeare has introduced to give a wildness and a supernatural elevation to his 
scenes, as if to remove them still farther from that assimilation to common life in 
which their excellence is vulgarly supposed to consist.*^
On stage, to give the representation more reality, the emphasis is placed on 
comparatively trifling things: for example, though Mrs. Siddons’s dismissal of the
Lamb,Charles. The Works o f  Charles and Mary Lamb. Vol.l. Ed. E.V.Lucas. London: Methuen, 1903, 
p.lOl.
” lb id .,p .l07.
Ibid., p.108.
Ibid., p.108-109.
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guests ill the banquet scene in Macbeth was enthusiastically applauded, the scene is not 
very important for the overall meaning of the drama. Thus, in acting, non-essentials are 
likely to be unduly raised in importance.
In his view of the contemporary stage, Coleridge echoes Hazlitt and Lamb:
those who went to the Theatre in our own day, when any of our poet’s works were 
represented, went to see M' Kemble in Macbeth,— or M'^ Siddons' Isabel, to hear 
speeches usurped by fellows who owed their veiy elevation to dexterity in snuffing 
candles since all inferior characters, tlii'o’ w'' our poet shone no less conspicuously 
& brightly, were given them to deliver.(Zcc/1, 254)
Here, Coleridge points out the danger we are often apt to fall into; firstly, we tend to go 
to see actors not the play itself. Secondly, he opposes the adaptation or sometimes 
distortion of the plays that follows from the fashion for allowing the star actor to 
appropriate all well-known speeches even if they had been allotted by Shakespeare to 
minor characters. In Coleridge these feeling hardened into a general contempt for 
theatrical performance:
he never saw any of Shakespear’s plays perfonned, but with a degree of pain, 
disgust, and indignation. He had seen Mrs. Siddons as Lady, and Kemble as 
Macbeth—  these might be the Macbeths of the Kembles, but they were not the 
Macbeths of Shakespear; he was therefore not grieved at the enormous size and 
monopoly of the theatres, which naturally produced many bad and but few good 
actors; and which drove Shakespear from the stage, to find his proper place, in the 
heart and in the closet;... .{Lect I, 563)
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But it does not follow that Coleridge is appropriately considered a ‘closet critic’. His 
objection is not to performance, but to performance that distorts the plays.^^
Coleridge, in distinguishing the English drama from the Greek drama, emphasises 
‘the accidents of the English stage’ that appealed to the imagination and that gave rise to 
Shakespeare’s dramas. He comments that the stage was then itself as near as possible to 
a closet. In other words for the Elizabethan audience the disparity evident in Coleridge’s 
time between the experience of reading a play and seeing it performed did not yet exist.
The fact that he is not merely a ‘closet critic’ is evident from his theory of illusion, 
for his theory of illusion is surely based on his understanding of dramatic illusion.
3. Coleridge’s Idea of Illusion
The problem of illusion and reality is perennial in literature, philosophy, and 
theology. In drama, especially, the relationship between the two is a recurrent topic. 
Calderon’s Life is a Dream^‘ is a good example. Sigismundo, after having been 
confined in a tower because of a prophecy that he would revolt against the king and ruin 
the countiy suddenly finds himself the Prince of Poland. After tasting the luxury and 
pomp of life in a palace for a while, he is taken back to his cell, and when he awakens
See Jackson, J.R.de J. “Coleridge on Dramatic Illusion and Spectacle in the Performance of  
Shakespeare’s Plays.” p. 16. Jackson’s position is that Coleridge is not anti-theatrical. He argues that 
“Coleridge is preferring an imaginative reading in the closet, not to all productions on stage, but to the 
inappropriate and often ludicrous adaptations of the contemporary theater.” See also p.20, op.cit, He says 
that “It is evident that Coleridge’s complaints about the performance of Shakespeare’s plays and his 
advocacy o f the closet as a more appropriate place for them are not intended to be antitheatrical in any 
general sense. Nor do they imply the belief that Shakespeare’s plays are more suitable for reading than for 
acting.” Also see Carson, Julie.“An Active Imagination; Coleridge and the Politics o f Dramatic Reform.” 
M odem Philology 86(1988):22-33, p.23. Carlson argues that Coleridge believes in the function o f drama 
which has the power to revive the British Public’s imagination. But he finds that his contemporary theatres 
fail to live up his theoretical expectations.
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from a drugged stupor, he realises that life is but a dream: 'What is life? An illusion, / 
fiction, passing shadow,/ and the greatest good the merest dot,/ for all of life’s a dream, 
and dreams/ themselves are only part of dreaming.’(Act II, Sc.ii)
The idea that ‘life is a dream’ is implicit in the concept of theatnim mundi, which 
itself gives Shakesepare one of his favourite topics. Jaques in As you Like It is one of 
several characters to conclude that life is but a stage. Another favourite Shakeseparean 
technique, the play within a play carries similar implications.
Coleridge’s interest in illusion lies in the mental process by which illusions are 
entertained during the theatrical performance rather than in the thematic problem of 
illusion. Frederick Burwick argues that, in spite of Coleridge’s debt to Schlegel, his 
concern with illusion in Shakespeare’s works is distinctive. “Where Schlegel was 
fascinated by Shakespeare’s making illusion a part of the plot, Coleridge attempts to 
explain illusion in terms of the poetic imagination.”^^  “Illusion”, according to 
Gombrich, “is hard to describe or analyse, for though we may be intellectually aware of 
the fact that any given experience must be an illusion, we camiot, strictly speaking, 
watch ourselves having an illusion.
For Coleridge, drama is an imitating of reality under a semblance of reality. He 
explains the production of illusion thus:
Calderon de la Barca, Pedro. Life is a Dream. Tr. Edwin Honig. New York: Hill & Wang, 1970. 
Burwick, Frederick. Illusion and the Drama: Critical Theory o f  the Enlightenment and Romantic Era., 
p. 192. Also see Burwick, “Illusion and Drama.” Romantic Drama. Ed.Gerald Gillespie. Amsterdam, 
Philadelphia: J.Benjamins Pub.Co.,1994. 59-80., p.62.According to Burwick, Schlegel inisits that “By 
thematizing illusion, Shakespeare secures the audience participation in the illusion-making process.” 
Gombrich, E.H. Art and Illusion. London: Phaidon, 1977, p.5.
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a (Forest— > Scene is not presented to the Audience as a Picture (of a Forest,) but as 
a Forest; and tho’ we are not actually deceived by the one (more or less) than by the 
other, yet our feelings are differently affected in the two cases. In the former there is 
analogon of deception, a sort of temporary Faith which we encourage by our own 
Will, because we know that it is at any time in the power of our will to see it as it is, 
and no longer as that which it presents to us. Its end is to produce illusion, as far as 
the nature of the Thing permits, and the true stage Illusion both in this and in all 
other Things consists not in the mind’s judging it to be a Forest but in its remission 
of the judgment, that it is not a Forest— {Led I, 130) y
Burwick argues that the major elements of Coleridge’s theory of illusion are all implicit 
in the 1808 lectures from which the above passage is taken. In Coleridge’s view of 
illusion, two characteristics are crucial: the first point is that ‘illusion is ‘a sort of 
temporary faith’ encouraged by ‘our own will’, the second is that true stage illusion 
consists in the mind’s remission of the judgment that it is not a forest’.
As Burwick suggests^" ,^ we can perceive Coleridge’s notion of illusion through his 
annotation to Richard Payne Knight’s An Analytical Inquiry into the Principles o f  Taste. 
Knight quotes Burke’s argument that “the nearer tragedy approaches the reality, and the 
further it removes us from all idea of fiction, the more perfect is its power.” Burke 
compares theatrical and real execution, and argues that no staged death can excite the 
same strong sympathy as the real execution of a king or princess does. Coleridge retorts 
that the comparison itself is totally wrong because
See Burwick, Frederick, Illusion and Drama, pp.222-223. According to Burwick, “In reaction to 
Richard Payne Knight’s associationist account o f illusion as passive response, Coleridge argued that the 
aesthetic experience depends upon a willing and active awareness o f illusion as illusion. Knight described 
the mind reacting in sympathy with increasing emotional stimulation until the reason surrenders to the 
force o f  the passions. Coleridge argues that dramatic illusion is not a passive response, nor even a 
voluntary surrender to illusion. It involves, rather, a deliberate choice not to compare and contrast, but to 
accept the experience in the artist’s own terms; not to judge, but to witness the judgment o f the artist. 
Judgment is a balance of observation and meditation. It appeals primarily to the imagination, rather than 
merely to the senses. The spectator engages the work as “waking dreams” or “half-dream.” Through a 
“half-faith” or “temporary Faith which we encourage by our Will,” we arrive at “a negative B elie f’ in
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whatever may be our sensations when the attention is recalled to a scenic 
representation how farsoever we may then lose sight of its being a mimic show, we 
know perfectly at the time, when we are going to see it, or when assembled at the 
Theatre in expectation; that it is nothing better or worse. It is possible, that the mind 
during the representation of a tragedy may have fits of forgetfulness & deception 
and believe the fiction to be the reality, but the moment you suppose it in a 
condition to make a choice of this kind, all sense of delusion vanishes.(CMIII, 404- 
405)
From this passage, we can note that Coleridge never allowed that drama and real life 
could be directly compared. In drama, according to Coleridge, we laiow that the events 
we witness are a representation but we feel that they are reality.(CM III, 406) Coleridge 
tries to explain the apparent contradictory experience that occurs when we read drama or 
during its theatrical performance.
Coleridge often explains illusion by comparing it to a dream. Probably the best 
way to understand his idea of illusion is first to examine his idea of dreams.
3 • i Illusion and Dream
In discussing the differences between Coleridge’s idea of imagination and those of 
his English predecessors, I pointed out the autonomy of imagination as its ground. For 
Coleridge dreams are also an important clue to explain the autonomy of the mental
illusion. As Thomas McFarland has shown, Coleridge’s effort to revise Hume’s analysis o f belief into an 
argument o f faith led to his decisive formulation o f  “poetic faith” as “the willing suspension o f disbelief.” 
See Ford, Jennifer. Coleridge on Dreaming: Romanticism, Dreams and the Medical Imagination. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.33. According to her, “Coleridge often referred to his 
dreams as being like dramas, with their own characters, costumes, settings, and temporal and spatial 
conventions. The most essential quality likening dreams to drama was that both required the suspension of 
volition. From his earliest recorded thoughts on dreams, Coleridge considered the suspension o f volitional 
as one o f the fundamental qualities o f dreaming. Following from this, the illusory qualities inherent in 
watching a play are similar to the illusory qualities o f a dream. He also often perceived his dreams as 
being performed on a stage— a space within which the actions and characters o f the dream unfolded. He
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faculties. Coleridge’s view of dreams can be considered from two apparently 
contradictory dimensions: one is symbolical and the other phenomenal. The two 
dimensions for him are dialectical, not contradictory.
Dream as a conduit for vision is familiar in Western thought. Dreams in the Bible 
are usually represented as offering symbols or laiowledge of the future such as Jacob’s 
and Joseph’s dreams in Genesis. In literature, dream vision has been an important 
device for centuries. Dante’s Divine Comedy, for example, is a kind of dream vision. So 
is Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress. In both, dreams are not illusions but rather reveal 
visions of truth. The Romantics inherited these traditions. For them, dreams are 
phenomena especially useful in explaining the mystery of mental activity. ‘Dreams’, 
according to J.R. Watson,
are extraordinary examples of the private and unexpected workings of the individual 
mind; they have a mysterious and involuntary quality about them, an unpredictable 
and inconsequential mode of operation which suggests that the mind is stranger, 
freer, and more resourceful than any mechanical account would allow; and they 
operate in symbols. The symbolic operation of dreams links them with the working 
of the poetic imagination, which can allow one thing to stand for another, and can 
transform abstraction into symbol. It is not difficult to see why the Romantic poets 
were fascinated by dreams.^'’
Thus, the Romantic poets often use dreams in their poetry. Wordsworth, in Book V 
of the Prelude, describes a dream of an Arab bearing two books, one of them being 
called “Euclid’s Elements’ and the other being a shell from which he heard ‘A loud 
prophetic blast of harmony’. According to the Arab, the one holds stars and weds soul to
termed this theatrical dreaming space ‘Somnial or Morphean Space’ (C N IV 5360), and carefully recorded 
many o f its features tiu'oughout his lifetime.”
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soul ill purest bonds of reason, undisturbed by space or time; that is, the book reveals the 
everlasting truth of the principle of the universe. The other is a god or many gods with 
voices more than all winds, with power to exhilarate the spirit, and to soothe through 
every clime, the heart of human kind; namely, the book in its spiritual aspect. In the 
dream the Arab holding these two books is changed to the knight of Cervantes and 
sometimes becomes himself again, sometimes is neither the one nor the other, 
sometimes is both at once. The laiight wanders the desert to find a place to bury the two 
books and the poet himself yearns to join the knighf s enteiprise. Wordsworth’s allegoiy 
clearly has to do with the nature of truth and the possibilities of its representation, and it 
is significant that he should offer his account of these things within a dream vision.
Keats, in ‘Lamia’, gives a particular meaning to dream. When, with the help of 
the snake, Hermes is able to see the nymph he was looking for, the poet comments, ‘It 
was no dream; or say a dream it was,/ Real are the dreams of Gods, and smoothly pass/ 
Their pleasures in a long immortal dream.’(LL. 126-28) Keats here desires divine 
experience in which there is no contradiction between dream and reality. The story of 
Lycius goes on to indicate that human experience is defined by their incompatibility. 
But in ‘The Eve of St. Agnes’, the love Madeline dreams of and the flesh and blood 
lover who has appeared himself in her room are ‘melted’ together, as if in privileged 
moments of mutual passion, or, perhaps, only in poetry, human experience may itself 
become divine.
Shelley is also attracted to the form of the dream vision. Queen Mab, for example, 
is a kind of dream vision in which Queen Mab offers lanthe a dream in which the true
Watson, J.R. English Poetry o f the Romantic Period 1789-1830. London and New York; Longman,
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nature of reality is revealed to her. It is a dream from which she awakes reborn. Shelley 
suggests that lanthe’s awakening will be spiritual rather than simply physical: ‘Yes! she 
will wake again,/ Although her glowing limbs are motionless,/ And silent those sweet 
lips,/ Once breathing eloquence/ That might have soothed a tiger’s rage,/ Or thawed the 
cold heart of a conqueror./ Her dewy eyes are closed,/ And on their lids, whose texture 
fine/ Scarce hides the dark blue orbs beneath,/ The baby Sleep is pillowed:’ (I, 31-40).
Coleridge himself follows the tradition of dream vision as is evident from 
‘Kubla Khan” s subtitle, ‘A Vision in a Dream’, and from its preface in which Coleridge 
claims that the poem occurred to him in a dream. In Aids to Reflection, Coleridge 
employs dream to explain the two distinct types of mysticism.^^ There Coleridge 
understands dreams both symbolically and phenomenally; that is, dreams are shaped by 
past experiences but at the same time, they have the power to modify waking 
experience.
1985, p.56.
AR, pp.391-392. He takes the mysterious experiences of two different men in a desert : a pilgrim, by 
chance or by his genius, comes to an oasis or natural garden where he happens to see snow-white 
blossoms, through which the green and growing fruits may be seen and the ripe golden fruits glowed. The 
impressions are so deep, vivid, and faithful that they are inscribed in his memory. However, he hurries 
back to the desert, scared by the roar heard horn the desert. While huriying back, shadows and 
imperfectly seen and vivid fragments o f things distinctly seen blend with the past and present shaping o f  
his Brain. Coleridge comments thus: ‘Fancy modifies Sight. His dreams transfer their forms to real 
Objects; and these lend a substance and an outness to his Dreams.’ He illustrates the second sort o f mystic 
endowed with equal gifts o f nature. The difference from the first is that the gift is developed and displayed 
by all the aids o f education and the mystic is accompanied by well guarded merchants and fellow pilgrims 
on the established track. Instead o f the light o f a lantern, the full moon rises and chance leads him to the 
same oasis. He also experiences all kinds o f bliss in nature. The moonlight modifies the things around him 
and Coleridge offers the moonlight as a symbol o f the modifying power of the imagination;
But the Moonshine, the imaginative Poesy of Nature, spreads its soft shadowy charm over all, conceals 
distances, and magnifies heights, and modifies relations, and fill up vacuities with its own whiteness, 
counterfeiting substance; and where the dense shadows lie, makes solidity imitate Hollowness; and gives 
to all objects a tender visionary hue and softening. Interpret the Moonlight and the Shadows as the 
peculiar genius and sensibility of the Individual’s own Spirit; (AR, 393)
Coleridge did not remark whether the second mystic actually dreamed or not, but he says that ‘the 
Delightful dream, which the latter tells, is a Dream o f Truth’.
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Coleridge also tries to explain dreams scientifically, but without rejecting the notion 
that a spiritual faculty is at work in dreams. Coleridge’s interests in dreams may have 
been strengthened by Andrew Baxter’s An Enqit'uy into the Nature o f the Human Soul 
and Erasmus Darwin’s ZoonomiaP But it was also for him a personal interest. His 
notebooks often record his dreams.
Fri. Morn. 5 ° clock—Dosing, dreamt of Hartley as at his Clnistening—how as he 
was asked who redeemed him, & was to say, God the Son/ he went on, humming and 
hawing, in one hum & haw, like a boy who knows a thing & will not make the effort to 
recollect it—so as to irritate me greatly. Awakening (gradually I was able to completely 
detect, that) it was the Ticking of my Watch which lay in the Pen Place in my Desk on 
the round Table close by my Ear, & which in the diseased State of my Nerves had 
fretted  on my Ears—I caught the fact while Hartley’s Face & moving Lips were yet 
before my Eyes, & his Hum & Ha, & the ticking of the Watch were each the other, as 
often happens in the passing off of Sleep—that curious modification of Ideas by each 
other, which is the Element of Bulls. I arose instantly, & wrote it down—it is now 10 
minutes past 5.(C/VI 1620, October 1803)
In The Interpretation o f Dreams, Freud suggests that dreams might come from external 
sensory stimuli and produces some case studies to illustrate this. He quotes from lessen 
(1855) that a peal of thunder might set us in the midst of battle and, from Meier(1758), 
that ‘he was overpowered by some men who stretched him out on his back on the 
ground and drove a stake into the earth between his big toe and the next one. While he 
was imagining this in the dream he woke up and found that a straw was sticking 
between his toes.’^  ^ Freud explains such phenomena as demonstrations that we are in
See Watson, pp.57-60 and Schneider, Elizabeth. Coleridge, Opium and Kubla Khan. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1953, p.96.
29 Freud, Sigmund. The Interpretation o f  Dreams. Tr. James Strachy. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1976, p.84.
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contact with the extra-corporeal world even in sleep. Coleridge, too, is, as the passage 
quoted above suggests, particularly interested in dreams in which the internal and 
external worlds merge or blur to curious effect.
Coleridge, however, tries to search for the fact that images and thought have their 
own power by analysing this dream; that is, by examining ‘the curious modification of 
ideas by each other.’ He tries to find the clue of the principle of unity as in Bulls by 
explaining the working of the dream. His reflections on dream even illuminate for him 
the mystery of evil. He writes: “do not the bad Passions in Dreams thi'ow light & shew 
of proof upon this Hypothesis?— Explain those bad Passions: & I shall gain Light, I am 
sure—A Clue! A Clue!”(C7VI 1770 Dec. 1803).
Coleridge, in Aids to Reflection, rewrites Pilgrim’s Progress, in a manner that 
focuses attention on the superimposition of dream on reality:
Awakened by the cock-crow, (a sermon, a calamity, a sick-bed, or a 
providential escape), the Christian pilgrim sets out in the morning twilight, 
while yet the truth(the vùpoç rsXsiog 6 rqg kXsvOspiag ) is below the 
horizon. Certain necessary consequences of his past life and his present 
undertaking will be seen by the refraction of its light: more will be 
apprehended and conjectured. The phantasms that had predominated during 
the hours of darkness, are still busy. Though they no longer present 
themselves, as distinct Forms, they yet remain as formative Motions in the 
Pilgrim’s soul, unconscious of its own activity and overmastered by its own 
workmanship. Things take the signature of Thought. The shapes of the recent 
dream become a mould for the objects in the distance; and these again give an 
outwardness and a sensation of reality to the Shapings of the Dream.(zfR, 35- 
36)
Andrew Baxter suggests that the fact we are not conscious of the activity of the soul 
does not necessarily mean that it is inactive and that, in fact, “it is far from being true
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that the soul then(during dreams)^^ is only percipient, exclusive of being active; for it is 
just as active as it would be in like circumstances, when the person is awake . Bes i de s ,  
according to him, during our sleep, our volition is suspended, but “the ideas of the mind 
are by habit much more frequently connected with sensation than with volition; and 
hence the ceaseless flow of our ideas in dreams.”"’^  These arguments of Baxter probably 
had an impact on Coleridge’s notion of the autonomy of ideas and images, and of the 
activeness of our soul during sleep.
Coleridge’s thoughts on dream are clearly related to his thoughts on illusion, and 
related in turn to his notion of dramatic illusion:
It is among the feeblenesses of our Nature, that we are often to a certain 
degree acted on by stories gravely asserted, of which we yet do most 
religiously disbelieve every Syllable—  nay, which perhaps, we happen to 
know to be false. The truth is, that Images and Thoughts possess a power in 
and of themselves, independent of that act of the Judgment or Understanding 
by which we affirm or deny the existence of a reality correspondent to them. 
Such is the ordinary state of the mind in Dreams. It is not strictly accurate to 
say, that we believe our dreams to be actual while we are dreaming. We 
neither believe it or disbelieve it— with the will the comparing power is 
suspended, and without the comparing power any act of Judgment, whether 
affirmation or denial, is impossible. The Forms and Thoughts act merely by 
their own inherent power: and the strong feelings at times apparently 
connected with them are in point of fact bodily sensations, which are the 
causes or occasions of the Images, not (as when we are awake) the effects of 
them. Add to this a voluntaiy Lending of the Will to this suspension of one of 
it’s own operations (i.e. that of comparison & consequent decision concerning 
the reality of any sensuous Impression) and we have the true Theory of Stage 
Illusion—equally distant from the absurd notion of the French Critics, who 
ground their principles on the presumption of an absolute Delusion, and of Dr 
Johnson who would persuade us that our Judgments ai'e as broad awake 
during the most masterly representation of the deepest scenes of Othello, as a 
philosopher would be during the exhibition of a Magic Lanthorn with Punch
The words in the parenthesis are mine.
Baxter, Andrew. An Enquiry into the Nature o f Human Soul. Vol.2. London: Printed for A.Millar, 
1745, p.22., The words in the parenthesis are mine.
Darwin, Erasmus. Zoonomia; or the Laws o f  Organic Life. Vol.l. Dublin, 1794-1796, p.216.
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& Joan, & Pull Devil Pull Baker, &c on it’s painted Slides.—  Now as 
extremes always meet, this Dogma of our dogmatic Critic and soporific 
Irenist would lead by inevitable consequence to that very doetrine of the 
Unities maintained by the French Belle Lettrists, which it was the object of 
his strangely over-rated contradictory & most illogical Preface (to 
Shakespear) to overthrow.— {CL IV, May 13, 1816)
Here, the autonomy of images and thoughts as revealed in dreams is the crucial clue in 
the explanation of illusion, authorising a theory of dramatic illusion that allows him to 
reject each of the diametrically opposed views that he ascribes to Johnson on the one 
hand and the French critics on the other.
Coleridge, up to a point, shares this view of illusion with contemporary critics 
such as Lord Karnes and Erasmus Darwin. Kames argues from the nature of dramatic 
illusion against the unities of time and p l a c e . B u t  he emphasises the forming of 
illusion during the performance:
When a play begins, we have no difficulty to adjust our imagination to the 
scene of action, however distant it be in time or in place; because we know 
that the play is representation only. The case is very different after we are 
engaged: it is the perfection of representation to hide itself, to impose on the 
spectator, and to produce in him an impression of reality, as if he were a 
spectator of a real event; but any interruption annihilates that impression, by 
rousing him out of his waking dream, and unhappily restoring him to his 
senses.
”  Home, Henry (Lord Kames). Elements o f  Criticism. Vol. II. p.415. In his opinion, “Where the 
representation is suspended, we can with the greatest facility suppose any length o f time or any change o f  
place: the spectator, it is true, may be conscious, that the real time and place are not the same with what 
are employed in the representation: but this is a work o f reflection; and by the same reflection he may also 
be conscious, that Garrick is not King Lear, that the playhouse is not Dover cliffs, nor the noise he hears 
thunder and lightening. In a word, after an interruption o f the representation, it is no more difficult for a 
spectator to imagine a new place, or a different time, than at the commencement o f the play, to imagine 
himself at Rome, or in a period of time two thousand years back. And indeed, it is abundantly ridiculous, 
that a critic, who is willing to hold candle-light for sun-shine, and some painted canvasses for a palace or a 
prison, should be so scrupulous about admitting any latitude of place or o f time in the fable, beyond what 
is necessary in the representation.”
Ibid., p.418.
246
Darwin, in his Botanic Garden, also denies the state of continuous delusion
We must not confound our sensations at the contemplation of real misery 
with those, which we experience at the scenical representations of tragedy. 
The spectators of a shipwreck may be attracted by the dignity and novelty of 
the object; and from these may be said to receive pleasure, but not from the 
distress of the sufferers. But at the exhibition of a good tragedy, we are not 
only amused by the dignity and novelty and beauty of the objects before us; 
but, if any distressful circumstances occur too forceable for our sensibility, we 
can voluntarily exert ourselves, and recollect, that the scenery is not real: and 
thus not only the pain, which we had received from the apparent distress, is 
lessened; but a new source of pleasure is opened to us, similar to that which 
we frequently have felt on awaking from a distressful dream; we are glad that 
it is not true. We are at the same time unwilling to relinquish the pleasure, 
which we receive from the other interesting circumstances of the drama; and 
on that account quickly permit ourselves to relapse into the delusion; and 
alternately believe and disbelieve, almost every moment, the existence of the 
objects represented before us.^^
Kames and Darwin, in some important respects, anticipate Coleridge’s views on 
dramatic illusion. For example, like Coleridge, both insist on the volition and the 
consciousness of the audience so that theatrical illusion as properly described by them as 
a waking dream. But their arguments reveal certain differences from Coleridge’s.
Kames focuses on the moments when the illusion is suspended in order to argue 
his case that the obligation to preserve unity of time and place is unfounded. But during 
the performance, he suggests, the audience is likely to surrender more or less completely 
to the dramatic illusion. In other words, the audience is not likely to be conscious that it 
is watching a drama. Drama for him is a waking dream in that it offers a dream state 
while awake, therefore, it is like somnambulism, as is suggested by the thought ‘any
Darwin, Erasmus. The Botanic Garden (1791). Menston: Scolar Press, 1973, p.87.
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interruption annihilates that impression, by rousing him out of his waking dream, and 
unhappily restoring him to his senses’. In the case of Darwin, though he admits the 
volitional activity of our mind, volition comes into operation only when the illusion is 
too powerful to be enjoyed. At the time, the audience is represented as fully 
surrendering to the illusion.
For Coleridge, as for Kames and Darwin, drama prompts a waking dream but he 
defines it differently. Interestingly he places the audience in a mediate state using 
expression such as temporary half-faith, or half-waking, half-sleeping, or invoking the 
analogy of nightmare. All stage presentations, he says, produce a sort of temporary half­
faith, which the audience encourages and supports by a voluntary contribution on its 
own part.(Zcc/ I, 133-134) His own experience of watching drama and of nightmares 
enables him to elaborate on his predecessors’ theories.
He supposes that ordinary dreams and nightmares are different in that in ordinary 
dreams we do not take the dream as reality whereas in nightmare we are in a more 
complicated state. Nightmares have their origin in some corporal discomfort. At this 
time, mind, with or without our distinct consciousness, attributes the painful sensation 
to a correspondent agent, for example, an assassin stabbing at the side, or a goblin 
sitting on the breast. To that are added the impressions of the bed, curtains, and room 
received by the eyes when they open. The mind adds vividness and appropriate distance 
to the dream-image which returns when the eyes close again. And thus we unite actual 
perceptions with the phantoms of the inward sense and so confound the half-waking, 
half-sleeping reasoning power that we pass a positive judgement on the reality of what 
we see and hear though often accompanied by doubt and self-questioning.(Tccf I, 135-
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136) It is Coleridge’s focus on the middle state between the conscious and the 
unconscious, the state of half-sleeping and half-waking, that distinguishes his view from 
that of Kames or Darwin.
Aceording to Burwick, Coleridge extends his notion of stage illusion to aesthetic 
illusion.^^ In Lecture 1 of the 1818-1819 lecture series, he focuses on a comparison 
between dreaming and reading though he does not separate reading illusion from 
theatrical illusion clearly. The state we are in while dreaming and that while we are 
reading a deeply interesting novel, for Coleridge, differ not in kind but in degree: firstly, 
because all outward impressions on our senses are excluded, the images in sleep are 
more vivid; secondly, during sleep, the sensations and with these the emotion and 
passions which they counterfeit are the causes of our dream images while, in our waking 
life, our emotions are the effects of the images presented to us. Thirdly, in sleep our 
will and comparative power are suddenly suspended.
The first two points are related to the autonomous activity of our mental faculties. 
As in dreams, so in reading, the images are produced in our minds by the operation of 
our mental faculties. As to the third point, dreaming and reading are similar to each 
other in terms of the suspension of comparative power. Coleridge, however, points out 
the difference between dreams and reading or seeing plays. In an interesting play, read 
or represented, according to him, we are induced to suspend our comparing power veiy 
much as we do in dreams, but importantly, by means of the art of the poet and the actors 
and with the consent and positive aid of our own will.(Icc/ II, 265-266)
Berwick, Illusion and the Drama, p.223.
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3 • ii Imitation and Coleridge’s Theory of Illusion
Coleridge’s theory of illusion as a Temporary half-faith’ secured by the 
audience’s ‘willing suspension of disbelief depends upon his notion of the artistic work 
as an imitation/^ For Coleridge, “Drama is an imitation of reality not a Copy— '\Lect II, 
264). He emphasises that “philosophically we understand that in all imitation two 
elements must coexist, and not only coexist, but must be perceived as coexisting. These 
two constituent elements are likeness and unlikeness, or sameness and difference, and in 
all genuine creations of art there must be a union of these disparates.”(MTT, 45) He 
points out how disgusting it is if there be likeness to nature without difference. For him, 
“the more complete the delusion, the more loathsome the effect.”(M4T, 45) He links his 
theory of imitation to his notion of stage illusion:
The end of Dramatic Poetry is not to present a copy, but an imitation of real 
life. Copy is imperfect if the resemblance be not, in every circumstance, 
exact; but an imitation essentially implies some difference. The mind of the
37 See Foakes, “Shakespeare and the Use of Stage Illusion,” p. 109. According to him, under Coleridge’s 
analysis o f illusion “lies a very important distinction he made between an imitation and a copy, observing 
that our pleasure in an imitation, as in a landscape painting, comes from our consciousness o f  difference 
as well as likeness, whereas a copy strives to be identical with the original. Naive theories o f stage illusion 
start from a conFision between imitation and copy, as in the image of holding the ‘mirror up to nature’.” 
Also See J.R.de J.Jackson, “Coleridge on Dramatic Illusion and Spectacle,” p. 18. Jackson argues that 
Coleridge “is firm in his insistence that we do not watch the drama in order to witness reality, that we wish 
rather to see it represented in its essence through the medium of imitation. Also see Burwick, Illusion and 
the Drama, p.212-213. Burwick also explains Coleridge’s notion o f illusion under the context o f the 
difference between imitation and copy. He explains Coleridge’s notion thus: “...the effect o f  art can never 
be, and should never be, a confusion with reality. Our willing acceptance of the “truth” o f art never lapses 
into a belief that it is real... .Indeed, he amplifies this crucial aspect of imitation by defining various 
degrees o f illusion that result from the exposition o f difference. Domestic tragedy and opera provide the 
two extremes o f the scale. In domestic tragedy, the difference is minimal and the effects may be “too real 
to be compatible with pleasure.” In opera, the sense of reality is minimal, but the use o f music and dance 
in “explaining some tale” can “deeply affect and delight an audience.”
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spectator, or the reader, therefore, is not to be deceived into any idea of 
reality, as the French Critics absurdly suppose; neither, on the other hand, is it 
to retain a perfect consciousness of the falsehood of the presentation. There is 
a state of mind between the two, which may be properly called allusion, in 
which the comparative powers of the mind are completely suspended; as in a 
dream, the judgment is neither beguiled, nor conscious of the fraud, but 
remains passive.(Tec/11, 277)
For Coleridge, Shakespeare offered “an Imitation of human Actions in connection with 
sentiments, passions, characters, incidents and events for the purpose of pleasurable 
emotion; so that whether this be shewn by Tears of Laughter or Tears of Tenderness, 
they shall still be Tears of Delight, and united with intellectual Complacency.”(CM III, 
894)
For Coleridge theatrical representations are ideal.(Zee/ 1, 211) Here we can find a 
common point where the author and the audience is likely to meet; that is, 
communicating the ideal and receiving it. Sharing feeling seems to be Coleridge’s early 
interest. In a note, he writes, “The effort of the spectator to enter into the feelings of the 
person [? however fully/ principally] & the effort of the person principally concerning, 
to bring down the expressions of his feelings to the probable emotion of the 
Spectator.”(CAI, 155, 1796)
For Coleridge, illusion is produced ‘by the Art of the Poet and the Actors, and with 
the consent and positive Aidanee of our Will.’ If there is anything which prevents the 
mind from placing itself or from being gradually placed in the state of illusion in which 
images have negative reality, it is a defect. And consequently anything that forces itself 
on the auditors’ minds as improbable not because it is improbable but because it cannot 
but appear to be so is also a defect.(Tec/ II, 266)
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His theory of Tuiity of interest’ can be better understood from the point of view 
of the audience or the reader of a drama. When our interest is sufficiently engaged, we 
are more likely to be in a state of illusion, in which we are ready to take the narrow stage 
for ‘the vasty field of France’. The interest continues to exist when all parts of a drama 
are harmonised into a whole, which, in his own words, helps to maintain our ‘willing 
illusion’.
In reading Hamlet or Lear (also), though we are frequently sensible that the 
story is fictitious, yet in other moments we do not (less) doubt of the things 
having taken place than when we read (in History) about Pompey or Julius 
Caesar, we question the truth of the general story. Yet in Lear and Hamlet we 
have the unrealizing accompaniment of Metre. Nevertheless we believe: Our 
situation at a Theatre is undoubtedly veiy different, and the question before 
me now is to determine whether (as there can be no doubt that (we) have 
(various degrees of) continuous belief in the truth of fictitious stories in 
verse) whether by the helps which representation supplies the delusion (can) 
be carried still further, and we may we be made to believe even for a moment 
that the scene before us is not the representation of a transaction, but the 
transaction itself, is not a shadow or reflexion but a substance. In our attempt 
to answer this question let us first ask if there be anything in the 
representation of a play that will tend to strengthen or prolong the first species 
of delusion which undoubtedly exists (in reading it), viz that of the facts 
represented or feigned having actually occurred. I believe the answer will be 
no; the Playhouse, the Audience, the lights, the scenes all interfere with that 
deception and above all the (persons) gestures, and voices of the Actors 
which so immediately tell us that it is or M'  ^Such a One. These matters of 
fact, while consciously before us, are insuperable bars to the Imagination.(CAT 
III, 405-406)
This argument seems to focus on the futility of aspiring to complete delusion in 
theatrical performance especially by means of advanced stage equipment rather than 
constituting an attempt to distinguish theatrical performance from reading drama in its 
effect on the audience. ‘The scenes’ he points to are those in which a disparity between
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the event and its representation is inevitable; “the Powers of Nature, Storms &c, and the 
means employed to represent them (and in like manner, with respeet to the supernatural 
agencies.)”(Ibid, 406) However, he points out that “in the looks the gestures, and tones 
of a genuine actor, aided by the laiowledge of Nature displayed (in the words) by the 
Poet, there is no such disproportion or unfitness; and the representation I confess 
appears to me not only to approach to reality but often for a short while to be wholly 
merged or lost in it.”(Ibid., 406) In his view, the machinery on which the contemporary 
stage relied might heighten the delusion of the simple minded but will produce a 
contrary effect on refined minds.(Ibid., 406)
In Biographia, Coleridge extends his distinction between illusion and delusion to 
all fiction:
That illusion, contradistinguished from delusion, that negative faith, which 
simply permits the images presented to work by their own force, without 
either denial or affirmation of their existence by the judgment, is rendered 
imposssible by their immediate neighbourhood to words and facts of known 
and absolute truth. A faith, which transcends even historic belief, must 
absolutely put out this mere poetic Analogon of faith, as the summer sun is 
said to extinguish our household fires, when it shines full upon them. What 
would otherwise have been yielded to as pleasing fiction, is repelled as 
revolting falsehood. The effect produced in this latter case by the solemn 
belief of the reader, is in a less degree brought about in the instances, to 
which I have been objecting, by the baffled attempts of the author to make 
him believe.(BT II, 134)
Coleridge finds an example of producing illusion in The Tempest. The material of The 
Tempest is quite improbable; the magician, Prospero, his raising the tempest, Caliban, 
and Ariel, etc. However, what matters is not whether the story is probable or not, but its 
capacity to appeal to the audience’s Timer eye’. For Coleridge, illusion
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addresses itself entirely to the imaginative faculty; and although the illusion 
may be assisted by the effect on the senses of the complicated scenery and 
decorations of modern times, yet this sort of assistance is dangerous. For the 
principal and only genuine excitement ought to come from within,—  from the 
moved and sympathetic imagination; whereas, where so much is addressed to 
the more external senses of seeing and hearing, the spiritual vision is apt to 
languish, and the attraction from without will withdraw the mind from the 
proper and only legitimate interest which is intended to spring from 
within.(Tec/11, 268-9)
Coleridge here seems to echo SchlegeFs celebration of the bareness of the 
Shakespearean stage:
he (Shakespeare)^® left to the imagination to fill up the intervals agreeably to 
the speeches, and to conceive all the surrounding circumstances. This call on 
the fancy to supply the deficiencies supposes, indeed, not merely benevolent, 
but also intelligent spectators in a poetical tone of mind. That is the true 
illusion when the spectators are so completely carried away by the 
impressions of the poetry and the acting, that they overlook the secondaiy 
matters, and forget the whole of the remaining objeets around them.(CT)NT, 
453)
Like Coleridge, Schlegel insists that the illusion is completed only by the active agency 
of the imagination of an audience who are “not merely benevolent, but also intelligent 
spectators in a poetical tone of mind”.
4. The Audience
The word in the parenthesis is mine.
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For Coleridge, the audience takes a key role in the construction of a poetic work. 
What audience does he imagine? How freely can the audience understand the artistic 
work.? His consciousness of the audience is demonstrated not only in his criticism but 
also in his poetic works themselves. As his theory of illusion embraces both dramatic 
and reading illusion, so his idea of an audience extends to readers of poetic works as 
well as to spectators of theatrical performances.
First of all, Coleridge himself, as a poet, needs the audience and his 
consciousness of the audience is shown directly and indirectly in his poetic works. John 
Spencer Hill describes Coleridge’s conversational poems, for example, “as dramatic 
monologues— a generic term which stresses the dynamic interaction that exists in these 
poems between the speaker and the person, whether present or imagined as present, to 
whom the speaker is addressing himself.”^^  Coleridge’s conversational poems, however, 
are distinguished from such dramatic monologues as Browning’s or Eliot’s in that the 
speaker and the poet are not different persons. The crucial relationship is not that 
between poet and speaker, but between speaker and listener. In his conversation poems, 
he has several kinds of listener; an intimate listener, an absent listener, a potential 
listener, and a captive listener.
In “The Eolian Harp”, Sara is an intimate listener, who reacts to what he says, when 
she disapproves of his more daring metaphysical speculations. “This Lime-Tree Bower 
My Prison” addresses an absent listener, his friend Charles Lamb. In this poem, he tries 
to share with his friend his recognition that ‘nature never deserts the wise and pure’. His 
‘gentle-hearted Charles’ is the listener to whom ‘every sound of nature tells of life’.
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Though Lamb is not a present listener, the rook acts as a kind of messenger between 
them. In “Frost at Midnight”, his listener is his baby, a potential listener. He needs some 
companion in order to escape from abstruse musings. Though his baby cannot 
comprehend him, the poem is addressed, as it were, to the listener’s future self. In “The 
Nightingale” he speaks to an unidentified listener, Wordsworth or his sister or his baby, 
offering an admonition that they should not profane ‘nature’s sweet voices, always full 
of love and joyance’.
In other poems such as “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” we can see his 
awareness of an audience. In “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” the listener is the 
wedding guest, a captive audience. The mariner, from amongst other guests, chooses 
one as his listener and compels him to hear the mariner’s tale. The mariner says to the 
wedding guest, ‘I pass, like night, from land to land;/1 have strange power of speech;/ 
That moment that his face 1 see;/1 know the man that must hear me;/ To him my tale I 
teach.’
Whatever sort of listener he or she might be, we notice the poet needs an 
audience and he has this in common with the other Romantic poets. Andrew Bennet has 
spoken of the ‘romantic anxiety for a reader’, produced, he argues, by ‘the breakdown of 
the patronage system, the increase in commercial printing, and the growth of a large 
reading public’. These changes, according to him, resulted in the alienation of writers 
from their audience in the later eighteenth centuiy. The fact that the poets in the 
Romantic era could not expect the homogeneous audience which their predecessors
Hill, Johnson Spencer. A Coleridge Companion. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p.20.
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addressed prompts the Romantics to look for some special audience/^ Bennett locates in 
the romantics at once a desire to retreat into a private poetry and to reach out to an 
audience:
On the one hand the Romantics increasingly sought redemption in an ideological 
defence of solipsism, private vocabularies and mythologies, a redescription of 
audience as posterity, and an idealization of the Artist. On the other hand there is, 
articulated in Romantic poetics, an intense desire to be read and to be understood, a 
belief in the revolutionary redemptive powers of literature itself. Romantic figures 
of reading might be understood as attempts to integrate these conflicting poetic 
ideologies tlmough the use of more or less trustworthy narrators, embedded 
narration, mise en abyme, narrative parody, and a self-conscious exhibition of 
narrative anxiety: the anxiety of audience provides important generative energies for 
Romantic narrative form.'”
Garrett Stewart, on the other hand, takes interlocution in the Conversation poems 
of Wordsworth and Coleridge as “a metatrope of that natural interanimation that is often 
the poem’s topic, as if all physical presence, all natural energy, were in a dialogue for 
which a given human exchange might at any moment serve as metaphor.”'^  ^He says that 
the figure of conversation is instance and symbol, both metaphor and metonymy for the 
saturated company with other selves, especially with nature.
Bennett, Andrew. Keats, Narrative and Audience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 
pp.25-26. According to him, “the Romantics presented themselves as writing specifically for and towards 
close fien ds and family, this alienation from and aesthetico-moral confusion about the ‘reading public’ 
simply complicates the problem and increases what Coleridge calls the ‘anxiety o f authorship’(BT, vol.L, 
p.233). During the early years o f the nineteenth century, the need to ‘figure’ the reader— to determine as 
far as possible the addressee— becomes urgent. One aspect o f this attempt at redefinition involves the 
Romantics’ dissatisfaction with the ‘passive’ reader: Coleridge is most explicit on this point in Essay Two 
of The Friend and in his concept o f the ‘co-operating power’ o f poetiy. Characterizing the Romantic prose 
writer, John R. Nabholtz speaks about all types o f Romantic discourse when he says that the writer, 
‘sought to engage the reader as an active participant, often as the protagonist’.”
Ibid., p.30.
Stewart, Garrett. Dear Reader: The Conscripted Audience in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction. 
Baltimore,Md and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p.30.
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Both arguments are persuasive. However, it is also possible to explain Coleridge’s 
idea of an audience in the context of ‘the reconciliation of opposites’. Roughly
speaking, for Coleridge, a poet is one who has more than common sensibility, more than 
ordinary activity of mind, and a more vivid recognition of the truths of nature and the 
human heart. In Coleridge’s view, author, reader, and work are all three constitutive 
elements in the production of a work of art. Thus, he needs a creative audience or reader 
in order to produce creative work .
His idea of an audience is well demonstrated in the Dedication to the second 
edition of The Friend. The dedicatee is Mr. Gilman but the person he addresses as his 
friend is also his ideal reader.
Friend! were an Author privileged to name his own judge—in addition to moral and 
intellectual competence I should look round for some man, whose knowledge and 
opinions had for the greater part been acquired experimentally: and the practical 
habits of whose life had put him on his guard with respect to all speculative 
reasoning, without rendering him insensible to the desirableness of principles more 
secure than the shifting rules and theories generalised from observations merely 
empirical, or unconscious in how many departments of knowledge, and with how 
large a portion even of professional men, such principles are still desideratum. I 
would select, too, one who felt kindly, nay, even partially, toward me; but one 
whose partiality had its strongest foundations in hope, and more prospective than 
retrospective would make him quick-sighted in the detection, and unreserved in the 
exposure, of the deficiencies and defects of each present work, in the anticipation of 
a more developed future.(A I, 4)
His ideal audience, as shown in the above passage, is expected to have some special 
ability to direct as well as to understand him. Books, according to him, have descended 
from the status of religious oracles to that of venerable preceptors, and then to the rank 
of instructive friends, and then even lower to that of entertaining companions, and now
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they are degraded into culprits to hold up their hands at the bar of every self-elected, yet 
nonetheless peremptory, judge. He describes the judge as ‘self-elected’ because he does 
not have any title to authority and gives verdicts arbitrarily.
Coleridge points out that the same gradual retrograde movement has occurred in the 
relation which the authors themselves have assumed towards their readers. From the 
lofty address to readers, there was a gradual sinldng evident in terms of address such as 
“learned readers”, “candid readers” to the situation in which “the amateurs of literature 
collectively were erected into a municipality of judges, and addressed as THE TOWN! 
And now finally, all men being supposed able to read, and all readers able to judge, the 
multitudinous PUBLIC, shaped into personal unity by the magic abstraction, sits nominal 
despot on the throne of criticism”.(RT I, 59)
He is especially unhappy with the reading public of his own times:
as to the Devotees of the Circulating Libraries, I may not compliment their Pastime, 
or rather Kill-lime, with the name of Reading. Call it rather a sort of beggarly Day­
dreaming, in which the mind furnishes for itself only laziness and a little mawkish 
sensibility, while the whole Stuff and Furniture of the Doze is supplied ah extra by a 
sort of spiritual Camera Obscura, which {pro tempore) fixes, reflects & transmits 
the moving phantasms of one man’s Delirium so as to people the barrenness of a 
hundred other trains under the same morbid Trance, or ''suspended Animation”, of 
Common Sense, and all definite Purpose. We therefore altogether disjoin (from) the 
genus "Reading” this species of mental Pre-occupation, or rather Preventive 
Substitutes of occupation, and place it in the class, which has for its common 
distinctive character the charm of reconciling the two contraiy yet co-existent 
propensities of men, the Indulgence of Sloth with the Hatred of vacancy: and which 
Class, besides Novels, containing in it, Gambling, Swinging or Swaying on a Chair, 
Spitting over a Bridge, Smoking, quarrels after dinner between Husband & Wife, 
when téte ù téte, the reading word by word all the advertis[em]ents of a Daily 
Advertiser in a Public House on a rainy Day,,. . .{Lect I, 124)
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His unhappiness with the reading public is not simply an expression of elitism. Rather, 
it is another way of expressing his desire for a creative audience. He classifies readers 
into four kinds;
1. Sponges: persons who absorbed what they read and returned it nearly 
in the same state only a little dirted.
2. Sand-glasses who permitted everything to pass away and were 
contented to dose away their time in actual idleness—-
3. Strain-bags, who retained only the dregs of what they received—
4. Great Mogul Diamonds who were equally rare and valuable.(Tcc/ I,
203-4)
The classification is not class-based, but determined by the mental activity of readers. 
The first class of reader is passive: he or she receives everything without his(her) own 
mental activity. The second class of reader is the one who reads to kill time. The third 
class of reader is perhaps the worst kind of reader. For Coleridge, reading is a job which 
requires thinlcing, reasoning, and imagination. The ideal audience that he will call his 
‘friend’ is equipped with a powerful imagination. As the comparison to a diamond 
suggests, he is ‘rare and valuable’.
These ideas are also reflected in his idea of the audience of Shakespeare’s work. 
Though the audience of the Elizabethan age was not completely homogeneous, the 
author could anticipate what kind of audience he would have. Shakespeare, he says,
lived in an age in which from the religious controversies carried on in a way of 
which we have no conception. There was a general energy of thinking, a pleasure in 
hard thinking & an expectation of it from those who came forward to solicit public 
praise of which, in this day, we are equally ignorant. Consequently the judges were 
real amateurs. The author had to deal with a learned public, & he had no idea of a 
mixed public— it was divided, in truth, between those who had no taste at all & who 
went merely to amuse themselves— and those who were deeply versed in the 
literature to which they gave encouragement.(Tcc/1, 228)
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The two kinds of audience were both satisfied. The one enjoyed nothing but ‘the jokes 
and what was externally ludicrous’ and, for the other, the performance was ‘a profitable 
employmenf. Coleridge’s favourite audience, needless to say, is the latter, judging from 
his emphasis on Shakespeare’s appeal to the imagination. ‘Shakespeare’, in his opinion,
never gives a description of rustic scenery merely for its own sake, or to show how 
well he can paint natural objects: he is never tedious or elaborate, but he now and 
then displays marvellous accuracy and minuteness of knowledge, he usually touches 
upon the larger features and broader characteristics, leaving the fillings up to the 
imagination.(Tcc/ II, 245-6)
Schlegel’s ‘poetical spectators’ can be understood similiarly. He takes a scene in 
Richard III as his example:
We see Richard and Richmond in the night before the battle sleeping in their tents; 
the spirits of the murdered victims of the tyrant ascend in succession, and pour out 
their curses against him, and their blessings on his adversary. These apparitions are 
properly but the dreams of the two generals represented visibly. It is no doubt 
contrary to probability that their tents should only be separated by such small space; 
but Shakespeare could reckon on poetical spectators, who were ready to take the 
breadth of the stage for the distance between two hostile camps, if for such 
indulgence they were to be recompensed by beauties of so sublime a nature as this 
series of spectres and Richard’s awaking soliloquy.(CDNT, 438)
Here, the poetical spectators are equivalent to Coleridge’s ideal audience. A handful of 
warriors in mock armour can be taken as crowds of soldiers fighting at Agincourt for 
what Schlegel calls ‘the willing imagination of the spectators’.
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5. Author-Audience-Work
Do the audience use their imagination arbitrarily? E.S.Shaffer tries to link 
Coleridge and Schleiermacher in the establishment of hermeneutics. Schaffer argues that 
Coleridge was influenced by Schleiermacher and applied Schleiermacher’s 
hermeneutics in writing his Biographia Literaria, and especially in his reading of 
Shakespeare and Wordsworth. According to her,
Within the Biographia Literaria the climax is attained not with the definitions of 
Fancy and Imagination, but with their exemplary ‘proof in the depiction of 
Shakespeare as the model of the creative consciousness. Both the argument for 
aesthetic idealism, and its demand for ‘proof embodied in a work of art, were based 
on Schelling’s response to Kant especially as set forth in Das System des 
transcendentalen Idealismiis; Coleridge was able to fulfill that demand. 
Shakespeare was both an established writer and a provocative contemporary, whose 
status and significance as a ‘universal genius’ was created by Romantic criticism, 
not least Coleridge’s own.'*^
As we have seen, Coleridge requires his audience as his creative co-operator who 
can understand and sympathise with him. Robert DeMaria, Jr. distinguishes Jolinson’s, 
Dry den’s , and Coleridge’s notions of readership. For Dryden, the ideal reader is a 
representative of manlcind but, in a less general sense, he belongs to the intellectual 
upper class, “the judicious reader”. Johnson’s ideal reader is the perfect representative 
of all mankind, though an ordinary man. The reader is common in the same sense as the 
heroes in Everyman and The Pilgrim’s Progress are. He is abstract, timeless and 
judgmental. DeMaria argues that Coleridge sees himself as an ideal reader, especially of
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Shakespeare. Unlike Jolmson, he represents a personal and particular and he is involved 
in what he receives.T im othy J. Corrigan also points out Coleridge’s emphasis on the 
active participation of the reader in the forming of meaning. Corrigan writes, “Certainly 
a penetrating and incisive reader, Coleridge is likewise an expansive reader. For him, 
the margins— of the text and of the mind— are always wide.”'^  ^ As DeMaria and 
Corrigan insist, Coleridge himself may be the symbol of his ideal reader.
In Coleridge’s view, the audience’s or reader’s imagination must be employed to 
understand and sympathise with the author. Here, primary imagination and secondary 
imagination might be applicable to the audience’s reception of a work. Especially, in 
some particular audience such as Coleridge himself, the secondaiy imagination must 
operate. This notion is demonstrated in his comparison of the audience to a guest invited 
by the host, the author. His desirable and undesirable reader are compared to guests at a 
banquet:
A reader should sit down to a book, especially of the miscellaneous kind, as a 
well-behaved visitor does to a banquet. The master of the feast exerts himself to 
satisfy all his guests; but if after all his care and pains there should still be 
something or other put on the table that does not suit this or that person’s taste, they 
politely pass it over without noticing the circumstance, and commend other dishes, 
that they may not distress their kind host, or thi'ow any damp on his spirits. For who 
could tolerate a guest that accepted an invitation to your table with no other purpose 
but that of finding fault with every thing put before him, neither eating himself, nor 
suffering others to eat in comfort. And yet you may fall in with a still worse set than 
even these, with churls that in all companies and without stop or stay, will condemn 
and pull to pieces a work which they have never read. But this sinks below the 
baseness of an informer, yea, though he were a false witness to boot! The man, who
Shaffer, E.S. “The Hermeneutic Community: Coleridge and Schleiermacher.” The Coleridge 
Connection: Essays fo r  Thomas McFarland, Richard G ravi 1 and Molly Lefebure (eds.) London: 
Macmillan, 1990. 200-229, p.207.
De Maria, Robert Jr. “The Ideal Reader: A Critical Fiction.” PMLA 93(1978): 464-74, pp.464-468.
Corrigan, Timothy J. “Coleridge and the Reader: Language in a combustible Mind.” Philological 
Quarterly 59(1980):76-94, p.91.
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abuses a thing of which he is utterly ignorant, unites the infamy of both—and in 
addition to this, makes himself the pander and sycophant of his own and other 
men’s envy and malignity.(FI, 15-16’^ '*^  )
The claim here is that the reader or audience has an obligation of politeness, DeMaria 
argues that Coleridge’s ideal reader surrenders his right to evaluate when he is 
performing a sort of co-operation with the author.'^  ^ But this does not mean the reader is 
merely the author’s captive. His dislike of mere captivatedness is evident in chapter 
tlu’ee of Biographia Literaria. There, we can see that his ideas of the poet, the poetic 
work, and the audience are closely related to one another.
For Coleridge, the audience’s creative understanding of the author seems to mean 
to perceive natura naturans in the poetic work. His notion of the different kinds of 
auditor supports thus:
The man of no talent is swallowed up in surprise: and when the speech is ended, he 
remembers his feelings, but nothing distinct of that which produced them—(how 
opposite an effect to that of nature and genius, from whose works the idea still 
remains, when the feeling is passed away—remains to comiect itself with other 
feelings, and combines with new impressions!) The mere man of talent hears him 
with admiration—the mere man of genius with contempt—the philosopher neither 
admires nor contemns, but listens to him with a deep and solemn interest, tracing in 
the effects of his eloquence the power of words and phiases, and that peculiar 
constitution of human affairs in their present state, which so eminently favours this 
pow er.(£O n, 224-225)“'*
Such a view is related to his idea that “the consciousness of the Poet’s mind must be 
diffused over that of the Reader or spectator—but he himself, according to his Genius,
Coleridge notes that this passage is a translation of his Motto.
De Marla, “The Ideal Reader: A Critical fiction,”p.468.
Here, the speaker is Mr. Pitt, the Prime Minister o f that time. Coleridge writes that Pitt suffers from lack 
of imagination and that “Not a sentence o f Mr. Pitf s has ever been quoted, or formed the favourite phrase
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elevates us, & by being ahvays in keeping prevents us from perceiving any strangeness, 
tho’ we feel great exaltation.”(Tcc/ 1, 86-87) As the human mind works consciously in 
writing, so it does in reading. Tn reading a poemk according to him,
we look not only for a just description of material objects, or human affections, but 
we expect to find them represented in such constant activity of mind, arising from 
the poet himself, as shall give a greater pleasure to that which is already pleasurable 
& shall bring within the bounds of pleasure that which otherwise would be 
painful.(Tec/1, 222)
Coleridge himself makes an ideal audience of Shakespeare’s work. In his criticism 
of Shakespeare he consistently occupies the position of the audience. The ghost scene of 
Hamlet is an example. First, he illustrates the state of mind in which people see ghosts 
or visions by illustrating several cases. The ghost seers commonly were in a state of cold 
and chilly damp from without and of anxiety inwardly. Such is the state of Francesco. In 
the scene, Coleridge pays attention to the effect that a cliché such as ‘Not a Mouse 
s t i r r i n g h a s  on the audience thus:
...it has likewise its dramatic use and purpose/ for its commonness in ordinary 
conversation tends to produce the sense of reality, and at once hides the Poet and 
yet approximates the Reader or Spectator to that state in which the highest poetry 
will appear, and in its component parts tho’ not in whole composition really is, the 
language of Nature. If 1 should not speak it, 1 feel that I should be thinking it—the 
voice only is the Poet’s, the words are my own— . — That Shakespear meant to put 
an effect in the Actor’s power in the very first words— Who’s there—is evident from 
the impatience expressed in the words that follow—
Nay, answer me: stand and unfold yourself. A brave man is never so 
peremptory, as when he fears that he is afraid. The gradual transition from the 
silence—and the recent habit of listening in Francesco’s—1 think, I hear them—and
of the day”. The above notion o f different kinds of auditors seems not to be confined to the reaction of  
Pitt’s speech but to be extended to general reaction to auditors.
Hamlet I,i,7.
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the more chearful call out, which a good actor would observe, in the stand, ho! Who 
is there— {Lect II, 138-9)
From the ghost scene, according to Coleridge. “The audience are now relieved by a 
change of scene to the royal court, in order that Hamlet may not have to take up the 
leavings of exhaustion.”(TT II, 214)
Coleridge explains Shakespeare’s dramaturgy as functioning to generate the 
necessary dramatic illusion. The first scene of The Tempest does not demand anything 
from the audience. It serves merely as an introduction for what is to follow. In the 
second scene, Prospero’s speech is intended to excite the audience’s interest; it is a 
retrospective speech which informs the audience what has happened in the past. 
Coleridge’s attending to the process by which the audience acquires its ‘poetic faith’ is 
congruent with his admiration of Shakespeare’s judgement for unfolding of plot.
Coleridge’s overall description of Romeo and Juliet is another example of his sense 
of the author’s feeling for his audience;
With his accustomed judgment, Shakespeare has begun by placing before us a lively 
picture of all the impulses of the play; and, as nature ever presents two sides, one for 
Heraclitus, and one for Democritus, he has, by way of prelude, shown the laughable 
absurdity of the evil by the contagion of it reaching the servants, who have so little 
to do with it, but who are under the necessity of letting the superfluity of sensoreal 
power fly off tlrrough the escape-valve of wit-combats, and of quarrelling with 
weapons of sharper edge, all in humble imitation of their masters. Yet there is a sort 
of unhired fidelity, an ourishness about all this that makes it rest pleasant on one’s 
feelings. All the first scene, down to the conclusion of the Prince’s speech, is a 
motley dance of all ranks and ages to one tune, as if the horn of Huon had been 
playing behind the sœwQsfLR 11, 151).
In Richard II, Coleridge shows how the author-audience relationship is formed. 
Shakespeare represents our moral nature through “the absolute universality of his
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genius”(TF 11,175). The audience, in turn, reacts to Shakespeare’s intention: 
“...Shakespeare has carefully shown in himfRichard)^"^ an intense love of his country, 
well-knowing how that feeling would, in a pure historic drama, redeem him in the hearts 
of the audience.”(TR II, 175) In Henry V, Act.iv,sc.5, Coleridge also measures 
Shakespeare’s intention and its effect on the audience;
Ludicrous as these introductory scraps of French appear, so instantly followed 
by good, nervous mother-English, yet they are judicious, and produce the 
impression which Shakespeare intended,— a sudden feeling struck at once on the 
ears, as well as the eyes, of the audience, that ‘here come the French, the baffled 
French braggards!—And this will appear still more judicious, when we reflect on 
the scanty apparatus of distinguishing dresses in Shakespeare’s trying-room.(TF 11, 
184)
In King Lear, Shakespeare’s judgement and Coleridge’s imagination meet thus:
...—from Lear, the persona patiens of his drama, Shakespeare passes without delay 
to the second in importance, the chief agent and prime mover, and introduces 
Edmund to our acquaintance, preparing us with the same felicity of judgment, and 
in the same easy and natural way, for his character in the seemingly casual 
communication of its origin and occasion. From the first drawing up of the curtain 
Edmund has stood before us in the united strength and beauty of earliest manhood. 
Our eyes have been questioning him.(TR 11, 189)
Whether Coleridge’s appreciation of Shakespeare’s works is truly congruent with 
the author’s intention or not might be arguable. But, in appreciation of Shakespeare’s 
work, he seems to stick to his principle; that is, there is an essential universality in 
Shakespeare’s works and that this must be understood creatively as well as in accord 
with the author’s intention.
The word in parenthesis is mine.
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In this chapter, I have focused on the problem of whether or not Coleridge can 
appropriately be described as a ‘closet critic. In the Romantic era, the privileging of 
mental activity over sensory perception led in some cases to a general hostility to 
theatrical representation. Some critics have represented Coleridge as an exemplification 
of this tendency.
But I have attempted to show that he was not fundamentally antipathetic to theatrical 
representation. Shakespeare, as Coleridge knew, wrote his plays to be performed. In 
Shakespeare’s theatre, performance insisted that the audience use their imagination, so 
that they co-operated actively in the creation of the play. The elaborate stage sets, scene- 
shifting, and the concentration on star actors rather than dramatic characters that 
characterised the theatre of his own day all seemed to him to render the audience 
passive, with the consequence that the best possible way to appreciate Shakespeare in 
Coleridge’s own time, he thinks, is to read him in a closet, not to see him in the theatre.
But Coleridge’s account of the origin of the theatre proves the importance he 
attached to performance. In his explanation of the origin of the Greek tragedy, and of the 
beginnings of the English drama, he insists on the links between theatre and religious 
ritual; that is, the audience in the theatre shares a spiritual experience. Though 
Shakespeare’s dramas are much more complex than the Greek drama or indeed a church 
service, Coleridge required that theatrical performance retains a link with its ritual 
origins.
He often applies his theory of illusion not only to theatrical illusion but to illusion 
as an aspect of the reading experience. In doing so, he explains it by comparing it to 
dreams. At first sight, his comparison might appear to be simple, but it is more complex
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than it might seem. The concepts of illusion, theatre, and dreams are traditionally linked 
with each other. Before I discussed Coleridge’s comparison of theatrical illusion to 
dreams, I tried to look at other views of the relationship; for example, the view that Tife 
is a dream’ might emphasise the fact that life is after all evanescent or futile. Or it may 
mean that what we believe to be reality is in fact illusion. The link between theatre and 
dreams, as Ortega y Gassett suggests, could be found in the human aspiration to become 
other, or to overcome one’s confinement.
In creating theatrical illusion or illusion in reading, another important thing to be 
considered is how much the subjectivity of the audience operates. For Coleridge, the 
creative reception of an artistic work does not necessarily presuppose an absolute 
identification of the audience with the author. Rather it is better to say it amounts to a 
creative interpretation of the work. But the important presupposition is that there is a 
universality that unites author and audience. This view is echoed by an idea in 
“audience-oriented criticism”. Susan R. Suleiman, in her introduction to The Reader in 
the Text, points out that a common theory shared by rhetorical, semiotic, and structural 
approaches is that The author and the reader of a text are related to each other as the 
sender and the receiver of a message.’ '^ Naomi Schor takes interpretation of a fiction to 
be synonymous with imagination. She says that it is a “creative” rather than critical 
activity: the reader or spectator is not content merely to encode and decode, rather she or 
he delights in filling in the gaps, piecing together the fragments, adding something of his
Suleiman, Susan. “Introduction: Varieties of Audience-Oriented Criticism.” The Reader in the Text. 
Eds. Susan Suleiman & Inge Grosman. Princeton Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp.7-8.
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or her own to the texts in hand." Wolfgang Iser suggests that creation and interpretation 
are inseparable:
Although creation defies cognition, it nevertheless is conditioned by the context 
to be decomposed, which links it to the form of interpretation it is meant to disrupt. 
Inteipretation, in turn, though basically a cognitive operation, has to bridge a gulf 
between cognition and the incommensurable, which requires an imaginative leap, 
creative in nature. There is a cognitive conditioning operative in the creative act as 
well as an imaginary force in interpretation, though each of these qualities is 
differently proportioned according to the purpose it is meant to fulfil.^^
As Shaffer notes, Coleridge allows in his Shakespearean criticism for just such a leap of 
the imagination, a leap that was, in Shakespeare’s own time, taken by the audience of 
his plays in the theatre, but which in Coleridge’s day is more easily accomplished by the 
reader alone in his study.
Schor, Naomi, “Fiction as Interpretation.” The Reader in the Text. 165-82, p. 171.
Iser, Wolfgang. “The Interplay between Creation and Interpretation.” New Literary History 
.15(1984): 387-395, p.395.
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Conclusion
This thesis has dealt with Coleridge’s representation of Shakespeare as an artist, 
his artistic works and the audience’s reception of them. Before embarking on 
Coleridge’s criticism of Shakespeare, 1 traced the traditions of criticism with which he 
worked. This task was a preparatory study designed to indicate Coleridge’s originality 
and, to characterise his criticism as a transformed accumulation of the past. In doing so, 
my aim was to reveal that Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism is neither a repetition of 
his predecessors nor simply an English translation of German criticism. I found in 
Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism a fulfilment of the ideal described by Northi’op 
Frye: “Criticism, rather, is to art what history is to action and philosophy to wisdom: a 
verbal imitation of a human productive power which in itself does not speak.”*
One of the crucial words in Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism is ‘nature’. Like 
other aesthetic terms, ‘nature’ must be understood historically. I tried to see what is 
distinctive in the Coleridgean notion of nature not only because I thought it is a central 
idea underpinning the overall argument but a key term which differentiates him from his 
predecessors who also frequently used the epithet ‘natural’ in describing Shakespeare.
Walter Pater, in his Essays on Literature and Art, offers his appreciation of 
Coleridge’s notion of the essence of criticism, his refinement of a philosophy of nature 
into a theory of art, and his subtle co-ordination between the ideas of the mind and the 
laws of the natural world. According to Pater, Schelling’s Philosophy of Nature, which 
had an important impact on Coleridge, is a constant tradition in the history of thought.
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Pater notes that it embodies a permanent type of the speculative temper, which can be 
traced from the Greeks. This speculative temper, united with an inwardness of 
temperament, as in Jakob Boehme and in Coleridge, gives the old Greek conception of 
nature as a reflex of the intelligence of man a new impetus. Pater finds a clue to the 
Greek mind in Coleridge in anecdotes of his schooldays:
At fifteen he is discoursing on Plotinus, and has tanslated the hymns of Synesius. So 
in later years he reflects from Schelling the flitting tradition. He conceives a subtle 
co-ordination between the ideas of the mind and the laws of natural world. Science 
is to be attained not by observation, analysis, generalization, but by the evolution or 
recovery of those ideas from within by a sort of àvâ^ivrjcnç, eveiy group of 
observed facts remaining an enigma until the appropriate idea is struck upon them 
from the mind of Newton or Cuvier, the genius in whom sympathy with the 
universal reason is entire.^
Pater also clarifies the relationship between the mind and nature in Coleridge
thus:
Gradually the mind concentrates itself, frees itself from the limits of the paidcular, 
the individual, attains a strange power of modifying and centralizing what it 
receives from without according to an inward ideal. At last, in imaginative genius, 
ideas become effective; the intelligence of nature, with all its elements connected 
and justified, is clearly reflected; and the interpretation of its latent purposes is fixed 
in works of art.^
Pater, however, points out the limits of Coleridge’s artistic theory when he suggests 
that he tries to derive everything from ‘a power within, to which he gives a fanciful 
Greek name’. He finds Coleridge’s explanation of organic unity, or the unity of interest
* Frye, Northrop. Anatomy o f  Criticism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 12.
 ^Pater, Walter. Essays on Literature and Art. Ed. Jennifer Uglow. Dent, London, Rowman and Littlefield,
Totowa, N.J.: J.M.Dent& Sons Ltd., 1973, p. 14. 
 ^ Ibid., p .15.
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obscure and unconcrete. He also finds Coleridge’s description of Shakespeai'e as 
‘Nature Humanized’ the product simply of the obscure German metaphysics that he had 
studied. He takes the Coleridgean notion of imagination to be an extended and more 
complicated associative power. He writes that the “associative conceptions of the 
imagination, those unforseen type of passion, would come not so much of the artifice 
and invention of the understanding as from self surrender to the suggestions of nature”."^ 
Pater criticises Coleridge in that he “has not only overstrained the elasticity of his 
hypothesis, but has also obscured the true interest of art.”  ^ “Coleridge’s criticism,” 
Pater writes.
may well be remembered as part of the long pleading of German culture for the 
things ‘behind the veil’. It recals us from the work of art to the mind of the artist; 
and after all, this is what is infinitely precious, and the work of art only as the index 
of it. Still, that is only the narrower side of a complete criticism.^
For Pater, ‘natural susceptibility to moments of strange excitement’ and ‘the talent 
of projection, of throwing these happy moments into an external concrete form’ are 
what constitute an artistic gift. These two aims, according to him, form the concrete side 
of criticism and Coleridge neglected this. He insists that Coleridge sees in a picture only 
the rules of perspective. He points to an excessive inwardness in Coleridge. “That 
exaggerated inwardness,” he argues,
is barren. Here, too, Coleridge’s thoughts require to be thawed, to be set in motion. 
He is admirable in the detection, the analysis and statement, of a few of the highest 
general laws of art-production. But he withdraws us too far from what we can see, 
hear, and feel. Doubtless, the idea, the intellectual element, is the spirit and life of
ibid., p .l6 .
 ^ Ibid., p. 16.
" Ibid., p. 17.
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art. Still, art is the triumph of the senses and the emotions; and the senses and the 
emotions must not be cheated of their triumph after all. That strange and beautiful 
psychology which he employs, with its evanescent delicacies, has not sufficient 
corporeity.^
Does Pater evaluate Coleridge rightly? Is his aesthetic theory too lacking in 
concreteness? Mary Anne Perkins answers that "He is not, we have seen, one who 
ignores facts in favour of ‘Fictions and generalities’.”  ^ Though his notion of nature can 
be traced from ancient Greek thought and was influenced by the German 
naturphilosophen, he develops his own unique system distinguished from theirs. 
Coleridge, in his system, tries to explain the formation and operation of the universe 
based on the polarity of the constituent powers of nature.
Pater is right to see that Coleiridge’s artistic principles are closely related to his 
concept of nature. His definition of art, artistic form as an organic unity, his principle of 
reconciliation of opposites, and imagination all can be understood in the context of his 
notion of nature. But Coleridge’s concept of art is not an insubstantial rhetoric. As he 
argues in “Poesy or Art,” an artistic work is produced when man perceives the power of 
natiu'e and expresses it in a concrete form whether in the form of a poem, or a painting, 
or a piece of music. His theory of imagination is not a more complex theoiy of 
association nor does it recommend simply a surrender to the power of nature. It is an 
active agent similar to divine creativity. The secondary imagination is peculiar to artistic 
creation which is accompanied by an exercise of the artist’s conscious will.
Carefully considering these artistic principles, it is not correct to say that 
Coleridge’s criticism by its excessive inwardness fails in concreteness. Moreover,
’ Ibid., p .l8.
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nothing is further from the truth than to say that his Shakespearean criticism is driven to 
vagueness by a misty metaphysical concept of nature. As Coleridge, in Biographia 
Literaria, defines poetry by his definition of the poet, his understanding of Shakespeare 
lies behind his analysis of Shakespeare’s works. What is particular in Coleridge’s notion 
of Shakespeare is that Coleridge strenuously emphasises not merely Shakespeare’s 
intuitive power but his conscious realisation of it in a concrete form. When Coleridge 
describes Shakespeare as “Nature Humanized”, he doubly focuses on Shakespeare’s 
conforming with the spirit of nature and at the same time on his possession of a 
consciousness which does not exist in nature. When Coleridge defines Shakespeare as a 
genius, genius means, first of all, the power to master the inner law or inner principle of 
nature. Secondly, he means the conscious activity of the faculties of the mind in 
producing creative works. As we see through his demonstration of several qualities of 
genius in Shakespeare’s early poetry, his main concern is not only with the idea or 
general rule behind an artistic work but with how a central idea is harmoniously 
embodied in a concrete image or a series of images. Obviously colour, tone, feelings 
matter to Coleridge insofar as they are congruent with the central idea. His intense 
interest in the process of artistic production leads him to conclude that judgment is not a 
separate faculty from genius but rather that the latter appears in the former.
For Coleridge, Shakespeare employs method both poetically and psychologically. 
Here, method is the way of nature. But in doing so, the active mental faculties need to 
come into operation. The organic form and unity of feeling or unity of interest which 
Coleridge finds in Shakespeare’s works are not the products of Coleridge’s obscuration
® Perkins, Mary Anne. “Coleridge and the Other Plato.” European Romantic Review 8(1997): 25-40, p.30.
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of the true interest of art. He carefully pays attention to how methodically Shakespeare’s 
plays are formed and how organically parts are united into a whole. I have already 
discussed Coleridge’s opinion of form, characterisation, language, metre in 
Shakespeare’s works. In discussing form, Coleridge tries to show how exquisitely 
Shakespeare plants a germ in the beginning scenes for the future development of the 
play. Characterisation itself is closely related to the whole. In studying the psychology of 
the characters, Coleridge does not confine his focus to some disposition or humour of 
the characters such as jealousy in Othello or ambition in Macbeth but tries to see how 
character is related to the unfolding of the form. For Coleridge, language itself is a 
concrete form. Language in Shakespeare’s plays, according to him, is a crucial medium 
through which a central idea is condensed sometimes through the character’s speech and 
sometimes through powerful images.
The two artistic gifts which Pater mentioned, namely, a natural susceptibility to 
moments of strange excitement’ and ‘the talent of projection’ are as a matter of fact 
integral to Coleridge’s concept of imagination. ‘A natural susceptibility to moments of 
strange excitement’ is apparent at those moments when the primary imagination 
operates more powerfully than at ordinary times and ‘the talent of projection’ is 
expressed in artistic creativity through the secondary imagination.
It is true that Coleridge’s principal interest is in locating idea behind an artistic 
representation. However, as his principle of the reconciliation of opposites 
demonstrates, he never neglects the senses and the emotions. For him, the ideal 
metaphysician needs supreme sensibility and powerful emotions. The importance he 
attributes to the senses and emotions is above all displayed in the vivid and concrete
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images of his own poems but also in his analysis of the imagery of Shakespeare’s 
poems and plays. His psychology is far from being evanescent. Rather, as we see in his 
analysis of Lady Macbeth or Othello, his psychology is based on his subtle and 
substantial insight into human psychology.
His theory of illusion or of audience reception is also based on both his 
understanding of human faculties and on his actual experience as a member of an 
audience and as a playwright. His elaboration of the theory of illusion based on 
‘imitation’ and his comparison of illusion to dream represent a genuine advance. In the 
production of an artistic work, there must be a reconciliation between the artist and the 
audience. Neither the author’s will nor the audience’s will is exclusively the agent. 
Coleridge presupposes a universality or nature which the artist and the audience share. If 
an artist represents an idea in a concrete form, the audience will respond to it tlii'ough 
their shared nature. Coleridge constitutes himself as the ideal audience for Shakespeare.
George Saintsbury evaluates Coleridge’s status as a critic thus:
So, then, there abide these three, Aristotle, Longinus, and Coleridge. The 
defects of the modern, as contrasted with the ancient, man of letters are prominent 
in Coleridge when we compare him with these his fellows: and so we cannot quite 
say that he is the greatest of the three. But his range is necessarily wider: he take in, 
as their date forbade them to take, all literature in a way which must for centuries to 
come give him the prerogative. It is astonishing how often, when you have 
discovered in others of all dates, or (as you may fondly hope) found out for yourself, 
some critical truth, you will remember that after all Coleridge in his wanderings has 
found it before, and set it by the wayside for the benefit of those who come after.^
 ^ Saintsbury, George. History o f Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe. Vol.3. Edinburgh and London; 
William Blackwood and sons, 1904, pp.230-231.
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Both in his general criticism and in his Shakespearean criticism, his status seems 
to be firmly established. Of “his stature as literary critic.” according to Emerson R. 
Marks,
There is hardly any longer room to doubt. For the best of what he wrote in that 
capacity there is simply no substitute. If his Shakespeare criticism were destroyed, 
the loss could not be repaired even from the admittedly brilliant appreciations of the 
very Schlegel he “plundered.” '^
T.S.Eliot denies a sense of progress in the history of Shakespearean criticism 
except for advances in archival research; i.e., advances in editing, increased knowledge 
of personal aspects of Shakespeare, and the theatrical circumstances of his age. For 
Eliot, any criticism is the product of its age, though each age produces its own 
representative critics. From the Romantic period down to the present day, according to 
Eliot, Coleridge is “the greatest single figure in Shakespeare criticism”'* and such critics 
as Hazlitt, Lamb, and De Quincey only make a constellation about the primary star of 
Coleridge. Eliot suggests that Coleridge's writings about Shakespeare should be read 
entire.
for it is impossible to understand Shakespeare criticism to this day, without a 
familiar acquaintance with Coleridge’s lectures and notes. Coleridge is an authority 
of the kind whose influence extends equally towards good and bad. It would be 
unjust to father upon him, without further ceremony, the psycho-analytic school of 
Shakespeare criticism; the study of individual characters which was begun by 
Morgann, to the neglect of the pattern and meaning of the whole play, was bound to 
lead to some such terminus, and we do not blame Morgann for that. But when 
Coleridge released the truth that Shakespeare already in Venus and Adonis and 
Lucrece gave proof of a ‘most profound, energetic and philosophic mind’ he was
Marks, Emerson R. “Perverse and Inspired Genius.” The American Scholar 57(1988): 291-305, pp.301- 
302.
“ Eliot, T.S. “Shakespearean Criticism,” p.299.
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perfectly right, if we use these adjectives rightly, but he supplied a dangerous 
stimulus to the more adventurous. ‘Philosophie’ is of course not the right word, but 
it cannot simply be erased: you must find another word to put in its place, and the 
word has not yet been found. The sense of the profundity of Shakespeare’s 
‘thought’, or of his thinking-in-i mages, has so oppressed some critics that they have 
been forced to explain themselves by unintelligibles.'"
Nortlii'op Frye agrees with Eliot in that there is no clear notion of progress in 
Shakespearean criticism but rather a succession of monuments to contemporary taste. 
He notes that “In Shakespearean criticism we have a line monument of Augustan taste 
in Johnson, of Romantic taste in Coleridge, or Victorian taste in Bradley.” '  ^ As Frye 
points out, Coleridge, like all the critics, is representative of his age.
However, as Eliot argues, Coleridge’s criticism is not confined to his own age but 
extends to the present day in terms of its influence. James McKusick identifies 
Coleridge as the inventor of practical criticism. His treatment of Venus and Adonis and 
Lucrece are a result of its application. Emerson R. Marks finds the importance of 
Coleridge’s role as a critic in I.A.Richards's description of Coleridge as ‘the Galileo of 
criticism’ and in “a recent Coleridgean who sees in Coleridge the progenitor of the main 
Anglo-American critical approaches of the last 150 years and, to cap it all, of the current 
antagonism between deconstructionists and their opponents.”*'* Marks divides 
Coleridge’s followers into two schools; the philosophical and the practical and he 
suggests that Kenneth Burke and I.A.Richards belong to the first and Cleanth Brooks, 
Robert Pemi Warren, W.K.Wimsatt, R.P.Blackmur and John Crowe Ransom belong to 
the second.
Ibid., pp.298-299.
Frye. Anatomy o f  Criticism, p.8.
Marks. “Perverse and Inspired Genius,” p.302.
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As to Coleridge’s influence on Richards, quite a few critics set forth their views. 
A.C.Goodson argues that with Coleridge as his model and with Coleridge’s responsive 
attitude in mind Richards developed a method of para linguistic reading as the basis of 
Cambridge English and that “Richards's semasiology actually extended Coleridge’s 
commitment to poetic intelligibility, with the difference that language makes.” Anne 
E. Berthoff suggests that “Early and late, Coleridge was a presence in Richards’s work: 
it was in Coleridge’s criticism that he found his principal “speculative instruments,” the 
concepts we think with.” *^ According to her, Richards’s greatest importance for us is 
that he makes us to see the pedagogical implications of organic conceptions of language 
and thought as they were implied in Coleridge’s theory of imagination. She even insists 
that “Richards’s pragmatism sharpened his recognition of what Coleridge’s practical 
criticism could model.”
However, Marks points out that Richards only takes account of one aspect of 
Coleridge’s comprehensive studies and jettisons valuable theoretical cargo, which 
makes his reading of Coleridge reductive. McKusick classifies modern Coleridgeans 
into two types: one attempts to “uncouple the boxcars of Coleridge’s practical criticism 
from the locomotive of Schellingian metaphysics” and the other “has contented itself 
with stealing the goods out of the boxcars and then poking fun at the engineer.” *^  The 
former include such critics as George Saintsbury and T.M.Raysor who try to minimise 
the metaphysical dispositions in his criticism and highlight his own native genius. The
Goodson, A.C. Verbal Imagination: Coleridge and the Language o f Modern Criticism. New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p.25.
Berthoff, Anne E. “Coleridge, LA.Richards, and the Imagination.” The Educational Legacy o f  
Romanticism. Ed.John Wiilinsky. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1990. 55-72, p.61. 
Ibid., p.63.
McKusick. C oleridge’s Philosophy o f  Language, p.88.
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latter include critics such as Murray Krieger and Lentricchia who accuses Coleridge of 
neglecting the function of language in the creation of poetry. McKusick notes that for 
them “Coleridge’s preoccupation with metaphysics blinded him to the concrete 
specificity of language as a poetic medium; only a phenomenological approach can 
achieve the required concreteness.” ''* In the case of Lentricchia, McKusick admits that 
he is right in his claim that Coleridge’s critical method is based on metaphysics but 
comments that he is mistaken “in his view of Coleridge as an indolent aesthete, so rapt 
in his contemplation of a shimmering ideal that he loses touch with the real world of 
men, history, politics, and ordinary speech.” *^*
McKusick refutes their claim by calling attention to Coleridge’s theoiy of 
desynonymization and his commentary on the language in Shakespeare’s works. 
Coleridge, in distinguishing fancy and imagination, explains desynomization thus: “it is 
equally true that in all societies there exists an instinct of growth, a certain collective, 
unconscious good sense working progressively to desynonymize those words originally 
of the same meaning, which the conflux of dialects had supplied to the more 
homogeneous languages, as the Greek and German: and which the same cause, joined 
with accidents of translation from original works of different countries, occasion in mixt 
languages like our own.”(RZ I, 82-83) As I have discussed in chapter four, Coleridge 
describes language as comprised of diving words’. For him, words are the living 
products of the living mind and they partake both of the human mind and the world of 
things. Coleridge shows a keen interest in the process of the desynonimization of words 
as in the word ‘poesy’. He tries to display how this view of language is reflected in
Ibid., pp.88-89.
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Shakespeare’s language. He characterises Shakespeare's language as ‘the language of 
nature’. In Shakespeare’s works, for Coleridge, there is a constant interrelationship 
between the language and the whole work. For every subtlety and every delicacy of the 
situation, Shakespeare uses appropriate words. Seamus Perry notes, “The evident reality 
of Coleridge is a thinker dominated by divisions and differences, rather than unification 
and totalised wholes” and by way of supporting his argument, he recalls the Coleridgean 
saying: “bring me two things that seem the same, & then I am quick enough to shew the 
difference, even to hair-splitting”.^ *
Whether or not subsequent critics acknowledge Coleridge, his influence is 
evident in their work. R.A.Foakes argues that the remarkable feature of Coleridge’s 
criticism is
his ability to keep in view simultaneously many different aspects of a play; thus in 
the incisiveness of some of his psychological analyses he can be seen as a 
forerunner of A.C.Bradley, while in his minute attention to language and imagery he 
can be seen as anticipating the twentieth-century critical emphasis on poetic 
language and imagery.^^
Barbara Hardy, however, insists that " He is really the father not of Bradley but of Stoll, 
Wilson Knight, L.C.Knights, and the other modern critics who have so ably 
demonstrated what Coleridge himself insisted on in his Essay on Method, that 
‘Shakespeare was pursuing two Methods at once; and besides the psychological
Ibid., p.89.
Periy, Seamus. “Coleridge’s Turtle: Coleridge and the Divisibility of Life.” The Wordsworth Circle 
28(1997):27-34, p.27.
Foakes. Editor’s Introduction.” Lect /, p.lxxv.
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Method, he had also to attend to the poetical. However that may be, the importance 
of Coleridge’s Shakespearean criticism is best indicated by the general recognition of 
his successors that it is not possible to escape its influence.
Hardy, Barbara. “I Have a Smack o f Hamlet’: Coleridge and Shakespeare’s characters.” Essays in 
Criticism 8(1958): 238-255, p.238.
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